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PREFACE 
Since 2015 the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU or EEU1) between Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan and the Russian Federation has begun to work concretely. The EEU represents a 
contemporary project of economic integration for the post-Soviet space and a tangible effort to 
determinate the economic future and development of the entire Eurasia.  
Initially, the idea about the realization of a Eurasian community was elaborated by Kazakh 
President Nazarbayev during a speech at the Moscow State University in the year 1994. By his 
discourse, the Kazakh Head of Sate presented a simple and fascinating idea: to establish a 
functioning alliance of states that are unified by economic ties with the target to achieve stability 
and security in Eurasia.  
Through this passage is possible to discover the nature of the actual integration project of the EEU, 
based on the idea by Nazarbayev, namely the realization of a cooperation of states, that are each 
other economic interdependent, in order to favorite better their trade, the improvement of their 
national economies and the coordinated development of their standards of production.  
This proposal of economic cooperation as key of integration and collaboration between the post-
Soviet nations was supported by Russian President Putin during the year 2011 formally. 
Specifically, Putin called for the institution of an economic union between the former Soviet-
states, aimed to achieve economic stability in Eurasia against the challenges of the globalization, in 
response to the critic market and financial conditions that since 2008 are still generating trade 
economic shocks on the entire Eurasia. Exactly, the adverse economic situation of last decade for 
the former Soviet countries, as for example Belarus, strong dependent on Russia economically, can 
be delineated as principal reason that has favored the development of the Eurasian integration 
process. 
The EEU must be framed as a direct evolution of the previous forms of integration of the post-
Soviet space started since 1991 with the dissolution of the USSR and the foundation of the CIS. In 
this scenario, between the nineties and the early 2000s, were created different projects of 
cooperation, especially between Belarus, Russia and Kazakhstan (the troika2), to better define and 
improve their strong interdependent economic collaboration. Here, projects as the EURASEC 
(2000), the Customs Union (2010) or the Single Economic Space (2012) were already real attempts 
to restore the interaction of the post-Soviet countries in a system similar to the USSR, based 
                                                          
1
 The curtailment of Eurasian Economic Union will be used in the work between EAEU and EEU indistinctly. 
2
 Vinokurov Evgeny (2017): “Eurasian Economic Union: Current state and preliminary results”. In Russian Journal of 
Economics 3 (2017). P. 56 
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though on an economic basis. Concerning this last point, a fundamental aspect is the only 
economic nature of the actual project of the EEU. But, if from a side Nazarbayev and Lukashenka 
do not see any politic involvement of the Union other the economic cooperation, excluding de 
facto every possible form of limitation of their national sovereignty in favor of Russia – the 
predominant actor in the Union; from the other side, their Russian counterpart, although not 
explicitly, sees the EEU as instrument of geopolitical ambitious, to allow Russia to recover again a 
leader role in the region, increasing its position globally, proposing Moscow, as underlined by the 
Neo-Eurasianism, one of the poles of the modern world.  
In a time line, the EEU Treaty, ratified on May 29, 2014 in Astana, is seen as a natural continuation 
of the Customs Union, with the expressed volition of its members to strengthen their economic 
interaction as condition to further develop their integration. The cooperation, opened to all those 
states that want and can bring benefits to the entire Eurasian community, must be conducted, as 
expressed in the preamble of the Treaty, guaranteeing equal sovereignty and solidarity between 
all the participants. In this regard, the EEU contract has the principal targets: to develop measures, 
as exchange of specialized personnel, that can favorite the integration and economic development 
of the member-states (article 23); to realize a common market with the removal of barriers and 
custom duties (article 28); to reduce the economic diversification between the national economies 
of the member-countries, improving the foreign trade policy of the Union and asserting its 
efficiency in the global economic scenario (article 33); to implement an agreed macroeconomic 
policy, through the utilization of common legal framework, aimed to achieve a balanced economic 
development within the Union (article 62); to ensure freedom of trade in services, incorporation, 
activities and investments within the Union (article 65); to coordinate the energy policy of the 
member-countries, forming gradually common energy markets (article 79); and to create an 
agreed policy in labor migration, which can allow a right and equilibrate involvement of the 
citizens of the Union for their employment in the different work sectors of the states of the Union 
(article 96). 
Precisely, the abolishment of custom duties in the mutual trade, the creation of common energy 
markets and the possibility for the citizens of the Union to work in every country of the EEU 
legally, are the principal reasons that have mostly convinced Belarus, Kyrgyzstan and Armenia 
respectively to be part of this integration project. 
Considering the targets of the EEU, namely the volition to create a solid mutual trade, 
guaranteeing the four fundamental freedoms (goods, services, capital and workers), its economic 
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overview of the biennium 2015-2016 shows a general decrease of its economic indicators 
especially in direct comparison with the year 2014: in 2016 the Gross Domestic Product of the 
Union was 1 485 422 USD billion against 2 404 881 USD billion of 2014. 
The explanation of the economic course of the EEU touches different aspects, as the causes that 
stay on the basis of its stagnation. In this scenario is possible to identify external factors: as the 
consequences of the Russian geopolitical choices or the drop of the oil price; and internal factors: 
as the still presence of barriers, bilateral accords for the hydrocarbons market within the internal 
commerce of the member-states, or the volition of the participants to not loose they political 
autonomy towards Russia.   
All these factors are nowadays playing a decisive role in the evolution of the EEU, which rests, 
especially in comparison to the European Union or USA, still a relative small economic 
organization. Hence, to further expand the position of the EEU in the global economy, the 
member-countries must: follow the mutual obligations of the Treaty; eliminate board controls, 
favoring the mutual trade; and utilize their technologies, specialists and infrastructure to act all 
compact in favor of the Union, as an economic block. 
All these aspects, from the motivations that have conducted the actual participants to subscribe 
the Astana Treaty, to the provisions of the Treaty and the actual economic situation of the EEU’s 
members, will be the object of the following analysis.  
 
I Division of the work 
The work, realized in cooperation between the University Rostock and the Academy of Public 
Administration under the Aegis of the President of the Republic of Belarus, will start the 
examination through an excursus about the geographical, cultural and historical significance of 
Eurasia. After that, the analysis will be concentered on the inspection of the disposition of the 
contract of the EEU. Successively, will be researched and reported the economic situation of the 
member-states during the biennium 2015-2016 predominantly.  
In detail, the entire work is subdivided in three macro-chapters and a final part where will be 
reported the results and conclusions of the study. The first chapter, entitled “Historical excursus of 
the Eurasianism and the significance of the Eurasian Economic Union for its participants”, is 
divided in two principal sections. The first section deals with philosophical and political current of 
Eurasianism; while the second examinates the impact of the Eurasianism on the national level of 
the current members of the Union, analyzing their expectaions of the Eurasian integration project. 
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In coorelaction with the Eurasian idea, will be proposed, after have defined the meaning of Eurasia 
by the concepts of Sir Mackinder geographically and strategically, an accurated examination of this 
theory: from the classical philosophical thought of Danilevsky and Trubetzkoy, inclined to the 
exaltation of the Eurasian culture and identity as unique one; to its modern conception of Neo-
Eurasianism, specifically with the figure of Dugin and his strong emphasis on the nationalist 
character of the Eurasian civilization and of Russia as central pole of a modern multi-polar world. 
The theoretical and philosophical explanation of the Eurasian idea will help us to understand the 
role that the Eurasianism has played in the evolution of the national culture of the participants of 
the EEU and thus of their character toward the principal economic and politic Eurasian actor, the 
Russian Federation. Through this incipit, in the first chapter will be delineated the different 
positions of the actual EEU’s participants, their targets and expectations from this community. 
In the second chapter, “Analysis of the Treaty of the Eurasian Economic Union”, will be presented 
an illustration and explanation of all the entire legal corpus of the EEU. Theoretically, will be 
examined the functionalist aspect of the Union and the mutual obligations that the member-
countries have agreed in order to favorite their economic integration and trade. The analysis will 
cover all the 118 articles of the 28 sections of the Treaty with an overview about the most 
important Protocols of the 33 annexes that complete the legal framework of the Eurasian 
Economic Union. 
The third chapter, “Economic Analysis of the Eurasian Economic Union”, will be dedicated to an 
economic research of the member-states and of the entire apparatus of the EEU. The economic 
study will be focused on the lecture and comment of the most important economic indicators as: 
the Gross Domestic Product, the investments, the exports and imports in mutual and extra trade, 
the industrial sector or the energetic market of the Union. 
The final chapter, “Results, Recommendations and Final Observations”, will report the results of 
the research, giving a proper evaluation of the EEU, especially in economic terms, in the first years 
of its functioning and the impact that it is having on the national economies of the member-states.  
In order to offer a better comprehension about the different arguments of the research, was 
adopted the stylistic choice to subdivide the work in independent parts, where every chapter 
presents an own introduction, definition of targets, conclusion and bibliography.  
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II Objectives and methodology of the analysis 
The target of the first chapter wants to define the term Eurasia, by the examination of the 
philosophical current of the Eurasianism and its cultural and politic impact on the Eurasian region. 
By the study of the different concepts of the Eurasian doctrine, from the classic to the modern, the 
successive aim of the first chapter is to discover the role that this movement has played in the 
national cultures of the diverse participants of the Eurasian Union in their process of cultural 
national-building. Specifically here, the objective is to understand the perception of Russia and the 
symbol of its civilization as predominant actor towards the other former Soviet countries. In 
connection with the Eurasianism and the leader-role of Russia in the region, the following question 
is to comprehend and explain the reasons and own aims that have attracted the actual 
participants of the Union to be part of this modern project of integration. 
The second chapter has the principal aim to report the entire legal framework of the EEU, in order 
to have a clear idea about the mutual obligations of the member-states and to understand the 
economic theoretical nature of the Union. Through the analysis of all articles of the EEU treaty, the 
objective of this chapter is to discover which dispositions already are working between the 
member-countries and which steps still need to be implemented to achieve a proper integration. 
In the third chapter, by a deep economic analysis of the participants of the Union, the main target 
is to understand the real development of the first two years of functioning of the EEU. In this 
context, will be analyzed and compared the economic conditions of all actual participants of the 
Union, in order to have a limpid image about their economic performance in these last years. The 
report and comparison of economic data is aimed to answer the question, if within the EEU is 
possible to talk of a real improvement of the national economies of the member-states, or if the 
Union on its whole and the interaction between the member-countries are nowadays in a phase of 
stagnation.  
The analysis of the work will be conducted by an empirical-analytic approach based on the 
qualitative methodology of the political science. 
Precisely, the analysis of the first chapter will adopt empiric-analytical approach, where, through 
the study and interpretation of the most important Eurasian philosophers and thinkers, from Sir 
Mackinder, Trubetzkoy, Danilevsky, Dugin, Nazarbayev and Putin, will be examined the cultural 
development of the Eurasianism towards the EEU’s countries. The report and comment of 
scientific contributions of Eurasian experts as Kadri, Laruelle, Ostrovsky or Shekhovtsov will be 
essential in the analysis to offer a precise explanation about the diverse forms of Eurasianism. 
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The study of the second chapter, focused on the analysis of the legal framework of the EEU, will 
adopt the qualitative methodology, where, by a report and interpretation of the entire legal 
corpus of the Eurasian Economic Union, will explained the mechanisms and aims of the economic 
integration. 
The economic examination of the third chapter will be articulated, following the qualitative 
method, through a descriptive research and interpretation of the economic indicators of the EEU. 
Here, the most significant references will be the official economic statistics of the Eurasian 
Economic Commission, the Eurasian Development Bank and the economic databases of the 
Trading Economics, the World Bank and of the Observatory of Economic Complexity. Even the 
scientific contributions of experts as Pastukhova, Vinokurov or Westphal will be determinant to 
have a clear image about the economic situation of the Union. 
A further consideration regards the position of Belarus in the analysis. Indeed the Belarusian 
Republic will have the role to represent a concrete example in the explanation of the integration 
process of the EEU and to understand its effects on the national economy, especially during the 
biennium 2015-2016. In this concern, the analysis will deepen the consideration about the 
Belarusian economic indexes, will examine its partnership with the Russian Federation and will 
discuss the Belarusian expecations of the EEU. This investigation will be mainly conducted through 
the comments and official words of the Belarusian President, authorities and experts. 
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I Subject and structure of the analysis  
This chapter, divided in two sections, deals with the Eurasianism and the meaning of Eurasian 
Union amongst the founders of the Eurasian Economic Union. 
Precisely, the first section of the chapter will be centered on theory of Eurasianism, its history, 
characteristics and development from the 1920 to the new millennium in the passage from classic 
Eurasianism to the concepts of the Neo-Eurasian authors. 
The main notions that will be proposed during the theoretical excursus regard the importance of 
the landmass Eurasia, a region situated between Europe and Asia, and its geopolitical strategic 
position for the global economic and politic equilibrium. 
In this scenario, the role of the Russian Federation, due on its territorial extension and durable 
economic influence on the Eurasian region, acquires a notable importance. From this point of 
view, must be stressed as the Eurasian integration is nowadays claimed to be the principal aim of 
Russia’s foreign policy, where the volition of President Putin is to reconnect the entire former 
Soviet republics under the Russian control in the form of an economic community, namely the 
Eurasian Economic Union. From another point of view, the actual other members of the EEU 
(Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan) want to proft by the Union to improve their 
economic status by the elimination of economic barriers in their mutual cooperation.  
This passage will be the introduction to the second section of the work, where will be discussed 
the ambitions of Russia and the other members that joined this integration project: Belarus and 
Kazakhstan have a more common vision about the target of this EEU which must involve only an 
economic dimension; while, it could be argued that Russia wants to obtain with this project a clear 
hegemony over Eurasia, to recapture that global power – lost already after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. Regarding the Caucasian and Central Asian countries, as Armenia and Kyrgyzstan, 
these states have the aim to obtain economic and more important military assistance of Russia – 
especially Armenia for the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. 
Furthermore, the analysis will touch the political obstacles on the integration, as the case of the 
Ukraine that showed to the Eurasian panorama a limit of the integration process connected with 
the Russian geopolitical ambitious predominantly.  
In the last part, the analysis will point out the necessary requirements that need to be satisfied, 
especially from Russia, as the adjustment to the challenges of the globalization and the 
establishment of a unique market without barriers and without custom duties for its participants 
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especially for the energetic sector, in order to attract more countries in the orbit of the Eurasian 
project successively. 
II Objectives of the analysis 
The two aims of this chapter, corresponding to the two sections respectively, are connected to the 
comphrension of the significance of Eurasianism ideologically; its impact on the political and 
economic choices of the Eurasian countries and the expectations of the EEU’s countries.   
Specifically, the first section proposes to analyze the Eurasian idea, the main schools of this 
concept and its development between the XX and XXI century. The hypothesis of this study would 
argue that the Eurasian integration is firstly moved by ideological feature for the Eurasian 
countries: the Slavic brotherhood, an equivalent culture, tradition and ideology. These facets 
represent the pillars to consolidate the integration of the countries situated in the Eurasian region.  
Although exists different interpretation of Eurasianism, from the classic with Trubetzkoy, 
Danlivesky, Savitsky, to the modern, Dugin or Putin, the common aim of all these authors is the 
necessity to unite all Eurasian countries to give stability to Eurasia, fighting against the effects of 
the globalization, as the world economic recession or the loss of the Eurasian identity, and 
contributing to the economic development of the region consequently. In connection with this 
target, the successive goal of the first section is to understand the cultural impact that the 
Eurasian theory, especially the contemporary current of the Neo-Eurasianism, based on the 
nationalistic idea of the Russian predominance in Eurasia, is nowadays playing in the Eurasian 
region.  
The target of the second section of the first chapter wants to analyze the principal idea of 
Nazarbayev about the establishment of an economic Union, and as the presence of different 
states in the mechanisms of the EEU is dictated not only by economic issues but even from 
political and military targets. By the analysis of the actual members of the Union, the thesis which 
will be advanced in this part of study is that every EEU’s member is pursuing a precise target, 
which escapes from the merely economic scope of the Union. In this direction, the EEU, if will be 
able to create in its first stage working and stable economic trades between its participants, could 
evolve its structure in a second stage, that can incorporate military and political issues, as desired 
especially by the Russian Federation. 
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III Methodology 
The study will be conducted through an empiric-analytical approach by scientific academic 
contributions about Eurasia and its historical, political and economic aspects. Moreover, the works 
of the exponents of Eurasianism, from classic Danilevskiy, to the modern Dugin, will allow us to 
comprehend the different facets and its evolution from the XX century to the contemporary age.  
By the review and comment of Eurasian experts, this study proposes to demonstrate the principal 
thesis: the Eurasian idea as theoretical basis for the integration project of the Eurasian Economic 
Union.  
There are three principal Eurasian schools: classic Eurasianism, West Geopolitical School and the 
Neo-Eurasianism. Their analysis will constitute the theoretical basis of this study. 
The second section of the work deals with reception of the Eurasian idea in the actual members of 
the EEU and the possible future different implications of this community. 
In this part, by an analysis of the historical facts, the scientific work of Nursultan Nazarbayev (the 
Strategy of the Independence, 2003) and the explanation about the meaning of the EEU from the 
Russian vision in the contribution of Vladimir Putin (New integration project for Eurasia – a future 
that is born today, 2011), will be presented a diversification about the significance of the Eurasian 
integration for every country of the EEU: from an only economic meaning to political and military. 
Generally, the study of this section will be a purely hermeneutical analysis. The economic passages 
presented in this chapter will be reported through the data and comments of statistics and 
scientific articles. 
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SECTION I 
Introduction to the Eurasianism 
To properly comprehend the functioning of the Eurasian Economic Union, we must discover the 
ideological basis that stays on the fundament of this organization. Precisely, the EEU erects its 
pillars on the theory of the Eurasianism. Commonly, according to this theory, all Eurasian states 
should unite themselves under the Russian leadership, which has the target to coordinate all the 
interests of this geopolitical area, favoring its economic growth consequently. 
According to this aspect, the analysis about the EEU must considerate different point of views: 
ideological, cultural, economic, politic and military.  
To correctly perceive the significance of the Union, it is necessary to begin the study, analyzing the 
ideological fragment, because the EEU has the pivot of its behavior in the concepts of the 
Eurasianism.  
In the panorama of the Eurasian idea, a notable contribution in the development of this doctrine 
was represented by the impact of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), the 
Commonwealth of the Independent States (CIS) and nowadays by the influence of the Eurasian 
Economic Union. The integration proposed by the EEU is a fundamental stage of Eurasianism, 
because confirms the connection of the Eurasian states as an ongoing process due on their 
acumination of equal traditions, values and culture. This passage makes understandable as the 
Eurasian Union, other to be an economic alliance, prefixes the aim to exalt the ideological roots of 
the entire Eurasia.  
The three main targets about the clarification of the Eurasian doctrine that will be proposed in this 
work are: 1) the study of the diverse Eurasian interpretations; 2) the examination of the 
ideological background of Eurasia and 2) the research of the primary mechanisms that have 
pushed the actual members of the Union to create this coalition – vital for their commercial 
evolution. 
Concerning the first point, the principal ideological prospects about Eurasia are fundamentally 
three: 1) Eurasianism (Evrazijstvo) developed by Russian emigrants during the 1920s and 1930s; 2) 
the Western geopolitical school, which emerged in the late nineteenth century; and 3) the Neo-
Eurasianism, which was revived in Russia after the fall of the Communist ideology3. 
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 Ostrovsky Max (2008): “The idea of Eurasia“. In Working Paper (Helmut Kohl Institute for European Studies), 
64/2008. European Forum at Hebrew University, Marjorie Mayrock Center for Russian, Eurasian and East European 
Researcher. P. 4 
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According to the philosopher Nikolaj Berdjaev, the Eurasianism can be defined as the cultural-
philosophical and political position of the Russian emigration of the twenty years of the XX century 
with its ideas nearly to the Totalitarianism, while in the explanation of Dr. Susi Frank it represents 
the popular vision of the Russian migrants that wanted to prevent the trauma of the loss of the 
Russian Empire4.  
Basically, the Eurasianism in its classic vision asserts that the Eurasian region has its own values, 
culture and identity – different from the Western tradition. In reason of that, the Eurasians 
prefixed the aim to protect the Russian culture against the Western influence.  
In this context, Russia has the main mission, due to its geographical and economic importance in 
this portion of globe, to guide under its leadership all the other Eurasian nations in order to 
guarantee stability and economic development in the region, protecting at the same time Eurasia 
from the ideological threat of the Westernization.  
The Eurasians of the 1920s gave more resonance to the ideological aspects of Eurasianism. 
Successively, the more exquisite strategic politic and economic importance of Eurasia was 
underlined directly by the exponents of the Western geopolitical school and by the Neo-
Eurasianism of the XXI century. In the Western geopolitical school, the ideas of Sir Mackinder 
assumed a notable notoriety, because through his studies, he was the first to emphasize the 
particularity of Eurasia – a region of the world with a unique Russian culture and a great economic 
potential that, due to its location, assumes a decisive position in the geopolitical scenario for 
economic, political and military interests.  
The central aspects of the Eurasian theory – own identity, own economic resources, strategic 
position and Russian leadership – are in the present directly connected with the EEU and its 
mission to establish a strong association in the region, to guarantee the economic development of 
its associates and global competiveness against the world wide powers, seen in the European and 
American model. 
The concept of identity and the “proud” of the Russian civilization coincide with the start of the 
Eurasianism as thought by the Russian émigré thinkers during the 1920s. Mentioning the 
contribution of Dr. Eva Marlene Hausteiner, the motto of the Russian émigré was: “The Russians 
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 Cf. Frank Susi K. (2003) “Eurasianismus Projekt eines russischen „dritten Weges” 1921 und heute“, in: Europa und die 
Grenzen im Kopf. Klagenfurt. P. 198  
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and the peoples of the contemporary Russian world are neither Europeans nor Asians. We are not 
ashamed to call us Eurasians5”.  
The essence of this thought wanted to propose in the XX century a new independent identity for 
Eurasia, with the target to create a unique culture in this macro-region of the world.  
The concept was then reworked in 2001 by Alexander Dugin, maximal exponent of the Neo-
Eurasianism, in the Eurasian Manifest, where he clearly supported the modern Russian foreign 
political choices. 
In general, his ideas include an extensive process of strategic integration and the establishment of 
a Eurasian Union as model analogue to the USSR. Though, this new community must have a new 
ideological, economic and administrative basis, to respond to the modern threats and to 
overcome the challenges of the globalization correctly.  
The Dugin’s conception – more as part of the Russian nationalism than as an ideological grounding 
of Eurasia – takes side in the philosophical vision of the modern Eurasianism, which considers the 
Russian Federation the most important actor in Eurasia. Due to this reason, Russia has the 
principal task to unite all the former Soviet republics under its leadership, to guide them against 
the challenges of the globalization – e.g. the clash against the Atlanticism in order to not allow a 
Westernization of Eurasia, or the economic financial crisis of the last ten years.   
Dugin’s thought is more linked to the Russian predominance in Eurasia. Relying especially on the 
Soviet sentimentalism and nostalgia, his nationalistic ideas have reinforced the nationalistic spirit 
of the Russians, exalting the foreign political choices of Russian President Putin, as recently the 
Crimea annexation.  
Concerning the other two principal members of the EEU, Belarus and Kazakhstan, a real Eurasian 
nationalistic idea, especially in Belarus, has not in their territory strongly consolidated. In fact, the 
Eurasian doctrine has found its location in these countries exclusively due to economic reasons 
that link these nations to the Russian Federation. For example, in Kazakh version of Eurasianism, 
possible to evince from the work of President Nazarbayev, the ideological and economical aspects 
are the decisive points that justify the Eurasian Union under the leadership of Russia, which must 
have an only solid economic coordinator role of the region. 
Fundamentally, the Eurasian theory as ideological key-connection of the EEU’s members must be 
explained through the importance and the necessity of Russia for the other Eurasian countries. 
                                                          
5
 Hausteiner Eva Marlene (2014): “Next Stop: Eurasia? – Über die Untiefen der Analyse von Putins Politik“. In 
theorieblog.de 17.06.2014 http://www.theorieblog.de/index.php/2014/06/next-stop-eurasia-ueber-die-untiefen-der-
analyse-von-putins-politik/ (last view: 10.08.2016) 
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This reason justifies that, although the main reason of the Eurasian theory is based on the Russian 
main role in the region, it can be argued, that this concept can be accepted in all other Eurasian 
countries, where Russia can really have a decisive impact on their internal economic expansion, as 
for Armenia, Belarus or Kyrgyzstan.  
The doctrine of Eurasianism has evolved firstly geographically and culturally, assuming with the 
time a political and economic character, aligning its course with the actual global challenges. 
The concepts of the Eurasian theory, as the different schools of thought, the analysis of its actors 
and the strategic importance of Russia, will be the main objects of study in this section.  
1 Mackinder and the geographical strategic importance of Eurasia 
To define Eurasia from a common geographical and political point of view can be complicated, 
because of different interpretations about its significance. Indeed, quoting the Eastern Europe 
specialist Kadri Liik, it is possible to see the different interpretations of the term: “Eurasia in terms 
of physical geography most often refers to the landmass that stretches from the Atlantic to the 
Pacific. In terms of political geography, however, things are more complicated. Other terms 
relating to the region are clearer: when they speak of “Central Asia”, Russians mean the former 
Central Asian republics of the Soviet Union; “Asia” means first and foremost China and East Asia; 
the “Far East” refers to Russia’s own south-eastern and Pacific territories. But “Eurasia” is harder 
to define. It is usually used to refer to the territory of the former Soviet Union with the exception of 
the Baltic States6”.    
However, the classic perception of “Eurasia” is associated with the notion of “Geo-Politic”. 
Specifically, the Eurasian concept, correlated before to the term of “Pivot” (1904) and later to the 
conception of “Heartland” (1919), was coined by the Britain geographic Sir Halford Mackinder 
(1861-1947), who firstly accentuated the geographical and strategic prominence of this world 
regional zone and consequently its geopolitical relevance.  
By his article “The Geographical Pivot of the History” (1904) Mackinder identified the enormous 
grandeur of the East-Urals as the Pivot of the Eurasian area and affirmed directly that the “Pivot”, 
or “Heart-land” of Eurasia — more of Russia and Central Asia — was the key to balance the 
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 Cf. (Edit.) Kadri Liik (2014): “Russia’s “Pivot” to Eurasia”. Published by the European Council on Foreign Relations, 
May 2014. P. 6 
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powers of the world, stressing as that state which would have controlled this region, would be 
well-placed to dominate Eurasia and even the world7. 
Figure 1: Halford Mackinder’s Pivot and Heartland Designations, and the Central Asian Republics 
Today 
 
Source: Megoran Nick and Sharapova Sevara (2005): “Mackinder's "Heartland": A help or hindrance in understanding 
central Asia's international relations?” CA&CC Press AB Publishing House (Sweden). http://www.ca-
c.org/journal/2005/journal_eng/cac-04/02.megeng.shtml (last view: 12.08.2016) 
The Britain geographic at the beginning of the XX century gave serious resonance to the strategic 
importance of this area, highlighting the possible implications that could derivate from the control 
of this zone for the global political and economic interests.  
Mackinder’s paper discussed the historical interplay and balance of power between Europe and 
Asia, arguing as the European expansionism and its primary way of transportation by sea was 
losing in the 1900 its importance due to two key-factors: 1) there were no more uncontrolled 
territories for the Europeans to explore and seize, and 2) the importance of the development of 
railways as instrument to connect territories quickly. Regarding the last point, Mackinder believed 
that the railways-system was more efficient than seaways in transporting of troops, swinging the 
mobility advantage back to land power8.  
Exactly this last concept allows us to accentuate his main idea for the significance of Eurasia 
related to the transportation network. In fact, according to Mackinder, the project of the creation 
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 Cf. Megoran Nick and Sharapova Sevara (2005): “Mackinder's "Heartland": A help or hindrance in understanding 
central Asia's international relations?” CA&CC Press AB Publishing House (Sweden). http://www.ca-
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8
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of the Trans-Siberian Railway, started in 1891 under the Emperor Alexander III, was one grandiose 
target in the transportation of people and manufacture, because changed the general modality of 
transport, characterized before just from a movement via sea: “Trans-continental railways are 
now transmuting the conditions of land-power, and nowhere can they have such effect as in the 
closed heart-land of Eurasia, in vast areas of which neither timber nor accessible stone was 
available for road-making. Railways work the greater wonders in the steppe, because they directly 
replace horse and camel mobility. *…+ The Russian railways have a clear run of 6000 miles from 
Wirballen in the west to Vladivostok in the east9”. 
Mackinder claimed as this system of transport assmues a particular character for Russia to control 
Eurasia and benefit of its market directly: “A railway system would enable the incalculably great 
resources of the Russian Empire and Mongolia—population, wheat, cotton, fuel, and metals—to be 
properly exploited, leading to the inevitable development of a vast economic world outside the 
control of maritime powers. The resultant shift in the balance of power “would permit of the use of 
vast continental resources for fleet-building, and then the empire of the world would be in sight10”. 
Predominantly, the British geographer affirmed as the Euro-Asian zone, which has at his center 
Russia and consents an adequate overland transportation, represents the geopolitical core of the 
world. His analysis had the merit to emphasize the majesty and strategic position of Eurasia for 
economic and political interests.  
In consequence of these considerations Mackinder assumed that the Eurasian concept has two 
significant dimensions: a geographical connotation and political-ideological-philosophical 
meaning11. 
The first significance contemplates the geographical position of Eurasia: an extended zone 
between the European and Asian continent that due to its central position occupies a meaningful 
role in the geopolitical scenario. 
The second dimension is strictly connected with the evolution of Russia and its empire. Indeed, the 
importance of this world-zone found originally its confirmation during the period of 1720 under 
the Russian Empire of Peter the Great, who shaped Russia on the basis of the principles of 
Absolutism. This Empire, which collapsed during the February revolution of 1917, represented due 
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to its geographical extension and the political changings adopted in its internal mechanisms the 
key of ideological changes within the Eurasian population and system.  
In detail, the modernizing of Eurasia, through the adoption of an autocratic system, the 
development of the overland transportation for the economy and the vastness of the territory, 
showed at the beginning of the 20th century as this part of the world was moving the first 
significant steps to get a notable role in the global political and economic space. 
Analyzing these reflections, stands out as the Russian empire represented the keystone of the 
Eurasian evolution, but, more important, as it was a fundamental step for the same Russia’s 
development and the acquisition of a primary position in the region. Geographically, Russia 
became a Eurasian power since the 16th-17th century through the acquisition of the Central Asian 
region, Siberia and Far East. The Russian Empire undertook several campaigns to win the 
territories in the Caucasus region and Central Asia, with the handle of Georgia, Armenia and 
Azerbaijan from Turkish and Persian Empire. After that, the Russian Empire, by the contribution of 
the construction of the Trans-Siberian, which connected the whole territory, facilitated the trade 
among all parts of the Empire, with the result to increase its commerce and hegemony in Eurasia; 
and to assume a leadership position in the entire area consequently.  
In 1919 Mackinder reviewed his work, introducing the concept of Heartland. Precisely, after the 
end of the First World War, he drew attention to the importance of the East Europe for the world 
dominance through his most famous phrase: “Who rules East Europe, commands the Heartland; 
who rules the Heartland, commands the World-Island; who rules the World-Island, commands the 
world12”. The importance of Eurasia as strategic territory, confirmed his thesis especially during 
the Soviet Union and Cold War, when Eurasia (and Russia) acquired a more intensified pivotal 
pawn in the geopolitical equilibrium. 
2 The Eurasianism in its cultural and political construction  
Principally, we can distingue two main epochs in the history of the classic Eurasianism: the geo-
cultural period at the beginning of the 1921 and the politic phase in 1926/27.  
The geo-cultural phase had the merit to emphasize as the culture and the geography are two 
complementary aspects in the formation of the identity of a community (in this case of Eurasia), 
which distingues itself from other civilizations exactly because of its geographic position.   
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Retracing the analysis of Ostrovsky, the basic concept of Eurasianism, as expressed by Petr 
Savitsky (1895-1968), encloses the idea that Eurasia should be divided into three parts (Europe, 
Russia and Asia) instead of the traditional two (Europe and Asia). European Russia should be 
separated from the rest of Europe and integrated with Asian Russian as a Middle Continent or 
Eurasia, as the Eurasians called it13.  
The intellectual Savitsky, as reported by Shendrikova, privileged the cultural component over the 
political in his explanation of Eurasia. He proposed two models of Empires: a continental one, 
forged by political relations that conveyed the model of Russian Empire, and maritime and 
economic one, based on the British model. For Savitsky, only the first model could be considered 
healthy, able to create a supranational culture and contribute to the progress of humanity14.  
Specifically, according to the Eurasianists, Eurasia was a self-contained geographical entity whose 
boundaries coincided with those of the Russian Empire in 1914 roughly. Russia-Eurasia was neither 
European nor Asiatic and should be involved with neither Europe nor Asia. Its geopolitical destiny 
was to unite all of Eurasia under its authority, to recreate the empire of Genghis Khan15.  
The classic Eurasian idea was formulated by the Russian émigré thinkers, “the Eurasians”, during 
the XX century. Explicitly, the Eurasians can be defined as formulated by Dr. Frank: “A group of 
Russian émigré scholar of the twenties and thirties years of the 20th century, who designated 
Eurasia as cultural-geographic world with a Russian cultural identity16”. As is possible to evince 
from this passage, the Eurasians savants wanted to accentuate the geographic and cultural 
importance of Eurasia, influenced, ideologically, by the Russian mentality.  
The discussion on Russia’s civilization choice began in the middle of the XIX century out of the 
classic opposition between ‘zapadniki’ (westernizers) and ‘slavyanofily’ (slavophiles)17. 
Chronologically, in the panorama of the Eurasianism, Georgy Vernadsky (1887–1973) can be 
identified as the pioneer that started to deepen the Russian history and the positive influence of 
the Eastern culture on the Russian ideology.  
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Vernadsky, as described by Charles Halperin, presented the Mongol conquest of Russia as the 
pivotal development in the course of Russian history. He did not disagree with the usual view that 
the Mongols isolated Russia and that their conquest was a catastrophe. He stressed as the 
Mongols had profoundly transformed Russia's relationship with the steppe, and as in this action, 
they decisively shaped further the Russian migration, playing even a decisive role in the creation of 
the Russian statehood. The Mongols solved the problem of Russia's eastward expansion during the 
Kievan period. Vernadsky compared the eastward expansion of the East Slavs to the westward 
expansion of the Germanic peoples. He implied that no obstacle had impeded Germanic expansion 
westward. But Russia, European in culture and race, was geographically located in Asia, and thus 
East Slavic expansion during the Kievan period was stymied by the pastoral nomads of the 
steppe18.   
From a purely cultural side, Vernadsky sustained that the collision of the Byzantium Empire and 
the Turkic-Mongolian cultural heritages generated the core of Russian culture, which in essence 
amounts to a “Christianization of Turkishness19”. 
Quoting Halperin, Vernadsky anticipated a number of basic Eurasian axioms: that Russia was 
geographically as much Asian as European, that the Mongol conquest was the central event of 
Russian history, that the Mongol influence upon Russia was not entirely negative, and that Russian 
expansion eastward was one of the most important features of Russian history20.   
In 1920 Nikolaj S. Trubetzkoy (1890-1938) with his work “Evropa I čelovečestvo” (Europe and 
Mankind), laid the foundations for a new vision of Russia as an expression of the "civilization of the 
steppes", heiress of the empires of Genghis Khan and Tamerlane, with a significant positive 
formulation about the Tatar influence on Russia21. Prince Nikolaj Trubetzkoy, who wrote 
extensively about the pursuit of real Russian identity after the time of the Tsars, was one of the 
most important proponents of the Eurasian idea.  
Though, the year 1921 represents the born of the construction of the Eurasian doctrine officially, 
when appeared in Sofia the anthology “Ischod k Vostoku” (The Exodus to the East), an opera 
containing the contributions of a group of Russian émigré thinkers: Petr N. Savitsky, Petr P. 
Suvčinskij, Georgij V. Florovskij and Nikolaj S. Trubetzkoy. The principal idea that these authors 
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presented in this work wanted to propose a cultural-philosophical image of the Russian culture, 
with the aim to save Russia from the Bolshevism and from the diktat of the Western 
Universalisms. Here was elaborated the idea that Russia has its own cultural and historical 
identity, different from the individual and nationalist Europe22. 
The migrants insisted mostly on the special nature of the Russian eastern path and its dominant 
ideological influence on the Eurasian region.  
During the 1930s, the linguists of the Prague school, in the figures of Trubetzkoy and Roman 
Jacobson, stressed the closeness between Russia and Asia and their complex ethno-genesis nature 
through the ideological connection with the Finno-Ugric and Turk-Tatar population during the 
period of the Mongol Empire of the Golden Horde. These authors emphasized the cultural side of 
the Russian ideology, diversifying it from the West. The incipit of this discourse wants to lead to 
the main perspective of Eurasianism, namely that Eurasia, influenced culturally by the Russian 
vicissitudes and impact of the other populations in primis the Mongols, presents an unique 
culture, ideology and tradition, that de facto differs from the other world cultures.  
Concerning the political dimension of the doctrine, the Eurasianism has assimilated the ideas of 
Bolshevism, developing its theory during the USSR only ranged with the Soviet thought. 
According to Cohen Arial, the concept of Eurasianism as political theory emerged firstly after the 
Russian Revolution of 1917: “The Russian émigré thinkers formulated a third way for Russia 
between East and West and between capitalism and socialism. The idea never fully developed due 
to the predominance of Leninism23”. 
But, the Eurasian theory after the 1917, because of the more dominant ideas of the Bolshevism, 
did not deploy enough its geopolitical conceptions over the Eurasian region, acquiring only an 
incidental character among the Russian theoreticians of the USSR.  
Here, there were two positions within the group of the Eurasians, as described by Trubetzkoy in 
“my i drugie” (we and the others, 1925): the narodniki (populists) and the Bolsheviks. From one 
hand the Bolsheviks criticized the Eurasianism because considered a movement that was 
embodying the European thought. From the other hand the populist condemned the Bolshevism, 
because considered the October Revolution as an excrescence of the Romano-Germanic culture24.  
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Trubetzkoy, in this cultural spectrum, with his critic to the Western ideology, sided against the 
egocentrism of the West, introducing the concept of Nationalisms abstractly. 
From 1927, the second stage of the evolution of Eurasianism, philosophers as Nikolaj Alekseev 
(1869-1964) and Lev Karsavin (1882-1952) refined the concept and its intersection with the 
Bolshevism, comprehending as the connection with this ideology was essential to maintain alive 
the Eurasian idea between the Russian thinkers. Indeed, they specified in the Parisian Journal 
“Evrazija” (Eurasian) and “Evrazijskaja chronika” (Eurasian chronicle) as there was any contrast 
between the two ideologies, theorizing as for the construction of a future state, the Soviet system 
had not to be detached, but renovated25.  
This political vision, connected with the strategic position between Europe and Asia and the 
apparent economic advantage over the other continents consequently, was united to the theory 
of the dictatorship of the proletariat of the Russian philosopher Plechanov and its elaboration of 
Lenin, where the Russian and thus Eurasian population should guide this part of the world, trying 
to elevate the Russian ideology on the eyes of the world.   
Russia is for the Eurasian authors the sixth continent, separated from Asia and Europe, as a crucial 
node of a new world culture.  
Furthermore, to differentiate more the distance between Eurasian culture and the European 
dominated by the Western tradition of the Roman Right, the Russian historic Lev Karsavin 
assumed the idea of an autocratic state under the guide of the Orthodox Church elevating the 
Orthodox spirit over the Christianity, which always have assumed in Europe the role of primary 
religion. 
Basically, the essential idea of the Eurasians was to propose the centrality of Eurasia through the 
elevation of the Russian stateliness, elaborating an own idea of culture different from the secular 
Western ideology.  
2.1 The classic Eurasianism and the importance of Danilevsky  
Eurasia, as theorized by the Eurasians has own roots, ideology and must be separated from the 
rest of the world. 
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With this premise, in this section will be analyzed the main authors of classic Eurasianism that 
mostly have underlined the uniqueness of the Russian ideology against the Western, seeing Russia 
as the core of Eurasia, theorizing it as an independent part of the globe, a real continent.  
The Russian cultural identity and its idea of superiority against the Western characterized mostly 
the Russian Slavophil current of the XIX century. The preeminence of the Russian ideology was 
traced by Aleksej Chomjakov (1804-1860), who, through the theological substantive “sobornost’”, 
that designates the state of absorption of the individual and of his particular consciousness in the 
collective, wanted to trace the uniqueness of the Russians, as an ideological unique civilization26.  
Even the Russian philosopher Fyodor Dostoevsky (1821-1881), can be framed as eminent pre-
Eurasianist. In his diary of 1881 advocated for Russia’s historic mission to bring about a higher 
level of civilization in Asia27. 
Though, the precursor of the Eurasianism can be identified in the figure of Nicolay Danilevsky 
(1822-1885), who firmly emphasized the centrality of Russia as the main actor in the Eurasian 
space and the specificity of the Slavic culture, as core of the union between all Slavic states to 
form an own politic and ideological body. 
Danilevsky, the eminent creator of the Russian philosophy of history and main representative of 
the Pan-Slavism28 in the second third of the 19th century, through his book “Rossiya i Evropa” 
(Russia and Europe, 1869) traced firstly the Eurasian antagonism to the Romano-Germanic culture, 
envisaging a war between the Romano-Germans of Western Europe and the Greek-Slavs of 
Eurasia. In his idea of Eurasia, he proposed a renewed Slavic-Orthodox civilization.    
Specifically, with his work he wanted to take an outstanding position in the history of Eurasianism. 
According to Wiederkehr Stefan, with the opera Rossiya i Evropa, Danilevsky designed a 
philosophy of history, in which he rejected the idea of a unified humanity and the universal linear 
concept of progress of the enlightenment. Western Europe – in Danilevsky words, the "European 
civilization" or the "Germano-Roman type of culture" – embodies not the general human culture in 
the advanced stage of the world, rather it would represent the biological laws of growth and decay 
of the subjugated culture type. In this model of a multi-linear world history, the West loses its 
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ideological orientation and basis function on the Russian identity, because this belongs to the 
original Slavic culture type29.  
Danilevsky highlighted that individual cultural and historical types can be distinguished as old, 
middle and new histories; and as they appear in various stages of world development. His 
reasoning wanted to show that the European culture cannot be absolute between all ethnic 
groups and moreover that it was not the unique ideology in all different temporal spaces. Based 
on this concept, the Russian historian formulated five general principles, that are decisive for the 
development of cultural-historical types: “1) the cultural-historical types are formed by language 
families; 2) in the independent development of a cultural-historical type, the political independence 
is a necessary condition; 3) the fundamental principles of civilization cannot be transmitted from 
one type to another; 4) the wealth and diversity of cultural and historical type of the variety of 
contained ethnographic elements depend from the fact that the political organization decentralize 
themselves into a federation or a state system; 5) the analogy between the process of development 
of cultural-historical types can be explained as a plant which makes blooms only once30”.   
Throughout his studies Danilevsky came to the conclusion that Europe is not a geographical whole, 
since there is no geographical boundary that separates it from Asia clearly. He considered Europe 
nonetheless as cultural and historical unity, identifying it as the Romano-Germanic culture type. 
Consequently, Russia is not part of Europe, because it has no common roots with the European 
culture: “It was not a part of the Supranational, European Holy Roman Empire of Karl the Great 
and his successors; it did not have the national and common European feudal system, also did not 
participate and was not involved in its resolution on behalf of the civil and political freedom. Russia 
has also accepted neither Catholicism nor Protestantism. Russia is neither due to his parentage nor 
by adoption to Europe31”.  
Europe and Russia are two different cultural worlds for Danilevsky. Europe is older and stronger 
than Russia. However, in his opinion Europe does not see Russia as a part of itself. Europe and 
Russia are opponents, they have their own interests32. According to him, Europe sees in Russia and 
even in the Slavs something that is totally foreign and, at the same time, something that can be 
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exploited as mere material to Europe's advantage: “It (Europe) sees in Russia not only an alien, but 
a hostile power. Russia and the Slavs are hated by all European parties33”.   
The Russian philosopher used these assumptions to justify two main theses of his political theory. 
The first is the inevitable opposition of the political interests of Russia and Europe, between East 
and West, which would lead to a long historical struggle; a dispute that he called the "Eastern 
Question". In the fight against the West, which throughout the history has shown its aggressive 
character, the Slavic people need a political covenant definitely, a "Slavic Federation", to be able 
to contrast the Western impetus. This alliance introduces the second thesis of Danilevsky’s 
political theory directly, namely that Germany, a relative young nation in comparison with the 
other European countries of the XIX century, due to its cultural and politic expansion, was playing 
in the 1800 a leading role in European politics. Following Danilevsky’s opinion, the Germans were 
consequently the main threat for Russia and the Slavic world. In this context, he has not only seen 
a military threat from Germany, but also cultural. Specifically, he dreaded a Germanization of the 
Slavs. In response to the idea of Pan-Germanic, Danilevsky developed its Pan-Slavic conception 
and the thesis that the West-Slavic people, because of their dependence on Europe, were not able 
to organize their own political life. They needed the help of the Russians that, in his opinion, were 
the sole carriers of the political idea of Slavism.   
Danilevsky was the first to propound the philosophy of history as a series of distinct civilizations. 
His main thesis, the differentiation of Russia and Europe culturally and politically, had a strong 
impact among the Russian thinkers of the Eurasianism, as Vladimir Lamansky (1833-1914), who 
directly supported his concepts, speaking about Russia, as a “third world”, between the European 
and Asian culture34, or Nikolaj Trubetzkoy and Konstantin Leontyev (1831-1891).   
2.2 Trubetzkoy and Leontyev: the review of Danilevsky’s thought 
In the Eurasian school of the end 1800 early 1900, the Russian linguist Trubetzkoy has revived the 
ideas of Danilevsky about the Slavic culture as a different typology from the European identity. 
With this concept Trubetzkoy wanted to strengthen the importance of the Pan-Slavic ideology 
with its own attributes against the mythos of the European culture. In favor of this suggestion, the 
Russian philosopher formulated a distinction between the European and the Slavic tradition, 
arguing beside the dominance of the Europeans: “The intelligence of the Europeanized peoples… 
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have to be … recognize: … that European culture is anything absolute, not the culture of all 
mankind, but merely the creation of a limited and specific ethnic or ethnographic group that has a 
common history; that European culture represents a standard for the ethnic group, that has 
created it; that it is not more perfect and 'higher' than any other culture that is created by another 
ethnographic group; because there is no 'higher' and 'lower', but only more or less similar to each 
other cultures and peoples; that on this account the appropriation of the Roman- Germanic culture 
by a people that did not participate in its creation, is not an absolute good and has no absolute 
moral force; that a perfect organic appropriation of Romano-Germanic culture (and indeed any 
foreign culture)... only to an anthropological absorption of the people in the Roman-Germanic is 
possible...; that consequently the Europeanisation for every not Roman-Germanic people is an 
absolute evil35”. 
In his book “Europe and Mankind” (1920) the Russian linguist openly criticized the “European-
Egocentrism” that has in the history given a same linear course about all worldwide cultures, 
elevating the European culture as the highest one in the historical cultural evolution. The volition 
of the European culture to dominate all the other civilizations, did not allow the Russian identity to 
form itself properly, because it was hidden by the European values. Trubetzkoy motivated his 
thesis, connecting the cultural side with the geographical view, affirming as the Roman-Germanic 
culture was not absolute for all ethnographic communities, because every group, due to its 
location in diverse parts of the world, has simple different values and tradition.  
The uniformity of the Russian ideology over Eurasia was confirmed by Trubetzkoy with the 
Revolution of 1917, where the formation of new state could acclaim the legacy of the Russian, 
since Russians had stopped being a dominant nation, becoming “one people among the others36”. 
This passage wanted to justify from a side the union of all Slavic population among Russia; and 
from the other side wanted to find a compromise with the Bolshevism, seeing the two currents of 
thought not opposed but complementary. 
Konstantin Leontyev described in his book “Vizantizm i Slavyanstvo” (Byzantinism and Slavism, 
1875) the role of the state, religion and culture in the life of a community. 
Generally, Leontyev affirmed as Danilevsky had undoubtedly a decisive influence on the 
construction of his ideas: “Danilevsky was ... the first person who has observed the culture types. 
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The old Slavophiles have the ideas, but to them it's all unclear ... while to the author of “Rossija i 
Evropa” all is very clear37”. 
Leontyev has overhauled the political ideas of Danilevsky, encouraging nearer cultural bonds 
between Russia and the East against the revolutionary utilitarian influence of the West. In his 
thought, he rejected the idea of Pan-Slavism, replacing it with the idea of "Byzantine". Leontyev 
was intrigued by Byzantine, seeing it as a concrete principle, with its style and own historical roots; 
while, according to him, the Slavism as a principle did not represent anything concrete, as 
explained by Wiederkehr: “Danilevsky specified the "Eastern Question" as a confrontation of Old 
Roman-Germanic culture type with the New Slavic culture type: Pan-Slavism is a striving on the 
alignment. It is the pan-European revolution. We need not Pan-Slavic ideas, Slavs-support or Slavs-
caprice, but Slavic originality, Slavic creativity, and Slavic peculiarity”38.  
Concretely, Leontyev saw Pan-Slavism has an ordinary national principle without any historical 
forms. In contrast to Danilevsky, Leontyev has never expressed a concrete enthusiasm about the 
Slavism. Indeed, according to him, it is incomprehensible as a principle and even harmful in 
political sense for Russia: "Pan-Slavism is very dangerous, if not quite pernicious39”.   
In his idea of "Slavic Union", under the leadership of Russia, he did not want to realize such union 
based on a Slavic basis, but, instead, according to the principle of cultural Byzantinism.   
Leontyev discussed in detail which nation could be part of its "Slavic Union" and which should be 
excluded from it. For that, he stressed two criteria: 1) the risk of liberalism in the Slavic countries 
of Eastern Europe and 2) the importance of Orthodox Christianity. According to this attitude 
towards a future Union at the end of the XIX century, the Catholic Poland and the Germanized 
Czech Republic should not be part of this alliance; instead the Orthodox Greece should join it, 
because of its religious influence over the Slavic population. 
While Leontyev agreed with the ideas of Danilevsky about Russia's role as the leader of a possible 
Eurasian Union, but accentuating more the role of religion instead of Pan-Slavism as cornerstone 
of the Slavic Union, the theologian Vladimir Solov'ev (1853 - 1900) critiqued expressly Danilevsky's 
view and Leontyev’s opinion.  
Solov’ev revisited the religion and philosophical thesis of Danilevsky and Leontyev, raising doubts 
about the Eurasian culture, as anything superior to the European. 
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The significance of the works of Solov'ev is to find in the philosophical mediation of religion. Unlike 
the Byzantinism of Leontjev, Solov'ev considered as a religious model the Catholicism, which is 
tightly organized and uniform, instead of the Russian Orthodox Church, too fragile for him to play 
an active role in the story.  
Regarding his opinion, the Pope could be able to exercise a better control over a continent, 
because he was of the opinion that a strong religious person can coordinate in a proper way the 
population, exalting the value of their identity. Here he suggested the idea about a mystic Union 
between the Russian Orthodoxy and the Catholic Church40. 
In contrast to Danilevsky, Solov'ev argued that the Russian culture is an integral part of Europe, 
not independent and original. 
In his ideas is visible as Catholicism and the old European school influenced his thought decisively. 
Moreover, through its concepts is possible to evince as he was contrary to the Slavic school of the 
19th century, underlining the importance of European culture as the mother of all civilization even 
in the Eurasian region, accenting the idea of the Catholicism as guiding religion for the Slavs. 
Summarizing, we can assert that Danilevsky opened with his philosophy and his book "Russia and 
Europe" the dialogue on the strength of the Slavic culture and Pan-Slavism in the Eurasian region. 
His doctrine was revolutionary because for the first time in Russia, the European culture was seen 
as not the only doctrine of world civilization. His ideas and the successive revisions by authors such 
Trubetzkoy and Leontyev about a cultural and political distance of Eurasia from European rules, 
introduced the idea about the considerable potential of Russia as the main leader of the Eurasian 
region, and fostered the birth of Russian nationalism.   
3 The Western geopolitical school  
Eurasia, due to its position between Europe and Asia, was seen, especially since the beginnings of 
the XX century, as a strategic zone with a high economic, military and politic potential, able to 
determinate every geopolitical event. 
In fact, the geographical vision of Eurasia, as elaborated by Mackinder, had the merit to emphasize 
the geo-strategic position of this region in the global chessboard. This idea of geopolitical center of 
Eurasia was successively particularized by the Western geopolitical school.  
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In this philosophical vision it is necessary to mention firstly the figure of Karl Haushofer (1869–
1946), a German military general and geographer, who found the German school of Geopolitik and 
was its leader during the Weimar and Nazi periods. In his work “Pan-Ideas in Geopolitics” (1931) 
he discussed in detail the Russian Eurasianism in a chapter titled “Pan-Asia – Eurasia – Pan-
Europe”. Haushofer adopted both Mackinder’s Heartland thesis and his view of the Russian-
German alliance – the two actors that already Mackinder recognized as the major contenders for 
the control of Eurasia in the twentieth century. Haushofer suggested an alliance between the 
Soviet Union and Germany so that the vast resources of Eurasia could be used to support German 
ambitions on the world scene41. Moreover, the German general in reflection of the military 
strategies of the 1930s supported the idea that the German-Russian alliance should include Japan 
too.  
Figure 2: Haushofer’s Pan-Regional Model 
 
Source: Ostrovsky Max (2008): “The idea of Eurasia“. In Working Paper (Helmut Kohl Institute for European Studies), 
64/2008. European Forum at Hebrew University, Marjorie Mayrock Center for Russian, Eurasian and East European 
Researcher. P. 15 
The figure above shows the continents division as formulated by Haushofer, namely the partition 
of the global parts between the world powers. Considering his view, Central Asia was supposed to 
belong to the Soviet Union, as natural part of the Eurasian zone. 
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The thought of the German geographer, especially his subdivision of the regional world parts, 
constituted a fundamental aspect in the evolution of the geopolitical strategic significance of 
Eurasia. Indeed, his ideas and Mackinder’s thought were the incipit for the development of the 
modern Eurasianism.  
Both the vastness and strategic grandeur of Eurasia and the revision of the Mackinder’s view 
represented reason of debate during the twentieth century between the Western thinkers, 
especially the Americans, who aimed to understand and stem the Russian influence.  
The American admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840–1914) can be recognized as the founder of the 
American geopolitical thought related to the Eurasianism. Mahan identified in his researches the 
Eurasian region from Asia Minor to Japan as a key area of the world. He acknowledged the 
countries of this portion of earth: Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan, China, Korea and Japan, positioned 
between the two major powers: Britain and Russia. Russia was that power that Mahan considered 
more threatening to the fate of Central Asia, because of the great position of Russia, favorable 
more than the Anglo-Saxon for a southward expansion42. 
Quoting other exponents of this school, the American Nicholas Spykman (1893-1943) affirmed in 
his work "America's Strategy in World Politics" (1942) as the balance of Eurasian power was 
determinant to allow the American and Allied to win the Second World War: “As long as Stalin’s 
armies fight in Russia, Chiang Kai-shek’s troops resist in China, and British sea power rules the 
Indian Ocean, the Eurasian land mass will remain balanced and ours will be the deciding role in the 
power struggle of the Old World43”.  
Zbignew Brzezinski (1928-2017), Jimmy Carter’s national security adviser, following Mahan, 
Mackinder and especially Spykman, saw the Cold War as a geopolitical struggle for control over 
the Eurasian land mass: “The Soviet Union would prevail if it could eject the West from the western 
and eastern fringes of Eurasia. The West would be preponderant if it contained the Soviet Union. 
Soon the West was preponderant and launched its strategic advance into the former Soviet 
sphere44”. In his work "The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives" 
(1997) Brzezinski attributed to Eurasia a crucial geostrategic significance and stressed the 
necessity for the United States to have a direct control over this part of the globe, creating an 
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equilibrium in the region with the Americans as political arbiter, in order to contain the Russian 
dominance over the area. 
The Western school had the merit to export worldwide the significance of Eurasia as determining 
factor for the global balances. Mackinder and Haushofer emphasized the grandiosity of this world 
region, the overland transportation and as a hypothetic German-Russian-Japanese alliance could 
create a strong power that could be able to influence all the global political and economic 
processes.  
The American thinkers have assimilated the Mackinder’s idea, eulogizing the strategic importance 
of Eurasia. From Mahan to Brzezinski the principal argument of discussion was to find a channel of 
insertion for the United States, trying to control Eurasia, in order to balance the Russian solidity in 
the region. 
4 The binomial Eurasianism-Soviet Communism  
From a hand the ideas about the strategic position Eurasia elaborated by the authors of the 
Western Geopolitical School had the merit to point out the geostrategic importance of Eurasia in 
the global equilibrium, arousing sensible interest among global politicians and philosophers. From 
the other hand, the classic Eurasianism encountered difficulties to find its position as principal 
doctrine among the Russian thinkers, affirming itself at the beginning of the XX century only 
through a related linkage with the Communism doctrine.  
Although the two ideologies could be seen different for their principal ideas – the Communist class 
struggle and the Eurasian exaltation of the unique character of the Russian culture – the 
relationship between these two ideologies was positive to support the political, economic and 
cultural aspect of Eurasia and its population. 
This reasoning drove to two focal consequences: 1) the possibility to consolidate the Eurasian idea 
among the Russian thinkers and in the region; and 2) the glorification of the Eurasian population 
and culture, with a decisive support to the Russian nationalism.  
The Soviet Communism was not apparently in conflict or contradictory to the concept of 
Eurasianism, rather it was used to conquer and consolidate the Russian potency, influence and 
hegemony in the border areas. 
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Though, a definite ideological passage of the Eurasians to the side of the Soviet Union was not so 
rapid, but occurred only in the early 1940s45. 
This ideological alliance allowed the Eurasianism and the Soviet Union to find a same way of 
development, supporting the same principles of stateliness of Russia and the wealth of local 
resources (as oil and gas) as instrument to compete with the biggest world powers: USA and 
Europe. 
The exaltation of Russia, its Slavic population and its identity as proposed by the Eurasians, united 
to the Soviet ideas of economic and military Russian predominance, supported the Soviet Union 
ideologically. A confirm of this thought can be found in the main exponent of the Soviet-
Eurasianism Lev Gumilev (1912-1992), who endorsed and supported the creation of the Soviet 
Union enthusiastically, which firstly integrated the Central Asian and Caucasian regions and 
thereafter developed itself with emphasis in the Soviet - or better- in the Eurasian Empire. 
Through the term of “Superethos”, defined as a common geo-climatic condition related to cultural 
identity, Gumilev identified the “Russia-Eurasia46”. According to him, the Russian Eurasianism is 
based on the assumption that Russia is partly in Europe and Asia and that in terms of people, 
religion and geography has both Asian and European elements. Specifically, Gumilev supported 
the idea that Russia was the center of the "Old World" not only from a geographic sense, but also 
from a political-economic view. Moreover, Russia occupies a special place in the geopolitically-
Eurasian region and as central power has the primary mission to balance the interests between 
Europe and Asia47. 
The compactness of the concept of Eurasianism, as a crucial element of the Soviet ideology, found 
its demonstration during the Perestroika and the last days of the USSR, where some Russian 
politicians and intellectuals tried to rely to the concepts of Eurasianism, as glorification and unity 
of the Slavic people, for saving the Union. In the 1990s, the Eurasian idea acquired a prestigious 
consideration among the Russian leaders, seen as an instrument to unite the Russian population 
due to the fragility of the Soviet Communist ideology. 
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This because the Soviet politicians by the Eurasian theory, that already at the end of the 1980s 
foresaw a political and cultural brotherhood between all Slav nations, wanted to justify the 
continuation of the Soviet Empire because of its role of political world superpower. 
In fact, after the demise of the USSR, the Eurasian concept did not disappear; rather this ideology 
strengthened itself in the so-called “Neo-Eurasianism” and got new impetus and support of 
Russian nationalists that advocated for an aggressive policy towards Central Asia and South 
Caucasus, without forgetting the principal enemies: the Western ideology and America. 
5 Eurasianism and Pan-Slavism, a consideration 
In the study of Eurasianism and its development from classic to Neo-Eurasianism, its evolution 
should be analyzed even through its comparison with the Pan-Slavism. 
Defining the Pan-Slavism, this cultural and political movement of the XIX century, recognizing a 
common ethnic background among the various Slav peoples of eastern and east central Europe, 
supports the integrity and unity of the Slavic peoples48. The development of this ideology occurred 
mostly in those territories, as e. g. the Balkans, where non-Slavic empires, as the Byzantine 
Empire, Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire, and Venice, had ruled the South Slavs for 
centuries.  
Instead, the idea of Eurasianism, as proposed by Danilevsky and Trubetzkoy, is more connected 
with the cultural and identity exaltation of Russia and its civilization.  
If from a side the Pan-Slavism exalts the concept of unity of all Slavic countries, from the other side 
the Eurasianism emphasizes the Russian identity, as unique culture for the Eurasian region. Thus, 
Eurasia is the notion which assumes a special connotation. Citing Matthew Schmidt, “Danilevsky 
defined Eurasia as the vast unbroken landmass bounded on its edges by the high mountain ranges 
of the Himalayas, Caucasus, and Alps and the large bodies of water that made up the Arctic, 
Pacific, and Atlantic oceans, and the Black, Mediterranean, and Caspian seas. The gigantic, Rolling, 
low steppe in the center of this outline is the Eurasian plain that Mark Bassin has characterized as 
“an independent geographical world, self-contained and distinct from Europe as well as from 
Asia49.” 
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So, the denomination of Eurasia as a grandiose region for the classic Eurasians had the target to 
express the vastness and uniqueness of this region, in order to exalt its Slavic population and 
identity vigorously. Following this point, we can discover as the Pan-Slavism and the classic 
Eurasianism of the Russian emigrée had common elements about the exaltation of the Slavic 
identity: the unique Slavic culture and tradition; the role of Russia, seen as the guide-nation of all 
Slavic population; and the marked detachment of the Slavic culture from the West, seen in the 
Romano-Germanic culture primarily. 
During the Soviet Union, on the East part of Europe, the notion of Eurasianism knew a tenuous 
development, limiting its role in an exaltation of the Russian and Slavic roots, emphasizing the 
Russian influence over the Soviet republics principally.  
Generally, in the period of the USSR, the Eurasianism and the Pan-Slavism had mostly a common 
vision and played a same role in the formation of a solid Russian mentality. 
A precise differentiation happened with the modern Eurasianism, where the philosophical current 
changed its aspect, concentrating more to the war between West (Atlanticism) and Russian world, 
detaching itself from the Pan-Slavism. In fact, if the Pan-Slavism as the classic Eurasianism, wanted 
to support the Slavic population against the not Slavic empires; the Neo-Eurasianism proposed the 
aim, mostly visible in the thought of Aleksandr Dugin, to give emphasis on the history and tradition 
of Russia, in order to raise its hegemony toward the other Slavic neighbors and worldwide, 
opposing the particular Eurasian character to the American one.  
This conjecture underlines the passage from classic Eurasianism, similar to the exaltation of the 
Slavic identity of the Pan-Slavism, to the Neo-Eurasianism, which in its global aim exalts more the 
Russian identity, highlighting its sharp opposition and struggle against the West culture, identified 
in the American identity.      
6 From the classic to the Neo-Eurasianism 
At this point of the analysis, before introducing and examining the modern Eurasianism, is useful 
to recapitulate the principal features of the Eurasianism.  
Citing the analysis of Dr. Sergey Kolchigin (2002), quoted in the study of Dr. Golam Mostafa (2013), 
can be traced the five primary characteristics of Eurasianism: a) it is an idea of cultural dialog 
between Europe and Asia, b) it is the definition of the super ethnic collectivity; c) it is a both 
ideological and political movement of the 1920s of the 20th century; d) it is an idea of regional 
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integration in the Eurasian territory; e) it is put forward in opposing to the encroachment of 
western civilization for the sake of the establishment of the Russian World Empire50.  
From the political side, the Eurasians were the first among the Russian thinkers to introduce the 
concept of geopolitic. The term, which retraces the political, cultural and ideological links between 
the civilizations and portions of the world, expressed in the vision of the Eurasian authors, 
especially in Trubetzkoy and Savizky, the shift of the origins of the Russian State from Kievan Rus’ 
to the Mongolian Empire vividly.   
The Eurasianism identified Eurasia with Russia explicitly, targeting to consolidate the Russian 
integrity. Here, the Eurasian mission, as stressed by Ostrovsky, was to distinguish Russia from 
Europe and Asia clearly, ascertaining as it represents the sixth part of the world with an own 
unique culture51.   
The classic idea of this ideology, connected with the Russian predominant role in the Eurasian 
region, opened the view to see Russia directly, due to its grandiosity, as guide-coordinator of the 
entire Eurasian area, to guarantee the economic and ideological majesty of this zone against the 
threat of the other world powers, Europe and America.   
Reflecting about the statement of Europe and America as threats of Eurasia, we can identify the 
passage from Eurasianism to the Neo-Eurasianism. According to Max Ostrovosky, the classic 
Eurasians of the 1920s-1930s, wrote in a period when European power still held its sway over the 
world. Russia was “surrounded” by “European forts” and the “inevitable clash” was with 
“Europe52”. 
Successively, after the Second World War and during the Cold war, America, due to its global 
successes, became the principal enemy for Russia, opening the way to the Neo-Eurasianism, as 
stressed by the Eurasian researcher Gordon Hahn: “From the early 1940s to the late 1980s, that is, 
the period from Eurasianism to Neo-Eurasianism, Europe declined and the United States rose to 
preeminence. After its spectacular series of triumphs in the international arena, culminating with 
that over the USSR in the Cold War, America became for the Neo-Eurasians the embodiment of evil, 
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absorbing into itself the former Eurasianist hatred of Romano-German peoples: “Neo-Eurasianist 
anti-Westernism is almost wholly anti-American53”.  
With the official Communist ideology gone, Neo-Eurasianism reached the “level of a mainstream 
ideology54”. 
Quoting the Russian researcher Shendrikova: “The Eurasian thought, however, was not 
significantly widespread before the 1990s, when, with the fall of the Soviet Union and the 
communist ideology, the spiritual ties (duhovnye skrepy) between the peoples inside of the Russian 
Federation and its neighbors was left bereft of their ideological and institutional underpinning. It 
was then that the neo-Eurasianist movement arose, with Lev Gimilev and Alexander Dugin as its 
main ideologists55”. 
The Neo-Eurasianism affirmed a new concept of the theory, bonding it to religious elements 
(stressing for a moral imperative Orthodox-Christian government), geopolitical features and 
Nationalism. In the 90's, the authors of the Western Geopolitical School, especially Mahan, 
Mackinder and Haushofer, that had not assumed enough notoriety on the eyes of the classic 
Eurasians, were translated in Russian, in order to strengthen, through their works, the politic and 
military importance of Eurasia for the strategic worldwide politics.  
After the collapse of the USSR, The Neo-Eurasians had as first aim to revive the idea of a strong 
Russia as leader nation in the Eurasian area, exalting the Russian culture against the Western 
threat, identified in the USA. 
Dr. Bassin traced the similarities and differences between classical Eurasianism and Neo-
Eurasianism. According to him, both movements share a vision of Eurasia as a multi-national 
community of fraternal peoples united by a shared civilization. This shared vision dictates the 
second commonality between the two ideologies: the need of a geopolitical unity with the former 
imperial subjects/Soviet republics as the primary geopolitical imperative for Russia. However, he 
also noted that these commonalities are counterbalanced by three significant differences: 1) 
classical Eurasianism rejected Russian nationalism and imperialism, Neo-Eurasianism seeks to 
reestablish the leading position of ethnic Russians in the former Soviet space. 2) The classical 
Eurasianism was strongly isolationist, stressing the need to prioritize economic and political 
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integration of internal spaces, while Neo-Eurasianism promotes internal consolidation and directs 
attention externally. 3) Classical and Neo-Eurasianism differ in their perceptions of the West: while 
classical Eurasianism viewed the West as Russia’s principal threat, neo-Eurasianism is more 
ambivalent, stressing Atlanticism as Russia’s principal enemy56. 
Inside the Neo-Eurasianism is necessary to mention Aleksandr Dugin (1962), the principal 
exponent of the modern Eurasian idea, who formulated a new vision of the Eurasian concept, 
imaging it as a syncretism between socialism and religious orthodoxy, in contrast to the decadent 
Western liberal democracies. His main idea is linked to the role of Russia: a powerful nation that 
has more cultural features to Asia than to Europe and which represents the core of the 
geopolitical scene57. Dugin's Neo-Eurasianism of the XXI century is essentially imperialist and anti-
democratic; whose purpose is the establishment of an empire in the post-Soviet space under the 
leadership of Russia. This is justified by the fact that the Neo-Eurasians, reviewing the Pan-
Regional model of Haushofer, identifies the world divided in four dimensions with four principal 
poles: Berlin, Moscow, Tokyo and Washington.  
Figure 3: Neo-Eurasianism conception of multipolar world 
 
Source: “The Eurasian Idea". In The Fourth Political Theory beyond left and right but against the center. 
http://www.4pt.su/en/content/eurasian-idea (last view: 05.10.2016) 
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Regarding this global regional subdivision, the creation of a new Empire – the Eurasian Union – on 
the basis of the geopolitical triangle "Kiev-Moscow-Astana" is necessary to guarantee the stability 
of the Eurasian region58. Moreover, according to Dr. Bassin, Dugin sees the Western Europe in the 
rejection of American values as a potential ally for Russia – an idea with no precedent in classical 
Eurasianism thought59. 
In view of these aspects can be stressed as the Eurasianism of the XXI century made the decisive 
step to acquire a more marked role of savior of geographic, ethnic and cultural integration of 
Russia. The Russian Federation is seen on the Neo-Eurasian vision as the ideological, political and 
economic principal actor of Eurasia and its objective is to unite all the former Soviet Republics 
under its leadership, in order to form a Eurasian Union that can compete against all the world 
powers.  
6.1 Historical stages of Neo-Eurasianism 
A general overview of Neo-Eurasianism presents this movement nowadays as a philosophical 
doctrine with political features of combination between the ideas of Eurasianism, Pan-Slavism and 
Nationalism, where the notion of Eurasian Empire under the Russian coordination is strongly 
marked.  
The aim of this paragraph is to delineate the historical stages of the Neo-Eurasianism in order to 
understand the solid radicalization of the Eurasian idea in the region during the twenty-first 
century. 
A salient consideration that must be firstly pointed out is that although Russian Communism, 
Nationalism and Eurasianism are three different currents of thought, they are united in the 
premise that Russia should regain a great-power status and should become a center of opposition 
to American unilateralism. Their connection is extremely important in order to comprehend the 
evolution and transformation of the Eurasianism. 
According to Emre Erşen of Marmara University, “Neo-Eurasianism has emerged in the 1980s and 
1990s as a political opposition to Gorbachev’s ‘New Thinking’ and to the pro-American shift in 
Russian foreign policy in the first few years of Boris Yeltsin’s tenure. Neo-Eurasianism has been 
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gaining increasing influence in Russia, especially since the 1993 parliamentary elections, putting 
forward the idea of Eurasian empire, as a third way between the Communists and Nationalists60”.  
The period 1993-1998 was signed by an active development of Neo-Eurasianism among the 
Russian thinkers and politicians. The reasons of that can be traced in three determinant political 
and economic events that the Russian Federation had to figure out after the collapse of the USSR: 
1) the Chechen War 1994-96, where the Russian troops were repelled by the Chechen, pushing 
Yeltsin to declare a ceasefire, generating a climate of tension between the opponents of the war 
and the Yeltsin’s regime. 2) The negative economic consequences of the hyperinflation in Russia in 
the 1990's due to the expansion of the money supply by the central bank of Russia; and of the 
ruble crisis of 1998, where the Russian inflation rate was 84.4% and at the end of January 1999 
and the price of Russian crude oil was roughly 11 USD per barrel, down from 16 USD per barrel at 
the beginning of the same month61. The effects of this crisis had negative consequences on the 
former Soviet states too, making Russia losing its economic leadership among the Eurasian 
countries.  3) The Yeltsin’s resignation in the year 1999, generated exactly by the Chechen war and 
the economic crisis, urged Russia for a drastic changing with the target to stand out again the 
Russian splendor in the Eurasian and world scenario. 
Exploiting this situation, the Neo-Eurasian movement tried to influence the new Russian political 
class to base their action following the ideology of a nationalistic Eurasianism.  
However, the sharp commutation of Neo-Eurasianism in a political movement happened during 
the first years of 2000s. Exactly in 2002 was created the social and political movement “the Eurasia 
Party” with a clear support on the ambitious policy of Vladimir Putin.  
The main exponent of the movement, Dugin, created in 2003 the Non-Governmental Organization 
“International Eurasian Movement” with branches in 22 countries, included countries of Europe 
and America, with a tentative to support the Eurasian idea worldwide.  
By the analysis of the Eurasian Manifesto of Dugin’s movement, we can comprehend better the 
principal ideas of the Neo-Eurasianism: 1) the common struggle for multipolar world, based on the 
cooperation of different people, civilizations and cultures for the peace and mutual prosperity; 2) 
the close partnership between the European and Asiatic countries with the special role reserved 
for Russia as main mediator of this process; 3) the integration of post-Soviet space up to the point 
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of creation of united “Eurasian Alliance” in the cultural, economic, informational, strategic and 
political levels; 4) the active and multilateral dialog of the traditional confessions and ethnos of 
Eurasia, mutual understanding and esteem of Eurasian elites and societies; 5) the conservation 
cultural, religious, ethnic identities of every people, development of national uniqueness and 
originality; 6) the strengthening of peace and order basing on the Eurasian principles – Pax 
Eurasiatica; 7) the opposition to the negative tendencies – unipolar and one-dimensional 
globalization, cultural degradation, terrorism, narco-traffic, absence of social justice, ecological 
and demographic catastrophes62. 
In 2005, in the framework of the International Eurasian Movement, was formed the All-Russian 
youth political organization – “Eurasian Youth Union” (EYU), based explicitly on the ideology of 
Neo-Eurasianism with marked populist ideas.  
Since 2006, the Neo-Eurasian newspaper “Eurasian invasion” was published for the first time and 
was created the Internet TV “Eurasia-TV”. The aims of these projects were to give more visibility 
to the Eurasian idea, trying to connect not only Russian people, but all the population of the 
former Soviet Union.  
Nevertheless, the action of the modern Eurasianism, seen prevalently as a radical movement, has 
nowadays faced different geopolitical issues, especially the marked exaltation of Dugin for the 
military intervention of Russia in the armed conflict between the separatist self-proclaimed 
republic of South Ossetia in 2008 and recently with the explicit ideological support of the 
Ukrainian separatists in 2014. 
Generally, Neo-Eurasianism, mostly in the figure of Dugin, even advisor of the State Duma speaker 
Gennadiy Seleznyov, has influenced the internal and external policies of contemporary Russia, 
especially in the idea to relive the Russian hegemony among the post-Soviet republics.  
6.2 Neo-Eurasianism: the opponent of the Atlanticism 
Citing the analyst about radical right-wing parties Anton Shekhovtsov: “Neo-Eurasianism is based 
on a quasi-geopolitical theory that juxtaposes the “Atlanticist New World Order” (principally the US 
and the UK) against the Russia-oriented “New Eurasian Order”. Taken for granted, Eurasia is 
perceived to suffer from a severe ethnic, biological and spiritual crisis and is to undergo an organic 
cultural-ethnic process under the leadership of Russia that will secure the preservation of Eurasian 
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nations and their cultural traditions. Already by the end of the 1990s, Neo-Eurasianism took on a 
respectable, academic guise and was drawn in to scientifically support some anti-American and 
anti-British rhetoric of the Russian government63”.  
Neo-Eurasianism is fervent opponent of Atlanticism as is possible to evince from the core of the 
Eurasian Idea: "Eurasianism absolutely rejects the universalism of Atlanticism and Americanism. 
The pattern of Western-Europe and America has many attractive features that can be adopted and 
praised, but, as a whole, it is merely a cultural system that has the right to exist in its own historical 
context along with other civilizations and cultural systems. The Eurasian Idea protects not only 
anti-Atlantic value systems, but the diversity of value structures. It is a kind of "poliversum" that 
provides living space for everyone, including the USA and Atlanticism, along with other civilizations, 
because Eurasianism also defends the civilizations of Africa, both American continents, and the 
Pacific area parallel to the Eurasian Motherland. The term of Atlanticism deserves a clarification 
about its meaning on the eyes of the Neo-Eurasians64”. 
For the Neo-Eurasians the concept of "Atlanticism" is not based on the idea of universalism, but on 
the concept of Westernization that combines two cultures and civilizations – American and 
European –, identifying these two cultures as equivalent. Proponents of this school do not agree 
with Francis Fukuyama's notion of "End of History", because the Western democracy is not, 
according to them, the last point of the story or the unique world ideology. Indeed, they propose 
that an alliance between the Eurasian nations, as in the form of the Eurasian Union, can be an 
ideal project, to be a valid alternative to Atlanticism and to the challenges of the globalization. For 
them Neo-Eurasianism, unlike globalism, provides a living space for everyone, defending and 
promoting language, culture, religion and civilizations of all geographical areas including Africa and 
the Asian-Pacific region65 .  
In difference to the classic Eurasians, that have underlined the incompatibility of the Romano-
Germanic European culture with the Russian, the ideologically dispute moved with the Neo-
Eurasianism further, replacing the Romano-Germanic rival with the Atlanticism. Precisely, the 
Western world is differentiated by Atlantic USA, England and Continental Europe, where in Neo-
Eurasian vision continental Europe is seen now, in comparison to the classic Eurasianism, as a 
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neutral geopolitical zone, while the real threat for the Russian order is prevalently seen in the 
geostrategic force of USA. 
According to Erşen Emre, the Neo-Eurasianists put their emphasis on the idea of an inescapable 
war between the Atlantic empire led by the United States and the Eurasian empire led by Russia66. 
Against the Anglo-American attempts to create a Unipolar world order, the Neo-Eurasianists 
believe that Russia should establish a Eurasian bloc comprising of the countries of East-Europe and 
Asia united under the leadership of a new form of Russian-Eurasian empire, that should firstly 
encompass the lands of the former Soviet Union67.  
6.3 Centrality of the Russian ideological recognition 
The Eurasianism of the XXI century has assumed a merely radical way of Right-Nationalism, 
opposing the Slavic culture, suffering from the Western influence, to the Atlanticism. Russia, due 
to its glorious history, economic and geographic position has the task to guide the Eurasian 
countries against the Western threat.  
But, the leader position of Russia can be consolidated just if all the Eurasian states would 
recognize its power and are ready to create a coalition together in order to give prestige to the 
entire Eurasia. To achieve this aim, they should let the Russian Federation to guide them in a 
political and economic way. 
This passage defines clearly the idea of Eurasian Union on the Russian prospective and as the 
modern Eurasianism sees in the Russian Federation the guide-pillar of the entire Eurasia. Indeed, 
according to the Neo-Eurasians: “Russia is a “cosmos,” it takes smaller “solar systems” under its 
wing to create a loose federation of allied nations and states. In some instances, it rejects the very 
notion of “nation-statism” in that a true civilization can be only a federation, not a state68”.  
This concept summarizes the idea of Neo-Eurasianism’s foreign policy that retracts the Russian 
geopolitical space as a “cosmos” that takes smaller “solar systems” (in referring especially to the 
post-Soviet states) under its arm to create a federation of allied nations.  
                                                          
66
 Erşen Emre (2004): “Neo-Eurasianism and Putin’s Multipolarism in Russian Foreign Policy”. In Turkish Review of 
Eurasians Studies 2004-4. P. 136  
67
 Ibid. P. 137 
68
 Johnson Matthew. R. (2014): “Russian Nationalism and Eurasianism“. In news, analysis and forecasting on 
Geopolitics. 25.06.2014 http://www.geopolitica.ru/en/article/russian-nationalism-and-eurasianism#.VI2wTnvkqm0 
(last view: 08.10.2016) 
37 
 
Precisely, it refers to the concept that, although Russia occupies the center of Eurasia and its 
leader position is given due to its geographical dimension, the central position for Russia must be 
maintained and supported through its universal recognition by all Eurasian neighboring nations.  
Here the target of Neo-Eurasianism is the ideological consolidation of all Eurasian members 
around the centrality of Russia through a strong criticism and differentiation of all those values 
that come from the West and that denigrate the Slavic culture. After the achievement of an 
ideological recognition of the Russian leadership, the political and economic acknowledgment of 
Russia will be a natural consequence. 
The ideological recognition and consolidation of Russia and its position represents the core of the 
Eurasian integration. This position is good explained by the Russian philosopher Petr Bitsilli (1879-
1953), who in “Tragedija russkoj kulʹtury” (Tragedy of Russian Culture), proposed to differentiate 
the Eurasian culture from the Western tradition, claiming as the Eurasian region formed its own 
identity from its myth and culture over the centuries.  
For the historian Bitsilli, as reported in the work of Johnson Matthew, the culture is the "self-
assessment" of the personality of the mass. It is the overcoming of history in the sense that it 
persists through the time69. In his point of view, Russia should be, because of its centrality, not 
only an agent-actor between the peripheries of the Eurasian continent, but an arena in which all 
values of the Eastern tradition should meet together, to be propagated. The division and 
consolidation of equal values between the whole Eurasia will create a Eurasian culture, which, 
then over time, can expand itself between all the Eurasian countries70. 
For Bitsilli, the beginning of XX century represented the time of fragmentation, the separation of 
the Western values from the Eastern and the fortification of the Eurasian identity with the 
awareness for the Eurasian people to feel themselves, ideologically, more Asian than European71. 
6.4 The Neo-Eurasians authors 
Neo-Eurasianism has in its internal configuration different characteristics, from ideological to 
political aspects. Citing Marlene Laruelle the three most influential Neo-Eurasianists are: the 
orientalist Lev N. Gumilev (1912-92) with his “the theories of ethnogenesis”; the fashionable 
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theorist Aleksandr Dugin (1962) with “the fascistic geopolitics”; and the philosopher Aleksandr 
Panarin’s (1940-2003) with “defense of a multipolar world72”.  
Gumilev shared with the Eurasians their perception of key aspects of Russian history such as the 
European influence and the relation with the Mongols. However, he put forward a more radical 
interpretation of these aspects of Russian history, in particular regarding Russian relations with the 
Mongolian state73. The Soviet historian, although did not develop a real political theory, denied 
explicitly the Western ideas and liberalism, especially by a strong critic of the Europocentrism, in 
the vision as ideological proponent of all the civilizations. Gumilev developed an original theory of 
“ethnogenesis”, based on the concept of organic nature of the ethnic groups. Through this 
concept, explained in his book the rhythms of Eurasia74, he attempted to explain the regularities of 
the historical process from the point of view of natural sciences. 
Gumilev stressed mostly the determining influence of landscape on the culture and political 
system of the ethnic group – a peculiar basis of the Eurasianism. In his thought the Turanian75 
(Mongol-Turkic) had an incredible positive contribution on the Russian culture and people. In 
accordance with the Eurasians, Gumilev showed the positive role that the Mongolian played in 
order to preserve the Russian identity culture.  
According to Alexander Titov of University of London, “Gumilev’s relation to Eurasianism had 
several aspects. First, he accepted many important Eurasian ideas, especially those dealing with 
the geographical nature of Eurasia and its history, and continued to develop these ideas in a more 
thorough and comprehensive way. For example, he brought into focus Russia’s relations with the 
Eurasian nomads in much greater detail than the Eurasians themselves.  Second, Gumilev shared 
with the Eurasians the perception of such key aspects of Russian history as the European influence 
and relations with the Mongols. The radicalism of Eurasian views on Russian history was a reaction 
to the events of Russian history which they lived through76”. 
The affinity with the classic Eurasians was based on a rejection of Western reforms, an emphasis 
on non-occidental influences on Russia and development of the traditional sentiment of Russian 
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conservative nationalist thought. In the case of Gumilev the alternative to the West was the 
nomadic influence77 . 
Aleksandr Panarin was in the Yeltsin era a promoter of “people’s capitalism” and in the Putin era 
an advocate of “the restoration of both Orthodox spirituality and Stalinist statehood78”.  
From a political and economic side, Panarin accentuated several distinctions between classical 
liberalism and neo-liberalism. According to him, classical liberalism, demanded liberty to work 
without hindrance, and the right to benefit from one’s own labor. This certainly had benefits for 
society, and was not incompatible with a life centered on the values of family, church, and nation. 
Contemporary neo-Liberalism, however, in his vision, has a very different agenda: it seeks 
"emancipation" for the individual, and an excessive formalization of the citizen’s relations with 
fellow citizens and the state. Panarin argued, as reported by the study of Alexander-Davey Ethan, 
that: “The advance of neo-Liberalism is bringing about the slow death of civilization “for 
emancipation means not liberty to work, but freedom from all hardship, which inevitably comes to 
be understood as a right to complete self-gratification. What is far worse, emancipation signifies 
freedom from the constraints of religious and cultural traditions, which have furnished societies 
with the norms and prohibitions without which civilized life would be impossible79”. 
Generally, Panarin supported the idea that the liberals in their struggle to eradicate the traditional 
bases of civilization, they do not only endanger the political order of their countries; but they also 
doom their national economy to an eventual collapse. 
Retracing the analysis of Ethan from Cambridge University, Panarin stressed in line with the other 
Eurasians the necessity to mark the difference between the West and the Eurasian ideology. The 
research for a third way, between the Western universalism and the particularism of the non-
European world represented the main idea of his thought. Panarin’s work was focused on the 
research for a third way, between the West’s egalitarian universalism and the ethnic particularism 
of the non-European world. One of the intriguing ideas of Panarin, visible in his work the 
“Orthodox Civilization in a Global World”, is the need for a combination of the Eurasian religions 
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into something, what he called the “Great Tradition80”. His first vision of Eurasian religion wanted 
to combine the Orthodox Christianity and Islam. This idea was later abandoned in favor of an 
Orthodox supremacies and a renewed pan-Slavism, due to the bombardment of Serbia81 by the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).  
Some elements of the Dugin’s thought, as the ideological war against the Atlanticism or his radical 
character are already been introduced in the previous paragraphs transversely.  
The figure of Dugin, the most controversial exponent between the Neo-Eurasians, reflects properly 
the modern ideas and the radical changing of the Eurasianism after the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union. For this reason the next paragraph wants to offer an overview about the principal ideas of 
this contemporary Russian philosopher. 
6.5 Alexander Dugin, between Eurasianism and Nationalism 
Fundamentally, inside the Neo-Eurasianism can be identified two schools: the Modernizers and 
the Expansionists. The Modernizers, combining elements of Socialism and Nationalism, supports 
the principle that the end of the Cold War signed the decline of both America and Russia. 
Following this assumption, the advocates of this current as the Russian journalist Aleksandr A. 
Prokhanov (1938), claim that Russia must concentrate its potential on economic and technological 
improvements instead to enter in a hypothetic war against the United States of America.  
Instead, the Expansionists continue supporting the idea that the world is divided in two block, 
Eurasian and Atlanticism, a reason because Russia must expresses worldwide its force of great 
power. In this group the prominent figure can be identified in Aleksand Gele'vic Dugin82.  
Dugin, a Russian nationalist, has become popular in Russia, due to his radical ideas about a Slavic 
Union and the Russian Nationalism. In support of that, he founded the International Eurasian 
Movement on the 30th of May 2002 and was appointed professor at the Moscow State University 
in 2008.  
In his geopolitical ideas, as expressed by Ostrovsky Max, contained in the book “Osnovy 
Geopolitiki” (Foundations of Geopolitics, 1997), the Russian philosopher combined the theories of 
his two favorite geopolitical authors, Mackinder and Haushofer. From the former he adopted the 
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Heartland idea, which would form the nucleus of the Eurasian alliance; and from the latter the 
notion of the Eurasian Bloc, along which would be united the very anti-hegemonic Alliance83. 
In an ideological and historical analysis of a continent, for Dugin assumes the cultural aspect and 
the context a key-role in understanding the precise evolution of every singular global region and 
its population. In fact, he openly stresses as there is not only the European culture which has 
made the whole world, but exist many other cultures with proper identities which can be created 
only by the people that share same values in a specific context – as Eurasia.     
Next to the culture, the context has a particular valence in Dugin’s thought, because things can 
assume their real meaning only in relation to the environment and the precise historical time.  
Though, Dugin’s intention is not to deny the importance of Western culture in the history of 
civilization, but to separate the Western and American culture from the Slavic, in order to 
distinguish the differentiation between the civilizations of the world clearly. This main idea is 
traced in his book "The Fourth Political Theory" (2012), where the Russian contemporary 
Philosopher stated principally the Eurasianism as the theory of Slavic civilization and Russia's role 
as the political and economic leader of the Eurasian space84. 
Generally, Eurasia differs from the Western ideology, because the Slavic culture, as has already 
been highlighted by Danilevsky, has its own roots and symbols in the Pan-Slavic tradition. 
Specifically, the Panslavism and Western culture do not reject each other; rather in the historical 
evolution of the cultures, the Slavic accepted the main elements of Western philosophy, 
implementing them with its own characteristics. The result of this process is that the two cultures 
are dominated by same elements, proposed but in a different way with different facets. 
In the Western civilization Dugin identified not the classic European culture, but the politic and 
economic sphere of influence of USA, an ideology marked by Capitalism and Individualism. To 
preserve the Russian spirituality, “duchovnost’”, should be built an alliance between the Eastern 
cultures against the threat of the Atlanticism85. 
Dugin, following Mackinder's ideas, believes that the Anglo-American alliance constitutes one pole 
in the world of today against the continental pole, which Russia is accustomed to establishing for 
centuries. According to Dugin, the modern Russian task is to form such a continental bloc against 
                                                          
83
 Cf. Ostrovsky Max (2008): “The idea of Eurasia“. In Working Paper (Helmut Kohl Institute for European Studies), 
64/2008. European Forum at Hebrew University, Marjorie Mayrock Center for Russian, Eurasian and East European 
Researcher. P. 24 
84
 Dugin Alexander (2012): "The Fourth Political Theory". Arktos Media Ltd. London 
85
 Cf. Frank Susi K. (2003): “Eurasianismus Projekt eines russischen „dritten Weges” 1921 und heute“, in: Europa und 
die Grenzen im Kopf. Klagenfurt. P. 220   
42 
 
the Atlantic power by making use of the vast strategic and demographic potential of the Eurasian 
region. Since the Russians are in control of the Eurasian ‘Heartland’ and because of a geopolitical 
necessity and reality, the Eurasian bloc, that include the territories of the former Soviet Union, 
should be founded under the leadership of the Russians86.  
Regarding the Eurasian bloc, thus the former Soviet republics principally, Dugin underlines the 
necessity for Russia, mostly after the Cold War that showed as Russia alone could not confront 
itself against the Atlantic bloc, to have a close alliance between all the Eurasian states – “the 
Rimland” as defined by Spykman –, in order to create an Eurasian Empire that could contrast the 
American hegemony87. Following the model of Haushofer about an alliance “Mittel Europa - 
Eurasia - Japan”, as instrument to contrast the Continental bloc, the Dugin’s project of the axis 
“Berlin-Moscow-Tokyo”, would establish the own “Grossraum” or pan-region along the Pan-
American one – the framework of the desired and forthcoming multipolar world88. 
Dugin has grounded through his work the Neo-Eurasianist aversion to the US and the Anglo-Saxon 
world.  
According to Alexander Höllwerth, “Dugin's thought in his Eurasian vision appears esoteric, as it 
was influenced by the philosophical view of Plato on the nation as a civilization. The esoteric nature 
of Dugin is apparently in his work, because he claims that the ancient symbols of East and West 
show two types of civilization: the sea (Anglo-America) and the land (Eurasia). Eurasia means rise, 
while sea decline89”. 
In his interpretation about Eurasia, the Russian nationalist Dugin started from the incipit that the 
Eurasian idea collides against a globalized and universal identity; because Eurasianism has its own 
Pan-Slavic roots and history. In addition, he criticized the secularism of Catholicism and the 
characteristics of American culture, which, has prevailed throughout the world, especially after the 
Second World War. Here, Eurasianism has, according to Dugin, a multipolar prospective, that 
refuses the unipolar American hegemony: “The pole in this multipolar approach neither a nation 
state nor an ideological block as a large area, which is connected from the borders of a common 
society strategically. The typical large rooms are: Europe, USA, Canada, Mexico, Latin America, the 
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Great China, India and Eurasia. Eurasia is the area of the old tsarist empire of Russia and the Soviet 
Union. We call it "the Great Russia (Bolshaya Rossia)", or even Russia as Eurasia. Because of that, 
to ensure the independent pole, we must unite different countries in a geopolitical, economic and 
centralized unit, so that we, the Eurasian civilization, can describe ourself as an equal community 
not only for the Russians and Slavs, but also for the Turks and the indigenous people of Central 
Asia, Siberian and Caucasians90“. 
The Great Russia is according to Dugin a political unit, which is based on the similarity between the 
history of civilization and culture of different ethnic groups and peoples: “Sometimes is common to 
think that the Soviet Union was a communist creation and states as Ukraine, Kazakhstan and 
Azerbaijan were before the Soviet Union independent and were conquered by the Bolsheviks. The 
fact is that these nations have never really existed and were during the Soviet time only corporate 
districts without a real political or historical sense. These countries have been created in their 
present borders only after the collapse of the Soviet Union as result of its collapse”91.  
Dugin's Neo-Eurasianism implies a very specific type of nationalism, namely the nationalism of the 
New Right, and can itself be considered a Russian version of the broad pan-European movement, 
called the European New Right92. Indeed, citing Anton Shekhovtsov, “The analysis of Dugin fully 
agrees with the European New Right concept of organic nations, and defines the 'etnos' as an 
'immediate identity of an individual of the traditional society, from which he draws everything - 
language, customs, psychological and cultural attitudes, life program, and system of age-related 
and social identifications *…+ Dugin believes the nature of an ethnic community to be superior to, 
and deeper than, that of a state, Neo-Eurasianism refutes the idea of a modern nation-state, even 
the Russian one, and promotes the concept of a 'Eurasian empire' built on the principles of 
'Eurasian federalism'. According to the concept, all the political units of this 'empire' should be 
established in accordance with cultural, historical, and ethnic identifications rather than simple 
administrative division93”. 
Considering the actual project of the EEU, Dugin stressed in an interview of May 2015 that the 
idea of the Eurasian Union does not want force any independent country into the Russian sphere 
of influence, but in reality it wants, through an integration to Russia, to prevent the inevitable 
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collapse of the former Soviet republics, as already happened in 2008 with the splitting of Georgia 
or 2014 with Crimea94. 
In his book, the Foundations of Geopolitics, he outlined his political and ideological vision of 
Russia’s place in the world, as well as revisionist and expansionist foreign policy, hailing the ascent 
of Vladimir Putin. Here, as underlined by Shekhovtsov, it is possible to recognize obvious 
similarities between Dugin’s and Putin’s narratives: anti-Westernism, expansionism and rejection 
of liberal democracy95.  
By the words of Dugin, we can feel his strong nationalist spirit and support to the Eurasian 
integration with the Russian leader role greatly. This concept results even more clear when Dugin 
emphasizes that Putin should unite all the nations that were part of the Soviet Union at that time, 
again, to prevent their collapse. Their integration in Eurasia can protect the Slavic society and all 
the states neighbors of Russia that all together – due to their same identity – can cooperate in a 
better way. 
At this point, after having analyzed the main idea of Dugin, we have to recognize as his position 
appears very nationalist and radical. In fact, for example the filo Russians and Separatist in Ukraine 
were inspired by his idea of a "Bolshaya Rossia" (Great Russia). 
Resuming the Dugin's thought, it can be synthesized in two concepts: 1) Russia as a solution for 
the demise of the former Soviet republics and 2) the Eurasian ideology as bond of the Eurasian 
nations, in contrast to the Western and American culture.   
6.6 Dugin’s economic theory 
Dedicating attention to Dugin’s economic theory, the prinicipal idea of the Russian philosopher is 
that the West replaced the natural law with markets. The markets took the science and made it as 
an annex to the commercial dominance. The concept of the pure mechanism of the Renaissance 
was: “A world whose meaning was reduced to something artificially as a machine, without the 
establishment of the meaning of things in a social context. That represents the essence of the 
capitalism. Capitalism is based on the basis of egocentrism, the denial of private property (with the 
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exception of a few), and, perhaps most important, that the morale and culture have no place in the 
"rational" economy96”.   
The economy, if is related to the historical context properly, plays a crucial role in the attachment 
of power, which, according to Dugin, allows to obtain a consolidated position in the geopolitical 
scene. This gives the opportunity to exercise pressure and power over the various parts of the 
world.  
Connecting his economic reasoning to the Eurasianism, the Eurasian idea is subordinated on the 
common good of the community. Both competition and cooperation occupy an important place in 
the Eurasian economic mechanisms that make the production more efficient.  
In this context, the Eurasian Economic Union has the task nowadays to coordinate the Eurasian 
economy properly, allowing the creation of a unique market that can be competitive with the rest 
of the world. Here, is important the figure of Russia that, as predominant nation in Eurasia, must 
synchronize the internal economies of the diverse participants of the Union, so that the internal 
development of every state can improve and be strong enough to be competitive in the worldwide 
scenario.  
7 Mongolian Eurasianism  
Between the different interpretations of Eurasianism, this paragraph will be dedicated about to 
the Mongolian Eurasian vision. 
Historically, it was around 1219 when the Mongols first entered the areas nearest Kievan Russia. 
The Mongols organized Russia as they did their own state in order to introduce into the country 
law, order, and prosperity. As a result of this policy the Mongols gave the conquered country the 
basic elements of future Muscovite statehood: autocracy, centralism and serfdom97.  
Principally, the Mongol impact in the Russian territory let two contrasting ideological views, that 
emerged during the Bolshevik Revolution: 1) the Soviet historians, as Vasily Bartold, who have 
stressed the negative aspects of the Mongol conquest and argued as the Tatar rule delayed the 
development of a unified Russian culture, economy and national state. And 2) The Eurasian school 
of Russian émigrés that considered the Russia's unification under Moscow as the direct outgrowth 
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of Mongol rule: "The Russian state was the heir, successor, and continuer of Chingis-khan's historic 
work98".  
Concentrating on the vision of the Russian émigrés, the Mongol impact proved highly beneficial to 
the Russians: "The Tatars defended Russia from Europe," sparing it from conquest by the West. 
After the conquest Mongols and the people of Rus coexisted in harmony and peace. From their 
conquerors the Rus adopted typical Turanian character traits: steadiness, conviction, strength, and 
religiosity, all of which promoted the development of the Muscovite state99.  
Among the Eurasian authors, Trubetzkoy dedicated particular emphasis on the Mongolian 
influence in the Russian and Soviet history. Precisely, in the opera "the legacy of Genghis Khan: a 
perspective on Russian history not from the west but from the east" he affirmed as almost all the 
territories of the USSR were a part of the Mongolian empire founded by the Great Genghis-
Khan100. De facto in his analysis the Russian philosopher proposed to consider the empire of the 
Mongols as the predecessor of the Russian state. According to Trubetzkoy, the importance of 
Genghis-Khan in Eurasian history was underscored by the fact that the Emperor of the Mongol 
Empire fulfilled the unification of Eurasia. Thus, in the historical analysis of Trubetzkoy, Genghis-
Khan had a profound historical importance because his actions helped to realize the “systemic” 
nature of the Eurasian region in the form of a single state. Specifically, the great Mongol warrior, 
according to Trubetzkoy’s analysis, professed precise ideas that corresponded to what the 
Eurasianists called “ideocracy” (the rule of a powerful idea that transcended particular realms of 
culture, scholarship, religion, or politics).  
Summarizing, Trubetzkoy, concerning the Mongolian impact in the Russian historical development, 
affirmed its positive significance for the Russian evolution, equating the processes of 
transformation of Moscow under the impact of the Mongols to the course of changing described 
by the Eurasian authors for the transformation of Russia under the impact of the Bolsheviks. 
The same point of view was affirmed by George Vernadsky, who stressed as the Mongol cultural 
impact was considerable and occupied a central place in the Russian history. For Vernadsky also 
the Tatar influence on Muscovite administrative and military affairs was very profound. 
Commonly, the Mongolian impact was considered by Eurasians as a notable fact for the Russian 
historical and administrative transformation. 
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Deepening the analysis, it is important to underline the purely Mongolian view about Eurasianism. 
The Eurasian vision from the Mongolians is visible in the figure of Erendzhen Khara-Davan (1883-
1942), who with his ideas gave originality about Russia’s origins, stressing the Asian nature of 
Russia.  
Khara-Davan was a Kalmyk national democrat and enlightenment figure. In 1920 he emigrated 
along with the Russian White Army and settled in Yugoslavia where he earned his living as a doctor 
and wrote articles and books. In his vision of Eurasianism he stressed principally the Asian nature 
of Russia and its evolution connected with the Mongolian empire. According to the theoretician 
Pavel Pryanikov, Khara-Davan was certain that before Peter I, Moscovy (the country that in Peter’s 
time started to be called Russia) had nothing in common with Europe but was part of Asia and that 
the Mongol horde created Muscovy and Russian centralization for its convenience101 .  
In the examination of the Russian evolution, Khara-Davan underlined as the uniqueness of Russia 
is connected to the fact that it until the 16th century did not have social strata like the European 
feudalism. In his book “Chingiz Khan the Great Conquerer” (1928), as reported by Goble Paul, 
Khara-Davan argued: “There was no feudalism in Kyivan Rus’”. The feudalization of Rus took place 
in the Mongol period. “It involved primarily the Moscow principality, which transferred from the 
Horde into the service of the prince with many Tatars who brought with them a special eastern 
feudalism, based on the Turkic instate of tarkhanism”. *...+ The organization of Russia which was 
the result of the Mongol yoke was undertaken by the Asian conquerors of course not for the good 
of the Russian people and not for the elevation of the Moscow grand principality but for the 
Mongols’ own interests and the convenience of administering a large conquered territory102.” 
Thus, according to Khara-Davan, the Mongols have had a decisive impact for the Russian culture 
and have established something like an administrative hierarchy which prepared the ground for 
the establishment of a centralized state. It has the meaning that the Mongolians have played a 
decisive role in the historical evolution of Russia. For that the Mongolian Eurasianism supports the 
idea about the Asian roots of Russia and its well administrative organization due to the Mongolian 
presence. 
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8 Turkish Eurasianism and view about the Eurasian Union 
An original vision of Eurasianism between the Eurasian ideas is connected with the Turkish 
interpretation of Eurasia. 
Starting the analysis from a brief historical background, the Turks are descendant from the Huns, 
who decided to leave the area around Lake he Baikal and present Mongolia-Northern China in 
order to avoid submission to Chinese rule more than 2000 years ago. In the year 1071 a large 
branch of the nomadic Turks entered in Anatolia through the Caucasus and won the battle of 
Manzikert against the Byzantine Empire. Over the centuries they more or less lost their Eurasian 
roots and characteristics, became highly affected by the Islamic culture, mixed with the local 
Anatolian and Middle Eastern populations and thus lost their links with the other Turkic people 
that today habit Central Asia, Tataristan and other parts of Eurasia103. 
From this historical view is possible to advance the meaning of Eurasia conferring to the Turkish 
perspective.  
According to the interpretation of Dr. Golam, in the Turkish academic debates, Eurasia is 
considered of those areas and regions where mainly the Turkic peoples are settled, including the 
areas of modern day Turkey, the Balkans, part of the former USSR, Central Asia, the regions of 
Volga and Afghanistan104. In other words, citing the geopolitical expert Ali Külebi, Eurasia is: The 
vast region that encompasses the entirety of Europe and Asia from Atlantic to Pacific; Lisbon to 
Vladivostok. It is the region stretching towards the west and the east of the Ural Mountains. It is 
the region that has sheltered the Turkish and Slavic peoples – Turkish, Mongolian, Slavic, 
Hungarian and Finnish – for centuries. And finally, in its narrowest sense, Eurasia can be defined as 
the region the Turkish states, in other words, the Turkish world, inhabit105.  
This definition resumes aspects of the Mackinder’s vision about the greatness of this global region 
and its strong characterization by the variegated Slavic population. Reporting this vision to the 
notion of Turkish Eurasianism, we can evince as it is closely connected with the Slavic identity and 
with the theory based on Turkish-Slavic unification. Within this approach, as the orientalist 
Alexander Kadirbayev emphasized, the ideal of a stronger Eurasia lies in the unification of the 
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Turkish and Slavic peoples. According to Kadirbayev, as stressed in the work of Külebi Ali, 
“Eurasianism is grounded on the steppe and forest, in other words on the unification of the Turkish 
and Slavic peoples. Expansionism, crossing borders and foundation of mighty states are all results 
of the steppe culture. This is how the Turkish character was formed106”.  
For Dr. Golam Turkish Eurasianism is mainly a plan of creating commonwealth of Turkic states and 
the idea was more active and popular during the early 1990s after the collapse of the USSR when 
the five independent Central Asian states were created, having close links with Turkey (except 
Tajikistan) historically, culturally and ethno-linguistically. Here, the discourses of Turkish 
Eurasianism can, according to Özgür Tüfekçi, be classified into three separate types: nationalist 
Eurasianism, multiculturalist Eurasianism, and Westernist Eurasianism107.  
By this analysis the mayor components of Eurasianism are attributable to the religion, Islam, and 
to the prominence of the primary role attributable to Turkey in Eurasia. In its connection with the 
religious aspect, the Turkic-Muslim understanding of Eurasianism is propagated and supported by 
the Turkic-Muslim population in Russia that believe as Russia can be a Eurasian power only by the 
recognition of its Muslim population. However, this vision is mainly limited in academic and 
intellectual debate and discussion, where mostly is assumed that will be hardly any scope and 
support for a separate Eurasianism based only on the solidarity of Turkic-Muslim ideology108. 
Actually, regarding a possible entrance of Turkey in the Eurasian Economic Union, the tree groups 
have a diverse vision about its role. The most ambitious one comes from the nationalists that see 
Turkey as the leader of the Union. While the multiculturalists argue that Turkey and Russia might 
share the leadership, or the Westernists that propose as Turkey might be one of the significant 
players in the Union109. 
It is mostly because Turkey, like Russia, has Caucasian, Balkan, Middle Eastern, and European 
identities and different interests at stake in all of these regions – something that has inevitably 
influenced the regional Turkish policy and its role in the Eurasian region110. 
                                                          
106
 Külebi Ali (2006): “The forgotten option: Turkish Eurasianism”. In Daily News. 
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/the-forgotten-option-turkish-eurasianism.aspx?pageID=438&n=the-forgotten-
option-turkish-eurasianism-2006-08-23  (Last view: 04.01.2017) 
107
 Özgür Tüfekçi (2014): “Ahmet Davutoğlu's Foreign Policy Understanding: A Blend of Westernist and 
Multiculturalism Eurasianism”. The Arab World Geographer: September 2014, Vol. 17, No. 3. P. 277 
108
 Golam Mostafa (2013): “The concept of ‘Eurasia’: Kazakhstan’s Eurasian policy and its implications”. In Journal of 
Eurasian Studies. 19 March 2013. P. 163 
109
 Cit. Locl Özgür Tüfekçi (2014). P. 279 
110
 Gerald Marius S. (2012): "Russian Eurasianism vs. Turkey’s Eurasia?" Ministerul Finantelor Publice Bucuresti. P. 6 
50 
 
This point of view is confirmed by Professor Ramazan Ozey of Marmara University, with the 
approach "The Theory of Center Domination by Turks." Anatolia is the "World Fortress" (Dunya 
kalesi in Turkish, or the Heartland in classical sense), and the ruler-country in Anatolia, Turkey, 
possessing this acropolis, has an opportunity to take control over the regions of the "Internal 
circle111". 
In a comparison with the Russian Eurasianism, the most important difference of the Turkish 
approach, as expressed by Turkish foreign Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, is linked to the 
rejection of the conflict with Western civilization, positioning instead Turkey as a bridge between 
Western and Muslim civilization. While Eurasians attribute importance to the geopolitical location 
of Russia, Davutoğlu puts forward the uniqueness of Turkey and its position112 “Turkey holds an 
optimal place in the sense that it is both an Asian and European country and is also close to Africa 
through the Eastern Mediterranean. A central country with such an optimal geographic location 
cannot define itself in a defensive manner. It should be seen neither as a bridge country which only 
connects two points, nor a frontier country, nor indeed as an ordinary country, which sits at the 
edge of the Muslim world or the West113”. 
From a political side, the Eurasianism in Turkey affirmed itself after the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union, when the Turks discovered their kinship with this geographic region, allowing the arising of 
the pan-Turkish sentiment. Former Turkish president Süleyman Demirel spoke often of a “Turkish 
World from the Adriatic Sea to the Great Wall of China.” By this, he meant almost all territories of 
Turkic states in the Caucasus and Central Asia, but also former Ottoman territories in the Balkans, 
and possibly the Arab peninsula. In 1990s the Turkish left and right wing thinkers and politicians, 
as well as representatives of a number of pro-Islamic and pan-Turkist political forces, elaborated a 
model of Turkey's Eurasian policy, as a complete alternative to the pro-Western foreign political 
strategy. This approach is based on the idea of cooperation of the most important powers of 
Eurasia, Turkey, Iran and Russia, against the "Western imperialism114." After 1991, intellectuals, 
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entrepreneurs, scholars, and institutions started to use “Eurasia” instead of “the Turkish World,” 
because it sounded more politically neutral115.  
But, from the Russian perspective, especially in the Neo-Eurasian vision of Dugin, the role of 
Turkey in the Eurasian Union or in an alliance with Moscow was at the beginning of the 2000s 
strongly criticized because of its partnership with the NATO: “As a national state and NATO 
member, Turkey is inimical to the Eurasian project. Its selective assistance to the Chechen 
separatists, the permanent old Turkish- Armenian dispute, its supporting of an anti-Moscow 
atmosphere in Baku, and all issues connected with the construction of Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil 
pipeline, evidently suits the pro-Atlantic and anti-Eurasian strategies of Ankara116”. 
Although this vision was reviewed by Dugin in last years, the role of Turkey rests emblematic for 
its possible joining of the Eurasian Union. Indeed, the Russian volition to integrate Turkey in its 
system is dictated by the fact to diminish Turkish contacts with the European Union, avoiding in 
the same time the possible political and military approach of the USA in Turkey and thus near the 
Russian borders. For that Russia’s desire is to give a particular emphasis to Eurasianism in the 
Turkish ideological approach, exalting the own Eurasian culture and tradition, in order to 
strengthen the Eurasian identity in the country, consolidating the idea of USA as an extern agent, 
incompatible with the Eurasian region.  
9 Caucasian and Central Asian conception of Eurasianism  
Concluding the section dedicated to the study of the diverse Eurasian thinkers, is necessary to 
mention the Caucasian and Central-Asian authors that externalized a dissimilar idea about the 
central role of the Russian Federation in Eurasia. 
On the whole, the exponents of Eurasianism can be divided into two main categories: the authors 
that emphasize the dominance of Russia and its strength in the Eurasian region; and the thinkers 
that deny the idea of the Russian leadership within the Eurasian space.  
Analyzing the first group is immediately patent, that the authors of this current share totally the 
idea about the main role of Russia as a leader state in the Eurasian context. Belonging to this 
vision are the Eurasian classical and neo-classical writers. The principal fact that must be 
considered here is that these authors, as Danilevsky, Trubetzkoy, Savitsky, Gumilev or Dugin,  have 
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mostly East-European and Russian origins and, although lived in different epochs, commonly, have 
given emphasis on the strategic position of Russia in the Eurasian continent. In fact, according to 
these thinkers, Russia can be identified as the center of Eurasia and therefore has the natural right 
and power to control the entire Eurasian region, playing de facto a dominant role in this region.  
In opposition to this flow of thinkers there is a category of writers that criticized the strict 
dominance of the Russian leadership in Eurasia. Authors of this group, as Osmanov, Simavoryan, 
Matikeeva, Sengupta, Tolipov, Shrielman, Ivanov117, for the truth agree with the conception about 
the Russian central position in the region, according to the fact that due to geographical aspects, 
the Russian Federation occupies a special and privileged role in Eurasia. But, in contradiction to 
the Russian centralism, these thinkers believe that Russia is not the only dominant nation and core 
of the Eurasian space. Indeed, this controversial current supports the idea that the Eurasian center 
would be in China, or in Central Asia or in the Caucasus. 
However, here must be considered as the authors of this particular vision have Caucasian and 
Central-Asian origins, and that their point of view is inspired by the ideological collision with the 
Russian strong position.  
Moreover, is essential to note that they do not have any individual or coherent theory of 
Eurasianism, rather they challenge the idea of the leader position of Russia, arguing that the 
concept is controversial and divisive. 
In their elaboration of Eurasian Union, their fundamental criticism on such association is related to 
the absence of a solid political and economic base, which does not allow Russia and the other 
members of the Union to create a community that can compete with other nations or unions of 
the world. The problem lies exactly in the role of Russia, a nation that has a too marked dominant 
position in the Eurasian context in comparison with the other Eurasian states – something which 
makes difficult to determine a proper division of responsibilities between its various political 
actors and that represents the still ongoing problem of the EEU nowadays. Basically speaking, 
these Eurasian thinkers have noticed and recognized that, from political and economic view, 
Russia has the most important role in the organization of Eurasia. But, in this context of disparities 
between the different actors would be difficult to create an organization of states that can be yes 
united from an ideological view, but that from an economic and political basis, will be always 
subordinated to its principal entity, seen exactly in the force of Russia. 
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First section conclusion 
The analysis of the first section was conducted to discover the theory of Eurasianism, its facets and 
development. We evinced that this ideology during the XX century, especially by authors as 
Danilevsky, Trubetzkoy and Savitsky, affirmed the particular character of the Eurasian identity, as 
diverse from the Romano-Germanic culture. 
Such dogma however encountered difficulties to affirm itself among the Russian thinkers of the 
1920s, due to the predominant theory of that epoch: the Bolshevism. Thoug, the Eurasian idea 
was able to survive between the Russian philosophers by the fact of its similitudes with the Soviet 
ideology, mostly in the exaltation of the Russian culture and the role of Russia towards the 
Eurasian scenario, as coordinator state of the region. 
But, the concrete consolidation of Eurasianism was visible during the years of the Perestroika and 
during the 1990s after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, where the Russian politicians tried to 
save the union, referring to the Eurasian ideas, in order to compact the Soviet republics under the 
leadership of Moscow ideologically.   
Although the scope to save the Soviet Union was not reached, the theory of Eurasianism survived 
or rather consolidated its ideas among the Russian thinkers. The opportunity to develop its 
notions towards the Eurasian states was dictated by the ideological defeat of Communism that 
opened the way for the affirmation of the Eurasian idea as primary ideology in Russia and Eurasia. 
Precisely, the period 1980-1990s, confirmed the acknowledgment of the Eurasianism in Eurasia 
and contemporarily its evolution from the classic vision in the modern, with the consequence of 
the mutation of the ideology as simple theory of cultural exaltation in a populist movement. 
In this panorama, it is important to note as the affirmation of the Eurasian idea is even connected 
with the Western geopolitical school, especially in the figures of Mackinder and Haushofer, who 
underlined the political and economic importance of the Eurasian landmass. Specifically, they 
emphasized the particular character of this part of the world for its economic resources, as oil and 
gas, and the military strategic role of this region world, pivotal for the world political and 
economic equilibrium. 
The Western geopolitical school played a decisive role in the evolution of Eurasianism, moving its 
axis to a more radical way. The reviews of authors such Mackinder and Haushofer after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, was the decisive step to the consolidation of Eurasianism as ideology 
of Eurasia and to its passage to the form of Neo-Eurasianism. 
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Exactly here, the main exponent of Neo-Eurasianism, Aleksandr Dugin, with its Eurasian Manifesto 
conferred to the ideology a more radical character. Through the Neo-Eurasians authors, the theory 
changed its cultural approach, seeing as the first Eurasian threates the globalization and the 
American influence. Explicitly, the events of the Second World War and the vicissitudes of the Cold 
War showed the global strength of USA in the world scenario as threat for Russia and its force. In 
this scenario, the ideological conflict was moved from the clash between the Slavic and Romano-
Germanic culture, to the war between Eurasian and Atlanticism. By this point, we can evince the 
particular physiognomy of Eurasianism of the XXI century: a populist movement that exalts the 
Russian hegemony against the American threat. For the Neo-Eurasians, in order to win the 
ideological and economic struggle against the USA, all the Eurasian states need to be united and 
solid against the Western threat, establishing the Eurasian Union under the leadership of the most 
prominent country of the region – the Russian Federation.  
According to the modern interpretation of the Eurasianism, the Eurasian Union assumes its 
fundamental significance of integration: only a united Eurasia under the leadership of a strong 
nation (Russia) can be able to contrast the effects of the globalization and revive the Russian 
predominance worldwide, exalting in the same time the Eurasian culture globally. 
The connection between Neo-Eurasianism and the Eurasian process of integration, justifies the 
choice of this section to dedicate more emphasis to the analysis of the modern vision of this 
theory, because it, with its peculiarities, represents the conceptual pillar of the actual Eurasian 
Economic Union.  
The expression of this thesis is connected with the fact, that the Neo-Eurasianism, through the 
exaltation of the uniqueness of the Russian culture and the necessity for the Eurasian states to be 
unified in order to develop a strong Eurasian community and market economy, gives a solid 
ideological basis not only to Russia but to all the actual participants of the Union, that feel 
themselves as an unique coalition, exalting the Slavic brotherhood against the extern threats 
concretely. 
However, regarding this thesis it is necessary to make two considerations: 1) from a side we must 
assert that the evolution of Eurasianism in its modern vision assumed a too strong radical 
character.  
2) From the other side, we can affirm that the direct Neo-Eurasianism ideological support of the 
Slavic population and the concrete volition to assure stability in the region, especially economic, 
attest as the Eurasian idea represents that ideological pillar of the Eurasian Union, that can 
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favorite the internal integration and the expansion of the Union, if, however, the leadership of 
Russia will be accepted by the other counterparts of Eurasia – especially non Russian people and 
states.  
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SECTION II 
Eurasianism as ideological basis of the Eurasian Economic Union, an introduction 
The analysis about the origins of the Eurasianism and the specificity of the three major schools 
(classic, geopolitical and modern) of this movement, have had the merit to underline the 
geopolitical importance related to the Eurasian region.  
The integration between the former Soviet states and their connection with Eurasianism has 
embraced two principal epochs: 1) the period from 1920 to the end of the USSR, where the classic 
Eurasians as Trubetzkoy and Savitsky accentuated clearly a cultural legacy between the Eurasian 
states against the Westernization of the society. Here, the classic Eurasians wanted to affirm the 
necessity of alliance between all the Eurasian countries and thus to create a community united by 
same identity roots, culture and values. In their vision, they auspicated a change of the Soviet 
Union into the Eurasian Union, replacing the Bolshevism and Communism with the Eurasianism. 
The Eurasians, however, did not success to develop this idea in that period of time, because the 
Russian thinkers were literally entranced by the Bolshevik thought. 
2) The period after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the new millennium where due to the 
revision of the Neo-Eurasians, the movement assumed a radical vision, giving to the Russian 
Federation the task to embrace all the former Soviet countries under its wings in order to protect 
them against the American threat, and in same time to give Russia again a role of strong nation 
worldwide. 
The main idea of Eurasia as independent ideological region of the world and the accentuation 
about the leadership of Russia as primal coordinator of the entire Eurasian space allowed the 
Russian Federation after the end of the Soviet Union to maintain a precise control over the former 
Soviet countries and advanced the idea about the possibility to create an Eurasian Union. 
Concretely, the idea of the Eurasian Union was formulated after the end of the USSR, as necessity 
for the new republics to unite themselves in order to guarantee internal stability and 
development. However, at the end of 20th century, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the 
declarations of the West Geopolitical Schools about the strategic position of Eurasia opened the 
way to the Neo-Eurasianism to consolidate its populist ideas in the post-Soviet scenario. 
Chronologically, an embryonic project of Eurasian Union was proposed already in 1989 by the 
Soviet dissident Andrei Sakharov (1921-1989). In a reunion of the Democratic MPs about the sorts 
of the Soviet Union, Sakharov, fielded against the Communist Party of the USSR, affirming 
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distinctly as the Empire of the Soviet Union could not be long preserved and thus was necessary to 
replace it with a new legacy. By this situation, Sakharov proposed the idea of a Eurasian union and 
began drafting its constitution118. His idea of Eurasian Union wanted to be a method to unite the 
Soviet space through "a Constitution of the Union of the Soviet Republics of Europa and Asia119".   
The project of Sakharov wanted to pursuit the aim to establish a federation of Eurasian states, in 
order to replace the Soviet Union and its political contradictions, especially in the marked 
difference between center and periphery. 
Since the 1991 by the creation of the Commonwealth of the Independent States was attended to 
form a space of integration between the former Soviet republics. Though, this association was 
formed as an interstate organization, where, however, the fields of integrations and cooperation, 
mostly security and economic partially, were definitely weak. 
Generally, inside the different schools about Eurasianism, the establishment of a union is 
considered an integration of independent states which should allow them to strengthen their 
security, to guarantee stability and to modernize in economic terms the post-Soviet space 
completely.  
Due to the feeble integration of the CIS, seen more as forum of discussion than as very 
institutional organ of decision, during the end of the XX century and the beginning of the 2000s, 
the Eurasian projects of integration were established on the mechanisms of bilateral accords and 
specific regional programs between the different Eurasian states. In this scenario, it is necessary to 
underline as the goals of the Eurasianism were followed even in the regional projects. It is 
explained by two factors: 1) the former Soviet republics have always needed Russia, because of 
their strong economic dependence on Moscow, underlining, even after the end of the USSR, as the 
Russian position occupies the leader position of the continent. 2) The Russian Federation, 
especially since the new millennium with the ascent of Vladimir Putin, is pursuing the target to 
reestablish its hegemony over Eurasia.  
To obtain the target of enlargement of integration in Eurasia, the Russian strategy, after the end of 
the USSR, focused on the economic and security vectors. The Customs Union (CU), The Eurasian 
Economic Community (EEC), the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), as well as the 
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Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), aimed to pursue economic prosperity and stability in 
Central Asia120, represents the most relevant projects of Russian foreign policy in the first years of 
the 2000s, with the scope to reestablish its control over the territory of the former Soviet Union. 
With the growing economic crisis of 2008 and the necessity for the former Soviet countries to 
reach internal economy stability, the idea about a deeper cooperation, seen as economic necessity 
to cooperate all together in Eurasia, was always more concrete. 
In follow of that, in the year 2011 the Republic of Belarus, Russian Federation and Kazakhstan 
signed a declaration of establishment of a Eurasian Union. 
Consecutively, this embryonic integration assumed an economic connotation and since January 
2015 Lukashenka, Nazarbayev and Putin started the Eurasian Economic Union. 
In this context, is useful to remember as among the most influencing authors of the Eurasian 
Union and thus such thinkers that are supporting nowadays the integration of the post-Soviet 
space are the same leaders of the EEU. Precisely, mostly the ideas of Nazarbayev and Putin are 
today representing the two principal distinct views about the meaning of the Eurasian Union. 
In the following paragraphs the analysis will be concentrated about the significance of Eurasian 
Union for the Presidents of the three founding states of the EEU, proposing their own aims within 
this organization. For the members as Armenia and Kyrgyzstan will be proposed an explanation 
about the necessity and advantages that these states want to reach through their membership. In 
addition will be analyzed some determinant facts, as the Ukrainian civil war or the role of China, to 
understand their impact on the further development of the integration. 
10 Kazakh vision of Eurasian Union: an Economic Union  
The Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev formulated for the first time the idea about the 
establishment of the Eurasian Economic Union in spring 1994, when, during a speech in a Scientific 
Council of the Moscow State University, manifested the volition to create a new association in the 
CIS space with the aim to integrate further all Eurasian countries. This idea was embodied in the 
draft of the “Eurasian Union” (1997)121. 
The basic concept of Nazarbayev, as practical implementation of the Eurasianism, was imprinted 
to the creation of a single economic space for the mutual and internal development of Eurasia. 
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The project of the Kazakh President was formally addressed to the former Soviet republics, with 
the possibility to open the integration to all those states that would like to join the cooperation for 
a mutual benefit: the so called “practical Eurasianism”. 
According to Nazarbayev, to achieve the target of integration and mutual benefit must be 
established a strong community with a supranational power which determines a proper allocation 
and respect of the competences among all the members.  
In addition, reflecting about the official Kazakh position about the Eurasian Union, a complete 
union between all Eurasian countries would be possible due to the common feature of sharing a 
common territory and a same culture, history and tradition. The Kazakh sense of belonging to 
Eurasia and its culture is even possible to evince from the words of Dr. Mostafa: “For Kazakhstan, 
Eurasia is a unique region where all ethnic, cultural and religion groups live and co-exist peacefully 
through centuries of mutual trust, belief and understanding. *…+ Geographically, Kazakhstan is an 
Asian country and only about 10% of its territory is located in Europe but geo-politically, geo-
economically and geo-historically it considers itself as a Eurasian state122”. 
These contemplations reflect the thought of Nazarbayev, which is centered on the concepts of 
identity and ethnicity, as necessary aspects to create a solid cooperation – especially economic – 
among the Eurasian countries in order to reach a common stability.  
Indeed, in a precise territory, characterized by homogeneous values, the economic resources can 
be better organized between the different actors; and in the same time the population of this 
territory can properly and fully draw benefits from them.  
But, exactly the not precise homogeneity between the Eurasian countries – where the countries 
are not yet on a same economic level – is seen by Nazarbayev as the modern problem of the 
Eurasian integration.  
In his book of 2003 “the Strategy of the Independence123”, Nazarbayev gave his definition of what 
the Eurasian Union should be: “Eurasian Union is a union of equal independent states aiming at 
the realization of national state interests of each participating country and existing total 
integration potential. The requirements for members of Eurasian Union include a mutual 
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recognition of existing institutions of the participating countries, borders and territorial integrity, 
waiving of pressure and armed conflicts124”. 
In the idea of the Kazakh President, the Eurasian Union, which should not be a reincarnation of the 
USSR, must be instead a regional organization able to offer to its participants the preconditions to 
be part active of the organization, to mitigate the economic problems of the region due to the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and to resolve the internal conflict as result of the modernization and 
thus of the globalization125. 
Specifically, the President of Kazakhstan emphasized in his work that the obstacles for each 
community and its functioning, are associated with the lack of a common strategy. Therefore, the 
Eurasian Union must have a solid management base and must define strategic plans for the 
economic and political commitments between all the members126.  
Moreover, in the Kazakhstan’s view must be specified that the Eurasian Union is: 1) an economic 
project, not a political one. In fact, in Kazakh President’s vision of Union it must be built on 
economic pragmatism. 2) The Union must be based on the principles of equality, mutual respect 
for sovereignty and not interference into domestic affairs127. 
These two points are extremely important to understand the actual Kazakh position – similar to 
the Belarusian – about the meaning of the project of the Eurasian Economic Union. 
Looking in detail these two points, the first concept has the signification that Kazakhstan has 
nowadays joined the project of the Eurasian Economic Union exactly to obtain economic benefits 
through the cooperation between the other Eurasian states (especially to facilitate its trade with 
Russia), by the creation of common markets and thus by the abolishment of custom duties in the 
mutual trade. The second statement describes the fear of Nazarbayev about a possible politic 
engagement of the Union, where Russia, due to its centrality and territorial greatness, could limit 
the internal sovereignty of the other participants, constituting a threat for the national 
independence of all the other participants to the project. 
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As reported by Marlene Laruelle, we can evince as the Kazakh President is definitely against a 
possible development of the Union into a political dimension: “If the rules which were previously 
established in the treaty are not fulfilled, then Kazakhstan has the complete right to end its 
membership in the Eurasian Economic Union. Astana will never be in an organization which 
represents a threat to the independence of Kazakhstan128”. 
Summarizing the thought of Nazarbayev through the analysis of Dr. Golam, the principal 
characteristics and tasks of the Eurasian Union are: 1) it must be a competitor in global economic 
space. 2) It must be developed as part of the Europe Atlantic and Asian areas of development and 
economically it should be a bridge between the dynamic developments in the EU, East, South East 
and South Asia. 3) The Eurasian Union should be formed as a self-sufficient financial body which 
will be a part of the new global financial system. 4) Geo-economically and geo-politically the 
Eurasian integration should follow a special, evolutionary and voluntary path in future. 5) Such a 
Union can only be achieved through wide participation and support of the society129. 
The most important passage in the Kazakh vision of Eurasian Union is the maintaining of the 
independence of the entire Central Asia, excluding through a Eurasian Union the possibility for 
Russia to control the territory politically. In accordance with that, the Eurasian Economic Union 
must propose exclusively economic engagement for its members, affirming their national 
independence.  
Historically, the idea of Nazarbayev did not consolidate immediately in the Post-Soviet Space due 
to the lack of interests from the CIS members in a so ambitious process. However, the Eurasian 
Economic Union (2015) results nowadays the final stage of the three biggest economic integration 
steps: the Eurasian Economic Community (2000), the Customs Union (2010) and the Common 
Economic Space (2012). Here, the principal participants of these associations, Belarus, Kazakhstan 
and Russia (the troika), incarnate precisely the spirit of ideological brotherhood as imagined by the 
Eurasians and underlined from Nazarbayev in his Eurasian idea. 
 
 
 
                                                          
128
 Laruelle Marlene (2015): “Kazakhstan’s Posture in the Eurasian Union: In Search of Serene Sovereignty". In Russian 
Analytical Digest. No. 165, 17 March 2015. P. 8 
129
  Golam Mostafa (2013): “The concept of ‘Eurasia’: Kazakhstan’s Eurasian policy and its implications”. In Journal of 
Eurasian Studies. 19 March 2013P. 165 
62 
 
11 Eurasianism as ideological justification for the Russian foreign politic in Eurasia 
In order to understand the Eurasianism in its connection with the Russian idea of Eurasian Union 
properly, it is necessary to reflect about the conjunction of this doctrine with the Russian ideology 
and its politic aims primarily.   
First of all, must be stressed as the Russian Constitution does not indicate an official national 
ideology. In fact, the first two points of the article 13 of the 1° Chapter affirm: 1) in the Russian 
Federation ideological diversity should be recognized. 2) No ideology may be established as state 
or obligatory one130.  
This path has the meaning, that the Russian Federation does not present an official ideology 
constitutionally. Here, can be argued, that the acceptance of Eurasianism, especially the Neo-
Eurasianism, as prominent Russian ideology after the end of the USSR was justified from three 
principal factors: 1) from Danilevsky to Dugin, the main exponents of the Eurasianism – classical 
and modern – had Russian origins. 2) Since its beginning, the principal target of the Eurasian 
doctrine was to exalt the Russian civilization and territorial dimension. 3) The same Eurasians 
recognized Russia as Eurasia. These three motives can already explain as this theory has evolved 
itself as part of the Russian ideology, because of the intent of the Eurasians to glorify the image of 
Russia not only in the region but worldwide.  
The consolidation of this theory happened specifically during the 1980s, at the sunset of the Soviet 
period, when the Russian thinkers started to utilize the concepts of Eurasianism, glorifying the 
Soviet population and the image of Russia, with the target to solidify the fragile union between the 
Soviet republics.  
The effects of this phenomenon, although did not save the Soviet Union, started to be visible 
during the end of the twentieth century, allowing to reinforce the political and ideological position 
of Russia within the Eurasian scenario.  
Exactly in this context, the Eurasian assumptions have continued to justify the Russian foreign 
politic after the end of the USSR in the Post-Soviet space ideologically, exalting its role of 
coordinator of the entire Eurasia.   
During the 1990s, with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the hyperinflation of 1997, the same 
Russian Federation needed a solid theoretic basis which could emphasize its leadership, to 
legitimate a non-existing military, economic and politic control over the former Soviet republics 
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within the CIS. Regarding the military aspect, the Russian foreign politic was addressed, due to the 
economic problems during the end of the 1990s, to the military sector of the post-Soviet space. 
The effects of this politic had its implication in the creation of the Collective Security Treaty 
Organization, signed on 15 May 1992, between Russia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and since 1994 Azerbaijan, Belarus, and Georgia. The Russian aim by this 
alliance, supported by the idea of Eurasianism, wanted to emphasize the necessity of Russia to 
protect its population still living in the former Soviet countries, reestablishing a solid Russian 
presence in the entire Soviet scenario.  
Through this affirmation, it is important to underline as the Eurasian idea became the principal 
instrument in support of the Russian interventions in the post-Soviet space, as attested also from 
Dr. Jens Fischer: “Eurasianism streamed inside the political spectrum of the Russian Federation, 
with the aim of supporting its campaigns of foreign policy in Eurasia. Eurasian foreign policy means 
in this context a focus on the states of the CIS, but not on the whole Eurasian continent's foreign 
policy in this regard131”.  
Though, this passage explains as Eurasianism, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, wanted to be 
used by Russian politicians and philosophers to move towards the former states of the USSR, 
trying to legitimate the Russian impact on their territories with a solid ideological basis. 
Furthermore, the ideas of the Neo-Eurasians have legitimated the Russian foreign politic 
concretely, presenting the country as guide-nation and protector of the entire Eurasia against the 
Western threat. A reason that has allowed from a theoretical side for the former Soviet countries 
to see the Russian Federation as a necessary partner to guarantee stability and progress in the 
region, protecting simultaneously Eurasia from the world threats as the American one.   
The Neo-Eurasianism gives exactly emphasis about the central role of Russia and the Eurasian 
culture as significant pillars in the creation of the Eurasian Union. According to the historian Petr 
Bitsilli, “Russia should, because of its centrality, be not only an agent-actor between the peripheries 
of the Eurasian continent, but an arena in which all values of the Eastern tradition should meet, to 
be propagated. The division and consolidation of equal values between the whole Eurasia will 
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create a Eurasian culture, which, then over time, can expand itself and holing between all the 
Eurasian countries132”. 
The idea of the Neo-Eurasians about a union of Eurasian countries retraces the primary idea of the 
conflict with the Atlanticism, where the former soviet countries must form a coalition against the 
American threat. 
Specifically, “Hard-core Eurasianists” inspired by Dugin and traditional left-wing nationalist 
thinkers see the Eurasian Union project as a long-overdue attempt to challenge Euro-Atlantic 
civilization and to drive the West out from the Eurasian world. For others such as Dr. Vinokurov, 
the Eurasian Union project is actually an opportunity to create a common economic space with the 
European Union133. This passage describes as the EU, although the actual embargo due to the 
Ukrainian crisis, remains Russia’s largest trading partner and principal foreign partner of the 
associates of the EEU, a reason that makes clear to understand as, from the economic side, Russia 
cannot renounce to such important economic partner and testifies the necessity for an expansion 
of the Union to cooperate even with the Western countries. 
Besides, the Neo-Eurasians auspicate for an association that must have not only economical but 
even political connotations under the leadership of Russia. These concepts reflect perfectly the 
Neo-Eurasian vision, where Putin, Neo-Eurasian exponent, in his Eurasian idea sees the Eurasian 
Union as instrument to revive the political dominance of Russia in the region.   
11.1 The concept of Russkiy Mir  
Together with the nationalistic ideas supported by the Neo-Eurasianism, especially the exaltation 
of the Russian ideology, and mostly with the actual Russian foreign policy, visible in the Russian 
expansionism of last years in the example of Ukraine, is linked the concept of “Russkiy Mir” (the 
Russian World). 
In our analysis about the Eurasianism and the Eurasian Union, this term assumes a particular 
connotation in its investigation with the modern current of Eurasianism, and in the actual foreign 
policy adopted by the Kremlin in order to reestablish a Russian political control toward those 
countries that were parts of the USSR – and thus have had a deep Russian influence in the 
development of their national culture – through the actual mechanisms of the EEU.   
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Chronologically, the concept of the Russian World emerged for the first time during the Minsk 
negotiations in the period 1990-1991, when, in the political meeting between the Russian 
exponents and national popular fronts of the former Soviet countries, among the different issues 
(as the Baltic-Black Sea energy collector), the representatives of the former Soviet countries 
discussed about the need to create an information axis from Tallinn to Kyiv. In this context another 
subject gradually surfaced by the Russian politicians – the ‘Russkiy Mir’134. 
With this concept the Russian representatives wanted exactly to intend that the Russian presence 
in former Soviet territories will be always justified in those nations where there are economic, 
politic and especially cultural roots linked to Russian interests and culture.  
Historically, we cannot deny as this vision has its basis in the Eurasianism that from the classic to 
its modern view, has always had the aim to exalt and protect the Russian civilization against the 
threat of the Westernization. Therefore, the support of the Russian culture, considered as a 
unique by the Eurasians, must be protected and promoted in all the Eurasian countries, especially 
in the former Soviet countries, that have known their cultural evolution connected with the 
Russian and Soviet ideology. In conformation of this idea, according to the analysis of Victor 
Chenryshuk, in the Minsk negotiation of 1990 was clearly outlined by Moscow that “The 
boundaries of Eurasia coincide and will always coincide with the boundaries of ‘Russkiy Mir135”.   
Already Boris Yeltsin used this term, speaking about the Russian minorities and the necessity to 
protect them, as instrument of political influence and propaganda to reestablish Russian ties in the 
former Soviet countries by the use of a cultural justification.   
During the period 1995-2000, the concept and its particular adoption in determinate fields was 
devised by intellectuals, academics and journalists close to the Kremlin. Afterward, it was 
introduced into political discourse by Putin in 2001 publicly, in order to legitimate the domestic 
and foreign Russian politics136.   
To accentuate more the importance of the Russian culture in the world, President Putin instituted 
in the year 2007 a foundation with the name of "Russkiy Mir", aimed to promote the Russian 
language and culture abroad, especially in the post-Soviet states. Recently, this organization 
obtained during the year 2015, due to the economic crisis, just around 60% of the planned 750 
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million rubles (ca. 10.5 million euro)137, testifying however its importance in the Kremlin’s plans. 
This importance finds a confirmation by the nationalistic and patriotic ideas of the chairman of the 
Russkiy Mir Foundation, Viacheslav Nikonov, who claimed that the whole project is inherently 
trans-ethnic, since Ukrainians, Belarusians, and Jews can be part of the “Russian world.” He 
underlined the bio-political core of the concept by arguing that “we need to aggregate people, not 
lands”. Highlighting the “objective” and allegedly neutral character of the Russian world, he 
asserted that “it is about justice and truth, not nationality138”. Consequently, we can understand 
the binomial dimension of the concept: cultural and political. Trying to give an explanation of the 
term Russkiy Mir precisely, it can be useful to cite the contribution of the DGAP’s expert Wilfried 
Jilge: “The concept consciously relativizes the borders between nation states and is used to justify 
the “protective” role of the Russian Federation toward Russian-speaking minorities abroad, 
especially in the states of the former Soviet Union. *…+ “Speaking Russian” is thereby equated with 
“acting like a Russian” and “thinking like a Russian,” which goes hand in hand with tendencies to 
exclude in nationalist terms139”. 
From this statement we can evince as the cultural aspect and the Russian language want to allow 
Russia to justify its even political presence in those territories that presents Russian ideological 
elements, as instrument to protect its interests and population.  
A contribution about this explanation we can observe from Victor Chenryshuk: “‘Russkiy Mir’ 
begins and ends wherever the “Russian tongue” is understood as well as or even better than the 
mother tongue140”.   
For Anton Shekhovtsov, “In foreign policy, this concept means two things. First of all, as a 
diaspora, “Russkiy Mir” is supposed to be an agent of Russian soft power in the West in general 
and Europe in particular. Second, as a geopolitical concept, “Russkiy mir” refers to East European 
countries that Russia wants to keep in its orbit and where it can intervene in case they prefer a 
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different foreign policy141”. Jilge explains also from a geopolitical side the meaning of Russkiy Mir 
with the Russian diaspora: “Geopolitically Russkiy Mir was conceived as a Russian “diaspora 
empire,” with particular importance continually placed on the “Russian enclaves” in its “near 
abroad” – that is, on the European countries of the former Soviet Union, such as Ukraine and the 
Republic of Moldova142”.  
The potential of this term can be more marked citing Shekhovtsov: "Pyotr Shchedrovitsky wrote 
that “Russkiy Mir”, could be a potent source of Russia’s modernization. For him, the existence of 
“Russkiy Mir” implied the availability of “Russian capital” defined as “an accumulation of cultural, 
intellectual, human and organizational potentials expressed in the linguistic thinking and 
communication (humanitarian) resources of the Russian language143”. 
Politically, in the panorama of the Eurasianism, we can associate the concept of Russkiy Mir to the 
exaltation of Russian culture in his Neo-Eurasian vision as opposition of Eurasian values to the 
Western, which can validate the Russian dominance over Eurasia as support of its mythos and 
ideology. 
Indeed, a precise confirmation of this concept in supporting of the Russian foreign policy and 
expansionism is possible to retrace analyzing the contemporary case of Ukraine. Precisely, in the 
analysis of Jilge: “President Vladimir Putin justified the annexation of Crimea by evoking the 
concept of a “Russian World”. He spoke of Russians as living in a “divided nation” and highlighted 
the “aspiration of the Russian world, of historic Russia, for the restoration of unity.” He also 
stressed the existence of a “broad Russian civilization,” which has to be protected from external 
forces (particularly from the West) and which he defines as the sphere of Russian interests144”.  
By these words we can observe as Putin is actually using the notion of Russian World – and thus 
the cultural union of Eurasia under the Russian leadership – to justify the Russian ambitious to 
unify the Eurasian region, formed culturally by a solid Russian ideology, and to intervene in 
internal issues. It has the clear significance as the Russian intentions through the actual integration 
project of the EEU cannot have only an economic level, but even a political dimension, underlining 
also as Russia should cover a leader position within the Union.  
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Applying the term to the Russian domestic policy, the Russian World has the target to differentiate 
the character of the particular Russian civilization against the Western clearly. Exactly, the 
rejection of the western values from a hand retakes the contraposition between Eurasianism and 
Atlanticism. From another hand it expresses the importance of Russkiy Mir inside the Russian 
Federation on the eyes of the population as instrument to consolidate and legitimate the political 
choices – necessary to protect and elevate the role and the Russian culture inside the Eurasian 
borders, exalting the Russian political choices in order to express its dominance among Eurasia.  
11.2 The religious character of Ruskkiy Mir 
The political conception of Russkiy Mir was differentiated and critiqued by the Orthodox Church, 
which has always underlined the only spirituality character of the term.  According to Professor 
Andrey Makarychev, “The religious vision of the Russian world claims that the boundaries of the 
Russian world coincide with the canonical boundaries of the Church. Geographically, this concept 
embraces Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus; sometimes Moldova and Kazakhstan are also mentioned. 
The religious conceptualization assumes that in civilizational terms the “real” Russia is more than 
the current Russian Federation. The religious discourse insists that it is not language, contrary to 
the political vision, but Orthodoxy that determines the boundaries145”. 
Also in the analysis of Wilfried Jilge is possible to notate as in his point of view the idea of Russkiy 
Mir is exalted by Russian-orthodox and Slavophil tendencies. The Russian Orthodox Church has 
established itself as an important dispenser of Russkiy Mir ideology, focusing its rhetoric on the 
“sacred” East Slavic orthodox community of Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians, conveying the 
impression that Russians and Ukrainians are basically the same nation146.  
Indeed, from a religious dimension, the identification of Russian World is not a purely 
amalgamation of all societies formed by the Russian civilization to the control Russian Federation, 
but simply an unification of all those societies that share common values in an unique population, 
as a brotherhood. 
Accurately, the Orthodox Church through the Moscow and Russian Patriarch Kirill, emphasized the 
importance of the Russian world, where nowadays, due to the globalization challenges and thus 
loss of own identity, it is important to preserve a unified spiritual and cultural world of the eastern 
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Slavs: “Russia is distinguished from other countries in the presence of many nationalities, different 
religions; but most importantly, what distinguishes Russia from other countries, is its history, 
tradition and system of values, which are preserved in this country by the grace of God147”. In his 
definition of Russkiy Mir, the Moscow Patriarch notates as, “Russian world it is not the world of the 
Russian Federation or of the Russian Empire. Russian world is a special civilization, to which belong 
all people who today call themselves by different names: Russian, Ukrainians and Belarusians. By 
this world we can include people who do not belong to the Slavic world, but that perceived cultural 
and spiritual component of the world as their own148”. 
By the interpretation of the Orthodox Church, the concept assumes a spiritual connotation instead 
of a politic feature. Precisely, during a religious intervention on 18, July 2015 the Orthodox 
Primate expressed his regression in connection with the attempts of certain circles to politicize the 
concept of Russkiy Mir: “Russian world is not exclusively the Russian Federation’s world. Russian 
world - is both the Ukrainian and Belarusian world. It is a world that is created through baptism in 
the river; it is the world of Prince Vladimir, a system of values, which penetrated into the culture, 
into the life of our people. *…+ Open the" Tale of Bygone Years ", at the beginning of this work are 
the words" from which went to the Russian land. "There is no mention of Ukraine, Russia or Belarus 
- there is a Russian land149”. 
In contraposition to the political interpretation of Russian World, that exalts mostly the Russian 
language as determinant component belonging to the Russian civilization; from the religious view, 
the Church underlines the spiritual connotation of the term, where to be part of Russian World 
means to identify the own conscience with the Russian culture and consequently with all parts of 
its world. 
The religion interpretation of the Russian World wants to put emphasis about the conjunction 
between all the populations that are part of the Russian civilization. The legacy of the population, 
as Belarusian or Ukrainian, is necessary in order to prevent the dissolution of common values of 
these societies. This passage is testified by the words of Patriarch Kirill, “The religious dimension of 
the Russian world is a source of peace of our people. It is not easy today to store these values. But 
we must understand that without these values will not be any Russian, Ukrainian or Belarusian 
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people, and all would be melted in a certain pot of civilizations. Saving civilization, including the 
Russian world - it is our common task150”.  
Generally, the religious aspect of Russian World wants to exalt its spiritual character, stressing as 
the Russian culture is a fundamental aspect to unite all the populations that were ideologically 
formed by the Russian civilization, without any regional distinction. In this discourse is not only the 
language to identify all Slavic population as part of the Russkiy Mir, but exactly the sense of 
belonging to a precise society because of the share of equal values. 
11.3 Putin and the Russian perspective of Eurasian Union  
The concepts of the Neo-Eurasianism and the interpretation of Russkiy Mir are fundamental 
aspects to understand the Russian significance of the Eurasian project and the targets of this 
modern form of integration for the Russian President Vladimir Putin.  
Since the 2000s, through the radical ideas of Dugin and the rise to power of Putin, the Neo-
Eurasianism has consolidated its ideas among the Russian politicians strongly.  
Citing the Eurasian experts Bordachev and Skriba, Russia’s new Eurasian policy since the late 2000s 
can be described in the following terms: 1) the creation of new institutions that give proper weight 
to Russian interests and make Russia’s partners respect concluded agreements. 2) An emphasis on 
the economic dimension of cooperation. 3) Adherence to the principle of equality. In the Eurasian 
Economic Commission – the supreme regulatory body of the Customs Union and the Common 
Economic Space – all the member-states have equal number of votes. There is no guarantee 
though that with the deepening of integration this principle will not be altered. 4) Preserving 
subsidies and other economic and commercial preferences for the countries participating in 
Eurasian integration, in exchange for reciprocal economic, diplomatic or military concessions. 5) 
Placing economic pressure on states that adopted an anti-Russian stance (‘energy wars’ with 
Ukraine in 2008-2009, limited trade with Georgia from 2008-2013) or that refused to participate in 
Eurasian integration (trade limitations for Ukraine in 2013, Kyrgyzstan in 2009). Prices for Russian 
resources to these countries have been increased to market level, while their access to the Russian 
market was limited and tightened151. 
                                                          
150
 Cf. “Svyateyshiy Patriarkh Kirill: Russkiy mir — osobaya tsivilizatsiya, kotoruyu neobkhodimo sberech'”. In Russkaja  
Pravoslavnaja Zerkov‘. 8.09.2014 http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/3730705.html (last view: 24.01.2017)  
151
 Bordachev T. V., Skriba A. S. (2014): “Russia’s Eurasian Integration Policies“. Publication in IDEAS (London School of 
Economics), London. P. 20 
71 
 
In this prospect, a political project of Eurasia found obstacles to his realization, because of the 
volition of the former Soviet republics to be not merely subjects of the Kremlin’s decisions. In this 
way the idea of Eurasian Union has assumed in the Russian prospective the necessity to be 
economic union – although on the Russian eyes a future political conformation is not excluded – 
as solution to increase the Russian predominance in the Eurasia.  
Putin's vision of Eurasian Union finds nowadays its basis on the amalgamation of the Eurasian 
roots and economic interests among the Slavic countries, presenting it as a meaningful project 
that foresees a unity between all former Soviet countries to further tie Eurasia with the EU and 
China: “We are proposing a model of a powerful, supranational association capable of becoming 
one of the poles of the modern world [...] to play an effective bridge role between Europe and the 
dynamic Asia-Pacific Region152”. 
Fundamentally, Eurasianism is perceived in Russia as a balance against the West and the creation 
of a common, geographical and cultural space with the other former Soviet nations. This notion 
refigures the ideological basis of the Eurasian Union in a Russian perspective.  
Vladimir Putin delivered his concept of Eurasian Union during a speech at the Munich security 
conference in February 2007, underlining the possibility to create an “economic region from Lisbon 
to Vladivostok153”. 
Through his discourse, the Russian President accentuated firstly the volition to follow a new 
economic step of integration in the Post-Soviet space, in a framework of trade cooperation with 
the European Union. 
Afterwards, Putin elaborated his notion of Eurasian Union carefully, declaring openly the necessity 
of a solid cooperation in the Eurasian space, especially after the global economic crisis of 2008. 
The result of this process is possible to evince in his article for the Izvestija on 4 October 2011: 
“Noviy integrazionniy proekt djla Evrazii — Budushcheye, kotoroe roshdaetsja segodnja” (New 
integration project for Eurasia – a future that is born today), where the Russian President talked 
about the necessity to create a Eurasian Union, as mechanism to facilitate the global growth and 
civilization progress of the post-Soviet space, in order to achieve a common success and prosperity 
in the entire region.  
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Examining in detail the article of Vladimir Putin, the Russian President retraced the fundamental 
economic integrative steps that have conducted to solidify the idea about the Eurasian Alliance: 
“The specific experience of the CIS has permitted us to run a multi-level and multi-speed 
integration of the post-Soviet space, making appropriate formats such as the Federal Government 
of the Russian Federation and Belarus, the Organization of the Collective Security Contract, the 
Eurasian Economic Society, the Customs alliance and, finally, the single economic space154”. Already 
the Eurasian Economic Community and the Customs Union, created a huge market with more than 
165 million consumers, with unified legislation, free movement of capital, services and labor, 
representing the decisive step to the creation of a Single Economic Space. In the words of Putin, 
the single Economic Space between Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan represents a “Project, which, 
without exaggeration, is a historic landmark not only for three of our countries, but for all the 
countries of the former Soviet Union155”. 
The volition of the Russian President, as explained in his article, is centered into the creation of a 
fully Eurasian integration, in order to enhance the Eurasian economy as primary objective. 
According to Putin, this target can be realized through the project of the Eurasian Economic Union 
that already in its previous economic forms of regional integration, as the CU of 2010, has 
manifested positive results. The advancing of the project must be connected with the abolishment 
of barriers and obstacles in the business between the participants: “For people removing 
migration, border and other barriers so called "labor quota" shall mean the opportunity, without 
any limitation, to choose where to live, get education and work156.”   
In the realization of this concept, Putin was obviously influenced by the development of the 
European Union. In fact, as already underlined by Nazarbayev, the EEU should take as model the 
experience of the EU. Putin agreed with this concept in his theoretical formulation of Eurasian 
Union, talking but that the Eurasian economic integration is moving faster than the European 
Union: “At the time, the Europeans took fourth years to move from the European Coal and Steel 
Community to the modern European Union. The formation of the Customs Union and Common 
Economic Space is even more dynamic, because it takes into account the experience of the 
European Union and other regional organizations”. Although the economic data of the first two 
years of the EEU were negatively and the integration has not yet consolidated due to the still 
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existence of barriers in the trade of the member-countries, President Putin believes in the system 
of the Union as instrument to unite the Eurasian countries culturally and economically. 
Considering the EU, its impact for the organization of the EEU is visible analyzing its institutional 
structure: the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council, Eurasian Intergovernmental Economic Council, 
Eurasian Economic Commission and the Court of the Eurasian Economic Community – all 
institutions based on the model of their European counterparts. 
Furthermore, the project of the EEU, according to Putin, does not want to recreate the Soviet 
Union – the Eurasian Union is far removed from “any sort of resurrection of the Soviet Union” - or 
replace the Commonwealth of the Independent States. But, more important, Putin stresses as this 
alliance is an open source project. It means that all the partners and members of the CIS are 
welcomed in the Union and that the decision to join or not the organization must be a country's 
sovereign decision. 
Summarizing the thought of Vladimir Putin about the Eurasian Union, his volition is to tie more all 
the Eurasian countries, creating firstly economic links between them, in order to offer economic 
facilitations, and to develop then a system of mutual work between all the countries of Eurasia in 
political and economic areas. Based on this concept, Putin treats the Eurasian Union as “Powerful 
supra-national union” of sovereign states “that is capable of becoming a pillar in today’s world157.”  
This point of view is connected with the concept of multipolar world, where the world is divided in 
different centers that influence and administrate their own global regions. Here, Russia is the main 
actor of Eurasia and must guide, through a compact cooperation with the other countries, the 
entire region to its development. The Eurasian Union constitutes the center of multi-structuralized 
intercourse and interaction of a multitude of Eurasia’s people158. 
Generally, the Russian project retraces the Kazakh vision about economic integration with the 
volition to create an organization focused on energetic, industrial and technological policies, which 
should establish a common trade area, ensuring free movements of people, capitals, services and 
goods among all the members, similar to the European Schengen zone. 
The step of the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan was decisive, because created a 
huge market that consequently laid the basis for a higher level of integration, seen exactly in the 
Eurasian Economic Union. 
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12 The Eurasian Union on the Kazakh and Russian eyes, a comparison 
Before to continue our analysis, is necessary to make some considerations about the Kazakh and 
Russian vision of Eurasian Union. 
Regarding the Eurasianism and the project of the Eurasian Union, we can affirm that it was and it 
is still a common theoretical phenomenon of all countries of the Commonwealth of Independent 
States, although the idea of Eurasian Union was mostly marked in last decade by Nazarbayev and 
Putin. 
Principally in the Russian vision of Eurasianism, this ideology is treated as an anti-Western ideology 
that underlines the exclusiveness of a “special way for Russia159 ”. 
In the Kazakh idea of Eurasianism, this current is seen as a special regard of interaction between 
the Eurasian states, with the target to allow every country of this macro-region to cooperate 
together in order to obtain economic facilitations and internal stability.  
In consideration of this fact, we can notate as the Kazakh prospect of Eurasianism retraces the 
characteristics of the Central-Asian and Caucasian concept, where the core of Eurasia is not 
definitely centered on the Russian leadership in the area. In opposition to this vision, the Russian 
Eurasianism expresses the position of the Neo-Eurasians, amplifying the central role of Russia in 
Eurasia as political and economic coordinator of the entire region. 
The reflexes of these two points of view, Russian and Kazakh, are visible nowadays in the idea of 
Eurasian Union – seen in two different prospects. Indeed, for Nazarbayev the Eurasian Union must 
be a confederation of states, where must be respected the national independence and every state 
must occupy the same role in the community without distinction from center or periphery. 
For Putin the Eurasian Union is seen as a regional project of integration of the former Soviet 
republics, where Russia, due to its centrality and leadership in the region, must represents the 
regional power of the organization.   
While the Kazakh President sees the Eurasian Union as a community where all the participants 
must be on a same level and recover an identic role, the project of the Russian President is 
connected with the Russian hegemony in the Eurasian space, where Russia must assume a more 
centralized position in comparison to the other Eurasian countries, due properly to its leader role 
in the area dictated by a stronger economy and larger territory in the area. The aim of Putin, 
influenced by the Neo-Eurasianism, is connected to acquire internal profits for Russia with its 
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brother countries and enlarge its economic partnerships toward Asia, with countries as India, 
China, and Europe, in order to contrast the Atlanticism in the classic confrontation against the 
force of America. 
13 Approach of Eurasianism in Belarus 
In the case of Belarus is difficult to find a general idea of Eurasianism or generally to discover the 
roots of this ideology in the Belarusian identity. 
To ascertain this assertion is necessary to consider two elements of the Belarusian culture and 
history: 1) the Belarusian identity is the result of a combination between the Slavic culture, the 
European influence and the harmonious meeting of the Catholicism and Orthodoxy. 2) The 
Belarusian culture was in the centuries dominated by the strong influence of two identities: the 
Polish and the Russian. 
The first aspect is possible to discover in the modern Belarusian society and in its political and 
economic orientation, where Belarus is an open country, which conducts a friendly foreign politic, 
cooperating with all the countries that can offer benefits to the country, especially economically. 
Already this point can justify as the ideas of Eurasianism, especially in the Neo-Eurasianism’s 
radical vision of conflict with the West, is complicated to root on the Belarusian identity – 
historically opened to a multilateral politic orientation between all parts of the world. This 
orientation is still nowadays perceptible in the Belarusian politic approach. Here, President 
Lukashenka defines Belarus as island of stability, stressing the concept as Belarus is an open 
friendly country: “Our doors are always open for good people. The Old World and the New World 
begin to realize it. Belarus has never been a troublemaker in Europe160. 
Concentrating on the second point, through an historic overview about the Belarusian history, we 
can evince that, although a real Eurasianism has not evolved in Belarus, the country and its 
ideology has moved, especially since the XX century, aligned with Russia and its culture. 
To explain this point, is useful to conduct an historical cultural overview of Belarus. Before the 
Russians, the Polishs played a dominant cultural role in the Belarusian territory. Indeed, the Union 
of Liublin in 1569 enforced the dissemination of Polish culture in Belarus, having a strong effect on 
the society, where all became subject to the Polish influence. But after the suppression of the 
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national liberation uprisings in Poland, Belarus and Lithuania in 1830-1831 and 1863-1864, the 
polish influence was replaced by Russian dominance161.  
Just in the Nineteenth Century was visible in Belarus a real national rebirth and self-identification, 
with a separation from the hitherto dominant Russian and Polish cultures. The declaration of the 
Belarusian People's Republic in 1918 and the Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1919 gave rise 
to the political and state self-identification of Belarusians. In the 1920s a process of 
"belarusianization" was conducted in Soviet Belarus through the entering of the Bolsheviks in its 
territory, although the development of Belarusian culture began in the late 1980s, during the crisis 
of the Soviet Union and its dominant ideology.  
Therefore, for Belarus the unrelated state tradition refers to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Polish–
Lithuanian–Belarusian Commonwealth, to tsarist Russia, and to the Soviet Union. 
However, the impact of the Soviet regime and Communism had a deep influence on the national 
building of the Belarusian identity with the consequence that nowadays its political and economic 
aspects cannot be separated from the Soviet structure. The extraordinary Soviet influence could 
develop in Belarus openly, mostly because, as stressed by Belarusian expert Yury Shevtsov: “The 
polish impact in the territory due to its massive altering of all aspects of the society caused 
negative repercussions on the population. In such situation the Bolsheviks were seeing as 
liberators162” and by Belarusian historian Usievalad Ihnatouski (1831-1931), who wrote in 1921: 
“When the 1917 Bolshevik revolution abolished all social distinctions, for the Belarusians this 
outcome amounted to national liberation because the class and the national composition of 
Belarusians almost coincided with each other163”. 
This point confirms the thesis of the first section of the analysis, where the Eurasianism during the 
years of the Soviet Union encountered difficulties to affirm its ideas as the mainstream of Eurasia, 
due on the strong Sovietization of Eurasia. In the example of the Soviet Belarus, the Bolshevism 
was identified as the main ideology of the country because of its liberation action against the 
polish influence. 
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In follow of this aspect, must be notated, as the process of the post-Soviet “nation-building” was 
extreme complicated in Belarus, because there was and there is a deep union between the Soviet, 
Russian and the Belarusian identity164. 
Furthermore, according to the Belarusian analyst Siarhei Bohdan, it is extremely hard to identify 
nowadays an ideological affiliation of the Belarusian rulers. Some write about socialism in Belarus, 
and others call Lukashenka “a spontaneous socialist” or even a social democrat165 . 
Quoting Siarhei, “Belarus does not have any serious proponents of Eurasianism as far as the 
projects ideas of Slavic-Turkic cooperation are concerned. If Lukashenka ever had an ideology, it 
was that of Soviet restoration. He has little affinity for Eurasian ideas. Belarusian and Russian 
leaders follow different geopolitical visions and hold different worldviews166 ”. 
Taking into account these facets, a real current of Eurasianism is today not really visible in Belarus. 
Rather, we can affirm, that the Belarusian identity conformed itself with the time to the Russian 
ideology and its politic orientation followed in the years the Russian orientation.  
13.1 Significance of Eurasian Union for Belarus 
Belarus has participated in all the integration processes led by Russia since the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union, trying to always keep a very solid interaction with Moscow, as since 1996, where the 
Belarusian President Lukashenka together with the Russian counterpart Yeltsin advanced even an 
idea of building a Union State167. Moreover, the regional integration projects within the CIS, as the 
EURASEC, the CSTO, the CU, the SES, and recently the EEU in the year 2015 are all programs – 
developed by Russia to exert its sphere of influence on the former Soviet area – joined by Belarus.  
The same language, the culture, the Slavic identity and the energetic market make Moscow the 
first geopolitical partner for Minsk. The solidity of this relationship between Russia and Belarus 
was further stressed by President Lukashenka at the press conference for the Russian regional 
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mass media on 17 November 2016, affirming as: “The Russian Federation was and remains not 
only a strategic partner but also a brotherly state for us168”. 
Advancing the study from the solid relationship between Moscow and Minsk to the Eurasian 
Economic Union, this project is supported nowadays by the Belarusians enthusiastically. 
 
Fugure 4: Opinion of Belarusians about the Eurasian Economic Union 
 
Source: (Edit.) Vinokurov Evgeny (2016): “EDB Integration Barometer – 2016 (Fifth Wave of the Survey)”. Eurasian 
Development Bank, Centre for Integration Studies. Saint Petersburg 2016. P. 20 
Indeed, a general confirmation of that is possible to reveal from the Belarusian public opinion, 
where the joining of the EEU is considered positive and supported by the population, as showed 
by a survey of the Eurasian Barometer that attested in 2016 as the 63% of Belarusian opinions 
were positive about the membership in the EEU169. 
In relation to the project of the Eurasian Economic Union, Lukashenka firmly supports the Eurasian 
Integration, as affirmed during the signing of the Treaty: “This document gives us great hopes and 
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we believe we can have a great position, to articulate our goals and objectives within the 
framework of the Eurasian Integration170” 
In detail, the accession of Belarus in the EEU and its personal aims within this organization are 
connected with the economic facilitations that the country can obtain from Russia. In fact, a high 
dependent market, as the Belarusians from the Russian Federation, is the principal reason that 
explains the volition of Belarus to be part of the Union. 
This discourse can bring us easily to the thesis that the primary Belarusian aim inside the Eurasian 
Union is economic. Precisely, the expectation of the Belarusian authorities from the EEU is the 
realization of a regional market on equal economic conditions for its members without any 
barriers and customs duties in the circulation of goods, especially for the energetic sector171. 
Connecting with the fact that Belarus is mostly economic dependent on Russian raw materials; 
should but be underlined as this factor must not be misleading about the role of Belarus in front of 
Russia. In fact, if from a side it is truth that Russia has a great impact on the Belarusian authorities, 
from another side, the Belarusian government has showed in the years that may play pressure on 
the Russian counterpart – e.g. the gas war of the 2007 and the pivotal Belarusian position of 
transitory channel for the export of Russian gas to the West Europe. The strategic role of Belarus 
finds its confirmation in the words of the analyst Dr. John Daly: “Belarus has one negotiating card 
with Russia— its Soviet-era “Druzhba” oil pipeline, which transits nearly half of Russian oil exports 
to Central and Western Europe, over 70 million tons annually. *…+ Belarus is an important purveyor 
of Gazprom gas, transmitting more than 44 billion cubic meters annually. In return, through 
subsidized oil and gas supplies, Belarus receives from 15-18 percent of its gross domestic product 
from Russia every year172”.   
Moreover, the actual ruble crisis, with the strong deprecation of the Russian ruble in comparison 
on the dollar and euro, does not allow Russia to make its pressure on domestic economic choices 
of the country as in the past. Also, in the Eurasian space, Belarus can count on the bilateral trade 
with China, as attested by the reinforcement of the partnership between Lukashenka and during 
the visit of the Belarusian President in China in October 2016. 
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In consideration of these aspects, Lukashenka’s vision of Eurasian Union is: a union which must 
have only an economic aspect, facilitating and modernizing the internal market of the Eurasian 
countries without causing prejudice on their national sovereignty. From this aspect we can 
immediately illustrate that for Belarus, as for Kazakhstan, the EEU must not intact the political 
sector and thus the national independence of the Eurasian countries, but must be an instrument 
of integration of Eurasia in order to respond compact to the modern economic challenges. 
Furthermore, the Eurasian Union, according to the Belarusian President, must follow the model of 
the European Union and be good as this community173 .  
Following the vector of the friendly foreign politic of Belarus, the EEU in the Lukashenka’s vision, 
should expand itself worldwide, giving economic advantages to its members even in their internal 
trade with other external countries. In response of that, the Belarusian authorities, since the 
beginning of the EEU in 2015, have initiated to try an expanding-process of the Eurasian market 
worldwide, e.g. with countries as Slovakia, Pakistan or Indonesia, in order to make the 
organization an instrument to obtain economic benefits for the Belarusian foreign trade. 
14 Advantages of the Eurasian Union for Armenia 
Armenia joined the EEU on 1st January 2015, making the Caucasian republic the fourth founder of 
the Union. 
The Armenian choice of Eurasian Union arrived officially on 3 September 2013 after the 
negotiations between Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan and his Russian counterpart Putin. The 
decision to be part of the Eurasian integration instead of European association is connected with 
three principal aspects: 1) the identity roots of the Armenian population connected with the 
Eurasian culture – confirmed by the research of the Gallup International poll in October 2013 that 
was showed as the 64% of Armenians was favorable to join the union174. From a historical side, the 
enthusiastic Armenian support of the EEU is directly connected with the consolidated legacy 
Moscow-Yerevan, as expressed by the researcher Diana Shendrikova, “Russia and Armenia have 
very strong historical and cultural ties, strengthened by common Orthodox faith of the majority of 
its population. The two countries’ shared cultural and spiritual identity has always played an 
important role in their bilateral relations and now has gained a central role in Eurasian rhetoric, 
                                                          
173
 “Lukashenko: The Eurasian Economic Union should be at least as good as the European Union”. In Belta 24.03.2016 
http://eng.belta.by/president/view/lukashenko-the-eurasian-economic-union-should-be-at-least-as-good-as-the-
european-union-89945-2016/  (last view: 15.04.2016) 
174
 Almasian Mher (2014): "Why Armenia Chose the Eurasian Economic Union". In The Armenite. December 03, 2014. 
http://thearmenite.com/2014/12/armenia-chose-eurasian-economic-union/ (last view: 15.11.2016) 
81 
 
which implies the Eurasian peoples’ common cultural background, resulting from mutual 
contamination and interaction throughout their historical development175”. 
2) Armenian strong dependence on Russian energy market, as remarked in the Moscow Times by 
the economist Alexander Knobel who reported specifically as Armenia turned away from 
European integration after Russia offered it the budget price of 170 USD to 180 USD per 1,000 
cubic meters on its all-important natural gas imports176.  
3) The military alliance with Russia formed in 1997 and extended in 2010, in order to defend its 
borders against Turkey during the Artsakh War and Azerbaijan in the territorial dispute over the 
Nagorno-Karabakh. Due on the economic blockades of Baku against Yerevan in response to its 
occupation of the area, the Armenian President Sargsyan was pushed to find a military and 
economic solution through the help of Moscow in the Eurasian Union. Already the former 
Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrossian in the period 1991-98 underlined as that Russia’s 
benevolence and support were indispensable for the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. 
Explicitely, according to the expert Armen Grigoryan, Armenian entrance in the EEU is dictated by 
the Russian pressure, including threats to cancel security guarantees and an increase of the gas 
price among other leverages177.  
Reflecting about the accession of Armenia, it can have a positive but also a negative side for the 
progress of the Union. Specifically, the Armenian membership has the advantage to expand the 
Union as auspicated by Nazarbayev and Putin to consolidate Eurasia economically and 
ideologically. But from the specific integration view, it must be pointed out that the conflict for the 
territorial dispute with Azerbaijan can weaken the solidity of the entire community. In fact, 
Azerbaijan, although is not yet a member of the EEU, has a solid economic relationship with 
Kazakhstan. Armenia is directly involved in the territorial dispute with Azerbaijan; something that 
can cause a conflict of interest in the role of the alliances among the same participants, with the 
consequence that these kind of issues could decelerate the decision-make process of the Union 
and the integration process seriously. A concrete example of it, we can find in the meeting of the 
EEU’s leaders on April 8 2016 in Yerevan, where Kazakhstan planned to skip the EEU meeting in 
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order to avoid the pretense of endorsing the Armenian side in the ongoing Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict178 . 
Taking into account the example of Armenia, can be stressed as from a hand as the possible 
conflicts between the actual and possible future members of the Eurasian Union, like Azerbaijan, 
can have the consequence to hinder the Eurasian integration-process with negative results on the 
economic decisions of the entire Union. Though, from the other hand, the membership of Armenia 
can be seen as a positive feature for the Eurasian members in order to show to the international 
scenario the force of this organization to solve regional conflicts – a thing that could even attract 
other Eurasian countries to join the union.  
By the example of Armenia, we can confirm the thesis advanced by Putin in his vision of Eurasian 
Union, namely a union with economic but even with possible political and military implications. 
Indeed, the Eurasian Union on the Armenian eyes cannot only have an economic target, but even 
a security and political nature. In fact, the relationship with Moscow within the EEU’s system 
should provide economic advantages for Yerevan, but mostly should guarantee the protection of 
its territory against the neighbors as Turkey and Azerbaijan – something that the European Union 
Association Agreement would not provide. For that the Eurasian integration acquires a special 
meaning for Armenia, especially through the reinforcement of its cooperation with Russia, in order 
to be not alienated in the Eurasian scenario economically but more important militarily.  
15 Kyrgyzstan and the Eurasian Union: a necessary integration 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union Kyrgyzstan joined the Commonwealth of the Independent 
States and signed up the Collective Security Agreement on May 1992, remaining after the end of 
the USSR in the Moscow’s orbit. A further confirmation of that was successively visible first during 
1996 with the joining of the Eurasian Custom Union and later in the year 2002 when the Kyrgyz 
government agreed to the establishment of the Collective Security Treaty Organization as a 
military alliance. 
Nowadays, precisely on 21 May 2015, Kyrgyzstan completed its accession to the EEU, making this 
central Asian country the fifth member of the Eurasian Economic Union. 
From a theoretical side, Kyrgyzstan knew an identity building process based on the assumptions of 
the Soviet Union, developing a specific culture based on the Soviet assessments complementary.  
                                                          
178
 Putz Catherine (2016): “The Eurasian Economic Union's Armenia Problem”. In The Diplomat. April 06, 2016. 
http://thediplomat.com/2016/04/the-eurasian-economic-unions-armenia-problem/ (last view: 16.11.2016) 
83 
 
In addition, the position of Kyrgyzstan in central Asia – that momently shares its borders only with 
Kazakhstan in the panorama of the EEU – makes difficult the possibility for the Kyrgyz government 
to be part of other integration processes – a part the active cooperation with Beijing.  
It has the significance that, President Almazbek Atambaev had the only opportunity to choose the 
Eurasian project instead of the European Integration (as for example did Ukraine), because of the 
geographical position of Kyrgyzstan in the heart of Asia, accentuating the fact that the Eurasian 
Economic Union is the only practicable way for the Kyrgyz government. 
From the public opinion’s side the Eurasian Economic Union membership is supported by 70% of 
the population of Kyrgyzstan179 and is consolidated between the good relationship between 
Moscow and Bishkek. 
Reflecting about the position that this country can have in the EEU, we must assert that 
Kyrgyzstan, the poorest country within the Eurasian Union with a GDP of 6,572 billion USD in 
2015180, can just assume a merely theoretical connotation in favor of the numeric enlargement of 
the Union; but from economic side, it can bring a low contribution to the growth of the EEU. This 
concept is explained by the fact that the Kyrgyz economy is partially dependent on imports and 
remittances from labor migrants. 
Moreover, we have to consider the fact, that the EEU for Kyrgyzstan can even have internal 
economic disadvantages. Precisely, according to the researcher Johan Engvall, the Eurasian Union 
membership would hit certain economic sectors in the country: “Kyrgyzstan has successfully 
turned into an entrepôt for the import and re-export of consumer goods from neighboring China to 
other CIS countries. This bustling economic activity has developed thanks to the low import tariffs 
between WTO members Kyrgyzstan and China. The two major bazaars in Central Asia are both 
located in Kyrgyzstan—the Dordoi market just outside of the capital Bishkek and the Kara-Suu 
market outside of the southern city of Osh. The Membership in the Customs Union will eliminate 
Kyrgyzstan’s import advantage, since it would mean complying with the Customs Union’s higher 
external tariffs181.” The effects of this policy could cause a strong unemployment in the country – 
with the intensification of the migration process to the other members of the EEU that could 
generate an increase of inflation and of the costs of life for the Kyrgyz population successively. 
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The same Kazakhstan showed its perplexity about the role of Kyrgyzstan in the Union, stating as 
Kyrgyzstan’s entrance may expose the domestic textile manufacturing to foreign competitors, 
especially from lower labor cost of Kirghizstan182. 
Despite all, the official vision of Bishkek is, as explained in the analysis of Rehm Sophia, however 
positive about the participation in the EEU for the achievement of benefits as: 1) simplified visa 
and employment requirements for the approximately 500,000 Kyrgyz migrant workers in Russia 
and Kazakhstan; 2) the opportunities of joining a unified market of 175 million people; 3) the 
advantage for Kyrgyz farmers, that will be able to sell their products at a profitable price in the 
territory of the Union183. 
Though, we must stress that, the accession of Kyrgyzstan will not concede special economic 
benefits to the other participants of the Union that share a tenuous mutual trade with Kyrgyzstan. 
Here, the participation of Kyrgyzstan in the economic mechanisms of the Union can be interpreted 
as merely numerically that economically, because the Asian country nowadays does not have an 
internal economic level which could contribute to elevate the economic status of the EEU 
positively.  
Regarding the possibility of employment in the territory of the Union without barriers, we have to 
underline a possible problematic connected with the fact of the Kyrgyz migrant workers in Russia 
and Kazakhstan, that due on the visa facilitation of the EEU, could work regularly and cheaper in 
these countries of the Union. This phenomenon could have the predictable consequences to 
decrease the cost of work in the countries of the EEU, contributing to the growth rate of the 
internal unemployment of the Eurasian countries simultaneously.  
In relation of Kyrgyzstan, the theoretical component of geopolitical strategy is the most 
reasonable facet that explains as the choice of Kyrgyzstan to join the Eurasian community was 
dictated de facto from Moscow, to consolidate the route of mutual cooperation in economic and 
military sector. Truly, from an economic point of view the economic importance that Kyrgyzstan 
can assume on the eyes of Russia is minimal, but from a military perspective the significance of the 
country can already have a better connotation, allowing from an hand Russia to maintain a control 
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over the area and from the other hand assures Bishkek to have Moscow as security guarantor 
against the potential Uzbek aggression. 
After these statements about the role of Kyrgyzstan, the conclusion is that the participation of this 
country is moved from Moscow which wants to attempt to review its political and military control 
over the central Asia, exploiting the fact of the economic dependence of this area from Russia and 
its military implications. 
16 Possible accession of Mongolia to the EEU, a convenient step? 
Citing the work of the Mongolian researcher Chintushig Boldsukh, during the 95th anniversary of 
establishing diplomatic ties between Mongolia and Russia, the Mongolian Ambassador to Russia B. 
Delgermaa expressed Mongolia’s interest in possibly joining the EEU, which could have a large 
impact on the country’s future economic outlook and foreign relations184. 
From a military and political side, the Mongolia’s joining of EEU would allow Russia to further 
consolidate its border security and presence in the territory, with the consequence for the 
Mongolian country to distance itself from NATO member-countries. 
Considering this aspect, is necessary to stress as Mongolia since 1990s is pursuing an opened 
foreign policy in the meaning to establish a dialog and alliance not just with the close neighbor 
countries. According to this political choice, Mongolia is not inclined to sing up a precise military 
and political alliance with any country, resting balanced between West and East. Thus, a possible 
access of Mongolia to the EEU, must be underlined, could even have other than an economic 
dimension even political and military facets, that could be interpreted from the West as a clear 
alignment with Russia. 
From the economic side, according to the Mongolian analyst Chintushig Boldsukh, is 
comprehensible as the accession of Mongolia in the EEU would bring economic benefits and offer 
more stability for Mongolia’s trade, opening up markets in EEU territory and facilitating an 
increase in both the volume and variety of exports. The idea of a unified currency could also be 
beneficial to Mongolia, as the country would not have to shoulder the management of its primary 
currency. An EEU membership would also help quell Mongolia’s dependence on China and create 
more balanced trade turnover185.  
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Moreover, from an historic view, already the Soviet Union played a reasonable role in the 
Mongolian economy. Indeed, in the late 1980s Mongolia's foreign economic relations were 
defined primarily with the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon) members and other 
socialist countries. The Accession into Comecon was a great andvantage to Mongolia's economic 
development, permitting it to secure increased amounts of foreign investment, assistance, and 
technical cooperation; to expand foreign trade markets; and to promote product quality to 
international standards186. This passage shows as Mongolia and Russia have had close economic 
ties since long time and have maintained during the years a stable work interaction.  
But, economically, must be noted as that the accession to the EEU can present even some 
repercussion for the Mongolian internal market. In fact, if from a side the Russian Federation, 
according to the data of the OEC, with its 1.46 bn. USD187 is one of the top export destination for 
the Mongolian economy and is the most significant economic partner in comparison to the other 
members of the Union (e.g. Russia in 2013 constituted the 13% while for example Belarus was the 
2.45% of all Mongolian imports188), from another side must be pointed out as the actual Western 
sanction against Russia – and thus their consequences to the market of the EEU – cannot 
guarantee that: 1) the market of the Mongolia through the EEU will know a development, and 2) 
no guarantees that the trade with Eurasian members will increase. 
In consideration of these facts, the actual best choices for Mongolia would be the continuation of 
its neutral foreign policy without a clear alignment with Russia, trying however in the same time to 
strengthen its cooperation with the EEU’s countries by for example the establishment of a Free 
Trade Zone, in order to see if the EEU’s market could contribute to create an economic profit and 
stabilization of the Mongolian internal market. If the results of this possible cooperation would be 
positive for the country, it could lead to the conclusion that Mongolia in future – and when the 
system of the EEU would work properly in all its aspects – could have economic advantages from a 
possible accession to the Eurasian Economic Union.    
17 Obstacles to the integration: the case of Ukraine 
If for Kyrgyzstan the EEU was an obligated choice due to its geographical position, the situation for 
Ukraine is quite different. 
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The Ukrainian political instability, the Russian annexing of Crimea and the civil war in the Donbas 
region are direct effects of the collision for Kiev between the European and Eurasian integration. 
From the Moscow side, the incorporation of Ukraine into the EEU is a determinant passage, in 
order to reconstruct the Russian influence in its neighborhood stably. From a theoretical and 
historical side this concept is confirmed both in the Eurasian theory and in the Russian World’s 
strategy where Ukraine was and is still nowadays a crucial area. This country’s symbolic value, as 
stressed by the researcher Shendrikova, is amplified by its having been home to Kiev Rus’ (a 
medieval East-Slavic State hold to be the ancestor of Slavs)189.  
Although the historical basis let us to connect directly Ukraine to the Russian sphere of influence, 
we must assert that the Ukrainian population has always tried to opt for the European association 
(for example in September 2014, only 17% of Ukrainians were in favor of Ukraine joining the 
Eurasian Union, while 59% supported the European integration190). 
In premise of these facts, the Russian pressure on Kiev’s government to decide for the Eurasian 
integration instead of the European converged in the Euromaidan protest, opening the crisis of 
Yanukovych’s cabinet, culminating in his resignation on 22 February 2014, after his contested 
decision to suspend the signing of the Ukraine - European Union Association Agreement.  
As result of this action, the pro-European integration movements acquired a determinant position 
on the Ukrainian political spectrum, deterring from a side the contacts between Ukraine and 
Russia progressively; and from another side opening the conflict of the East-Ukrainian separatists 
in Donetsk and Luhansk, culminating in the Russian annexation of Crimea. 
The separatist conflict was in response of the volition of East Ukrainian people to not lose their 
economic advantages of cooperation with Russia. The Russian nationalism, the Slavic culture and 
the view of a united people between the Russian and Ukrainian are the principal values that are 
supported by the separatists in this civil war. The Neo-Eurasianism, especially through the figure of 
Dugin, supported since 2014 the action of the separatists, insisting on the importance of Ukraine 
for the completion of the Eurasian integration and thus for the geopolitical checkerboard. 
Regarding the Crimea, the peninsula was annexed by Russia after a referendum191 on 18 March 
2014.  
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According to Diana Shendrikova, “The practical importance of Crimea for Russia is hard to 
overestimate. It hosts Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, providing to Russia a warm port and an access to 
the Black Sea and important strategic defense asset. While it may lack modern vessels, the Black 
Sea Fleet remains capable of addressing naval threats and defends Russia’s interests within in the 
region. The annexation of Crimea came at the cost of the participation of Ukraine as a whole in the 
Eurasian project, which today remains bereft of the third ‘natural’ pillar of Russian World192”. 
Thus, for Russia and Neo-Eurasianism, Ukraine has a notable importance in order to revive the 
Russian hegemony over Eurasia. But the Crimea’s annexation and the Ukraine civil war were 
condemned by the other members of the EEU, especially Belarus and Kazakhstan. 
So, we can affirm that the consequences of Crimea had negative impact on the actual members of 
the Eurasian Union – something that can have the negative potential to undermine the 
compactness of the entire Union: “In the eyes of Kazakhstan, Crimea’s annexation was an 
announcement that Russia does not respect the sovereignty of post-Soviet states,” was affirmed by 
Nargis Kassenova of Kazakhstan’s KIMEP University’s Central Asian Studies Center193 . 
Lukashenka tried with the Minsk Protocol, signed on 5 September 2014 between the 
representatives of Ukraine, the Russian Federation, the Donetsk People's Republic (DPR), and the 
Lugansk People's Republic (LPR), to agree about a ceasefire in East Ukraine; and with the Summit 
in Minsk on 11 February 2015, between the leaders of Ukraine, Russia, France and Germany to 
agree to a package of measures to alleviate the ongoing war in the Donbas region. 
However, reflecting a moment about these actions, we can note as these decisions were the result 
of a political strategy of Lukashenka, who from a hand wanted to convict the Russian invasion and 
expansion towards the post-Soviet space. And, from the other hand, this plan was addressed to 
emphasize the friendly character of Belarus in order to engage itself in first person to achieve the 
peace in Ukraine, supporting the idea of national sovereignty in the entire Eurasia. Exactly this 
second concept had for Belarus the aim to reduce the political tension with West Europe, giving a 
particular contribution in the consolidation of the multi-vector Belarusian foreign policy.  
In a general overview about the EEU, Ukraine and Crimea have generated in the political debate 
serious doubts about the possibility of a further expansion of the Union, because the Ukrainian 
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example showed as Russia is seen not as a coordinator country, rather as a dominator of the 
entire area. 
Consequently, the case of Ukraine is showing the limits that the Union could have, namely if are 
present tensions between the participants of the EEU these could have the effects: a) to block the 
actions of this organization, and b) to create difficulties in the successive integration of other 
Eurasian countries, hindering the target of a united Eurasia. 
After these reflections, is possible to evince in the political debate as between the analysts the 
significance of Ukraine and its connection with the Eurasian Union is be valuated differently: some 
specialists argues that Russia’s annexation of Crimea was the end of the Eurasian Union project. 
Others, however, point out that Russia is now likely to need the Eurasian Union even more than 
before194.   
The essence of this passage wants to underline as Russia needs to integrate the Central Asian 
countries quickly, to obtain the necessary support on its project of integration before it can fail.  
Here, can be argued that, without Ukraine the EEU should move in an Asian direction, trying to get 
the consensus of those countries, as Uzbekistan or Tajikistan, that really see the Russian-Eurasian 
integration as the only one possible for their economic development. 
18 Russia and China, the control over Central Asia 
A further expansion of the Eurasian Economic Union should consider the incorporation of the 
Central Asian states. In this context, the binomial China-Russia represents the principal economic, 
political and military combined actor of Eurasia. 
Russia has been exerting its influence on the area since tsarist time, while China is showing its 
economic power on the region since the new century. 
From the historical side, the new borders that emerged after the dissolution of the USSR have 
shaped Beijing’s foreign policy toward Central Asia, especially because this region has strong 
ethnic and cultural linkages to China’s westernmost province of Xinjiang. Economic growth in 
China has enabled large investments in Xinjiang, which was declared a priority following the 
victory of the Communist Party in 1949. Central Asia was initially considered to be Russia’s 
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playground, while Chinese investments focused on Xinjiang. The Chinese approach was non-
confrontational toward Russian interests, instead looking to improve diplomatic relations195 . 
Although these two nations are still nowadays the economic and political core of Eurasia, their 
influence as large and super-power countries, was always accepted by both countries, because of 
common interests in the area and the shared volition to establish a peaceful climate of 
cooperation. 
Specifically, the Chinese presence is identified in the economic sector, while the Russian in the 
political, cultural and military sector. 
Beijing and Moscow have deployed together in their expansion and control over the area. 
Pursuing the aim of not belligerency, the adopted nature of collaboration was in the art of 
bilateral agreements, exactly to not interfere on the interests of the other counterpart.  
To understand this strategy of not collision from the Russian side, we must considerate the fact 
that nowadays, due to the recent Russian economic recession, China is becoming more attractive 
for the Central Asian countries. In this context China is acquiring a role of Eurasian’s pole. Moscow, 
to not decrease its presence in the area, has the task to intensify the strategic economic and 
political cooperation with China, using the partnership with Beijing as solid canal of interaction 
with the Asian countries. 
The result of this strategy wants: a) to allow stable economic cooperation for the Eurasian 
countries between both Russia and China; b) to protect the Chinese and Russian interests in 
Central Asia; and c) to avoid a possible European and American influence in the area. 
However, according to Dr. Slavomír Horák, “In Central Asia, the Eurasian Union can only slow 
down, but not stop, the growth of Chinese influence in the region, as local states in fact consider 
Russia a counterbalance to their growing dependence on China196”. The confirmation of this aspect 
is visible in the regional integration, which has brought possible candidates of the EEU, as 
Uzbekistan or Tajikistan, to prefer the economic support of China instead of the Russian, due to 
the higher quotas of investments from China. 
Though, to attest that the Russian presence is still stable in the area, is sufficient to consider that 
from the Central Asian countries Russia is seen the guarantor of military stability in the region, a 
reason that make these countries supporting the Russian role and a their possible future 
integration in the system of the EEU. 
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Directly, China wants to conduct only an economic policy in the area, alimenting its business with 
neighbor countries. All the other interests, from political to cultural, are let to the Russian 
interventions. This statement is supported by the volition of China to develop bilateral 
cooperation in the region, as for example with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.  
In fact, the Russian volition is through the EEU to consolidate even the partnership with China, 
favoring the commerce of Beijing with the Eurasian countries, in order to attract them more to its 
integration project. But, it must not be forgotten as Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have 
already a consolidated economic relationship with China. Thus, Russia must present its project still 
more interesting for all the members, even the actual, achieving results of improvement for the 
development of the national economies and for the mutual trade principally. 
However, the EEU is a project that between its aims has even the possibility to intensify the 
Russian influence on Asia towards China. According to the Eurasian researchers Vassily Kashin and 
Pavel Salin, “The Eurasian Union is a project related to Asia and above all to China. They see the 
Eurasian Union as part of a Russian response to the eastward shift of the world’s economic center 
of gravity. Since Russia would be a dramatically weaker junior partner in any relationship with 
China, it needs the Eurasian Union to enable it to balance China197”. 
This wish was expressed by President Putin, who in the year 2015 together with the Chinese 
leader Xi Jinping signed a decree on cooperation in tying the development of the Eurasian 
Economic Union with the "Silk Road” economic project. The importance of this agreement is 
possible to evince from the words of Putin: “The integration of the Eurasian Economic Union and 
Silk Road projects means reaching a new level of partnership and actually implies a common 
economic space on the continent198”.  
This strategy wants to be an instrument: a) to bound more China to the project of the Eurasian 
countries; and as consequence of that b) to allow countries as Tajikistan or Uzbekistan to choice 
for the Eurasian Integration, seeing it as a system that will not intact their commerce with China – 
rather a system which would favorite it more. 
To achieve this target Russia can even count on the stronger immigration force from the Central 
Asian countries (as Kyrgyzstan) – that will have better condition of work in Russia – and the 
Russian minorities present in these territories, supporting the ethnic and cultural integration, 
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based on Eurasianismus and on the political significance of Russian World about the Russian 
predominance in the area. 
19 Public opinion about the EEU 
After have examined the ambitiouses of every single participant of the Union and understood as 
each country is pursuing the realization of individual aims by the system of the EEU – from 
economic to politic and military –, the purpose of this paragraph is to offer an actual overview 
about the valuation of the Eurasian Economic Union from the citizens of the member-countries 
schematically.  
According to the survey of the Eurasian Development Bank (EDB), conducted in April-June 2016, 
with the exception of Armenia, the share of positive opinions in EEU member-states regarding the 
Eurasian integration during the year 2016 was greater than 60%, ranging from 63% in Belarus to 
81% in Kyrgyzstan. These preliminary data testify as the citizens of the member-countries, 
especially the inhabitants of Belarus and Kyrgyzstan, believe still nowadays, despite the economic 
recession, in the possibility of economic development and integration through the mechanism of 
the EEU. However, the financial crisis, the devaluation of the Russian rubles and the still lack of 
real integration of the member-states are problems that have impacted on the positive evaluation 
of the Union negatively. Specifically, comparing the years 2015 and 2016, at the question about 
the positivity of the integration based on the system of the EEU, was recorded a sensible decline in 
public support for participation in the Eurasian Economic Union for Russia from 78% (2015) to 69% 
(2016) and Armenia from 56% (2015) to 46% (2016)199. If Armenia has chosen the EEU despite the 
integration process of the European Union is especially to obtain a free labor market for its 
workers (especially a legal possibility for those Armenians that move to Russia for economic 
reasons) and the necessity to have in Russia a solid military ally. But, the slow effects of the EEU in 
the national economy (the mutual trade of Armenia diminished by -4.95% between 2014 and 
2016) has not enthused the Armenian population that, as is possible to evince from the results of 
the EDB survey, rests skeptical about the positive impact of the Union. Considering Russia, can be 
argued that the Russian population, due to the economic recession of last years, is losing its 
expectation to recover their national economy through the system of the EEU. Moreover, the 
mutual obligations of the Union (as the common tariff regime of the EEU that must take into 
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account the economic diversities of the member-countries) could disadvantage the Russian 
economy, the strongest in the panorama of the entire Union, generating a distorted effect even on 
the public opinion consequently. In addition, we have to considerate the fact that the Ukrainian 
implications have showed the difficulty to revive a total political control over the post-Soviet 
countries (Russia wants to obtain a leadership in the region and the effects of integration for 
Russia are more political than economic), another reason that can explain the drop of belief in the 
EEU from Russian inhabitants.   
Another index to analyze in the panorama of the EEU regards the free movement of citizens within 
the territory of the Union with the possibility to work, conduct business and take up residence in 
every country of the Union without restrictions. The 87% of the Kyrgyz respondents was favorable 
to the opportunity to work in the territory of the member-states. The explication of this high 
favorable rate (followed by Armenia with 78% in favor of the free movement provided by the EEU) 
is connected with the fact, that the accession of Kyrgyzstan to the EEU has the aim to favorite its 
flow of worker-migrants, especially to the Russian Federation without obstacles200. 
The objective to guarantee the four free movements as provided by the  EEU’s Treaty (article 96) 
can be achieved thanks to the good relationship between the member-countries. Indeed, in 2016, 
an average of 82% of the population of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia 
believed as their neighboring countries in the CIS region are friendly. For their part, Russians see 
their friendliest countries in Belarus (65%), Kazakhstan (51%), China (41%), and Armenia (35%)201. 
An exception is represented by Ukraine. Indeed, already a survey of the Lewada Centre in 2014 
after the beginning of the conflict attested as less than 10% of the Russian respondents had a 
positive attitude to Ukraine202. 
Concentering about Russia and Belarus, the good climate between Moscow and Minsk is even 
economically confirmed from the goods consumption and their origin: both countries had 
approximately the same level of preference for goods imported from the European Union and the 
“rest of the world” (the percentage of respondents choosing the countries in these blocs varies 
from 44% in Russia to 51% in Belarus). However, the population of Belarus is slightly more 
oriented toward buying products produced in CIS countries. Thus, in Belarus, 33% of respondents 
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prefer Russian goods, and in Russia 25% of respondents prefer Belarusian goods (in both cases, 
slightly greater preference was given to goods from Germany).203 This last fact lets us to 
considerate another point about the citizens of the EEU, namely their positivity about the possible 
conclusion of a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between the EEU and the EU. Precisely the Kyrgyz and 
Armenian people with 82% and 79% respectively, expressed their favorable position about the 
cooperation between the EEU and the EU; while only the 68% of the Russian respondents in 2016 
is favorable to a FTA with the European Union – which reflects the Russian geopolitical 
controversial position to the EU explicitly, due on the Russian embargo and Ukrainian crisis204. 
In general, despite the economic difficulties of last years, the citizens of the member-states, 
especially Kyrgyz and Belarusian, rest favorable to the economic cooperation within the system of 
the EEU. The Russian difficulties as well the stagnant economic situation with the EU have had 
effects about the effectiveness of the Union towards the Russian, that however still believe in the 
possibility to obtain again a leadership position in the region through the EEU. 
20 The phenomenon of globalization and its impact on the Eurasian space 
A principal target of the Eurasian Economic Union is to create a compact community against the 
secular challenges of the Globalization, in order to avoid the loss of an equal identity in the region 
and to create a system that can be equated to the modern economic settings excellently.  
Analyzing the phenomenon of the globalization in Eurasia, we have to refers to the Neo-Eurasians, 
that have not only advanced the threat of the Westernization of the society as risk for the Eurasian 
ideology, but in their prospective, especially in Dugin, the globalization is another element that 
must be fought through an alliance between all the Eurasian states in order to protect the region 
economically and culturally. In this perspective, the globalization assumes a negative connotation, 
as stressed by the Eurasian Movement: “We Eurasianists consider liberal unipolar Globalization to 
be the absolute worst evil and the greatest existential threat to every living person on the planet 
simply because the hyper-genocidal processes of Globalization deprive entire nations, peoples, and 
cultures of their inherent right to pursue their own traditional and unique ways of life independent 
of American control; in other words, we recognize Globalization to be a stealthy and highly 
specialized genocidal scheme which, unlike all other systems of genocide, deprives entire peoples 
of their true identities and thus cancels out – yes, exterminates! – the inherent ethno-cultural 
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dignity of every precious and irreplaceable segment of humanity; Globalization is therefore an 
attack on true autonomy – since true autonomy can only exist within a multipolar context – and 
thus it is an affront to the collective dignity of all mankind205”. 
Through this statement is clearly as globalization for the Neo-Eurasians is connected mostly with 
the Westernization of the society as a danger for the region to lose its personal way of thinking. In 
this vision the main threat of globalization assumes a particular cultural connotation.  
In its complex, Eurasia is a secular dimension which nowadays, as all the other world regions, is 
experiencing the various characteristic phenomena of global development. In-between is the 
globalization a sign of social evolution of people and their identity, impacting too on the Eurasian 
zone. 
The consequence of that was visible in the years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union by the 
different projects created inside the Eurasia: from the CIS to the actual EEU – all projects made 
with the aim to adapt the area to the changings of the modernity.  
In order to define the term of globalization properly, must be first asserted that in the sociological 
and economic panorama is difficult to find a common interpretation of globalization, because this 
current phenomenon of the XXI century is seen between the scientific disciplines differently: with 
a negative impact for the economy and with a positive feature for the social development. 
Considering the social side, can be useful to quote the interpretation of the sociological Anthony 
Giddens, who has defined globalization as a growing social interaction across the distances: “An 
intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local 
happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice-versa206”.  
Furthermore, explaining the globalization from an economic side can be convenient in our analysis 
to consider this phenomenon in correlation with the communist ideology. In fact, retracing the 
thought of Marx and Engels, we can discover as these two economists introduced already in 1800 
the evolution and generalization of the production in relation to the capitalism, referring thus to 
the concept of economic globalization indirectly. Specifically, this notion is possible to evince in 
the "Manifest of the Communist Party" of 1848, where the two philosophers asserted: "The need 
of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole globe. (...) 
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The bourgeoisie has created through its exploitation of the world market a cosmopolitan 
production and consumption of every country. (...). In the place of old local and national self-
sufficiency and seclusion occurs an intercourse in every direction, a universal interdependence of 
nations207“. 
The two authors stressed already in XIX century the mutation of the commerce and the 
rapprochement of peoples and cultures – an aspect nowadays defined with the term globalization 
schematically. 
Successively, about the relationship between Eurasia and globalization, Dugin has analyzed this 
concept in his book "The fourth political theory" (2009), explaining how the contemporary age 
with all its changes created a fourth theory, which fully commits itself to the globalization. Indeed, 
according to the Russian philosopher, the XX century, the century of the ideology, is already 
finished and one global and technological age has begun. Here, Dugin reports the three main 
theories of the XX century: 1) Liberalism (right and left); 2) Communism (including together with 
Marxism both socialism and social-democracy); and 3) Fascism (including National-Socialism and 
other variants of the Third Way, the National Syndicalism of Franco, Justicialism of Peron, the 
regime of Salazar, etc)208. 
In this classification, Dugin adds a fourth political theory that characterizes our present age: the 
globalization and its logistical and technological basis: “The Fourth Political Theory will not happen 
by itself. It might appear, but it might not. The premise of its appearing is disagreement: 
disagreement with post-liberalism as a universal practice, with globalization, with post-modernity, 
with ―the end of history, with the status quo, with the inertial development of the cardinal 
civilizational processes at the start of the 21st century209”.    
From the economic side, for Dugin the production and the trade are elements always connected 
to each cultural specific scene. But, nowadays this situation has changed because of globalization 
that has standardized the methods of production. Consequently, the task of the different nations 
is: to unite and create their own particular societies, together with those states with which have 
common values and tradition. This mechanism can prevent on the globalization of the economy, 
respecting the regional differences.  
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According to Shekhovtsov, “Dugin sees today's globalization as a process, in which the Western 
(first of all, Anglo-Saxon, American) cultural approaches become universal, while different socio-
political, ethnic, religious, and cultural aspects are often violently or artificially reduced to a single 
pattern. Within the terms of Neo-Eurasianism, the globalization and universalism of the Western 
liberal model led to the decomposition of ethnic communities into autonomous individuals210”. 
For Dugin, as reported by Johnson Matthew, the globalization has a negative connotation because 
is seen as profit of western ideology, which defines itself as a perfect science. Therefore, the 
Western ideology does not show the reality, because it considers itself as a proper science and 
does not let to be influenced by the social context.211 
Concentrating about the Eurasia in economic view, the globalization and its modifications on the 
socio-economic sector must be analyzed in the commercial sector of raw materials. By this 
scenario, must be considered the role of Russia and its economic power related to the gas and oil 
sector. It is because Russia dominates the economic scene and, due to these commodities, retains 
its leading position in the Eurasian context.  
The requirements of economic development pushed in the last decade to a reconsideration of the 
geopolitical context and to determinate new priorities for the economic sector of Eurasia as the 
need to modernize the energy links between the major economic Eurasian powers, Russia and 
China. Exactly the energetic sector dominates the Eurasian scene and for that needs a faster 
connection between the countries. In a context of modernization, the globalization and all its 
challenges take absolute priority in the reorganization of the structures in order to organize all 
structures for the modern era functionally, allowing for states as Russia and even China to 
maintain their strong position in the area (although nowadays the Russian position for the 
energetic sectors is undermined by the fall of the oil price which has altered its economic 
dominance towards the Eurasian countries).  
Refers to modern Eurasia, globalization and its challenges are based on the Eurasian Union, 
because Russia justifies its leadership within the Union as a coordinator of Eurasian space against 
the effects of modernity. The desire of protection, economically and ideologically, can explain as 
the current members of the EEU have decided to be part of this organization exactly to defend 
their economic interests under the protection of Russia.  
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According to Russian expert Timofei Bordachev: “Russia needs more than ever to base its national 
development strategy on the macro trends of global development: the globalization of economies 
and information, political democratization, and regulatory regionalization. In the coming years, the 
implementation of Russia’s foreign policy will be influenced by these major global development 
trends *…+.A central part of this globalization is the growing importance of the Asia-Pacific region 
as compared to the Euro-Atlantic world in the global economy, in world politics, and soon in 
cultural influence as well212”. 
The success of the Eurasian Union and thus of the leadership of Russia among the other members 
of the Union is bounded to the fact that the primary mission of this association is: 1) to consolidate 
the identity roots of the Eurasian ideology against the fear of loss of a territorial identity; 2) to 
expand the integration process to the Asian-Pacific region; and 3) to regulate a common market 
that can overcome the challenges of globalization as the international financial crisis since 2008 
easily.   
If Russia will create within the Eurasian Economic Union a stable market, especially in the oil and 
gas sector, it can be a successful instrument that could increase the ideological alliance with the 
other participants, calling for a consequential expansion of the Union. 
20.1 Advantages of the Eurasian Union as result of modernization of internal economy 
In a general way, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have the primary interest to obtain 
economic advantages in their relationship with Russia. In this scenario the Russian promise by the 
most recent project of integration is the enlargement of the economic space of Eurasia, with the 
possibility to create a market without customs duties between its members and with those third 
countries, that through their cooperation with the Union by the creation of a FTZ, can bring 
economic benefits to the common good of all the participants. 
To create these mechanisms and allow the Eurasian integration to evolve itself properly, is 
important to consider the success of Russia in creating an economic market without customs 
duties, especially for the energetic sector, and in facilitating the engagement of every member, 
making all of them active in the decisional process.  
More essential is the volition of Russia to invest in the countries of the Union, favoring the internal 
economic productivity with the target to modernize the internal market of every country of the 
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  (Edit.) Kadri Liik (2014): “Russia’s “Pivot” to Eurasia”. Published by the European Council on Foreign Relations, May 
2014. P. 25-27 
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EEU. An expressed goal of this process is the Russian wish to afford the necessary reforms in the 
national dimension of every member-country to allow a standardization of the national production 
in concordance with the conjectures of the World Trade Organization (WTO), assuring from a side 
the international recognition of the Union and from the other side an equalization of the different 
national economic status of the participants of the EEU. 
Based on these presuppositions, the Eurasian Economic Union assumes thus a positive 
connotation in the post-Soviet space because it prefixes the aims of: 1) to create a stable and 
efficient intern development of the members, where Russia through a financial support, the 
integration in its market and the possibility to cooperate without barriers, will favorite the 
increment of the quotas for import and export of the member-countries. In this way, although the 
existence of diverse common legal frameworks in the members of the Union, the approval of the 
draft for the customs code of the EEU on 16 November 2016 during the meeting of the Eurasian 
Intergovernmental Council in Gorky is showing the real intention of the Eurasian Union to move 
progressively to create a unique market.  
2) The development of the economic sector will have effects on the Eurasian population, with the 
creation of standard equal conditions of work for all the different countries – one of the principal 
targets that the Kyrgyz migrants would reach for their permanence in Russia and Kazakhstan.  
3) The solidification of the Slavic roots, ideology and culture, will consolidate more the Eurasian 
population, making it strong on the eyes of the EU and USA. The effect of this phenomenon can be 
the economic recognition of this organization on the eyes of the world powers, as a structure to 
do business with. 
4) From a geopolitical side the EEU, favoring the process of integration, can have the advantage to 
resolve regional conflicts, as the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, opening the possibility of cooperation 
to the neighboring countries, as Tajikistan or Uzbekistan. 
However, to reach all these objectives Russia must work first on its own structures, modernizing 
its internal market, resolving the problems of the economic recession; and agreeing about a 
resolution of the Ukraine conflict and the tension with the European Union politically. 
In addition, if Russia will show its role of coordinator and not of dominator of Eurasia, the 
integration process would move rapidly, favoring the economic expansion of the Union to the 
Asian-Pacific region.  
The results of that will be visible for the entire Union, where Russia, through the financial 
investments in all the Eurasian members and the creation of a custom market, from a side could 
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achieve its leadership in the region; and from the other side the other members can know an 
economic expansion, modernizing their markets in order to be competitive worldwide. 
Second section conclusion 
The analysis of the second section was dedicated on the impact of the Eurasian idea on the 
principal members of the Eurasian Economic Union and on the discovery of the own aims of every 
participant connected with the Eurasian integration. Here, we have revealed as the reception of 
the Eurasianism has assumed different connotations in every single state of the EEU. If from a side 
Russia is supporting the Neo-Eurasianism approach, which clearly exalts the Russian leadership in 
the region; from the other side Kazakhstan has a vision of Eurasianism centered on the support of 
the economic integration of the Eurasian countries based on the sharing of a same culture, values 
and identity, without distinctions between center and periphery. In Belarus, although the society 
and President Lukashenka are supporting the integration process mostly for the internal 
development of the country, especially in obtaining advantages from a common energetic market, 
a marked conception of Eurasianism is not really visible, mostly because of the Belarusian 
historical roots, that has known an identity process mostly influenced by the Bolshevism and the 
polish culture.  
The same discourse is possible to conduct in the analysis of the general integration process in the 
post-Soviet space, which has known in its entire after the end of the Soviet Union different grades 
of involvement for every nation.  
In consideration of these aspects, we can assert as among all the former Soviet states, Belarus, 
Kazakhstan and Russia are without doubts the three states that principally have manifested a real 
volition after the dissolution of the USSR, to move together politically and economically. In 
response of that, they have been actively engaged in all the post-Soviet projects of integration: the 
CIS, the EURASEC, the Customs Union, the Single Economic Space and nowadays the EEU. 
But, for Belarus and Kazakhstan the integration in these regional projects has always meant the 
possibility to obtain economic facilitations from Russia, while the pursued Russian policy was 
diversely oriented, namely to reestablish its hegemony in the post-Soviet space. 
This approach is retraceable today in the role of the EEU: economic for Belarus, Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan; military and economic for Armenia; economic, politic and military for Russia. 
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In addition, the integration has even showed the lack of unanimity among the former Soviet 
republics on concerns of deep integration and vectors of development, because of their economic 
disparity and different political orientation. 
These discrepancies, united to the strongest role of Russia, because of its territorial dimension and 
economic resources, have slowed down the integration course and opened doubts about the real 
possibility of this community to give solidity to the entire Eurasia and thus to expand its role 
worldwide. 
The Russian annexation of Crimea, expressly condemned by Belarus and Kazakhstan, because seen 
as an act of violation of the national sovereignty of Ukraine; or the financial economic crisis and 
the drop of the oil price with the deflation of the Russian ruble, that exalted the economic pole of 
China strongly, are all examples that are undermining the Russian role and its project of hegemony 
in the Eurasian region.  
Furthermore, these facts can destabilize as well the Russian target to include political elements in 
the organization successively. The same integration can have troubles to a further development 
because of the existence of regional conflicts that can influence the decision making process of the 
Union negatively, creating disagreements among the same Presidents of the EEU. 
In this scenario is important for Moscow to make attractive the Eurasian Union in order to 
maintain its internal equilibrium stable and give a real opportunity to the organization to integrate 
more countries.  
To achieve this aim, the Putin’s orientation, visible in his work “New integration project for Eurasia 
– a future that is born today”, is to generate economic stability in the region with the creation of 
an unique market without customs duties and direct Russian investments in all the participants of 
the Union, in order to exalt the Russian position and values in Eurasia against the threats of the 
Westernization, seen in the struggle with the Atlanticism, and the phenomenon of the 
globalization. 
But, the financial crisis of last years had signed the economies of the member-states and especially 
of Russia negatively, determining from a side a fall of the Russian investments in the territory of 
the Union, and from the other side, created a sense of growing perplexity of the member-
countries about a real further development of the Union. It means that only the next years, when, 
the economy of the Union will be stabilized through the removal of barriers and the creation of 
common markets, the real potential of the EEU could be demonstrated. 
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Following that, we can come to the conclusion that the evolution of the EEU depends on the 
creation of a real working economic market and, more important, to the Russian strategy and 
setting. In connection with this last point, it implies that a further integration of the Central Asian 
countries and the development of the organization even in a political dimension depend on the 
approach that Russia decides to follow towards the other participants. To reach this objective, 
namely the solidity of the Union and its progressive evolution, the EEU has the priorities: 1) to 
create an energetic market without custom duties; 2) to invest in the internal economies of the 
other states, modernizing their economies according to the WTO213 standards; 3) to coordinate 
the area economically without interfering in the domestic policies of the Eurasian states, and 4) to 
guarantee an equal role in the decisional process for all the members in a democratic way. 
Assuring these preconditions and moving by a solid shared cultural basis, the Union could evolve 
itself decisively, incorporating more states and solidifying the Russian role in the region and on the 
eyes of the other world powers.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
213
 Armenia acceded to the WTO in the year 2001; Kazakhstan in 2015; Kyrgyzstan in 1998; and Russia in 2012. Belarus 
is still in the phase of accession, but not a member.  
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Background of the Eurasian Economic Union, an introduction 
The Eurasian Economic Union with its primary purpose to establish an economic entity, provided 
by supranational bodies, as firstly presented by President Nazarbayev in March 1994 during his 
speech at the Moscow State University, has a background longer than twenty years and reflects 
the project to institute de facto a stable and compact regional cooperation between the former 
Soviet republics, that historically have been united each other by an high economic 
interdependence. Following this aspect, is useful to trace the phases that have contributed to the 
creation of this contemporaneous stage of Eurasian integration schematically.  
The process of the Eurasian integration lays its basis on the period immediately after the collapse 
of the USSR. The economic and politic ties of the Soviet time had influenced for almost seventy 
years of history the Eurasian scenario deeply. For this reason, the Belarusian, Russian and 
Ukrainian authorities, in order to avoid a drastic disruption of the entire Soviet system with 
catastrophic consequences among the internal economies of the new independent states, 
established officially on December 8, 1991 the Commonwealth of the Independent States aimed, 
among other objectives, to support their commercial interaction principally. The priority of this 
form of cooperation was addressed to the volition to build a common economic space based on a 
free trade zone and to create principles of cooperation that could be coordinated by recognized 
institutions in order to guarantee the independence of the young republics and their national 
sovereignty. Exactly, the institution of the CIS had the principal target to maintain alive the 
numerous economic ties of the former Soviet republics, especially in the crucial sectors of 
industry, agriculture, transport and energy. On the basis of the Eurasian culture, thus of a mutual 
cultural understanding between those states that constituted the Soviet Union, and of the 
predictable economic sustenance of Moscow for all former Soviet countries, it was understood as 
the economic requirement and development could be exercised only maintaining a compact 
economic bond with the Russian Federation in a solid Eurasian network. 
However, the impact of the CIS in post-Soviet space produced during the last two decades just 
tenuous effects on the economic integration and on the creation of a free trade area. 
Generally, it could be argued that the CIS due on: 1) the economic crisis of the Soviet countries 
caused by the dismemberment of union; 2) the loss of economic importance of Russia because of 
the hyperinflation of the 1990s; 3) the Russian volition to maintain a military and political 
dominance on the former countries after the dissolution of the USSR; and 4) the absence of a 
supranational institution in the Commonwealth; had only a formal consultation role instead of a 
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real decisional body, evidencing the difficulties to unify a so vast territory and to accept for the 
young republics the renovated tentative of Russian dominance on the post-Soviet territory. 
The lack of results of the Commonwealth conducted the former Soviet countries to adopt new 
strategies for their economic development based on bilateral agreements. In follow of that, 
countries as Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia – that have maturated a more consolidated economic 
partnership in the Eurasian scenario –, decided firstly to establish a Free Trade Zone during the 
year 1994 and then during 1995 to launch a Customs Union (joined in the year 1996 from 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan), in order to facilitate their reciprocal trade. In 1996 Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan and Russia decided to increase their cooperation in the economic and humanitarian 
fields. In this scenario they created a common market of goods, services, capital and labor 
establishing a transport and energy system. 
The creation of a common market without barriers between its members represented the first 
embryonic stage of the actual EEU that is nowadays pursuing the objective to set up a system of 
market exchange without duties. The stable evolution of these agreements conduced Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, Russia, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan during the year 1999 to sign the Treaty on the 
Customs Union and the Single Economic Space.  
A year after, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan established the Eurasian 
Economic Community, joined by Uzbekistan in 2006. Through the EURASEC the participants 
prefixed the central aim to deepen their cooperation economically, promoting their integration 
simultaneously. To achieve this purpose, the countries intended to set a common external tariff in 
respect of third countries and harmonize their non-tariff barriers. But, this plan showed 
immediately the economic discrepancies between the associates due to their different grade of 
economic development (a common problem still actual in the EEU).  
In 2007 was officially settled by these countries the difficulty to heal their economic differences. 
In consequence of that, it was decided to implement regional integration initiatives by the 
Regional Trade Agreement (RTA) at diverse speed and different levels, i.e. Belarus, Kazakhstan and 
Russia planned to set a common external tariff and to create a Customs Union, while Kyrgyzstan 
and Tajikistan decided to stay in the first level of the integration, namely in the FTZ214. 
Subsequently, was signed in October 2007 between Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia the Treaty on 
the Establishment of the Common Customs Territory and Formation of the Customs Union. 
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 Cf. Kirchner R., Tochitskaya I. (2014): “Belarus’ membership in the Eurasian Economic Union: An Assessment”. 
German Economic Team Belarus IPM Research Center. Policy Paper Series [PP/05/2014].  P. 5  
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As it possible to evince from these phases, the three countries that since the dissolution of the 
USSR have decided to move closer are exactly the founders of the Economic Eurasian Union, 
namely Belarus, Russia and Kazakhstan. This partnership has brought profits reciprocally: Belarus 
and Kazakhstan can count on the Russian economic support, while Moscow, through the support 
of Astana and Minsk, can expand its political and economic leadership in Eurasia. 
The decisive turning, which conducted these three states to intensify more their interaction, 
arrived after the year 2008, when the global financial crisis leaded the states to minimize the 
economic risks, granting in the same time a continue development. In this context, the regional 
project of integration found its development in June 2009, when were defined the integration 
stages and timeline about the creation of a single custom area. Specifically, on November 27, 2009 
the Interstate EURASEC Committee (the supreme body of the Customs Union) approved a 
Customs Code and a Common External Tariff (unified external duty rates), reaching an agreement 
on the creation of a Customs Union that came into effect on January 1, 2010.  
Furthermore, in order to promote their integration in a successive step and enlarge it to new 
proponents in the Eurasian area, the Presidents of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia established the 
Single Economic Space on the basis of the Customs Union, précising as this apparatus had to move 
successively in the creation of the Eurasian Economic Union. The primary aim of this new stage of 
integration wanted to create a vaster environment of integrations with other regional 
organizations, as the European Union, and other countries worldwide, in order to promote the 
economy of the entire Eurasia globally. 
On November 18, 2011 the Presidents of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia signed the Declaration on 
Eurasian Economic Integration to escalate the success of the CU; and elaborated an agreement on 
the Eurasian Economic Commission. This Commission became since February 2, 2012 to work as 
permanent supranational regulatory body of the CU and of the SES.  
As final point, since January 1, 2015 the Eurasian Economic Union started to work, continuing the 
process of integration of Eurasia with the aim to favorite the economic expansion and global 
competitiveness of the Eurasian countries through the modernization of their national markets. 
Indeed, the development of the EEU is aimed to create: 1) a common space, where goods, 
services, capital and work force can move in freedom and without barriers; and 2) a space of 
interaction, where the member-states may follow a coordinated policy in key sectors as economy, 
energy, industry, agriculture and transport. Here, the Treaty of the EEU has exactly the target to 
regulate the economic spheres of interaction between the members of the Union, creating a 
118 
 
common legal framework, in order to obtain the harmonization of their macroeconomic, 
monetary, trade, investment and taxation policies. 
I The EEU Treaty, methodology and objectives of its analysis 
The Treaty on the EEU (composed by 118 articles, divided in 28 sections and completed by 33 
annexes) was executed in the city of Astana on May 29, 2014 between the Russian Federation, the 
Republic of Belarus and Kazakhstan; registered, as provided by the article 116 of the Treaty of the 
EEU, with the Secretariat of the United Nations in accordance with Article 102215 of the Charter of 
the United Nations; and entered into force on January 1, 2015.  
The organization was joined by Armenia and Kyrgyzstan successively, expanding the Union and the 
Eurasian integration process.  
Figure 1: Actual members of the Eurasian Economic Union 
Country Date of ratification 
Armenia 10 October 2014 
Belarus (Founder) 29 May 2014 
Kazakhstan (Founder) 29 May 2014 
Kyrgyzstan 23 December 2014 
Russian Federation (Founder) 29 May 2014 
 
The Treaty is divided into four parts. In the first part are contained the provisions that have 
general applications, and the categories and areas of the Eurasian Economic Union’s competence. 
In the second part are listed the provisions concerning the functioning of the Customs Union, 
circulation’s regulation of medicines and medical devices, customs regulation inside the Union, the 
areas and principles of foreign trade policy and consumer protection, as well as coordinated policy 
in the field of technical regulations, sanitary, veterinary, and quarantine sanitary measures. The 
third part of the Treaty refers to the Single Economic Space. It contains 14 sections that discipline 
areas as macroeconomic and currency policies, trade in services, establishment and 
implementation of investment activities, regulation of financial markets, taxes and taxation, 
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 The article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations provides that: 1) every treaty and every international 
agreement entered into by any Member of the United Nations after the present Charter comes into force shall as soon 
as possible be registered with the Secretariat and published by it. 2) No party to any such treaty or international 
agreement which has not been registered in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article may invoke 
that treaty or agreement before any organ of the United Nations.  
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general principles and rules of competition, natural monopolies, energy, transport, government 
procurement, intellectual property, industry and agro-industrial complex, and labor migration. The 
last part of the Treaty deals with its transitional and final provisions. 
In consideration of the contents of the Treaty of the Eurasian Economic Union can be explicitly 
affirmed, as this organization has in the core of its mechanisms an exclusively economic function. 
But, in addition to this statement, is important to stress as every participants of this association is 
however trying to pursuit an own target: a more political and military aims from the Kremlin 
position to an only economic desire of development and facilitation of business from the 
Belarusian and Kazakh side. Though, done this consideration, the EEU is officially an Economic 
Union. Consequently, its analysis will be conducted in this section only in an economic dimension, 
where, through a deep descriptive analysis of the Astana Treaty, will be observed and explained 
the legal framework of its regulation, institutions and mechanisms. The study of the sections of 
the Treaty has the aim to offer a complete knowledge of the entire mechanisms of the EEU and of 
its working.  
The following analysis, adopting the qualitative methodology by a report, interpretation and 
analysis of the legal framework of the Economic Eurasian Union, will examine the entire Treaty of 
the EEU, quoting and commenting all the articles of the Treaty. To the most significant sections, 
especially those in connection with the basic functioning of the Union and the regulation of the 
economic mechanisms, will be dedicated special critic considerations and observations (mostly 
from a Belarusian outstanding), examining the actual development and real application of the 
norms of the Treaty. In the study will be dedicated attention even to the annexes to the Treaty of 
the EEU. It is good to specify that the analysis of the annexes will be, for the aim of this work, 
partially, namely only a report and comment of the most important parts of the Protocols that are 
useful to complete the explanation of the discipline listed in the sections of the Treaty.  
1 The meaning of the Eurasian Economic Union 
The first step to understand the aims of the Eurasian Economic Union is to comprehend the 
necessity of this regional organization in the global economic space. By the words of Viktor 
Khristenko, former Chairman of the Board Eurasian Economic Commission, is possible to delineate 
the reasons that have conducted the member-countries to build a coalition together for the 
development of a new economic project: “We live in a time of major change. A new global 
economic architecture is emerging that is set to define development trends for decades to come. 
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The recent crises prompted a global quest for new patterns of strategic development, and today a 
number of countries are looking to form and consolidate regional unions. The Eurasian space is 
becoming such an area of consolidation. We are witnessing and participating in events that are 
destined to transform the world economic landscape216.” 
Therefore, the actual economic crisis, the regional subdivision as form of better development (on 
the example of the EU) and the volition to move economically together, favoring the economic 
expansion of the entire Eurasia, are the official principal targets of the EEU.  
Moreover, the decision to codify the Treaty of the Eurasian Economic Union was dictated by the 
requirement to create a precise, compact and simple legislative framework, in substitution of the 
regulatory legal framework of the Customs Union and the Single Economic Space, formed by over 
hundred international treaties signed between 1995 and 2012. Concerning the CU, must be 
underlined as its positive impact favored the development of the Eurasian integration and 
represented a decisive passage for the formation of the EEU, as testified in the analysis of Eurasian 
specialists Dragneva and Wolczuk, “The most evident progress in the Eurasian project has been in 
relation to the CU. This development was made possible to a large extent by the adoption of an 
improved legal framework. A range of international agreements containing the various elements of 
common customs regulations were signed, the most important being the Customs Code of the CU 
adopted in November 2009217”. 
So, considering the positive impact of CU, whose system allowed for example Russia in August 
2012 to access in the World Trade Organization, and the successive creation of the Single 
Economic Space, which codified the trade area of Belarus, Russia and Kazakhstan; the consecutive 
step was thus to simplify and coordinate the Eurasian integration properly, through a unique and 
efficient document. In fact, the realization of the Treaty of the EEU was promoted in order to 
achieve a systematic regional development and a more coordinated cooperation in 
macroeconomic areas, finance, trade and investment, transportation and energy, industry and 
agro-industry. The necessity to promote the mutual trade is dictated by the fact to establish a 
common development through an increment and diversification of mutual trade; and the creation 
of facilities for the growth of high value-added production. 
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Furthermore, the organization was formulated openly with the target, visible in the article 108 of 
the Treaty of the EEU, to allow other Eurasian states that would be part of the association and 
share same objectives, to access to the Union without particular restrictions. Indeed, a further 
expansion and possibility to embrace all Eurasia is what mostly the participants, especially the 
Russian Federation and Kazakhstan, are expecting through this organization. 
A successive confirmation of this target, as well the realization of a free market, can be discovered 
in the Belarusian prospective by the official speech of Belarusian President Lukashenka on January 
2015 during his addressing of chairmanship of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council: “Our state 
considers the Eurasian Economic Union as the major integration association that promotes 
economic and social stability in the region. We welcome the consistent increase in number of 
participants of the Eurasian integration; we support the open and equitable dialogue of the EAEU 
with other countries, international organizations and international integration associations. [...] At 
all stages of preparing the Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union, the Belarus party consistently 
declared the need of maximum liberalization of the conditions for economic activity under the 
EAEU. We still believe that the Eurasian Economic Union shall be founded on complete elimination 
of exemptions and restrictions in the movements of goods. [...] Our common objective is consistent 
elimination of restrictions and exemption with further development of single markets in as many 
areas as possible, including in construction and transportation. We believe that the development of 
a common market of transport services, including the development of program for phased 
liberalization of cabotage transportation, is one of the major components of competitiveness of 
our products both on internal and foreign markets. [...] I believe that our close cooperation will be 
a guarantee of the most effective implementation of the set plans and successful establishment of 
the Eurasian Economic Union as an independent center of sustained economic development218. 
The words of Lukashenka had the merit at the beginning of the institutional life of the EEU to point 
out the importance of the global partnership as key to obtain a regional stability against the 
treaties of the globalization and the pressing financial crisis. The stage of the regional integration is 
even seen as possibility to establish a solid structure over Eurasia which could be able to 
cooperate worldwide with the major organizations, as the EU, the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA), the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), or the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Indeed the European Union and the Asiatic market represent 
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 Eurasian Economic Commission (2015): “Address by the Belarus President Aleksandr Lukashenko to the member 
states of the Eurasian Economic Union”. January 21, 2015 
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the two decisive key-economies where the EEU would (and should) address its market. Another 
decisive point to notice in the Lukashenka’s discourse is the fundamental necessity to eliminate 
every kind of restrictions and barriers in the common market of the Union, in order to promote 
the four fundamental economic freedoms of the Union (goods, services, capital and labor) and to 
allow a correct shape of the common markets of electric energy, gas, oil and oil products. Exactly 
this last point and the creation of equal conditions for economic entities of all the EEU member-
states, with the complete elimination of exemptions and restrictions in the movements of goods, 
represents the significant pillar of the functioning of the EEU. This passage is possible to evince by 
the words of Belarusian Energy Minister Vladimir Potupchik who talked about the necessity to 
create a same level of prices, in order to develop the market of the Union on an equivalent level 
for all the participants of the Union: “In order to create the common electricity market by 1 July 
2019 and the common gas market by 1 January 2025 (of the EAEU) we should level gas prices as 
much as we can, and this is what we are doing today. All the arrangements that we reached were 
announced by Belarus' Vice Premier Vladimir Semashko and Russia's Vice Premier Arkady 
Dvorkovich. All the future steps will depend on the political decisions adopted at the highest 
level219".  
In addition, is important to refer as the concept of integration and development of the markets 
are two principal characters of the EEU. This passage was already expressed by President 
Lukashenka during his speech in the Peking University on September 2016, where the most 
significant Belarusian authority articulated the importance of integration and worldwide 
cooperation for the EEU as instrument to strengthen its global economic impact: “Belarus is deeply 
convinced that the Eurasian Economic Union's cooperation with the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the European Union and other regional 
associations could produce substantial benefits for securing our trade, economic and investment 
interests220”.  
Thus, summarizing these concepts, the Eurasian Economic Union has the aims: 1) to favorite the 
integration of Eurasian country in an Eurasian regional project similar to the model of the 
European Union; 2) to promote an equal cooperation and development of the members market 
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through the elimination of any kind of restrictions; 3) to develop the internal economies of the 
members, equalizing their systems with the standards of the WTO; 4) to favorite the free 
movements of goods, services, capital and labor; and 5) to be an opened organization with the 
meaning to favorite the access of new participants to its mechanisms and to cooperate with other 
international organizations. 
From a pure economic side, the volition to create a further project of integration through the 
Eurasian Economic Union reflectes the economic global problems that Belarus, Kazakhstan and 
Russia were suffering during the last years due to geopolitical tensions and the global financial 
crisis. 
Figure 2: Mutual trade between the founders of the EEU in USD million 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Belarus     
  Turnover 40 798.6 44 750.5 40 697.1 38 804.5 
  Balance –10 432.8 –10 570.5 –5 280.3 –6 356.7 
Kazakhstan     
Turnover 
  Balance 
23 029.3 
–8 822.7 
24 626.3 
–10 950.7 
24 603.7 
–12 736.5 
19 665.2 
–9 250.6 
Russia     
Turnover 
Balance 
62 322.4 
19 307.0 
67 686.0 
21 622.8 
63 591.3 
18 164.7 
56 541.5 
15 492.7 
Source: Vinokurov Evgeny (2017): “Eurasian Economic Union: Current state and preliminary results”. In Russian Journal 
of Economics 3 (2017) P. 61 
The effects of this phenomenon were visible in the situation of economic stagnation and decrease 
of the turnovers of the troika, which in a comparison between 2013 and 2014 registered a 
complementary economic diminution of its turnover – mostly significant for Kazakhstan and 
Belarus, whose economies depend in primis on the relationship with the Russian Federation. 
In the foreign trade of the member-countries, the economic situation registered even passivity: 
the total of exports dropped from 64 520.0 million USD of the year 2013 to 57 448.3 million USD 
during 2014221. This decrease of -10.96% was sensible and a determinant clue that explained the 
necessity for the countries of the CU and SES to provide a further integration in order to 
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strengthen their economies together by the formation of a common regulated market and 
implement of investments as necessity for the modernization of their domestic markets - exactly 
the targets of the Eurasian Economic Union.  
2 The Treaty of the EEU, a neo-functionalist approach 
The Astana Treaty, as conceived by its founders, wants to favorite an economic integration in the 
post-Soviet area, creating common markets, favoring the mutual trade and equalizing the 
economic levels of its participants. Thereby is possible to ascertain as the EEU has in its principal 
aim the promotion of the regional economic integration between its members by the creation of 
an environment for a stable development of the national economies. This aim wants to raise the 
competitiveness and cooperation between the Eurasian states under the conditions of the global 
economy.   
With this incipit and before examining the EEU Treaty, the target of this paragraph is to 
determinate the theoretical nature of the EEU and of its legal framework.  
Theoretically, by the intention of the founder members, the integration of the Eurasian states in a 
coordinated entity is the main target proposed by the Treaty of the EEU. In order to have a clear 
comprehension of the meaning of integration within the Union, can be useful to consider the 
theoretical models that better can frame the schema of the EEU, namely the liberal-
intergovernmentalism model and the neo-functionalism. 
In detail, according to Andrew Moravcsik, the process of integration is successful when there is a 
full interaction of three factors: 1) the economic interests "pattern of commercial exchange222" – 
the strongest factor; 2) the relative negotiation power of national governments; and 3) the 
incentive to increase the credibility of the international commitments223.  
Taking into account these three factors and connecting them to the example of the EEU, it can be 
observed as the economic interests between the member-countries represent the keystone of the 
entire Eurasian integration. The negotiation between the national governments assumes in the 
politics of the Union a notable character, because the EEU is not provided of a supranational 
power, but the final decisions are committed to the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council, formed 
by the Head of State of every member-country, that (effectively) decide according to their national 
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interests. The third point underlined by Moravcsik can be connected in the theoretical analysis of 
the Treaty of the Union about its international legal personality, as provided by the article 116. 
The meaning of a recognized international character can allow from a side the other states of 
Eurasia to join the Union, recognizing the dispositions of the Treaty, and from the other side 
affirms the legal certainty of the entire framework of the association on the eyes of the 
international community, providing thus for a predictable expansion worldwide.  
Considering these facets of the liberal-intergovernmentalism model as proposed by Moravcsik in 
his explanation about the European Integration, this theory gives emphasis on the national states, 
represented by the governments that are the central actors in the decisional process, with a 
driving force concentered on the economic interests. The integration process is controlled by 
national actors, where the supranational institutions are only performers of these actions without 
an own operational autonomy. Moreover, this theoretical model assumes the fact that the 
integration is a political and not a technocratic process224. 
Now, applying further this model on the Eurasian integration can be noted as the Heads of the 
State of the participants of the EEU represents the central actors for the decisional process, and as 
the aim of upgrading the national economies is the principal factor supported within the Union. 
Besides, the EEU, not doted of a supranational power (which excludes a federalist character of the 
Union), has its decisional core exactly in the interests supported by the Presidents of the member-
countries. In relation to this model, a concept which must be analyzed is the “bargaining” 
between the different members of the Union, where the states, pursuing their national interests, 
try to find a negotiation to solve their dispute, reaching agreements with positive effects for both 
parts. However, must be considered that this phenomenon can have in the EEU only an economic 
effect, because a political dimension of the Union, as provided in the Treaty, is excluded. But, must 
be underlined as the effects of this phenomenon could be traceable in the EEU because the 
interests of the parts are mostly individual and the national egoism of the member-states can 
prevail: Russia wants to use the Union for its geopolitical ambitious of domain in Eurasia, while 
Belarus or Kazakhstan wants to reach better economic facilitation in their market with Russia. 
Additionally, in contrast with the model of Moravcsik, the integration of the EEU cannot be 
defined as only political but even technocratic. Indeed, as underlined in the Treaty for the macro-
area of cooperation, the coordination and together working of the member-states, especially for 
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the creation of technical guidelines for the markets of the Union, should be performed by special 
technical commissions of experts that better can create the conditions of cooperation and 
harmonization between the parts. Here is not excluded that every part in the achievement of the 
harmonization of the sectors can pursue its national interests, creating conditions of bargaining. 
These considerations bring us to make a step further to better define the theoretical model of the 
EEU, namely the neo-functionalism.   
In the neo-functionalist model, as presented by authors as Haas, Mitrany, Lindberg and 
Scheingold, is present in the foreground a strong cooperation between the members of an 
association. The integration has here a technocratic character and arises as consequence of the 
spread of the internal market, which allows an advanced expansion on other areas of cooperation 
between the parts225. 
In consideration of the neo-functionalism to the case of the EEU, it can be stressed, as the 
cooperation and integration of the member-countries of the Union has a solid basis: 1) the EEU is 
a continuation of the Customs Union of 2010; and 2) the cooperation especially between Belarus, 
Kazakhstan and Russia goes back to the year 1991 since the creation of the CIS.  
Further, the technocratic aspect is central in the EEU Treaty, where i.e. the meeting between 
specialists of every member-state should better form the economic area of cooperation in the 
economic key area of cooperation, as the creation of the energetic markets. However, in 
connection with the thought of the neo-functionalist, must be asserted as in this vision, through 
the initial decision of integration connected with the economic sector, there would be an 
expansive dynamics that would lead to the interdependence of various sectors and, hence, to 
further levels of integration that can overcome the economic aspect226. But, as before underlined, 
the EEU excludes in its Treaty every political aspects; so it can be argued that the spillover effect of 
the neo-functionalist should be excluded in the mechanisms of the EEU.   
After these reflections, it can be observed as the Astana Treaty wants to provide the four 
fundamental freedoms, to pursue a coordinated energy policy and to form common energy 
markets, creating perfect conditions of cooperation between all the participants. In order to 
realize it, the Treaty wants to reach a coordinated harmonization of the rules of competition 
between the members, placing them all on the same level. In this schema, the neo-functionalist 
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theory applicable to the process of the EEU can explain the volition of full economic integration of 
the participants of the Union, overcoming the national borders exclusively for an economic scope. 
In fact, if we considerate Belarus, which strongly depends on Russia, the Eurasian Economic Union 
is a meaningful choice, because thanks to the increased socioeconomic interdependence and the 
regulation of the national economic sector on the prevision of the Treaty, economic tasks and 
objectives can be solved and achieved better in regional context than in the national context – 
exactly as is possible to evince from the neo-functionalist theory.  
But, the reality of the first years of working of the Union is showing power-asymmetries between 
the member-states – especially if we considerate a comparison between Russia and Kyrgyzstan; 
and as the different national aims of the countries of the Union can have different effects on the 
evolution of the EEU, from economic to politic and military. 
These asymmetries explain as the background theory of the Union has thus a functionalist 
character, where every state is trying to use the system of the Union to obtain a personal target. 
A final consideration must be expressed about the volition of the states to not renounce to their 
national sovereignty, excluding any political influence on the integration process – although Russia 
would expand its control over Eurasia even through a political dimension. But, if Russia will be able 
in next years to expand its predominance within the Union and over Eurasia is still unpredictable 
and depends on different factors, as geopolitical decisions – first of all the resolution of the 
conflict in Ukraine.   
3 Theoretical interpretation of economic integration  
Theoretically, an economic union, established by those countries that share common ideas and 
want to eliminate trade and policy barriers in their commerce, has the purpose, through an 
economic integration, to increase the welfare of its associates efficiently. This purpose is exactly 
the scope which the Eurasian Economic Union wants to reach. Precisely, the EEU, by a together 
working of its participants in the establishment of common markets has the target to achieve 
welfare gain for its associates, creating, through the harmonization of national legal frameworks, a 
development of the internal economies of the member-countries. Thus, a progressive economic 
integration by the formation of customs union with application of a harmonized legal framework is 
the basic idea about the institution of the EEU. 
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Academically, the integration economic theory as independent discipline finds its first decisive 
contribution in the study of Jacob Viner (1950)227, who firstly introduced the concepts of trade 
creation and trade diversion in the examination of the effects that the economic union can 
generate in term of welfare gain. Viner argued as the effects of the establishment of a trade bloc 
can be positive for the intra-trade of associates with even progressive consequences on the extra-
trade of the member-states. According to the Canadian economist, the effects of a trade bloc in 
term of welfare increasing depend upon the relative magnitudes of trade creation and trade 
diversion. Specifically, following the analysis of Snorrason Thomas, trade creation is the 
replacement of domestic production by lower cost imports from a partner (considered by Viner 
beneficial because it does not affect the rest of the world); while trade diversion is the 
replacement of lower cost cheaper imports from the world market by more expensive imports 
from a partner (considered harmful). Viner stresses that the relative strength of these two effects 
determines whether or not a trade bloc is welfare enhancing or not228.  
Viner, together with Jaroslav Vanek (1965), in the economic debate were the two authors that 
distinguished trade blocs as customs unions involving internal free trade and a common external 
tariff. While, other contributors, as James Meade (1955), used the term customs union more 
loosely, involving internal free trade, but with application of original tariffs level in the extra-trade. 
By this notion, the term bloc assumes the significance of customs union and free trade areas 
indistinctly. Meade stressed that the relative magnitudes of trade creation and trade diversion 
alone are insufficient to determine the welfare effect of a bloc on world welfare because the 
benefits of preferential liberalization depend not only upon the extent of trade creation but also 
on trade costs. Similarly, losses are determined not just by the amount of trade diversion but also 
by the magnitude of the increase in costs due to trade diversion. Explicitly, Meade, in the 
explanation of his theory, constructed a multi-commodity model with complementary and 
substitutive goods and concluded that a high degree of complementarity between the goods of 
the customs union and those of the third countries increases the probability of positive welfare 
effects, since the welfare-reducing trade diversion is less. Simplified, it means that a customs 
union between two similar states has rather positive effects than a union of very different states. 
In the case of the substitutability of the goods of a customs union’s country and those of a third 
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country, the probability of positive welfare effects for the customs country will be reduced since 
the trade expansion in the customs union is compensated by a reduction in trade with the cheaper 
third country229. Therefore, the customs union implies positive benefits for the member-states 
because, if it is assumed that the participants of the union share a same idea and have similar 
economic models, their complementarity in the production and trade without the application of 
customs duties can bring an increase of their welfares. The common trade without implications of 
commerce distortions can have a positive impact in the economies of the member-states that 
replace their trade with third countries, which involves extra-costs as customs duties, with a 
common market with a tariff-regulation aimed to a complementary increment of welfare. 
Applying this passage on the EEU, must be asserted as although the principal idea of the member-
states is the increment of their mutual trade and improvement of their national economies, their 
economic dimension, their level of production and the still presence of barriers in their trade (as 
the lack in the harmonization of national normative acts or necessity to apply technical regulations 
for the production from the member-states unequivocally) represent obstacles that are nowadays 
contracting their economic integration. These barriers, as provided in the Astana Treaty, must be 
eliminated in order to favorite a full cooperation.  
After these initial considerations, is useful now to explain the idea of economic integration 
theoretically. 
Analyzing the concept of economic integration, a universal definition of this notion in the 
international trade is not present. For example the economist Bela Belassa (1962) defines 
economic integration as both a process and a state of affairs. Here integration is intended as a 
process that removes trade discriminations between the member-states, while a state of affairs in 
the sense that the integration provides the absence of any form of discrimination.  
The fundamental term is the removal of obstacles that prevent the free trade. Already Ricardo and 
Smith underlined as a free trade market and the movements of goods without distortions are the 
principal factors for a best policy of integration230. 
For Peter Robson (1987), the integration assumes the meaning of an efficient use of the resource. 
The absence of discrimination, as for Belassa, and the free movement of goods are the necessary 
conditions for the integration231. 
                                                          
229
 Beckmann R., Hebler M., Kösters Wim and Neimke M. (2000): "Theoretische Konzepte zum Europäischen 
Integrationsprozeß: Ein aktueller Überblick". Ruhr-Universität Bochum. P. 10 
230
 Cf. Snorrason Thomas S. (2012): “Asymmetric Economic Integration Size Characteristics Economies, Trade Costs and 
Welfare”. Physica-Verlag, 2012. P. 15 
130 
 
Willem Molle (1990) indicates through the economic integration the gradual elimination of 
barriers between the member-states: from a liberalization of the trade among the partners to a 
coordination of national policies. The concept of removal of discriminatory barriers in order to 
establish a limpid cooperation between the member-states is advanced even by Ali El-Agraa 
(1994). As for Molle, also for Jacques Pelkmans (2006), the removal of frontiers for the free 
circulation of goods, is the explication about the economic integration232. 
The common market has the advantage that from a side is guaranteed the freedom of good 
movement and from the other side that all existing non-tariff barriers (as technical and fiscal 
regulations) in the mutual trade are eliminated. Considering the second point, the elimination of 
barriers in the trade of the participants is the priority to set in the union, in order to have positive 
welfare effects in the national economies. As highlighted by Ian Wooton (1988), the setting of 
common external tariff (CET) is important too to reach positive welfare effects: “A customs union 
will always benefit from increasing its production efficiency, as long as it adjusts its CET structure 
appropriately233”. 
Other effects to considerate in the economic integration are the long-term effects that the union 
can create within its associates. The consideration of the long-term effects of integration shows 
that it is necessary to adapt and extend the forms of cooperation in all sensible areas. In order to 
achieve an extended collaboration between the associates of the union is necessary to develop 
and exchange technical knowledge through a united training of the workforce between the 
countries of the Union. Liberalization in the area of intermediate product production, on the other 
hand, is associated with an increment in the incentives for innovation, which also has a positive 
long-term trading effect and can favorite the growth rate in the area of integration.    
A final aspect that must be considered is the distribution of economic-policy competences 
between supranational and national levels. For example, in the customs union the establishment 
of the common customs duties, the supervision of the free movement of people in the common 
market, and the monetary policy should be carried at a supranational level through the 
subsidiarity principle, in order to take into consideration all economic aspects of every member.  
Synthesizing, the economic integration starts from a regime of free trade between the member-
states to arrive to a full economic union gradually.  
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Figure 3: Stages of economic integration between national economies 
Forms Free trade 
between 
member 
countries 
Common 
Customs Tariff 
Mobility of 
production 
factors 
Harmonization 
of economic 
policies 
Unification of 
the whole 
economic 
policy 
Free Trade ●     
Customs 
Union 
● ●    
Common 
Market 
● ● ●   
Economic 
Union 
● ● ● ●  
Full Economic 
Union 
● ● ● ● ● 
Source: Hitiris, Theo (1994): “European Community Economics”, 3. Aufl., New York 1994. P. 2 Cit. in Beckmann R., 
Hebler M., Kösters Wim and Neimke M. (2000): "Theoretische Konzepte zum Europäischen Integrationsprozeß: Ein 
aktueller Überblick". Ruhr-Universität Bochum. P. 4 
According to the model above, the abolition of economic restrictions starts on the commodity 
markets, with a gradual growing economic policy cooperation between the participants of the 
Union through free or preferential trade agreements. Precisely, the economic integration begins 
through the establishment of a free-trade zone with the abolishment of mainly import duties and 
quantitative import restrictions in the trade of the member-states. The further creation of the 
customs union brings the participants to the creation of common tariffs even in the commerce 
with third countries, in order to unify their tariff systems in a unique entity. Moreover, the 
common market, through the abolishment of non-tariff trade barriers, as technic limitation or 
social standard, favorites the liberalization of trade in goods and services. Further, for the citizens 
of the common market, this means that they can freely establish themselves in each participating 
country, open trades and carry out transactions on the same basis of the residents of that country. 
Finally, there is the creation of a monetary union which consists of a common market and 
currency. In general, every level of economic integration needs an adequate minimum political 
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consensus that is necessary to the expansion of the areas of cooperation234. Regarding the EEU, it 
can be stressed, that the economic integration means an integration of regional economies by 
reducing both tariff and non-tariff trade barriers; as well as restrictions on the free circulation of 
production factors (capital and work) and of citizens in the territory of the Union. Although the 
EEU’s Treaty explicitly provides to harmonize the legal framework of the member-states, for their 
cooperation between the exchange of qualified personnel, for the creation of a common market 
without the presence of any kind of barriers, the actual stage of the EEU can be classified in the 
second stage of economic integration, namely in the creation of the Customs Union. However, as 
underlined for example by Belassa and Wooton, a deeper integration depends on the elimination 
of economic distortion in the mutual trade and the perfect adjustment of common tariffs. These 
passages for the EEU, as the harmonization and unification of the national policies, are 
determinant to create in future a full working economic union. 
4 Principles and objectives of the Eurasian Economic Union 
Starting the analysis about the Treaty of the EEU is essential to discover the fundamental values of 
this organization. 
As is possible to evince in the preamble of the document, the solidarity and the necessity to 
cooperate economically in favor of a sustainable integration are the basic principles of the EEU. 
Indeed, through an examination of the introductive part of the contract, stand out the principles 
of: 1) equal sovereignty of all members, as need for unconditional respect for the rule of 
constitutional rights and freedoms of people; 2) the solidarity principle in the cooperation as basis 
to respect the culture, history and tradition of every member; 3) the conviction of a further 
economic Eurasian development as necessary for the common development of all the 
counterparts; 4) the volition to cooperate together in order to solve common problems properly, 
improving and modernizing the competitiveness of national economies within the framework of 
the global economy; and 5) the confirmation to further strengthen mutually beneficial and equal 
economic cooperation with other countries, international integration associations, and other 
international organizations, according to the WTO’s rules and conforming to the United Nations 
Charter and other universally recognized principles and regulations of international law.   
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These key aspects introduce the article 1 of the Treaty: 1) The Parties hereby establish the Eurasian 
Economic Union (hereinafter “the Union”, “the EAEU”) ensuring free movement of goods, services, 
capital and labor within its borders, as well as coordinated, agreed or common policy in the 
economic sectors determined under this Treaty and international treaties within the Union. 
2) The Union must be an international organization of regional economic integration and must 
have international legal personality235. 
From this first aspect, we can evince the international legal personality of the Union, its exclusive 
economic nature and its principal aim to guarantee the free movement of goods, services, capital 
and labor among the territories of its members. 
After a presentation and explanation of terms and definitions contained in the Treaty and 
explained in the article 2; in the second section of Treaty, is confirmed in the article 3 as the Union 
should conduct its action in the total respect of the principles of the international law, the 
sovereign equality of the member-states and their political structures. The meaning of this 
segment wants to affirm as every participant should have same position and significance within 
the organization. Specifically, taking into account the granting of the sovereign equality 
established by the Treaty, this mechanism was coined to avoid the lack of decision that every 
applying state for the accession to the EEU could have regarding the position of Russia, which, due 
to its primary economic dominance, would dominate the entire Union. The same reasoning is 
possible to apply in the reinterpretation of the respect of the political structure and special 
features of every single country. A concept that underlines cooperation based on the mutual 
equality. In this context is stressed, always in the article 3, as every state must give its efforts to 
properly create favorable conditions for the right work of the Union. 
The article 4 of the Treaty explains the main objectives of the Union: “1) to create proper 
conditions for sustainable economic development of the member-states, in order to improve the 
living standards of their population; 2) to seek the creation of a common market for goods, 
services, capital and labor within the Union; and 3) to ensure comprehensive modernization, 
cooperation and competitiveness of national economies within the global economy236”. 
The objectives of the EEU embrace the volition of the Union leaders about the creation of an 
organization that can be competitive in the global economy through an alliance of all Eurasian 
countries in a regional community. The first step is to assure a modernization of the internal 
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economies through the creation of a unique commercial area, on the basis of the Single Economic 
Space, and provide successively to develop the EEU’s trade with all most important world 
organizations. This is presented as a necessary assumption to overcome the challenges of the 
globalization and the global financial crisis of last decade. 
To reach these aims is defined in the article 5 of the Treaty, as the jurisdiction of the EEU is limited 
within the scope included in the treaty and other international treaties recognized by the Union. 
This statement confirms the possibility of the EEU to influence and determinate the economic 
decisions of the participants, as reported in the second comma of the article 5, where the 
“Member-States must seek to implement coordinated or agreed policy in accordance with the basic 
principles and objectives of the Union237”. 
Regarding the international treaties and their relationship with the Treaty of the Economic 
Eurasian Union, the article 6 delineates as the entire law of the Union is constituted of: the Treaty 
of the EEU; the international treaties within the Union and the international treaties of the Union 
with third party; and the decisions and dispositions of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council, 
the Eurasian Intergovernmental Council, and the Eurasian Economic Commission.  
The most important observation, which is provided from the same Treaty in the second and third 
comma of article 6, is the necessary not contradiction of international treaties with third parties 
and the contents of the Treaty of the Union; and the prevalence, in case of conflicts, of the 
dispositions of the EEU’s document over the international treaties. Moreover, in the fourth 
comma of article 6 is delineated as in case of conflict between decisions of the Supreme Eurasian 
Economic Council, the Eurasian Intergovernmental Council, or of the Eurasian Economic 
Commission, that the decisions of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council prevail over decisions 
of the Eurasian Intergovernmental Council and the Eurasian Economic Commission. In the same 
matter, the decisions of the Eurasian Intergovernmental Council prevail over decisions of the 
Eurasian Economic Commission238. 
Through this point is easy to understand as the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council, formed by 
the Presidents of the member-states, plays the most important decisional role regarding the 
problematic and most decisive choices about the operation of the EEU. The article 7 of the Treaty 
confirms the prestigious role of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council, that determinates the 
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procedure for the international cooperation of the Union, as the negotiations on draft 
international treaties of the Union with a third party.   
5 The body of the Union and appointment of its officials  
In the article 8 of the EEU’s Treaty is delineated the entire body of the Union: the Supreme 
Eurasian Economic Council (SEEC) – “the Supreme Council”; the Eurasian Intergovernmental 
Council (EIC) – “the Intergovernmental Council”; the Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC) – “the 
Commission” or “the EEC”; and the Court of the Eurasian Economic Union – “the Court of the 
Union”. In the fourth comma of article 8 is defined the duration of the role of the Chairmanship of 
the Supreme Council, the Intergovernmental Council and the Commission, that are arranged on a 
rotational basis for one calendar year without the possibility to prolong. Through this act, the 
Legislator wants to assure the equivalence of every state and their opportunity to occupy an 
important role in the system of the organization. Besides, the impossibility to extend the 
mandatory of every office has the double meaning of 1) to not blockade the decisional process; 
and 2) the volition of every state to set precise targets of their own mandate, trying to achieve 
them rapidly in order to guarantee a constant progress of the Union.  
Furthermore, the article 9 of the Treaty establishes clearly as the charges of the officials of the 
permanent bodies of the Union must be chosen by the member-states on national level among 
qualified people and with a special education appropriated to recover the institutional roles in the 
body of the EEU.  
In addition, an important passage which demonstrates the volition of transparence and equality of 
the Legislator in the organization of the Commission of the Union is demonstrated in the second 
comma of article 9: “The officials of a Department of the Commission may not be nationals of the 
same state. Candidates for these positions shall be selected by the EEC Competition Commission 
with regard to the principle of equal representation of the Parties239”. 
The equality and impartiality can be testified from the possibility to have heterogeneous officials 
in the department of the Commission. The selective process is granted by the Competition 
Commission of the Union, which decides on a competitive basis. The selection of candidates from 
the Competition Commission, as expressed in the comma fourth of article 9, is composed by all 
members of the Board of the Commission, excluding its chairman. The Board of the Commission 
decides in form of recommendations by a majority vote. After that, if the Chairman of the 
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Commission decides contrarily to the recommendation of the members of the Commission, the 
Chairman of the Board of the Commission must refer the issue to the Council of the Commission, 
which will take the final decision.  
Figure 4: Principal Bodies of the Eurasian Economic Union 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.1 The Supreme Eurasian Economic Council  
The article 10 of the Treaty defines as the Supreme Council, formed by the Heads of the state of 
the participants of the Union (Armenian President Sargsjan; Belarusian President Lukashenka; 
Kazakh President Nazarbayev; Kyrgyz President Atambayev and Russian President Putin), is the 
supreme Body of the EEU. Following, the article 11 itemizes the convocation of the Supreme 
Council for minimal one time per year. For urgent cases or for initiatives of a member-state, the 
Council can be convened extraordinarily. The same article provides that the Chairman of the 
Supreme Council must organize the meetings and the work of this apparatus. In the case the 
Chairman should terminate his mandate early, the procedure determinates that the new chosen 
member of the Supreme Council of the presiding member-state should exercise the powers of the 
Chairman of the Supreme Council in the remaining period240. To guarantee the transparency of the 
decisional process, is even established that the meetings of the Supreme Council may be attended 
by members of the Council of the Commission, Chairman of the Board of the Commission, and 
other invited persons. By this aspect the Legislator wanted to create a mechanism of perfect 
cooperation between all the institutions of the Union, allowing the possibility for the other bodies 
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of the Union to interact with the Supreme Council, assuring more limpidity in all the final decisions 
of the Council.  
This last aspect leads us to define the powers and tasks of the Supreme Council. Here, the article 
12 defines in the first paragraph as the Supreme Council must: consider the main issues of the 
Union’s activities, define the strategy, directions and prospects of the integration development 
and make decisions aimed at implementing the objectives of the EEU.  
The second paragraph of article 12 lists in 23 subparagraphs all the basic powers of the Supreme 
Council. Between the most important powers herein we can mention: the determination of 
strategy, directions and prospects for the formation and development of the Union; to make 
decisions aimed at implementing the objectives of the Union; the approval of the composition of 
the Board of the Commission, distributing responsibilities among Board of the Commission 
members and terminating their powers; the approval of the Rules of Procedure of the Eurasian 
Economic Commission; the approval of the Budget of the Union, the Regulation on the Budget of 
the Eurasian Economic Union and the report on implementation of the Budget of the Union; the 
determination of the amount (scale) of contributions of the member-states into the Budget of the 
Union; the making of requests to the Court of the Union; the determination of the procedure for 
admission of new members to the Union and termination of membership in the Union; the 
approval of the Procedure for International Cooperation of the Eurasian Economic Union; the 
decision on negotiations with a third party on behalf of the Union; or the decision on the 
establishment of the auxiliary bodies in the relevant areas241.  
The article 13 provides that the Supreme Council takes its actions through decisions and 
dispositions, adopted by consensus. In the case e.g. about the decision of a member to leave the 
Eurasian Economic Union, the principle of decision is the consensus minus. By this mechanism the 
Legislator prefixed the aim that the EEU must be formed by all those states that share same 
principles and have the awareness to reach determinate targets for the common development. 
According to this principle, the decision of those states that do not feel anymore to be part of the 
project must be not contradicted, avoiding the creation of internal feud within the Union that 
could block the entire decision making process. 
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5.2 The Intergovernmental Council  
The article 14 of the Treaty defines the Intergovernmental Council. It is composed by the Heads of 
governments of the member-states, specifically the Armenian first Prime Minister Sargsjan, the 
Belarusian Kobyakov, the Kazakh Sagintayev, the Kyrgyz Jeenbekov and the Russian Medvedev.  
The Intergovernmental Council must be hold minimal twice per year, in comparison to the 
Supreme Council that despite must be convoked minimal once a year. Moreover, every member-
state as well the Chairman of the Intergovernmental Council may convene an extraordinary 
session of the Council in case to solve urgent cases. The Chairman must organize and prepare the 
works of every session, which can be attended even by members of the Council of the 
Commission, Chairman of the Board of the Commission, and other invited persons, reinforcing the 
principle of transparency in the decision process of the entire working of the Union. 
In hierarchical order the Intergovernmental Council finds its location under the Supreme Council 
and has the following powers as contemplated in the article 16: “1) to ensure implementation and 
control the performance of this Treaty, international treaties within the Union and decisions of the 
Supreme Council; 2) to consider, on the proposal of the Council of the Commission, any issues for 
which no consensus was reached during decision-making in the Council of the Commission; 3) to 
issue instructions to the Commission; 4) to present candidates for members of the Council and the 
Board of the Commission to the Supreme Council; 5) to approve the drafts, the regulation and the 
report on Implementation of the budget of the Union; 6) to approve the Regulation on the audit of 
financial and economic activity of the Eurasian Economic Union’s Bodies, standards and 
methodology for conducting audits of financial and economic activities of the Bodies of the Union, 
to decide on the execution of audits of financial and economic activities of the Bodies of the Union 
and to determine their time periods; 7) to consider, when proposed by a member-state, any issues 
relating to the cancellation or amendment of a decision issued by the Commission, or, in case no 
agreement is reached, to refer them to the Supreme Council; 8) to decide on suspension of 
decisions of the Council or the Board of the Commission; 9) to approve the procedure for verifying 
authenticity and completeness of information on the income, property and property obligations of 
members of the Board of the Commission, officials and employees of the Commission and their 
family members; 10) to exercise other powers provided for by this Treaty and international treaties 
within the Union242”. 
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The analysis of the tasks of the Intergovernmental Council allows us to understand as this body of 
the Union has principally a role of: a) control over the real operation of the organization and 
respect of the members about their obligation within the rules of the Union; b) to review the 
decision of the Commission that have not found a consensus, with the possibility to consider 
about the cancellation of decisions and amendments of the Commission; and economically c) to 
approve drafts, regulation and report on implementation of the budget of the Union.  
The article 17 enunciates as the decision process of the Intergovernmental Council must be 
reached in form of decisions and dispositions and adopted by consensus. Reflecting about the 
mechanism of consensus it possible to evince that the Legislator in the contemplation of the 
Treaty wanted to assure the principle of mediation between all the members, in order to obtain 
that every choice can be evaluated as the best formulation between all the exponents of the 
Intergovernmental Council, reflecting thus the homogeneity of the member-states in adopting 
solutions and, on the whole, marking the compactness of the entire Union.  
5.3 The Commission of the Union 
The article 18 of the Treaty defines the Eurasian Economic Commission, located in Moscow, as a 
permanent Body of the Union. In the working process, the Commission agrees by decisions, 
dispositions and recommendations. Here, we distinguish between decisions, dispositions and 
recommendations of the Council of the Commission internally – reached through consensus; and 
the decisions, dispositions and recommendations of the Board of the Commission – taken by a 
qualified majority (two-third of votes) or consensus.   
Regarding the issues where the Board of the Commission decides by consensus, is the Supreme 
Council that compiles a list of different matters where the Board must express its decision through 
the formula of consensus. 
A further explanation about the powers, structure and working of the Commission is contained in 
the Annex 1 to the EEU’s Treaty “Regulation on the Eurasian Economic Commission”. This 
document, completing the article 18 of the Treaty, defines in its first section the general provisions 
of the Commission: 1) to enable the functioning and development of the Union; and 2) to develop 
proposals in the sphere of economic integration within the Union243. 
The principles upon which the Commission bases its activities are: the mutual benefit, equality and 
respect for the national interests of the member-states; the economic justification of its action 
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with the scope to provide a reasonable investment of the resources for the economic 
development of the participants; and transparency, publicity and objectivity.  
Analyzing further, the basic objectives are listed all the spheres of intervention of the Commission, 
namely all economic areas as e.g.: customs tariff and non-tariff regulation; transfer and 
distribution of import customs duties; statistics of foreign and mutual trade; macroeconomic 
policy; energy policy; natural monopolies; mutual trade in services and investments; transport and 
transportation; monetary policy; financial markets (banking, insurance, the currency market, the 
securities market). 
From this simplified list we can ascertain as the Commission represents the decisional motor of 
the Union for all its economic decision in the macro-economic areas, from monopolies to 
regulation of industrial, agricultural and energetic sector. The importance of this organ of the EEU, 
which has the right of a juridical person, is confirmed by the fifth comma of the general provisions 
that makes the Commission the depository of international treaties within the Union and of 
decisions of the Supreme Council and the Intergovernmental Council. Moreover, in the sixth 
paragraph is provided explicitly as the Supreme Council may vest the Commission of the power to 
sign international treaties on matters within the competence of the Commission.  
The Commission is even responsible for the preparation of the budget of the Union and by its 
powers must adopt decisions, that essentially, apart the decisions containing restricted 
informations, take effect at least 30 calendar days after their official publication, with regulatory 
and binding effect for the member-states. 
The decisions of the Commission are adopted through the vote of its two branches: the Council 
and the Board of the Commission. The vote procedure, as expressed by the paragraph 21 of the 
general provisions, is so divided: “In the Council of the Commission, a single vote of the Council 
member should be equal to one vote; in the Board of the Commission, a single vote of the Board 
member should be equal to one vote244”.  
It is important to affirm as the activities of the Council of the Commission and the Board of the 
Commission must be supported by the Departments of the Commission, which consist of officials 
and employees. To the Head of every department, in order to better coordinate their actions, 
there are the directors of departments of the Commission. The directors and their deputies should 
be appointed by the Chairman of the Board of the Commission on the basis of recommendations 
of the competition commission for a term of 4 years. 
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5.4 The Council of the Commission 
The principal task of the Council of the Commission, as expressed in the paragraph 22 of the Annex 
1, is to define the principal and general regulations of integration processes in the Union and of 
the general management of the Commission's activities. Regarding its composition, the paragraph 
23 affirms as the Council of the Commission must be composed of one representative, the deputy 
Head of the Government, for every member-state. This passage stresses more the basic principle 
of the Union, namely the equality between all its participants. In confirmation of that is possible to 
note as between the tasks of the Council of the Commission, this apparatus, in order to ensure 
observance of the national rights of the member-countries in the employment-system of the 
departments of the Commission, must establish the Commission of Ethics with the approval of its 
regulation. 
Summarizing the main functions and powers of the Council of the Commission, this body of the 
Union must: improve legal regulation of activities of the Union; submit for the approval of the 
Supreme Council main integration directions within the Union; consider the cancellation of the 
Commission's decisions taken by the Board of the Commission; approve qualification 
requirements to officials and employees of the Commission; and create and develop an integrated 
information system of the Union. 
The meetings of the Council of the Commission can be proposed by any of its members that may 
initiate a meeting of the Council of the Commission and make proposals on the agenda. Its validity 
is ascertained if attended by all members of the Council of the Commission, as well by the 
Chairman of the Council of the Commission. In consideration of the Chairman, this figure must 
manage the issues that will submitted during the discussion; determinate the agenda; and open 
and close every meeting, giving in this way to his position a central role in the organization of the 
work. 
As reported above, the Council of the Commission should adopt decisions, dispositions and 
recommendations by consensus. If the negotiation trough consensus is not obtained, the 
procedure provides that the successive examination and decision will be entrusted to the Supreme 
Council or the Intergovernmental Council in order to not block the decisional process. 
Furthermore, the Council of the Commission, as every of its members, has the possibility within 15 
calendar days from the date of publication of a decision of the Board of the Commission to submit 
a proposal to the Board of the Commission for its cancellation or amendment. In case of 
successive disagreement about the reviewed proposal between the Council and the Board of the 
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Commission, the decision will be subjected to consideration of the Supreme Council or the 
Intergovernmental Council. This last passage illustrates as the Council of the Commission recovers 
hierarchically a higher position in comparison to the Board of the Commission.   
5.5 The Board of the Commission 
According to the Paragraph 31 of the Annex 1 on the Treaty of the EEU, “The Board of the 
Commission, comprised of representatives of the Member States based on the principle of equal 
representation of the Member States, shall be the executive body of the Commission. The 
allocation of responsibilities and the number of the Board’s members must be decided by the 
Supreme Council245”. 
In the analysis of this segment is possible to note the presence of the principles of equal 
representation and professionalism because the choice of the members must follow precise 
requirements as a special training and at least seven years of experience for official duties, 
including at least one year in a senior management position at a public authority of a member-
state.  
The Supreme Council, after have examined the proposals of each member-state for their 
candidates for membership in the Board of the Commission, appoints both the members of the 
Board for a term of four years (with the possibility to prolong their mandate) and the Chairman for 
a term of four years too (excluding in this case the opportunity of a prolongation). In case of non-
approval of a candidate for the Board of the Commission by the Supreme Council, the member-
state must nominate a new candidate within thirty calendar days. 
Besides, the Legislator prefixed for the members, officials and employees of the Commission, the 
duty to work in the Commission on a permanent basis, excluding from a side possible conflicts of 
interests between the member-countries and the legislation of the Union; and assuring from the 
other side the principle of impartiality in the conduction of the work of the Board of the 
Commission in the exercise of the executive power of the EEU. Guaranteeing transparency and 
impartiality in the exercise of their function, the Legislator provided too in the paragraph 36 the 
exclusion for the members of the Board of the Commission to own any kind of business activity or 
be part of the management body of a commercial entity. Through this mechanism the volition of 
the Legislator is to exclude for the members of the Board of the Commission cases of 
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impeachment, avoiding that the members of the Board may use their power to reach proper 
targets that could afflict the working of the Union negatively or in favor of a single member-state.  
The article 43 of the Annex 1 lists the functions and powers of the Board of the Commission, that 
we can summarize as the most significant: “To develop own proposals and compiling proposals 
submitted by the member-states in the field of integration within the Union; to adopt decisions, 
dispositions and recommendations; to implement decisions and dispositions adopted by the 
Supreme Council and the Intergovernmental Council and decisions adopted by the Council of the 
Commission; to monitor and control the implementation of international treaties in the legal 
system of the Union; to submit annual progress reports for consideration by the Council of the 
Commission; to develop recommendations on issues relating to the formation, functioning and 
development of the Union; to assist the member-states in the settlement of disputes within the 
Union before applying to the Court of the Union; to interact, within its powers, with public 
authorities of the member-states; to develop a draft Budget of the Union and draft reports on its 
implementation, ensuring implementation of the budget estimates of the Commission: to draft 
international treaties and decisions of the Commission adopted by the Council of the Commission, 
as well as other documents required for the exercise of powers by the Commission246”. 
In the exercise of its function and to reach its aims properly, the Board of the Commission can 
establish advisory bodies, composed of authorized representatives of public authorities of the 
member-states. The advisory bodies under the Board of the Commission may, within their powers, 
issue recommendations for the Commission on matters within their competence. 
In order to assure stability and coherence in the achievement of its objectives, the Board of the 
Commission, as established at the paragraph 49 of the Annex 1, must hold a meeting at least once 
a week. The preparation and the organization of the meetings are entrusted to the Chairman of 
the Board of the Commission, who must set up the agenda with all issues that will be discussed. 
Other to have a principal role in the organization of the work of the Board of the Commission, the 
Chairman of the Board of the Commission exercises other important functions as: to determine 
operation procedure for the Departments of the Commission and matters within their 
competence; to participate in the meetings of the Council of the Commission; to represent the 
Board of the Commission in the Council of the Commission; to act on behalf of the Commission as 
the administrator of the Budget of the Union; to manage funds within the budget estimates of the 
Commission and financial resources of the Commission; to conclude civil law contracts and appear 
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in court; to approve regulations on the Departments of the Commission; and to ensure verification 
of facts specified in a request of a member-state to revoke a member of the Board of the 
Commission. 
To conclude, the paragraph 52 of the Annex 1 lists the responsibilities of a member of the Board of 
the Commission: “Prepare proposals on matters within his/her competence; report at meetings of 
the Board of the Commission and the Council of the Commission on matters within his/her 
competence; coordinate and control activities of the supervised Departments of the Commission; 
prepare draft decisions, dispositions and recommendations of the Board of the Commission on 
matters within his/her competence; monitor the implementation by the member-states of 
international treaties that form the Union law on matters within his/her competence; monitor the 
enforcement by the member-states of Commission decisions on matters within his/her 
competence; prepare draft expert opinions; cooperate with public authorities of the member-states 
on matters within his/her competence; ensure the drafting of international treaties, decisions, 
dispositions and recommendations of the Commission adopted by the Council of the Commission, 
as well as other documents required to exercise the powers of the Commission on matters within 
his/her competence; ensure due participation of the supervised Departments of the Commission in 
regulatory impact assessment procedure; submit to the Board of the Commission proposals for the 
establishment of advisory bodies under the Board of the Commission on matters within his/her 
competence247”.  
5.6 The Court of the Union 
The article 19 of the EEU Treaty, completed with the annex 2 “Statute of the Court of the Eurasian 
Economic Union”, delineates the Court of the Union, located in Minsk, as a permanent and 
juridical body of the Union. The objective of the Court, according to the paragraph 2 of the first 
chapter of the annex 2, “Must ensuring, in accordance with the provisions of this Statute, uniform 
application by the Member States and Bodies of the Union of the Treaty, international treaties 
within the Union, international treaties of the Union with a third party and decisions of the Bodies 
of the Union248”.  
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Essentially the role of the Court is to maintain equilibrium and resolve possible disputes between 
the provisions of the Treaty, the internal legislation of the states and assure the accordance 
between the norms of the EEU and the international treaties. 
The Court, as provided by the Chapter II of the Annex 2, should include in its composition two high 
qualified judges, with a term of nine years, from each member-country. The judges, endowed all 
by equal status, are appointed by the Supreme Council on the proposals of the member-states. In 
the Treaty is guaranteed the principle of impartiality of the judges, affirming their impossibility in 
participation of activities incompatible with the office of judge. In this case, as for example if the 
judge has no longer the status of citizenship of an EEU state or in case of serious misconduct 
incompatible with the high status of a judge, can be dismissed by his function. In confirmation of 
the impartiality and the possibility of conflicts of interest of the judges, the article 18 of the Annex 
2 explicates as, “The judges may not represent the interests of any state or interstate authorities 
and organizations, businesses, political parties and movements, as well as territories, nations, 
nationalities, social and religious groups and individuals249”. 
The articles 14 and 15 of the Annex 2 provide that all activities of the Court should be managed by 
the Chairman of the Court. The Chairman of the Court should have a Deputy Chairman, elected by 
Court judges for duration of three years among the judges of the Court in accordance with the 
rules of procedure subject to approval by the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council250. To assure 
the principle of impartiality is established that the Chairman of the Court and the Deputy 
Chairman may not be citizens of the same member-state. Between their major tasks, they deal 
with organization of the work of the Court; approval of the structure and activities of the Court 
and judges; or appointment and dismissing of employees and officials of the Court in accordance 
with the procedure envisaged in the EEU Treaty.  
Analyzing in detail the tasks of the Court, in the article 39 of the Chapter IV of the Annex 2 is 
indicated that the Court must resolve disputes arising in connection with the implementation of 
the Treaty, international treaties within the Union and/or decisions of the Bodies of the Union, at 
the request of a member-state or at the request of an economic entity251. In the exercise of 
justice, the article 50 of the Annex 2 explains as the Court must apply: “1) the generally recognized 
principles and regulations of international law; 2) the Treaty, international treaties within the 
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Union and other international treaties to which the states that are parties to the dispute are 
participants; 3) decisions and dispositions of the Bodies of the Union; and 4) the international 
custom as evidence of the general practice accepted as a rule of law252”. 
The article 53 of the Chapter V of Annex 2 delineates the principles of the Court in the 
performance of its functions specifically: independence of judges; transparency of proceedings; 
publicity; equality of the parties to the dispute; competitiveness; collegiality. In addition, the Court 
respects the principles of the international treaty in the processing of its actions. The work of the 
Court, as established by the Legislator, must resolve the disputes that could appear in the decision 
and disposition of the other apparatuses of the EEU. Tough, the Court should not suspend any 
Treaty or decision that is placed in dispute before the last decision, assuring to not block the 
working process of the Union. 
The section 3 of the Chapter V of Annex 2 elucidates the composition of the Court for the 
examination of the cases. Here is expressed that the Court is composed for the explication of its 
functions of the Grand Panel of the Court, the Panel of the Court and the Appeals Chamber of the 
Court. The Grand Panel, which includes all judges of the Court, should examine in its session, valid 
only if all judges are present, the procedural matters prescribed by the rules of procedure. The 
Panel of the Court should include at least one judge from each member-state participating 
alternately by the names of the judges. The session is considered valid if at least one judge of 
every member-country is present, guaranteeing the principle of representation in the act to take 
the final decision. The Appeals Chamber of the Court is formed for the task to examine appeals 
against the decisions of the Panel of the Court. The Appeals Chamber of the Court includes judges 
of the Court from those member-states that did not participate in the proceedings of the results in 
the decision of the Panel of the Court in question. The validity of the acts of the Appeals Chamber 
is reached when at least is present one judge representing each involved member-state. In order 
to achieve the principle of transparency and professionalism completely, the Legislator provided 
too, that the Chamber should be formed by very qualified personal in situation of particular 
disputes concerning e.g. the provision of industrial subsidies or agricultural state support 
measures, confirming the technocratic nature of the integration.  
The Chapter VII of Annex 2 in the article 95 prefixes that the Court should, within the time limits of 
the rules of procedure, adopt judgments on procedural matters of the Court, including judgments 
on: 1) admission or rejection of an application; 2) suspension or resumption of proceedings; 3) 
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termination of proceedings253. After 90 days of the date of receipt of an application, the Court 
should issue its decision and provide an advisory opinion following a request for clarification. 
The decisions of the Court will bind the parties that have brought on its attention the dispute. 
However, here is appropriate to make some consideration related to the limitation of the 
jurisprudence of this body of the EEU. Indeed, the Court may not extend its decisions beyond the 
issues stated in the application and may not alter and/or override the effective rules of the Union 
law and the legislation of the member-states. This point confirms as the volition of the member-
countries for a deeper integration, renouncing to their sovereignty in term of jurisdictional 
competence within the Union is still limited. 
As provided by the Legislator, the Grand Panel of the Court should issue decisions on: 1) an appeal 
lodged by a member-state regarding compliance of an international treaty within the Union or its 
certain provisions with the Treaty; 2) an appeal lodged by a member -tate regarding observance by 
another member state of the Treaty; 3) an appeal lodged by a member-state regarding compliance 
of a decision of the Commission; 4) an appeal lodged by a member-state challenging actions 
(omissions) of the Commission; 5) an appeal lodged by an economic entity on compliance of a 
decision of the Commission or its certain provisions directly affecting the rights and legitimate 
interests of the economic entity in the sphere of business and other economic activities with the 
Treaty and/or international treaties within the Union; 6) an appeal lodged by an economic entity 
on compliance of a decision of the Commission or its certain provisions directly affecting the rights 
and legitimate interests of the economic entity in the sphere of business and other economic 
activities with the Treaty and/or international treaties within the Union. 
Regarding the decisions of the Court to the Commission, the article 113 and 114 of the Annex 2, 
provide that, “The Commission should execute the effective decision of the Court, establishing 
nonconformity of the disputed actions (omissions) of the Commission to the Treaty and/or 
international treaties within the Union and violation thereby of the rights and legitimate interests 
of economic entities envisaged in the Treaty and/or international treaties within the Union, within 
a reasonable time not exceeding 60 calendar days from the date of entry into force of the 
respective decision of the Court, unless a different term is specified in the decision of the Court. In 
case of failure to execute the decision of the Court, the respective Member State shall be entitled to 
apply to the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council for measures required for its execution254”.  
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For this last segment is important to report a reflection. In order to not intact the process of the 
Union, if the Commission, bounded to follow a determinate choice of the Court but without 
obtaining a real explication of this issue, may bring the decision to the attention of the Supreme 
Council. In this case the Council, examining the controversy, will adopt a solution in order to solve 
the dispute. This point lets us to confirm more the primary importance of the Supreme Council, 
which may hold between its powers even the jurisdictional competence.   
5.7 Observations about the bodies of the Union 
The bodies of the Eurasian Economic Union retraces the framework of the Customs Union and, as 
imagined by its founders, are inspired to the schema of the European Union – although the EEU 
presents a four-tiered governance structure that is more pyramidal than the more diffuse 
decision-making processes of the EU. 
Summarizing the organogram of the Eurasian Economic Union, the highest body is the Supreme 
Eurasian Economic Council, which is composed of the Presidents of the member-states. The SEEC 
is reunited minimally once a year and takes its decisions by consensus. The Supreme Council is 
responsible to determinate prospects, strategies and directions to develop and reach the 
objectives of the Union, to regulate the domestic market. 
A step lower in the institutional hierarchy of the Union there is the Eurasian Intergovernmental 
Council, composed by the Heads of Government of the member-states. The EIC reunites itself at 
least twice a year, takes its decisions by consensus and is responsible to determinate all the issues 
that were not decided because the absence of a consensus during the decision process of the 
SEEC. 
The permanent regulatory body of the Eurasian Economic Union is the Eurasian Economic 
Commission – which in a comparison with the structure of the European Union would correspond 
to the European Commission. It consists of 15 members (three for every member) and is formed 
by the Council of the Commission, consisting of 5 members; and the Board of the Commission, 
consisting of 10 members, including Chairman (two for member-state), that takes its decision by 
qualified majority (two thirds of the Board members’ voices) and by consensus in case the 
question is related to the list of sensitive questions determined by the SEEC. The decisions of the 
Board are adopted by two-thirds majority on matters not related to the competence of the 
Council. The Council, which oversees the executive, has the authority to cancel or reconsider any 
decision of the Board. The mayor tasks of the Commission, guided nowadays by Armenian Tigran 
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Sargsyan, are regarded to the correct functioning of the Union and to the development of 
proposals in order to favorite better the economic integration within the EEU. The Chairman of the 
EEC Board is appointed by the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council for four-year tenure on a 
rotational basis without the right of prolongation. In comparison to the Custom Union 
Commission, where the votes between the parties were divided: Belarus 21.5%, Kazakhstan 21.5% 
and Russia 57%; in the EEC each member of the Commission Council and the Commission Board 
has one vote255. It means that the decision-making mechanism in the EEC excludes the dominance 
of any state, exactly to guarantee the supranational power of the Commission which must be 
neutral among all participants. In confirmation of this fact, is possible to add that the EEC’s main 
executive body, the Board, comprises 10 members (ministers), where each member-state is 
represented by 2 of these ministers. Such a representation scheme diminishes Russia’s role as the 
region’s leading state in EEU affairs: despite being responsible for 87% of the Union’s total Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), Russia has only 20% of its total voting power256. The volition to institute 
such mechanism was arbitrary, exactly to avoid that the participants of the Union could be 
overwhelmed by the Russian powerful. 
Finally, the judicial branch is represented by the Court of the Union, which ensures the application 
of the EEU’s Treaty as other international treaties among the other bodies of the Union and the 
states.  
Reflecting on the EEU in general, this organization represents nowadays the successive integration 
step to the Custom Union because is structured neutrally in order to protect all the interests of the 
member-countries. But, from another point of view must be underlined two aspects: 1) in the 
organization fails an internal Parliament. In fact the EEU has not elected body. All the ministers are 
appointed by the Head of States of every member-country – highlighting in the same time the only 
economic aspect of the Union, excluding political levels. In addition, the multilayered architecture 
of the Commission (lower layer – international officers as European Commissioners, upper one is 
made of states representatives) shows that the architects had no intentions to make the EEU 
politically influential: any of its decision can be blocked by its upper layer. However the idea to 
have a Parliament is possible to realize. At the moment the states are mitigating this issue 
harmonizing their national legal framework in all the fields of the Treaty.  
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2) The Russian power of decision will be always greater in comparison to the other members. It is 
because of the Russian territorial dimension and population density that represent the 2/3 of all 
the EEU. However, in order to attract more countries in the EEU’s organogram, the Russian 
objective is to have a balance of the decision process between all the participants. This aspect 
does not exclude that the Russian Federation in the decision process will have a mayor impact, but 
an aspect moderated by the same Russian volition to attribute equal power to all members, 
showing the volition to give parity inside the Union. It can be argued, that this passage is a 
coherent vision of Putin’s target: from a side to offer to the members an equal vote in the 
structure of the Union in order to attract more Eurasian states. From the other side, Russia knows 
that due to the economic dependence of the Eurasian members from its market, the decisions, as 
thought by the Russian counterparts in the body of the EEU, will take in power without many 
obstacles.  
Despite the matter of the Russian possible dominance in the decisional process, the institutions of 
the Eurasian Economic Union in their complex should exercise first of all a monitor control that 
make the legal instances of the Treaty to be observed correctly. But, as reminded by the 
Belarusian President at the session of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council in Bishkek on 14 
April 2017, this function of control is not yet implemented totally and must be improved: “It is 
necessary to set a moratorium on the adoption of new laws that might discriminate the member 
states. The Eurasian Economic Commission shall monitor the observance of the rule. The Eurasian 
Intergovernmental Council and the Eurasian Economic Commission need to devote more attention 
to removing exemptions, barriers and restrictions on the EAEU domestic market257”. 
In general the bodies of the Union have the tasks to regulate and coordinate the economy of the 
organization reflecting the necessities of the member-states. In this purpose must be considered 
the economic differences of the participants of the Union and the primary objective of the bodies 
of the Union to harmonize the entire system process of the EEU, achieving the respect of an equal 
legal framework between all the participants. 
6 Information exchange within the EEU 
The EEU Treaty in the Section IV at the article 20 defines as every activity of the Union must be 
funded from the Budget of the Union – determined and approved by the Supreme Council in 
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Russian rubles for every fiscal year. Following, the articles 21 and 22 list as: “1) the financial and 
economic activities of the Bodies of the Union must be audited at least once every 2 years in order 
to oversee the implementation of the Budget of the Union; and 2) the institution of a group of 
inspectors must control the efficiency management and disposal of the funds of the budget of the 
Union, reporting their research to the Supreme Council258”. This mechanism allows a direct 
financial control about all the activities of the Union, with the aim that all invested funds in the 
EEU are really used by every body of the Union correctly. 
In the V section, part two of the Treaty about the Customs Union, the article 23 underlines the 
importance of developing measures that can favorite and support the integration process of the 
members. Exactly here we can find a confirmation of the targets of the EEU, namely the necessity 
and volition to implement actions and channels, especially in the form of informatics and 
electronic communication, to exchange useful information between the participants, creating a 
system of sharing of notices and facts relevant for the Union in order to strengthen the basis of 
trustiness among the EEU.   
The annex 3 of the Treaty “Protocol on Information and Communication Technologies and 
Information Exchange within the Eurasian Economic Union” explores the subject of the article 23, 
setting up the basic principles of information exchange and coordination of communications 
within the Union and establishing the procedure for the creation and development of an 
integrated information system. Principally, this Protocol in the paragraph 3 provides the 
importance to create an integrated information system in specific areas: “1) customs tariff and 
non-tariff regulations; 2) customs regulations; 3) technical regulations, application of sanitary, 
veterinary-sanitary and phytosanitary quarantine measures; 4) transferring and distribution of 
import customs duties; 5) transferring and distribution of anti-dumping and countervailing duties; 
6) statistics; 7) competition policy; 8) energy policy; 9) monetary policy; 10) intellectual property; 
11) financial markets (banking, insurance, the currency market, the securities market); 12) support 
for the activities of the Bodies of the Union; 13) macroeconomic policy; 14) industrial and 
agricultural policy; 15) circulation of medicinal products and medical devices; 16) other matters 
within the powers of the Union259”. The volition of the Legislator to form a system for exchange 
information for the markets, financial sectors and different economic sectors of interaction of the 
EEU is to provide a better integration of the national levels of the member-states in the common 
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dimension of the EEU dispositions, trying too to reach the harmonization of the diverse internal 
legal frameworks of every member, conforming them to the previsions of the Treaty. 
Going further in the examination of the annex 3, the paragraph 4 reports the objectives for the 
creation of an integrated system of communication within the Union: “a) to create and maintain a 
single system of regulatory and reference data of the Union based on the unified system of 
classification and coding; b) to determinate an integrated information structure for the interstate 
exchange of data and electronic documents within the Union; to establish information resources 
common to all the member-states; c) to ensure information exchange under the provisions of the 
Treaty to enable the formation of common information resources, information support of 
authorized authorities exercising state control, as well as the implementation of common 
processes within the Union; d) to provide access to the texts of international treaties and acts 
constituting the law of the Union; e) to establish and maintain a common infrastructure for 
documenting information in electronic form260”. 
This system wants to allow creating a perfect channel of distribution and communication of issues 
connected with the work of the EEU through central and informatics database, respecting the 
principle of transparency between all members of the organization that by the system of the EEU 
and the direct contact with the local authorities of every member-state can provide relevant 
informations for the economic actions of the Union among the participants equally. Reflecting 
about this last statement, is possible to evince as the aim of this mechanism is connected with the 
other principal target of the EEU, namely the volition to bring all members to a same level of 
development, in order to synchronize better their actions and thus the evolution of the Union 
totally. In this context, the EEC has the task to create, coordinate and control the electronic code 
and system of exchange of information between both the members of the Union and the third 
states, executing a function of control through dispositions and obligations with the target to 
allow the exact exchange of issues, excluding in the same time the inappropriate use of relevant 
documents.  
In order to achieve a complementary exchange of all issues regarding the Union and to ensure its 
efficient functioning and development, the article 24 of the Treaty of the EEU provides the 
necessity to collect official statistics within the Union, according to the principles of professional 
independence; scientific validity and comparability; completeness and accuracy; relevance and 
timeliness; transparency and accessibility; cost-effectiveness; and statistical confidentiality. The 
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Legislator through these principles affirms the importance of communication and exchange of 
information as instrument to reach a coordinate growth of the work of the participants of the 
Union, moving forward to the consolidation of their integration. 
7 Functioning of the Customs Union 
In the section VI of the Treaty is explained the functioning of the Customs Union. Precisely, in the 
article 25 are delineated the principles about the working of the CU: “1) an internal market for 
goods must be in place; 2) the common customs tariff of the Eurasian Economic Union and other 
common measures regulating foreign trade with third parties must be applied; 3) a common trade 
regime must be applied to relations with third parties; 4) common customs regulations must be 
applied; 5) free movement of goods between the territories of the member-states must be ensured 
without the use of customs declarations and state control (transport, sanitary, veterinary-sanitary, 
phytosanitary quarantine), except as provided for by the Treaty261”.  
Analyzing this article, the Legislator provides the creation of an internal market for goods for the 
Eurasian states, where will be applied a common system of regulated measures between the 
participants and for those third countries that cooperate with the Union – although this 
mechanism should be implemented because, especially in the trade with third countries, the 
member-countries are still applying their tariffs based on bilateral accords. For that, the objective 
of the Union is firstly the realization of common measures in the mutual trade of the participants 
of the EEU and then in the extra-trade of the Union, in order to achieve a coordinated 
development and a regulation of the common trade.  
The article 26, completed by the annex 5 of the Treaty “Protocol on the Procedure for Transfer and 
Distribution of Import Customs Duties” defines as the import customs duties must be transferred 
and distributed between the budgets of the member-states in order to assure an equal 
distribution of the costs. This Protocol agrees the procedure for transfer and distribution of the 
amounts of import customs duties between the participants of the Union under the obligations to 
pay for goods imported into the customs territory from September 1, 2010. 
Specifically, the paragraph 3 of the Annex 5 specifies that the amounts of import customs duties 
must be transferred to the single account of the authorized authority in the national currency of 
the member-state in which they are payable in accordance with international treaties and acts 
constituting the law of the Union that govern the customs legal relations. In order to fix the quotas 
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effectively, respecting thus the equality of the internal system and financial situation of the 
member-states, the Protocol fixed that the amounts of import customs duties should be refunded 
(offset) in accordance with the internal legislation of the member-states, unless otherwise 
provided by international treaties and acts constituting the law of the Union and governing 
customs legal relations, with account of the provisions of the annex 5262. 
In follow of that, the paragraph 12 of the Annex 5 illustrates the distribution ratios for the 
amounts of import customs duties of the troika of the Eurasian Economic Union, based on their 
territorial dimension and economic significance in the Union: the Republic of Belarus 4.70%; the 
Republic of Kazakhstan 7.33%; the Russian Federation 87.97%263. With the accession of Armenia 
and Kyrgyzstan, the tariffs were so redistributed: Russia — 85.32%; Kazakhstan — 7.11%; Belarus 
4.55%; Kyrgyzstan — 1.9%; and Armenia — 1.11%. 
The monitoring control about these activities are led by the State Control Committee of the 
Republic of Belarus, the Accounts Committee for Control over Execution of the Republican Budget 
of the Republic of Kazakhstan, and the Accounts Chamber of the Russian Federation that must 
annually verify observance of the provisions of this Protocol by authorized authorities of the 
member-states. Internally, the power of control is entrusted to the Commission, which should 
submit annual reports to the Intergovernmental Council regarding the transfer and distribution of 
import customs duties. 
The article 28 of the Treaty affirms as the Union should adopt measures to ensure the functioning 
of the internal market in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty. Precisely, the internal 
market should be formed by the economic space, where must be guaranteed the free movement 
of goods, persons, services and capital. Explicitely, the comma 3 of the article 28 represents the 
core of the Union, establishing the abolishment of any duty in the mutual trade of the members: 
“Within the functioning of the internal market, the member states must not apply import and 
export customs duties (other duties, taxes and fees having equivalent effect), non-tariff regulatory 
measures, safeguard, anti-dumping and countervailing measures in mutual trade, except as 
provided by this Treaty264”. 
The creation of the internal market within the Union and thus the abolishment of duties for the 
export, but especially for the import of goods of the energetic sector, is one of the principal 
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targets of the members of the Union, as Belarus, that through this system could import for 
example gas from Russia without the payment of duties. 
Moreover, a still actual big issue of the EEU is the necessity to remove the non-tariff barriers 
(NTBs) in the mutual trade, in order to create a better interaction without obstacles. 
However, a regime of restrictions in mutual trade between the member-states is not excluded and 
must be applied in regime of special cases. In fact, the article 29 of the Treaty justifies the 
possibility to adopt restrictions in the mutual trade for reasons of: protection of human life and 
health; protection of public morals and public order; environmental protection; protection of 
animals, plants, or cultural values; fulfillment of international obligations; national defense and 
security of a member state. Thus, the Legislator proved that this procedure must be followed only 
for the restrictions expressed above, avoiding any kind of unjustified discrimination on the mutual 
trade between the participants of the Union. 
8 The Sections VII and VIII of the Treaty 
The articles 30 and 31 of the Treaty of the EEU establish respectively a common market of 
medicines and medical products (medical devices and equipment) within the Union in compliance 
with the relevant standards of good pharmacy practice based on the following principles: 1) 
harmonization and unification of the legislation of the member-states in the sphere of circulation 
of medicines; 2) ensuring the uniformity of mandatory requirements for the quality, effectiveness 
and safety of circulation of medicines on the territory of the Union; 3) adoption of common rules 
in the sphere of circulation of medicines; 4) development and application of identical or 
comparable research and monitoring methods to assess the quality, effectiveness and safety of 
medicines; 5) harmonization of the legislation of the member-states in the field of control 
(supervision) over circulation of medicines; 6) exercising licensing and supervisory functions in the 
sphere of circulation of medicines by the relevant authorized authorities of the member-states265. 
The article 100 of the Treaty completes the legislation about the common market of medicines 
and medical products, affirming its beginning since January 1, 2016, in accordance with the 
international treaties in order to establish common recognized principles for the circulation of 
medicine. 
The section VIII of the Treaty deals with Custom Regulations. Precisely the article 32 affirms as the 
Union must apply common customs regulations in accordance with the customs code of the 
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Eurasian Economic Union, international treaties and acts constituting the law of the Union and 
governing customs legal relations in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty.  
Considering this sector, the formation of a pharmaceutical market represents the first concrete 
step about the creation of a system of common regulated markets within the legal framework of 
the Union. This market, in function since the 1th January 2016, assumes a notable significance 
because inside the territory of the EEU operate many pharmaceutical companies and the 
implementation of common rules in this market can really show if the agreement and rules of the 
EEU work between the members properly in order to coordinate their economic activities even in 
the other sectors.  
9 The Foreign Trade Policy of the EEU 
The target of the Union is addressed to embrace from a side the entire Eurasia and those countries 
that share equal values within this global region and from the other side to expand itself in the 
world economy, cooperating with those countries and international entities that could bring 
economic benefits in the evolution of the Union, and thus of the internal economies of its 
participants. Exactly this aim is possible to discover in the article 33 of the Treaty, where is 
indicated as the goal of the foreign trade policy of the Union wants to promote sustainable 
economic development for the member-states, economic diversification, innovative development, 
improvement of structures, acceleration of the integration process, favoring principally the 
efficiency and competitiveness of the organization in the global economic scenario. 
Here, is possible to underline as the members of the EEU have the target to create an efficient 
economic system within the Union. To achieve this aim, it is important to reach for them an equal 
level of development – an objective however still in 2017 difficult to obtain – that could improve 
more the economic importance of the Union. Though, the achievement of stable development of 
the internal economies of the participants is a requirement that must be obtained, in order to be 
able to reach a second internal target of the Union, namely the configuration of its members to 
the standards of the WTO, a thing that would give the advantage for the countries of the EEU to 
equalize their economic system to the WTO rules, improving better their cooperation with states 
worldwide consequently. 
This digression is directly connected with the principles of the foreign trade policy of the Union 
expressed in the comma 2 of the article 33. In this paragraph is enunciated as the application of 
measures and mechanisms for the implementation of foreign trade policy must be exercised by 
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the participants only to achieve the objectives of the Union. For that, the principles of validity, 
objectivity and publicity must be respected in the development and adoption of measures and 
mechanisms for the implementation of the EEU’s foreign trade policy. Through these principles, 
the Legislator prefixed the target to protect the rights and interests of the member-states in 
consideration of the aggregated foreign trade, which must be regulated by the bodies of the Union 
and conducted by the signing of treaties and accords with third states only in the specific case that 
the possible adopted system would not create any damage to the member-countries and to their 
national economic production. 
Furthermore, the article 34 enunciates the most favored nation treatment, indicating as this 
treatment for the foreign trade must be applied within the meaning of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) of 1994, in the cases provided by the international treaties of the Union 
with third countries. Besides, the article 35 expresses as the free trade regime of the Union within 
the meaning of GATT with a third country must be completed with the provisions of the article 102 
of the EEU Treaty, which expresses as “The member states may unilaterally grant preferences in 
trade with a third party on the basis of an international treaty concluded by the respective member 
state with such a third party before January 1, 2015 or an international treaty to which all the 
member states are participants266”. 
In order to guarantee equal development, the second paragraph of the article 102 prefixes as the 
member-states should unify all preferences treaties. The aim of promoting improvement of the 
economic situation between the developing and least developed member-states is expressed in 
the article 36 of the Treaty, “The Union may grant tariff preferences in respect of goods originating 
from developing countries using the common system of tariff preferences of the Union and/or least 
developed countries using the common system of tariff preferences of the Union267”. In this 
direction, the Legislator, to promote the CU and a systematic improvement of the economic 
markets of the member-states efficiently, defined two rates import customs duties for the 
developed and least developed countries of the EEU. Specifically, the paragraphs 2 and 3 of article 
36 provides that for the preferential goods imported into the customs territory of the Union and 
originating from developing countries using the common system of tariff preferences of the Union, 
the rates of import customs duties should amount to 75% of rates of the import customs duties of 
the Common Customs Tariff of the Eurasian Economic Union, while for the least developed 
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countries the rate should be zero. It has the significance that the developing states should 
contribute more to the market of the EEU, giving in the same time to the less developed countries 
the opportunity to participate and contribute to the economic working of the EEU equally. 
The procedure is completed with the previsions of the second comma of the article, which 
explains as all measures adopted in respect of goods imported into the customs territory of the 
Union must be applied until the expiration of the period determined for them by the appropriate 
decision of the Commission. Continuing, the paragraph 3 enunciates the task of the Commission, 
which with its decision must determinate the conditions for the application and procedure for the 
common system tariff preferences of the Union. Before the decision of the Commission to 
implement the article 36, the Protocol applied was the Common System of Tariff Preferences of 
the Customs Union of December 12, 2008.  
Ongoing on the examination of the articles of the Treaty about the foreign trade of the Union, the 
article 37 provides as common rules must be applied for the determination of the origin of goods 
imported into the EEU. The Commission with its decisions, through the collection of statistics, 
determinates the rules for this subject. In case of repeated violations by a third party of the rules 
for determining the origin of goods, the Commission may decide to suspend the acceptance of 
documents confirming the origin of goods by customs services of the member-states. The fourth 
and fifth commas of the article 102 complete as well the discipline of the article 37: “Prior to the 
entry into force of a Commission’s decision determining the rules for identification of the origin of 
goods stipulated in paragraph 2 of Article 37 of this Treaty, the Agreement on the common rules 
for determining the country of origin of goods of January 25, 2008, should be applied. Prior to the 
entry into force of a Commission’s decision determining the rules for identification of the origin of 
goods stipulated in paragraph 3 of Article 37 of this Treaty, the Agreement on the rules for 
determining the origin of goods from developing and least developed countries of December 12, 
2008 shall be applied268”. 
The article 38 provides as the member-states are responsible in the coordination of trade services 
with third parties, assuring freedom of interaction and decision with third countries in respect of 
the previsions of the Treaty. 
The article 39 in order to promote the expansion of the Union worldwide prefixes the abolishment 
of restrictive measures in the trade with third parties. In this context, the Commission of the Union 
must render assistance in the accession to the Eurasian market for third countries that express 
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their volition to cooperate with the Union. In case of dispute for the existence of sanctions 
between a member-state and a third part, the Commission should conduct consultations with the 
respective third part and the member-state, in order to find a solution. 
In the case of existence of restrictive measures provided by an international treaty within the 
Union with a third country, the article 40 prefixes that the Commission decides about the 
possibility to impose those measures in the territory of the Union. If an international treaty signed 
before January 1, 2015 between a member-state and a third country impose restrictive measures, 
the member-state may unilaterally apply such response measures as increased import customs 
duties in excess of the Common Customs Tariff of the Eurasian Economic Union, as well as 
unilaterally suspend tariff preferences provided that administration mechanisms of such response 
measures do not violate any provisions of the Treaty269.  
The article 41 in accordance with the legislation and rules of the international Treaty and the WTO 
indicates the possibility for the Union to apply joint measures as: insurance and export credits, 
international leasing, promotion of the concept of “good of the Eurasian Economic Union”, 
introduction of a common system of labeling for the Union, exhibition, fair and exposition 
activities, advertising and branding activities abroad. The application of these measures has the 
aim to promote the export of goods originating from the member-states to foreign markets, 
improving the conditions of production of the Eurasian goods and thus the image of the Eurasian 
Economic Union in its global aspect on the worldwide eyes.  
10 Customs Tariff Regulation and Non-Tariff Regulation 
In the article 42 of the Treaty is indicated as the single commodity nomenclature of foreign 
economic activities of the EEU and its common customs tariff, which must be approved by the 
Commission, must be applied on the territory of the Union, representing the instrument of the 
trade policy of the EEU. The main objectives connected with the application of Common Customs 
Tariff are: “To enable efficient integration of the Union into the global economy; to streamline the 
commodity structure for goods imported into the customs territory of the Union; to maintain a 
rational correlation between export and import of goods on the customs territory of the Union; to 
enable progressive changes in the structure of production and consumption of goods within the 
Union; to support for various economy sectors of the Union270”.  
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As it possible to evince from these objectives, the Legislator, through the system of the common 
tariffs, prefixed the aim to reach a stable system of import and export within the custom territory 
in order to expand in a second moment, by this mechanism, the structure of investments of the 
Union in the global trade, favoring its accession and consolidation in the relationship with the 
world market. 
Following the analysis, the subparagraph 3 of the article 42 lists the diverse types of import 
customs duty rates: ad valorem rates expressed as a percentage of the customs value of goods; 
specific rates determined depending on the physical characteristics in kind of taxable goods 
(quantity, weight, volume or other characteristics); and combined rates with elements of the first 
two types. By this system, the Legislator wants to guarantee a better control within the territory of 
the Union, assuring in the same time the possibility for the member-countries to apply seasonal 
custom duties for a maximal of six months. Every state that has acceded to the system of the EEU 
is obligated to not apply import duties in the trade with the other member-states, in order to 
guarantee equality in the internal trade market of the Union. However, the article 43 provides the 
possibility to adopt tariff exemptions in respect of good imported into the Custom Union. The 
accordance about the tariff exemptions are provided by the Annex 6 of the Treaty of the EEU, 
“Protocol on Common Customs Tariff Regulation”. 
The section II of the Annex 6 lists the goods that are imported in the territory of the Union 
subjected to exemption from import custom duties: “1) goods that represent contributions of 
foreign founders into the authorized (share) capital (fund) within the time limits determined in the 
founding documents for the formation of such capital (fund). The procedure for the application of 
tariff exemptions in respect of such goods must be determined by the Commission. 2) Goods 
imported within the international cooperation in the field of exploration and use of outer space, 
including the provision of services to launch spacecraft, in accordance with the list approved by the 
Commission. 3) Products of deep sea fishing of vessels of the member-states, and vessels leased 
(chartered) by juridical persons and/or natural persons of the member-states. 4) Currencies of the 
member-states, currencies of third countries (except for those used for numismatic purposes), and 
securities in accordance with the legislation of the member-states. 5) Goods imported as 
humanitarian aid and/or in order to eliminate the effects of natural disasters, accidents or 
catastrophes. 6) All goods, except for excisable goods, except for passenger cars specially designed 
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for medical purposes, imported by third countries, international organizations and governments for 
charitable purposes271”. 
The article 44 of the Treaty of the EEU provides the possibility, through a decision of the 
Commission, to set tariff quotas in respect of certain types of agricultural goods originating from 
third countries and imported into the customs territory of the Union. In this regard, in the annex 6 
is indicated as the Commission must set the tariff quota for a certain period; notify the quotas 
assigned to the interested third countries; and publish the duration, volume and information of 
the tariff quotas applied. Within the Union, the distribution of the tariff quota volume between 
the participants of foreign trade activities of a member-state should be based on their equal rights 
in respect of obtaining the tariff quota and non-discrimination on the grounds of the form of 
ownership, place of registration or market position272.  
The article 45 of the Treaty delineates the powers of the Commission on Customs Tariff 
Regulations. This body of the EEU should: maintain the single commodity nomenclature of foreign 
economic activity and the common customs tariff of the Eurasian Economic Union; determine the 
rates of import customs duties, the cases and conditions for granting tariff exemptions; set out the 
application procedure for tariff exemptions; specify the conditions and application procedure for 
the common system of tariff preferences of the Union, approving: 1) a list of developing countries 
and developed using the common system of tariff preferences of the Union; 2) a list of goods 
originating from these countries; and a 3) list of sensitive goods in respect of which the import 
customs duties may only be changed by decision of the Council of the Commission shall be 
approved by the Supreme Council273.  
Furthermore, in consideration of the tariff quota volume between the member-states, the annex 6 
provides their distribution between the countries, taking in account their difference between the 
volumes of production and consumption, in order to guarantee fairness between the members 
regarded to their economic potential. 
The article 46 provides the non-tariff regulatory measures in trade with third countries: 
prohibition of import and/or export of goods; quantitative restrictions on import and/or export of 
goods; exclusive right to export and/or import of goods; automatic licensing (surveillance) of 
export and/or import of goods; authorization-based procedure for import and/or export of goods. 
These measures, as indicated in the Treaty, must follow the principles of transparency and non-
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discrimination. The legislation for this subject is completed by the Annex 7, “Protocol on Non-Tariff 
Regulatory Measures in Relation to Third Countries”. In the second section of the Annex 7, is 
established as the Commission may adopt, even by proposal of member-states, drafting a list of 
good, decisions on the introduction, application, extension and cancellation of common non-tariff 
regulatory measures. 
In order to guarantee the principle of non-discrimination of internal market of the Union and thus 
of the participants, the section III of the Annex 7 establishes the possibility to introduce 
commercial bans in exceptional cases as temporary quantitative restrictions on export in order to 
prevent or reduce any critical shortage in the internal market of food products or other goods that 
are essential for the internal market of the Union274. For this subject, it is essential, that in the 
application of a restriction, the Commission must decide taking in account the impact of the 
quantitative restrictions that can have in the internal market of the member-states. Moreover, the 
section VII of the annex 7 at the article 38 explains that, with regard to the import and/or export 
of certain types of goods, special measures may be introduced if: “1) required to comply with 
public morality or public order; 2) required to protect human life and health, the environment, 
animals and plants; 3) related to the export and/or import of gold or silver; 4) used for the 
protection of cultural values and cultural heritage; 5) required to prevent the exhaustion of non-
renewable natural resources; 6) related to a restriction of export of goods originating from the 
territories of the member-states in order to ensure a sufficient supply of such goods for the 
domestic manufacturing industry during periods of low domestic prices for such goods as 
compared to the world prices; 7) required for the acquisition or distribution of goods in cases of 
their general or local short supply; 8) required for the fulfillment of international obligations; 9) 
required for ensuring national defense and security; 10) required to ensure compliance with legal 
acts related to the application of customs legislation, environmental protection and intellectual 
property protection275”. 
Reflecting about the previsions of these measures, it is possible to understand as the central aim 
of the Legislator is the protection of the internal market and of the economies of its members, in 
order to guarantee the not discrimination of the EEU trade. The expansion of the Union is a target 
to reach through the development of the local economies that must be supported in their 
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evolution. After that the progress of the national economies should have the consequence to 
expand and favorite the evolution of the Union market worldwide.  
In consideration of that, the section VIII of the annex 7, “External Financial Status Protection and 
Ensuring Balance-of-Payments Equilibrium”, affirms, as in the only specific case of critical balance 
of payments, exceptional measures may be introduced for certain type of goods, through a 
proposal of a member-state and the decision of the Commission, which must evaluate every single 
case in order to not block from a side the process of evolution of the Union and from the other 
side to not prejudice the internal trade of the participants.  
In this case, the article 47 of the Treaty of the EEU, completed with the article 50 of the section X 
of the Annex 7, provides the possibility for a member-state in trade with third countries to impose 
temporary measures unilaterally. Here is the Commission which will take a decision, indicating the 
period of application of the temporary measure.  
The article 48 underlines too the importance for the Union to promote the market of its internal 
members. In this part is explicitly affirmed that: “In order to defend economic interests of 
producers in the Union, trade remedies may be imposed on products originating in third countries 
and imported into the customs territory of the Union in the form of safeguard, anti-dumping and 
countervailing measures, and in the form of other measures in cases provided for in Article 50 of 
this Treaty276”. The Commission, through an investigation, decides for this subject, adopting 
decision on application, modification, revocation or non-application of a safeguard, anti-dumping 
or countervailing measure, as defined in the Annex 8, “Protocol on the Application of Safeguard, 
Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Measures to Third Countries”, of the Treaty of the EEU, which 
sets up provisions pertinent to the application of safeguard, anti-dumping and countervailing 
measures to third countries with a view to defend economic interests of producers in the Union. In 
a brief analysis of this Protocol in the article 3 is defined as the application of safeguard, anti-
dumping or countervailing measure on imports of a product may only be imposed if, through an 
investigation conducted on the basis of international treaties and acts that constitutes the law of 
the Union, is determined the existence of increased imports into the customs territory of the 
Union that causes or threatens to cause serious injury to the domestic industry of the member-
states277. The same discipline of investigation of the Commission is applied in the case of 
determination of serious injury or threat to the domestic industry of the member-states caused by 
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the increased imports into the customs territory of the Union. Besides, the article 15 of the Annex 
8 provides that in critical circumstances where delay would cause damage to domestic industry of 
the member-states which it would be difficult to repair, the Commission until the completion of 
appropriate investigation may take a decision on application of a provisional safeguard duty for a 
period not exceeding 200 calendar days278.  
Connected with this discipline, the article 49 of the Treaty in the subparagraph 6 establishes that: 
“A safeguard measure may be applied to a product if, pursuant to an investigation, the 
investigating authority determines that such product is being imported into the customs territory 
of the Union in such increased quantities, and under such conditions as to cause or threaten to 
cause serious injury to the domestic industry of the Member States.279” 
A Safeguard measure, which should not exceed a period of four years of application if is not 
provided an extension, is defined in the article 23 of the Protocol. This measure is applied by the 
decision of the Commission in the amount necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury or threat 
to the domestic industry of the member-states, and to facilitate the adjustment of the domestic 
industry of the member-states to the changing economic conditions.  
The article 49 of the Treaty of the EEU in the subparagraph 7 defines: “An anti-dumping measure 
may be applied to the product that is considered to be dumped if, pursuant to an investigation, the 
investigating authority determines that imports of such product into the customs territory of the 
Union cause or threaten to cause material injury to a domestic industry of the member states or 
materially retard the establishment of a domestic industry of the member state280”. 
The section IV of the annex 8 at the article 40 explains as a product is considered as being dumped 
if its export price is less than its normal value. Summarizing the excursus about the role of the 
Commission, the investigative role of the Commission must research the country of origin for the 
determined product, determining the export price during the investigation based on the value of 
the EEU, and in a positive conclusion, may apply a restrictive measure to the interested part, in 
order to prevent injury to the domestic industry of the member-states. In case of application of 
anti-dumping duty, the article 100 provides that this measure is applied to the dumped product 
that is supplied by all exporters, and causes injury to the domestic industry of the member-
countries, except for the product supplied by those exporters281.  
                                                          
278
 Annex 8 to the Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union. P. 11 
279
 Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union. P. 43 
280
 Ibid. P. 43  
281
 Cit. loc. Annex 8. P. 36 
165 
 
The subparagraph 8 of the article 49 of the Treaty of the EEU defines: “A countervailing measure 
may be applied to an imported product that was granted a specific subsidy from an exporting third 
country on the manufacture, production, export or transportation of the product if, pursuant to an 
investigation, the investigating authority determines that imports of such product into the customs 
territory of the Union cause or threaten to cause material injury to a domestic industry of the 
member states or materially retard the establishment of a domestic industry of the member-
states282”. 
The countervailing measures are described in the annex 8 at the article 121: “A financial 
contribution by the granting authority that gives additional benefits to the recipient of subsidies, 
rendered within the territory of the exporting third country in the form of: direct transfer of funds 
(including grants, loans, purchases of shares) or obligations to transfer such funds (including loan 
guarantees)283”. 
Continuing the analysis, the discipline of investigation is even applicable for the imposition of 
provisional countervailing duties, as explained in the article 143 of the annex 8. Here is indicated 
that if the Commission, prior to the termination of the investigation, sustains the existence of 
subsidized imports and material injury to the domestic industry of the member-states caused by 
such imports should take a decision on the application of a countervailing measure in the form of 
provisional countervailing duty, that should remain in force for up to 4 months to counteract the 
injury to the domestic industry of the member-states caused by the subsidized imports. For the 
principle of transparency, the article 199 of the annex 8 provides that prior to the decision on the 
initiation of an investigation, within thirty calendar days the investigating authority should notify 
the exporting third country in writing of the receipt of an application for the imposition of an anti-
dumping or countervailing measure. Here, the article 217 provides that the duration of the 
investigation should not exceed: “1) 9 months from the date of initiation of the investigation on 
the basis of safeguard measure application. This period may be extended by the investigating 
authority, but not more than for 3 months; 2) 12 months from the date of initiation of the 
investigation on the basis of anti-dumping or countervailing measures application. This period may 
be extended by the investigating authority, but not more than 6 months284”.  
For the anti-dumping investigation, the articles 222 prefixes that the investigation should be 
terminated without imposition of an anti-dumping measure in cases where the investigating 
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authority determines that a margin of dumping is de minimis, or that the volume of dumped 
imports, actual or potential, or the material injury, or threat of material injury, or material 
retardation of the establishment of the domestic industry of the member-states caused by such 
imports, is negligible285. 
For the countervailing duty investigation, the article 225 provides that “After the application is 
accepted and before a decision to initiate an investigation has been taken the investigating 
authority should suggest the government of the exporting third country, from which the subject 
product is exported, to enter into consultations with the aim of clarifying the situation as to the 
existence of a subsidy, its amount and consequences of granting an alleged specific subsidy and 
arriving at a mutually agreed solution286”. 
Generally, as provided by the article 239, after the decision to initiate an anti-dumping or a 
countervailing duty investigation has been adopted, the investigating authority sends to known 
exporters and (or) producers of the product subject to investigation a questionnaire which must 
be completed by them. Then, within 10 business days, the investigating authority must publish on 
the official website of the Union on the Internet the following notice of the decisions taken in the 
course of investigation: of the initiation of investigation; of the imposition of provisional 
safeguard, provisional anti-dumping or provisional countervailing duty; a short description of the 
evidence of increased imports to the customs territory of the Union and of serious injury to the 
domestic industry of the members of the Union. However, as established in the article 272 of the 
annex 8, the Commission on the results of the investigation may decide not to apply safeguard, 
anti-dumping or countervailing measures, even if the application of such measure meets the 
criteria set forth in this Protocol. Such decision may be taken by the Commission if the 
investigating authority, based on the analysis of all the information provided by the interested 
parties, comes to the conclusion that the application of this measure may affect the interests of 
member-states.287 
Finally, the article 50 of the EEU Treaty, in order to advantage and protect the internal market of 
the Union, provides that an international treaty, establishing a free trade regime between the 
Union and a third part, may impose bilateral trade defense instruments through the imposition of 
a measure of the Commission. 
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11 Technical regulation of the EEU 
The section X of the Treaty deals with technical regulation of the Union. Exactly in the article 51 
are listed the principles of the technical regulation, that can be summarized as follow: 
“Determination of mandatory requirements to products or to products and product-related 
requirements to design, manufacture, construction, installation, commissioning, operation, 
storage, transportation, sale and disposal; determination of common mandatory requirements in 
technical regulations of the Union or national mandatory requirements in the legislation of the 
member-states to the products; compliance of technical regulations within the Union with the level 
of economic development of the member-states and the level of scientific and technological 
development; uniformity of researches rules and methods and all measurements during mandatory 
conformity assessment procedures; inadmissibility of any restrictions of competition in conformity 
assessments; state control (supervision) over the observance of technical regulations of the Union 
based on the harmonization of the legislation of the member-states; harmonization of interstate 
standards with international and regional standards; uniformity of rules and procedures for 
mandatory conformity assessments; implementation of agreed policy for ensuring uniformity of 
measurements within the Union288”. 
Through an examination of these principles, we can understand the volition of the Legislator in the 
determination of the technical regulation of the Union to establish common measures between 
the member-states aimed to improve the cooperation, uniformity of the legislation, the control 
and the development of a coordinated policy that can better favorite their integration within the 
Union. This fundamental aspect is possible to connect with the principal target of the Union to 
create standard recognized procedures among its participants, in order to harmonize the entire 
legislation, contributing to the growth of the Union in its entire, and respecting the international 
treaties – as basic presupposition for its interaction with the other countries worldwide. 
The article 51 is completed by the annexes 9 “Protocol on Technical Regulation within the Eurasian 
Economic Union” and 10 “Protocol on Agreed Policy for Ensuring Uniformity of Measurements”.  
The annex 9 determines the rules and procedures of technical regulation within the Union. This 
Protocol indicates as the technical regulations of the Union, in accord with the approved 
recommendations on the content and structure of typical technical regulations of the Union from 
the Commission, based on the relevant international standards, should determine mandatory 
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requirements to subjects of technical regulation, as well as for identification rules, conformity 
assessment forms, processes and procedure289. The development, the adoption as well the 
modification or cancellation of technical regulations must follow the procedure approved by the 
Commission. The subparagraph 4 of the annex 9 indicates as the Commission, in order to meet the 
requirements of technical regulations of the Union, should approve a list of international and 
regional (interstate) standards and, in their absence, a list of national (state) standards, voluntary 
application of which should ensure observance of technical regulations of the Union. Following, 
the comma 5 affirms as the conformity assessment procedure determined for subjects of technical 
regulation in the technical regulations of the Union should be held in the form of registration 
(state registration), testing, conformity assessments, and examination and/or in any other form290. 
In order to guarantee transparence in its proceeding is provided that the Commission should 
create a system of information in the field of technical regulation as part of the integrated 
information-mechanism of the Union.  
The annex 10 determinates the principles of agreed policy of the member-states in ensuring the 
uniformity of measurements in order to provide comparability of measurement results and 
outcomes of assessment of conformity of products to technical regulations of the Union, as well as 
of quantitative measurements of products291. 
This Protocol provides as the member-countries, in order to establish equality in their activities, 
must conduct an agreed policy to ensure uniformity of measurements through the harmonization 
of the legislation. For this scope, the participants must: a) establish a mechanism of mutual 
recognition of the results of activities to ensure uniformity of measurements; b) use standards 
measuring instruments: provide exchange of information; and c) apply an agreed procedure. The 
results of activities in ensuring the uniformity of measurements should be recognized with regard 
to measuring instruments manufactured on the territories of the member-states292. 
The aim of the Legislator through this mechanism is to favorite the cooperation between the 
members of the Union, creating a system of standard values by the exchange of information 
between the participants. For that, the paragraph 7 of the annex 10 indicates that the regulatory 
legal acts of the member-states (regulatory and international documents, international treaties of 
the member-states in ensuring the uniformity of measurements, certified measurement methods, 
                                                          
289
 Cf. Annex 9 to the Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union.  Pp. 6-7 
290
 Ibid. Pp. 7-9 
291
 Annex 10 to the Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union. P. 1 
292
 Ibid. P. 5 
169 
 
measuring instruments in fields regulated by the member-states, information on unit standards 
and value scales, approved types of standard samples as well of measuring instruments) should 
form the data funds of the associates of the Union in ensuring the uniformity of measurements293. 
As coordinator of the agreed policy, the Commission has the role to approve documents regarding 
the list of system units for the measurements; the rules of mutual recognition of the results and in 
generally the procedure for the approval of the entire process. For this aim, the role of the 
Commission must guarantee the uniformity of the proceeding between the member-states. 
The article 52 of the Treaty of the EEU explains the scope of the technical regulations of the Union, 
which must be adopted only for the purposes of: protection life and health of people, animal and 
plants; property; environment; preventing consumer misleading actions and ensuring energy 
efficiency and resource conservation in the Union294. 
The Commission has the task to determinate the procedure for the development and adoption of 
the technical regulations that must be applied exclusively to those products included in the 
common list approved always by the Commission.  
The article 53 of the Treaty deals with circulation of products and validity of technical regulations 
of the Union. In this paragraph is affirmed as every released product within the Union must be 
safe. It means that must be ascertained for the products that can circulate inside the custom 
territory that they have completed the required conformity assessment procedures as determined 
by the technical regulations of the Union. The control must be exercised by the Commission and as 
expressed in the comma 4 of article 53 together with the supervision of the state control of the 
member-states and their procedure. Analyzing this statement is possible to evince the aim of 
harmonization of the legislation of the participants in the sphere of control, where the Legislator, 
by the dispositions of the Treaty, wants to create a mutual system of control for the Union on the 
basis of the internal legislation of the member-countries, using their provisions as well for the 
supervision of the duties of the bodies of the Union – in this case of the Commission. 
The article 54 explains the accreditation within the Union that must occur on the basis of these 
principles: “Armonization of rules and approaches in the field of accreditation with international 
standards; ensuring voluntary accreditation, transparency and accessibility of information on 
accreditation procedures, rules and results; ensuring objectivity, impartiality and jurisdiction of 
accreditation authorities of the member-states; ensuring equal accreditation conditions for all 
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applicants and confidentiality of information obtained during the accreditation; inadmissibility for 
a single authority of a member-state to combine the accreditation powers with the powers of state 
control (supervision); inadmissibility for a single authority of a member state to combine the 
accreditation and conformity assessment powers295”.  
The above mentioned principles want to respect the equality between the authorities of the 
member-states, excluding every form of discrimination from state to state. This form has the 
purpose to reinforce the compactness of the participants and their further integration in the 
system of the Union. The concept is underlined by the commas 2 and 4 of the article 54, where is 
explained as the participants through their internal legislation must assert conformity on the 
assessment of the accreditation, in order to achieve equivalence of all applied procedures. The 
discipline about the accreditation is completed by the annex 11 “Protocol on Recognition of 
Results of Accreditation of Conformity Assessment Authorities”. This Protocol determines the 
conditions for mutual recognition of the results of accreditation of conformity assessment 
authorities. The member-states are called to harmonize their legislation in the sphere of 
accreditation mostly through the adoption of international standards and the exchange of 
information on the principles of openness of information, gratuitousness and timeliness296. 
In conclusion of this section about the technical regulation of the Union, must be enunciated the 
article 55, which provides the elimination of technical barriers in the mutual trade of the Eurasian 
Economic Union with third countries. The elimination of barriers should be conducted through the 
conditions of an international treaty within the Union. The choice of the Legislator is for this point 
to expand the market of the Union and allow third parts to invest without barriers in the EEU 
market, simplifying the procedure of external cooperation.  
12 Sanitary, Veterinary-Sanitary and Phytosanitary Quarantine Measures in the EEU 
The section XI of the EEU Treaty explains the discipline about the sanitary quarantine measures 
within the Union. In the article 56 of the Treaty is indicated that the applied sanitary, veterinary-
sanitary and phytosanitary quarantine measures must be based on scientifically justified principles 
(as international and regional standards, guidelines, and recommendations) and only to protect 
life and health of humans, animals and plants. In order to achieve these measures, must be 
conducted an agreed policy, implemented through adoption and implementation of international 
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treaties and acts of the Commission between all the participants. However, in order to guarantee 
security, the comma 4 of article 56 provides that every member-state should have the right, in 
occurrence of special events, to develop and apply temporary sanitary, veterinary-sanitary and 
phytosanitary quarantine measures. 
The discipline of the article 56 is completed with the annex 12 of the Treaty of the EEU: “Protocol 
on Application of Sanitary, Veterinary-Sanitary and Phytosanitary Quarantine Measures, which 
determines the principles and procedures for applying sanitary, veterinary-sanitary and 
phytosanitary quarantine measures”. 
The article 57 of the Treaty indicates that sanitary measures should be applied to people, vehicles, 
and products subjected to sanitary and epidemiological supervision (control) included in the 
common list of products (goods) subjected to state sanitary and epidemiological supervision 
(control) in accordance with acts of the Commission, which approves, in concordance with the 
authorized authorities in the field of sanitary and epidemiological welfare of the member-states, 
the procedure for developing, modifying and applying common sanitary, epidemiological and 
hygienic requirements and procedures297.  
The praxis, as prefixed in the second section of the Annex 12 of the Treaty, establishes that the 
member-states should arrange sanitary and quarantine stations at checkpoints designed for the 
transportation of products (goods) subject to state sanitary and epidemiological supervision 
(control) across the customs border of the Union and take steps to conduct all the required 
sanitary and anti-epidemic activities298. The control of member-countries must occur through the 
instructions of the Commission, completed by their internal legislation. Precisely, the member-
state should: 1) take agreed measures to prevent the importation, distribution and elimination on 
the customs territory of the Union of infectious diseases and mass non-infectious diseases 
(poisoning) hazardous to human health, consequences of emergencies, as well as acts of terrorism 
involving biological agents, chemical and radioactive substances; and 2) conduct sanitary and anti-
epidemic activities to prevent the importation into the customs territory of the Union and 
circulation of products subjected to state sanitary and epidemiological supervision that are 
hazardous to human life, health and living environment. 
The article 58 deals with application of veterinary-sanitary measures, that must be applied to 
goods included in the common list of goods subjected to veterinary control approved by the 
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Commission, as well to items subjected to veterinary control, imported and moved among the 
territory of the Union. The common veterinary requirements are disposed by the Commission, 
applied in the veterinary stations by the authorized authorities of the member-states, in order to 
prevent the entry and spread of contagious animal diseases in the Union. 
The comma 6 of article 58, in order to assure safeguard on the circulation of the products within 
the territory of the Union, indicates as goods subjected to veterinary control should be 
transported from the territory of one member-state to the territory of another participants in 
accordance with the common veterinary requirements. These goods must be accompanied by a 
veterinary certificate, unless otherwise determined by the Commission299. 
The same procedure of the sanitary measures is applied for the exercise of veterinary control, as 
indicated in the third section of the annex 12. The member-states, through their authorized 
authorities, should conduct a control on the goods in order to avoid the importation and spread of 
any infectious agent on the territory of the Union. In case of detection of an infection, the 
member-state must send all the relevant information to the Commission and provide mutual 
scientific, methodological and technical assistance on the issue. The article 58 in the comma 8 
provides even the possibility for the member-states to develop and implement temporary 
veterinary measures in case of official information received by relevant international 
organizations. 
The article 59 explains as the phytosanitary quarantine measures should be applied to products 
included in the list of quarantineable products subject to phytosanitary quarantine control at the 
customs border of the Union and on the customs territory of the Union.  
To complete this discipline, the article 18 of the annex 12 provides that the phytosanitary 
quarantine control (supervision) at the customs border of the Union and on the customs territory 
of the Union should be exercised in the manner approved by the Commission300. At checkpoints 
designed for transportation of quarantineable products, the member-states should establish plant 
quarantine stations, to exercise the control as provided by common rules and standards approved 
by the Commission. In case of detection and spread of quarantine items on the customs territory 
of the Union, the member-state must send respective information, as well as information on 
phytosanitary quarantine measures in act, to the integrated information system of the Union.   
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13 Consumer Protections 
The section XII of the Treaty of the EEU is dedicated to the consumer protection. Specifically, the 
article 60 assures as the Treaty, together with the legislation of the member-states, must 
guarantee and protect the rights of the consumers within the market of the Union. Applying the 
principle of equality in all the associates of the Union, the Legislator indicates as every citizen 
should benefit of the same legal protection and defense procedure in the field of consumer 
protection in every member-states without distinction between national citizen of a country and 
other individual of another member of the Union – stressing more the volition to create a compact 
integration without barriers. Following that, the article 61 stresses as the member-states should 
conduct agreed policy in the sphere of consumer protection to safeguard the citizens of the Union 
against dishonest economic activities, harmonizing thus their procedure in defense of the 
consumers.  
The agreed policy, as provided by the Treaty of the EEU, must follow the principle and discipline of 
the annex 13 “Protocol on Agreed Policy in the Sphere of Consumer Protection”. The section 3 of 
the annex 13 specifies that the agreed policy for consumer protection must be implemented 
through: “1) provision of timely and reliable information on goods (works, services) and 
manufacturers (sellers, contractors) to consumers, state authorities and consumer public 
associations; 2) measures to prevent the activities of mala fide economic entities and sales of low-
quality goods (services) on the territories of the member-states; 3) creating conditions for 
consumers encouraging freedom of choice of goods (works, services) through the development of 
legal literacy and legal awareness of consumers; 4) implementation of educational programs in the 
field of consumer protection as an integral part of national education in educational systems of the 
member-states; 5) involvement of the media, including radio and television, in the promotion and 
systematic coverage of consumer protection issues; 6) approximation of the consumer protection 
legislation of the member-states301”.  
To offer more transparence in the production of goods and their distribution, protecting the rights 
of consumers, the third section of the annex 13 provides as the member-states should facilitate 
the work of independent consumer public associations and their participation in the formulation 
of the agreed policy for this subject. In the implementation of the consumer protection the 
authorized authorities of the member-states must interact together through exchange of 
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information; and conduction of analytical studies and cooperation in the prevention, detection 
and suppression of violations for the discipline of consumer protection. Near the work of the 
authorities of the member-states, the Commission, as explained in fifth section of the annex 13, 
has the task to: “1) issue recommendations to the member-states on the application of measures 
aimed at improving the efficiency of interaction between authorized authorities in the sphere of 
consumer protection; 2) issue recommendations to the member-states on the procedure for 
implementing the provisions referred to in this Protocol; and 3) create advisory bodies for the 
protection of consumer rights in the member-states302”. 
14 Macroeconomic Policy of the EEU 
In the section XIII of the Treaty is disciplined the macroeconomic policy of the Union. In the article 
62 is explained that the member-states should implement an agreed macroeconomic policy to 
achieve the aim of a balanced economic development. Through this passage is possible to see the 
volition to equalize the internal economies of the single states united to the aim to obtain a 
coordinated economic development for all the participants.  
Specifically, in the comma 3 of the article 62 are expressed the main directions of the agreed 
policy: “1) to ensure sustainable development of the economies of the member-states using the 
integration potential of the Union and competitive advantages of each member; 2) to establish 
common operation principles, ensuring their effective interaction; 3) to create conditions to 
increase internal sustainability of the economies of the member-states; and 4) to develop common 
principles and guidelines to predict social and economic development of the member-states303”. 
The provisions about the determination of the agreed macroeconomic policy within the Union are 
explained in the Annex 14 “Protocol on Implementation of Agreed Macroeconomic Policy”. Here is 
underlined that the member-states should: 1) agree on measures to use the integration potential 
of the Union and competitive advantages of the member-states in the most feasible spheres and 
sectors of economy; 2) take into account the main directions of economic development of the 
Union and the main benchmarks on macroeconomic policy of the member-states; 3) develop 
official forecasts of the socio-economic development of the member-states; 4) conduct agreed 
macroeconomic policy within the quantitative values of macroeconomic indicators referred to in 
Article 63 of the Treaty when determining the sustainability of economic development; 5) develop 
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and implement, with the participation of the Commission, measures, including joint measures, 
when macroeconomic indicators determining the sustainability of economic development of a 
member state do not meet the quantitative values determined by Article 63 of the Treaty; and 6) 
hold consultations on issues related to the current economic situation in the member-countries in 
order to develop proposals aimed at stabilizing the economy304.  
In this process, the third section of the annex 14 defines the role of the Commission, which briefly 
can be summarized in the task of monitoring and coordination of the execution of the agreed 
macroeconomic policy by the member-countries. 
The section IV of the annex lists the indicators that must be used to determinate the level of 
integration: 1) the volume of national investments into the economy of each member-state, 
including direct investments; 2) the volume of investments into the national economy from each 
member-state, including direct investments; 3) the share of each member-state in the total export 
of the member-state; 4) the share of each member in the total import of the participants; and 5) 
the share of each member-state in the total foreign trade turnover of the other associates. 
Moreover are listed in the paragraph 6 of section IV of the annex 14 the indicators to use to 
determine the level and dynamics of economic development: 1) the growth rate of GDP; 2) the 
GDP per capita at purchasing power parity 3) balance-of-payment current account balance; and 4) 
index of the real effective exchange rate of the national currency, calculated on the basis of the 
consumer price index305. 
The participants, as prefixed in the paragraph 8 of the annex, should agree on interval quantitative 
values for the following external forecast parameters for a period of 3 years. Concluding, the 
Supreme Council, as explained in the paragraph 10 of the annex, may decide to revise external 
forecast parameters used in the development of official forecasts of socio-economic development 
of the member-states.  
Technically, the article 63 of the Treaty indicates the main economic spheres that determinate the 
sustainability of the Union development. Here is précised that the member-states should conduct 
their economic policy using the quantitative values provides by the EEU, namely: a) annual deficit 
of the consolidated budget of a state-controlled sector should not exceed 3% of the gross 
domestic product; b) debt of a state-controlled sector should not exceed 50% of the gross 
domestic product; c) inflation rate (consumer price index) per annum (December to December of 
                                                          
304
 Annex 14 to the Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union. P. 3 
305
 Ibid. P. 5  
176 
 
the previous year, in percent) should exceed the inflation rate in the member-state with the 
lowest value by not more than 5%306. In consideration of this aspect, the third section of the annex 
14 underlines as the development and implementation of macroeconomic indicator must be 
carried by the member-countries taking in account the recommendations of the Commission307. 
Here, in case of a member-state should exceed the quantitative values of the macroeconomic 
indicators, the Commission, through the development of recommendations, has the task to 
control the respect of the economic sustainability of every participant of the Union. 
This regulation is established in order to achieve a mutual and balanced sustainability of the 
economic situation and stable development of the member-states.  
15 Monetary Policy 
The section XIV in the article 64 lists the objectives and principles of the monetary policy of the 
Union. Here is outlined that the member-states, in order to reach the targets of the cooperation, 
namely the guaranteeing of the four free movements within the Union and the strengthen of the 
economic integration, should conduct an agreed monetary policy based on the principles of: 1) 
harmonization and convergence of approaches to the formation and implementation of their 
monetary policy; 2) establishment of the required organizational and legal conditions at the 
national and interstate levels for the development of integration processes in the monetary 
sphere; inapplicability of any actions in the monetary sphere that may adversely affect the 
development of integration processes; and 3) implementation of economic policy aimed at 
increasing confidence in the national currencies of the member-states308. 
The legislation about the discipline of the monetary policy is completed by the annex 15 “Protocol 
on Measures Aimed at Implementation of Agreed Monetary Policy”, which determinates the 
measures that must be adopted by the participants in order to conduct agreed monetary policy. 
For this aim, the section II of the annex 15 indicates the provisions that must be taken by the 
participants, namely to coordinate the policy on the exchange rates of their national currencies. 
This point is connected directly with the subparagraph 3 of the article 64 of the Treaty which 
provides that the exchange rate policy must be coordinated by an independent body formed by 
the Heads of national (central) banks of the member-states. 
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Listing the other measures that the member-states should apply, we can summarize them in: 1) 
ensure convertibility of their national currencies for the current and capital balance of payment 
items; 2) enable direct mutual quotations of national currencies of the member-states; 3) improve 
the mechanism for payment and settlements relations between the member-states through the 
increased use of national currencies in mutual settlements between residents of the member-
countries; 4) prevent multiplicity of official exchange rates hindering mutual trade between 
residents of the member-states; 5) ensure regular exchange of information on the status and 
development prospects of the foreign exchange market; 6) form an integrated currency market of 
the member-states; 6) and develop trade in national currencies in organized markets of the 
member-states, making it accessible to foreign exchange market participants309. 
In order to achieve an equivalent legislation in the monetary sphere, the paragraph 4 of the 
second section of the annex 15 lists the duties of the member-states, as for example: a) gradual 
elimination of currency restrictions; b) to identify agreed approaches to the procedures of opening 
or maintenance of accounts of third-country residents in banks located on the territories of the 
member-states; c) to determine the necessary amount of rights and obligations of residents of the 
member-countries  in the implementation of foreign exchange transactions; d) to ensure the free 
circulation by residents and non-residents of the member-states of funds and monetary 
instruments within the customs territory of the Union; and e) to guarantee harmonization of 
requirements to accounting and control of foreign exchange operations310. 
The Legislator for the aim to reach a coordinated monetary policy, respecting the principle of 
transparence, indicates in the section III of the annex 15 the importance of exchanging 
information between the authorities of the member-states; their coordination on the organization 
of currency control; and cooperation in the prevention, detection and suppression of violations of 
the legislation. To grant a properly agreed policy, the authorities should conduct studies, analysis 
and give each other assistance through the exchange of statistical information on currency 
regulation and control, implemented by the development of guidelines and the organization of 
meetings. 
The Protocol 15 of the Treaty provides in its fifth section, the possibility in exceptional cases for 
the member-state to introduce own currency restrictions for a period not exceeding 1 year. This 
mechanism was contemplated by the Legislator in order to not give any financial problems to the 
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participants that have acceded into the Union. Indeed, in case of deterioration of the economic 
and financial situation in a member-state or in the situation that the implementation of 
liberalization measures may damage the security interests of a the national situation of a 
participant, it is provided the introduction of restrictions measures that must be however notified 
to the other members and to the Commission within fifteen days from their introduction.  
In addition, the comma 4 of the article 64 of the Treaty, underlines as the approaches to the 
regulation of the monetary policy must be determined under an international treaty within the 
Union, in order to give legal recognition in the global relationships of the EEU. In general, the 
monetary and financial policy of the EEU rests nowadays still an objective hard to be 
implemented, especially because of the devaluation of the Russian ruble and the high inflation 
rate of the member-countries, specifically Belarus, whose economy is tightly connected to Russian 
and has suffered mostly by the global financial crisis since 2008, reaching a peak of inflation in 
2013 by 23.08%311. 
16 Trade in services, incorporation, activities and investments 
The section XV of the Treaty regulates the services, activities and investments within the Union. 
Precisely, the article 65 of the Treaty stresses the purpose of this section, namely to ensure 
freedom of trade in services, incorporation, activities and investments within the Union. The 
measures of the article 65 and its corresponding Protocol, the annex 16, “Protocol on Trade in 
Services, Incorporation, Activities and Investments” are applied to those measures regarding the 
delivery and receipt of services, as well as incorporation, activities and investments. Here, are 
excluded principally the services and activities that are governed by the other section of the Treaty 
and the functions that are carried out by the state governments. Moreover, the Legislator in the 
comma 6 of the article 65 précises as the discipline provided in this section must be not: a) 
contrary to interests or elements of the member-states which could preclude the national 
security; b) intervene against military interests of the participants; or c) prevent from taking any 
action required to fulfill the obligations of the member-state under the Charter of the United 
Nations in order to maintain international peace and security. Equally, the provisions of this 
section must not prevent the member-states to adopt different measures in order to protect 
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public moral or maintain public order; to protect life of people, animals and plants; and in general 
the security and privacy of the citizens of the participants of the Union.  
The paragraphs 9 and 10 of the article 65 explains the possibility to exclude the discipline of this 
section for a member-state when exist restrictions from a member-state in respect of a third state 
and when the extension of the provisions of this section would lead to circumvention or violation 
of these prohibitions and restrictions. Same procedure of exclusion is possible to apply from a 
member-state to an individual of another member when it is proven that the considered person of 
another state does not conduct any significant business operations on the territory of the 
mentioned member-state312.  
The discipline above is completed by the annex 16 which determines the legal basis for regulating 
trade in services, incorporation, activities and investments in the member-states. The section III of 
the Protocol defines as every member-state should cancel and not introduce new restrictions on 
transfers and payments in connection with trade in services, incorporation, activities and 
investments, in particular with regard to: income, funds, salaries and other remuneration received 
by investors and nationals of other member-states allowed to perform investment-related 
activities on the territory of the recipient state313.  
Every measure explained in this section, as explained in the paragraph 9, must not affect the rights 
of the member-states for obligations that are not included for the scope of the Union. The 
possibility to impose on payment and transfers restrictions from the member-states are provided, 
as delineated in the section IV of the annex 16, in the cases of deterioration of the balance of 
payments, a significant reduction in foreign exchange reserves or sharp fluctuations of the 
national exchange rate. However, the restrictions may be applied only in the case that these not 
create discriminations or damages to the other members of the Union. Furthermore, their 
application should comply with the articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund of 
July 22, 1944 and must be communicated immediately to the other member-countries, in order to 
not vitiate the working process of the Union. 
The section VI of the Protocol, regarding the national treatment for trade in services, 
incorporation and services, underlines in the article 21 that the treatment of every single state for 
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this subject should be no less favorable314 than that regime accorded under the same (similar) 
circumstances to its own same (similar) services, service suppliers and service recipients. 
Continuing, the article 22 indicates as every state may perform obligations through the provision 
of formally similar or formally different treatment to services, suppliers and recipients of services 
of any other member-state as compared to the treatment accorded by that member-state to its 
own same (similar) services, or suppliers or recipients of services315. 
With respect of trade in services, incorporation and activities is provided that the participants of 
the Union should not apply any restrictions to citizens of the Union and other member-countries. 
The only possibility for the member-states to introduce restriction is for the previsions disposed in 
the Annex 2 of the Protocol on Trade in Services, Incorporation, Activities and Investments: “List of 
"Horizontal" Restrictions Retained by the Member States for All Sectors and Activities”. 
This procedure is confirmed in the paragraph 32 of the annex 16, where, in order to guarantee the 
free circulation of services is provided that: “No Member State shall be entitled to introduce or 
apply the following additional requirements to persons of the member states and persons 
incorporated thereby as conditions for their incorporation and/or activities: 1) on exportation of all 
manufactured goods or services or any part thereof; 2) on importation of goods or services; 3) on 
the purchase or use of goods or services originating from a Member State316”. 
The free circulation of workers in other states of the Union without restrictions is stressed in the 
article 35 of the annex 16, where is outlined that the member-state should not impose in its 
territory any restrictions on employment of workers for activities of juridical people, branches or 
representative offices created, acquired and/or controlled and individual entrepreneurs 
registered317.  
Following the analysis, the article 38 of the Protocol defines the common market of services, 
where is indicates as every person of the member-states has the right to supply and receive 
services without any restrictions, exceptions and additional requirements – except for the 
conditions and restrictions provided in Annex 2 to the Protocol 16. 
The article 67 of the Treaty contemplates as the liberalization of trade in services, incorporation, 
activities and investments should be conducted accounting to the international principles and 
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standards through the harmonization of the legislation of the member-states and their mutual 
cooperation. In order to achieve the liberalization, the member-states should follow the 
subsequent principles: 1) to optimize the regulations, eliminating and simplifying the market of 
services and its procedures; 2) to harmonize proportionality between the parts the market and the 
legislation in order to favorite the mutual administrative cooperation; 3) to ensure mutual benefits 
for the sharing of benefits and obligations between the members; 4) coherence in the adoption of 
measures that must not deteriorate  the condition of mutual access in the activities of the market 
with gradual reduction of restrictions, exemptions, additional requirements and conditions; and 5) 
to guarantee economic feasibility for the creation of a common market of services within the 
Union, as stipulated in paragraphs 38-43 of Annex 16318.  
Referring to the last point and conducing an excursus on the mentioned paragraphs of the Annex 
16, must be underlined as the common market of services refers to a particular economic sector 
where each member-state grants to people of any other member-state the right to supply and 
receive services without any restrictions, exceptions and additional requirements (except for some 
conditions and restrictions provided in Annex 2 to this Protocol). The common market of services 
within the Union should operate in the service sectors approved by the Supreme Council on the 
basis of proposals agreed by the member-states and the Commission. On this basis, the 
participants, in order to encourage the liberalization, have the aim to spread, on a reciprocal basis, 
the rules of the common market of services into the maximum number of service sectors through 
gradual elimination of exceptions and restrictions provided by national lists319. 
Therefore, in order to improve the integration and to favor better the business conditions, the 
member-states should allow to every citizen of the Union to conduct his commerce in the sphere 
of service, eliminating all barriers, and liberalizing the market. For this aim is provided the 
development of a liberalization plan which should ensure harmonization of procedures through 
mechanisms that contemplates the national procedure with the legislation of the Union. Though, 
the removal of barriers is still nowadays an ongoing process, but the possible realization of free 
common markets for service can have the advantage to further expand the mutual trade of the 
associates. 
Generally, in the discipline of the internal regulation for services, as provided by the article 57 of 
the annex 16, every member-state should ensure that all measures are applied in a reasonable, 
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objective and impartial manner. For those states that are not conformed on the discipline as 
provided by the Treaty, there is the obligation to conform their mechanisms to the common 
structure of the other participants of the Union. 
The section VII of the annex 16 deals with investments within the EEU. Exactly, the article 68 of the 
Protocol affirms: “Each member state should ensure on its territory fair and equitable treatment to 
investments and investment-related activities conducted by investors of other member states320.” It 
has the meaning that the principles of impartiality and respect of every state of the Union must be 
guaranteed in the investments that are conducted in the territory of the Union. Specifically, every 
member-country must ensure the not discrimination of the investor of another member-country , 
as expressed in the article 79 of the Protocol: “Investments of investors of a member state made 
on the territory of another Member State should not be subject to direct or indirect expropriation, 
nationalization and other measures with consequences equivalent to those of expropriation or 
nationalization, except in cases where such measures are taken for the public benefit in the 
procedure determined by the legislation of the recipient state, are not discriminatory and involve 
prompt and adequate compensation321”. 
Concisely, in the case of a dispute, the discipline provides that every discussion should be – at least 
tried – to be resolved by negotiations and compensation of the injured part. 
The article 68 of the Treaty of the EEU stresses the importance of cooperation of the member-
states, affirming as the participants should assist each other, ensuring efficient cooperation 
between their authorities. For this aim, the principal passage, as defined by the Legislator, for the 
cooperation must be the exchange of information between the authorities of the member-states. 
This last statement introduce the comma 2 of the article 68, where are defined the aspects 
included in the administrative cooperation of the Union: a) prompt information exchange between 
competent authorities of the member-states with regard to both entire service sectors and 
specific market participants; and b) establishment of a mechanism to prevent violations of the 
rights of service providers and legitimate interests of consumers as well as the public interest322. 
In the third comma is provided when a member-state has the right to require information to the 
other authorities of another member-state, namely: 1) for people of such other member-state 
that have incorporated or are supplying services on the territory of the first member-state and, in 
particular, information confirming that such people are actually incorporated in their territories 
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and that, are allowed to engage entrepreneurial activities; 2) for issue of permits; and 3) for 
administrative measures, criminal and legal sanctions and insolvency (bankruptcy) recognition 
decisions adopted by the competent authorities in relation to respective people and directly 
affecting the jurisdiction or professional reputation of such people323. 
The administrative cooperation must be carried out in order to create an efficient system that can 
protect the rights of the beneficiaries of one state in the delivery of services to another member; 
to execute tax and other obligation in the entire territory of the Union for its citizens; to guarantee 
concurrence, eliminating unfair business; and to grant a prospect through statistics about the 
amounts of service of a member-state.  
In case of existence of a service of a member-country that can cause damage on the health or 
safety of people, animals, plants or the environment on the territory of a member-state, the 
member-state that has discovered it must inform the Commission, which has the task to resolve 
the issue. The same Commission should help the member-states in the creation of a system of 
administrative information within the Union and must control the member-states about their right 
conformation with the previsions of this article. 
For the purpose of the appropriate regulation of the trade in services, incorporation, activities and 
investments in the Union, the article 69 of the Treaty of the EEU, underlines as each member-state 
should ensure transparency and availability of its legislation on this discipline. It means that in 
addition to a common cooperation, all the decisions and information must be published online, 
using the network channel for the communication within the Union, to assure perfect 
transparency within the Union. 
In order to exclude that any regulator acts can preclude or intact personal interests and rights of 
the Eurasian citizens, the member-states should ensure preliminary publication. For this subject, 
the participants should post on the Internet all information regarding the procedures for filing 
individual comments and suggestions to such acts as well as information on the duration of public 
discussion of draft regulatory legal acts in order to enable all interested persons to send their 
comments and suggestions. Draft regulatory legal acts should be generally published within 30 
calendar days before the date of their adoption, while all comments and/or suggestions received 
by the competent authorities of the member-states during public discussions should be taken into 
account to the extent possible when finalizing draft regulatory legal acts324. 
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In this procedure the member-states should create an informatics mechanism of interaction and 
response to the electronic requests of any person who can be regarded by a regulator legal act. 
Additionally, to promote the transparency of the activities within the Union for its citizens is even 
provided as the associates of the Union should ensure consideration of appeals from people from 
all the countries of the Union. 
17 The financial markets of the Union 
The section XVI of the Treaty provides the regulation of the financial markets of the Union. 
Specifically, the article 70 lists the principles that the member-states should follow for the 
regulation of the financial markets: “1) to deep their economic integration in order to create a 
common financial market within the Union; 2) to ensure protection of the rights and interests of 
the consumers in the financial sphere; 3) to enable mutual recognition of licenses in the banking 
and insurance sectors; 4) to identify approaches to risk management in the financial markets of the 
member-states in accordance with international standards; 5) to fix requirements for banking and 
insurance activities and activities in the securities market; 6) to determinate the procedure for 
exercising supervision over the activities of financial market participants; and 7) to assure 
transparency in the financial activities of the Union325”. 
In this direction, to enable free movement of capital in the financial market, the member-states 
should: 1) exchange all the information between authorized authorities; 2) to carry out mutual 
consultation; and 3) to favorite the cooperation in financial activities and market security 
generally. The discipline of the article 70 is completed with the Article 103 and the Annex 17, 
“Protocol on Financial Services”.  
The article 103 of the Treaty indicates the necessity for the member-states to have completed the 
harmonization of their legislation in the financial sphere by the data 2025. After that, the states 
should establish a supranational authority, located in the Kazakh city of Almaty, conferring precise 
powers and functions for the regulation of the financial market. 
To give a precise explanation of this subject, the financial services and activities of financial 
suppliers where is applicable the discipline of the article 70, are listed in the annex 17. Here, as 
financial services are defined: insurances, banking services, financial leasing and services in the 
security market.   
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In the annex 17 is specified, that the member-states should apply for financial service suppliers the 
national treatment and the most favored nation treatment in respect of the provision of the 
article 70 of the Treaty for these financial services: 1) insurance of risks relating to international 
marine transportations and commercial air transportations, commercial space launches and 
freight; 2) reinsurance and auxiliary insurance services such as consultancy, actuarial services, risk 
assessment and settlement of claims; 3) provision and transfer of financial information, processing 
of financial data and related software of suppliers of other financial services; and 4) consultancy 
and other auxiliary services, including the provision of reference materials326. 
The member-states should allow every supplier carrying a financial service to conduct it according 
to the most favored national treatment without distinctions from the national citizens. Besides, is 
provided in the Protocol, that any member-state should be allowed to apply or impose on its 
territory the following restrictions in respect of financial service suppliers of another member in 
connection with their incorporation and/or activities: restrictions on the forms of incorporation, 
including the organizational legal form of a juridical person; restrictions on the number of 
incorporated juridical people, branches or representative offices in the form of quotas; restrictions 
on the volume of purchased shares in the capital of the juridical person; restrictions on 
transactions of incorporated juridical people, branches or representative offices327. In order to 
assure impartiality in the treatment is established that every country of the Union should ensure 
that all measures of every participants affecting trade in financial services are applied in a 
reasonable, objective and impartial manner. For the aim to not create barriers in the financial 
trade, the member-states should develop a common system of rules that must be based on 
objective and transparent criteria, facilitating the procedure without restrictions. Equally, the 
member-states should not apply licensing or qualification requirements and technical standards 
that may invalidate or reduce benefits specified in the individual national lists in Annex 1 to the 
Protocol 17. Restrictions are provided in the case to protect interest of investors, depositors, 
policyholders, beneficiaries, or measures required to ensure the integrity and stability of the 
financial system. 
The paragraph 21 of the annex 17 provides that the participants of the Union, on the basis of 
international principles and standards, should create an harmonized system in the financial 
sectors of: 1) bank – where they should harmonize requirements for the regulation and 
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supervision over credit institutions; 2) insurance sector – where the member-states should 
harmonize requirements for the regulation and supervision over professional participants of the 
insurance market guided by the international best practices and principles; and 3) service sector in 
security market – where the countries of the Union should harmonize the requirements for the 
regulation of and supervision over the securities market guided by international best practices and 
principles of the International Organization of Securities Commissions. To favorite the entire 
process, the participants should develop mechanisms of interaction between the authorities in the 
sphere of regulation, control and supervision of activities in their financial markets, including 
exchange of confidential information in financial sector. Besides, the paragraph 30 provides that, 
In order to prevent systemic risks in the financial markets, the legislation of the financial sector of 
the member-states should be harmonized with regard to the requirements for activities of rating 
agencies in compliance with the principles of transparency, accountability and responsibility328. It 
has the meaning that the Treaty of the Union wants to create a recognized financial system, where 
all the members can apply a same procedure without discrimination, equalizing their legislation, 
submitting the mutual obligations of the Treaty. 
17.1 The Financial market and economic development of the EEU 
At this point of the analysis we can make some observations about the importance of the financial 
market of the EEU and the significance of its coordination for the positive economic development 
of the Union.  
The regulation of the common financial market within the Union has the advantages to develop a 
system and implement financial policies in the Union, as underlined by Tigran Davtyan, Director of 
the financial policy Department of the EEC: “Among the most important vectors for the 
development of the common financial market is the creation of favorable conditions for the 
establishment and implementation of activities on the financial markets of EAEU, free movement 
of capital within the Union (removal of barriers), stimulation of the development of competition, 
growth of investment attractiveness of the EAEU States, reducing administrative barriers and 
costs329”. The volition of the development of a common infrastructure for the common financial 
market and its institutional framework has the target to coordinate the activities of the Union in 
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the field of financial markets, development of administrative cooperation with the interaction of 
national regulators on issues of regulation, and supervision in financial sectors. The success of this 
system is connected with the proper regulation of the financial markets of the member-states, 
where the fundamental step is the equalization of their national standards to the provisions of the 
article 70 of the Treaty and its annex 17. Precisely, in order to guarantee the investments, must be 
developed a mutual bank and insurance sector through the coordination of the national agencies 
of the participants of the EEU in a common exchange space of the Union. 
According to Dr. Vinukorov, the financial mechanisms of Eurasian integration are realized within 
the framework of the Eurasian Development Bank (EDB) and the Eurasian Stabilization and 
Development Fund (ESDF). The EDB (6 member-states, paid-in capital of 1.5 USD billion, current 
investment portfolio ca. 2.2 USD billion) is a functioning regional international financial institution. 
Over 10 years, it cumulatively invested ca. 4.85 USD billion, while prioritizing projects promoting 
mutual trade and mutual investments. The ESDF, which can be defined as a regional IMF, with 
capital of 8.5 USD billion and the same six member-states acts primarily as the lender of last resort 
in extending public budget loans330. 
Figure 5: Socioeconomic development indicators of the Eurasian Economic Union (2015) 
Indicator Armenia Belarus Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Russia 
GDP Nominal, 
$ billion 
10.5 55.0 184.4 6.5 1331.1 
Purchasing 
power parity, 
$ billion 
23.1 164.3 399.6 18.5 3402.9 
Nominal per 
capita, $ 
3515.0 5754.5 10508.3 1112.8 9054.9 
Population, 
million people 
3.0 9.5 17.7 6.0 146.5 
Foreign trade, 
$ billion 
4.7 57.0 75.9 5.7 526.3 
Source: Vinokurov Evgeny (2017): “Eurasian Economic Union: Current state and preliminary results”. In Russian Journal 
of Economics 3 (2017). P. 58 
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As is possible evince from the table above, the Eurasian Economic Union has already produced an 
aggregate GDP of approximately 2 USD trillion, where the two most important economies of the 
association are represented by Russia and Kazakhstan.  
Thus, the priority to create a common market with a same regulated system in the exchange of 
products and services assumes a priority for the members of the EEU. Indeed, in the precise case 
of the financial service, the increment and distribution of services as well the coordination of the 
providers is linked to the realization of a precise scheme of harmonization and interaction of the 
national agencies on the basis of the dispositions of the Treaty of the EEU, through the 
involvement of the Eurasian Development Bank and the Eurasian Stabilization and Development 
Fund. 
18 Taxes and Taxation within the Union  
The section XVII of the Treaty deals with the taxation system inside the Eurasian territory. The 
article 71 specifies that all goods imported from a member of the Union to another should be 
subjected to indirect taxation. It means that the application of taxes in mutual trade by a member-
state in its commerce with another Eurasian country must be commiserated and applied under the 
same circumstances in respect of products originating from its territory. Through the setting of tax 
system, the volition of the Legislator is that every country can profit from the investments in the 
territory of the Union, having the opportunity to match its goods to those of the country where 
are imported without paying excessive taxes that could prevent its investment. Thus, to achieve 
this aim, the member-states should harmonize their legislation in order to prevent any violation of 
terms of competition and interference with the free movement of goods, works and services at 
the national level or at the level of the Union, including: convergence of excise tax rates for the 
most sensitive excisable goods; and improvement of the system of collection of value added taxes 
in mutual trade331. 
Following, the article 72 indicates as the member-states in the mutual trade must apply in 
collection of taxes a zero value added tax rate and/or exemption from excise duty on the export of 
goods and indirect taxation on import. This passage represents a vital point of interaction between 
the associates, because confirms the necessity to eliminate taxes in the mutual trade as decisive 
precondition for the establishment of common markets and for the possibility to allow even the 
less developed economies of the EEU, as Armenia or Kyrgyzstan, to invest and export in the 
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territory of the Union without additional costs. This discipline is completed by the Annex 18, 
“Protocol on the Procedure for Collection of Indirect Taxes and the Mechanism for controlling their 
Payments on Export and Import of Goods, Performance of Works and Provision of Services”. The 
annex 18 in the third paragraph specifies that in the situation of exporting goods from the territory 
of a member of the Union to another, on the taxpayer who is exporting the good, should be 
applied a zero VAT rate and/or exemption from excise taxes upon submission to the tax authority 
of the following documents in electronic form within 180 calendar days from the date of shipment 
of goods: 1) agreements (contracts) concluded with a taxpayer of another member-state; 2) a 
bank statement confirming the actual receipt of proceeds from the sale of exported goods at the 
account of the exporting taxpayer (in case of a cash-payment or of export of goods under a lease 
agreement, the taxpayer must submit to the tax authority a bank statement confirming the 
deposit of amounts received by the counterpart; 3) a statement of import of goods and payment 
of indirect taxes executed in the form provided by an international interagency treaty and marked 
by the tax authority of the member-state to the territory of which the goods are imported 
indicating the payment of indirect taxes; 4) transport (shipping) and/or other documents required 
by the legislation of the member-state and confirming the movement of goods from the territory 
of a member to another; and 5) other documents confirming the validity of a zero VAT rate and/or 
exemption from excise taxes provided for by the legislation of the member-state from the 
territory of which the goods are exported332. 
Through the presentation of the documents above listed, the tax authority verifies the validity of 
the application of a zero VAT rate and/or exemption from excise taxes. If the information 
submitted by a taxpayer does not correspond to the data obtained within the exchange of 
information determined between tax authorities of the member-state, the tax authority should 
recover indirect taxes and penalties in the procedure and amount provided for by the legislation of 
the member state from the territory of which the goods were exported. This procedure has the 
target to regulate properly the validity of the documents, preventing the unequal redistribution 
and payment of taxes between the members in their imports and exports. 
The section III of the annex 18 indicates the technique for collection of indirect taxes on import of 
goods, explaining in the thirteen paragraph as the indirect taxes on goods imported into the 
territory of a member-state from another country of the Union should be levied by the tax 
authority of the member state into the territory of which the goods were imported. 
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Continuing, the fourteen paragraph of the Protocol disciplines the determination of the tax on the 
purpose of the VAT payment, which is fixed on the date of registration of the taxpayer's imported 
goods on the basis of the cost of purchased goods (including goods produced under a 
manufacturing agreement), as well as goods received under a credit on goods (commercial loan, 
material loan) agreement (contract), tolling goods and excise taxes payable on excisable goods333. 
To respect the discipline and assure transparence, is further affirmed as in order to ensure 
complete payment of indirect taxes, the legislation of the member state governing the pricing 
principles for taxation purposes may be applied.   
Regarding the indirect taxes on the performance of works and provision of services, these, as 
explained in the second paragraph of the article 72 of the Treaty, should be collected in the 
territory of the member, which is recognized as the place of sale of these works and services. 
As for the import of goods, even for the performance of works and provision of services is applied 
a zero VAT rate, if it is provided by a contract between taxpayers of the member-states; and 
documents that confirm the execution of the work and the export of the goods. 
Generally, to assure non-discrimination and equality in the taxation system, the authorities of the 
countries of the Union should exchange all information required to ensure complete payment of 
indirect taxes in accordance with an international interagency treaty, which should determine the 
procedure for information exchange, the application form for import of goods and payment of 
indirect taxes.  
For the regulation, the Treaty specifies in the comma 4 of the article 72 that when a member-state 
imports good from another member the praxis specifies that indirect taxes must be levied by tax 
authorities of the member-state to the territory of which goods are imported334. 
The exclusion of collection of indirect taxes is determined for: a) those goods, that according to 
the legislation of the member-state, are not subject to taxation; b) goods imported from citizens 
into the territory of another member for personal use and not for business; and c) for goods 
imported into the territory of a member-state from another in connection with their transfer 
within a single juridical person.  
The article 73 defines the jurisdiction of personal income taxes. Here is précised that a member-
country, in accordance with its legislation and the provisions of international treaties, may levy 
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income taxes from a tax resident citizen of another member-state in connection with his 
employment, starting the taxation from his first day of employment in its territory.  
19 Rules of competition of the EEU 
In the section XVIII of the Treaty are defined the principles and rules of competition within the 
Union, with the purpose to avoid and eliminate, as underlined in the first comma of the article 74, 
anti-competitive behaviors and actions that can produce negative impact on the competition in 
the mutual trade between the participants. The article précises as the rules and principles must be 
connected to the implementation of competition (antitrust) policy within the Union and to 
relations with economic entities (market participants) of the member-states, in order to avoid the 
existence of adverse effects on competition in trans boundary markets on the territories of two or 
more members of the Union. To ensure a fair competition in the territory of the EEU, the member-
states, as underlined in the third comma of article 74, may adopt further prohibitions according to 
their legislation, with the regard to the prohibitions defined in the article 75 and 76. Specifically, 
the article 75 establishes that the members of the Union must determinate in their legislation 
prohibitions of: 1) agreements between state government authorities, local authorities and other 
agencies or organizations exercising their functions or agreements between them and economic 
entities, if such agreements result or can lead to any prevention, restriction or elimination of 
competition; and 2) provision of state or municipal preferences335. 
Overall, the member-states should ensure efficient control over the economic sector to prevent 
any kind of unfair concurrence. For that the authorities of every country must implement and 
reinforce the antitrust policy monitoring and preventing violations. The sixth comma of the article 
75 establishes for this aim, that the member-states should determinate in their legislation 
penalties (calculated on the basis of the income generated by the violator in selling goods) for the 
market participants that overdriven the rules of the competitions (anti-competitive agreements, 
abuse of dominance by economic entities) based on the principles of efficiency, proportionality, 
security, inevitability and certainty. 
Moreover, the member-states, in order to give transparency on their antitrust policy, must publish 
information on the activities of their authorities in the media and online.  
Through these considerations, it is easy to understand that the Legislator has the purpose to make 
the market of the Union stable and accessible to all the associates without any prejudice. This aim 
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can be achieved through the participation and the cooperation between all the member-states 
through a together harmonization of their competition-system. In this context the authorities of 
all the countries of the Union should interact and communicate in order to exchange information 
and in case of dysfunction of the market they are called to work together in order to prevent any 
effect against the unfair concurrence. 
In connection with this last point, must be mentioned the article 76, which establish the general 
rules of competition. Principally, the article 76 defines that every action or omission that prevents, 
eliminates or restricts competition should be prohibited. The article lists the actions and omissions 
that are not allowed: “1) to set and maintain monopolistically high or low prices of goods; 2) 
withdrawal of goods from circulation resulting in an increase in the price of such goods; 3) forced 
imposition of any economically or technologically unjustified contract conditions to a counterpart; 
4) economically or technologically unjustified reduction or cessation of production of goods, if the 
goods are in demand or orders for their delivery have been placed and their production is feasible; 
5) economically or technologically unjustified refusal to enter or evasion from concluding 
agreements with individual customers; 6) economically, technologically or otherwise unjustified 
setting different prices (tariffs) for the same products, thus creating discriminatory conditions; and 
7) creating barriers to entry into the commodity market or exit from the commodity market for 
other economic entities (market participants)336”. 
The article 76 underlines as the unfair competition must be prohibited in all its forms within the 
market of the Union including for example the dissemination of false, inaccurate or distorted 
information, which may inflict damage to an economic entity; or misleading to the nature, 
method, nature of the good and its place of manufacture. 
Furthermore, are prohibited agreements between economic entities of the member-states if these 
entities are competitors operating in the same product market and such agreements may lead to 
setting or maintaining prices, discounts, allowances or extra charges; increasing, decreasing or 
maintaining prices in tenders; dividing the commodity market in the territorial principle, by the 
volume of sales or purchases of goods; reduction in or cessation of the production of goods; and 
refusal to conclude agreements with certain sellers or buyers337. 
                                                          
336
 Cf. Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union. Pp. 80-81  
337
 Ibid. P. 82  
193 
 
Even the vertical agreements338 between economic entities should be prohibited, if they can 
produce distorting effects on the price of goods or when such agreements obligate the buyer to 
not sell goods of any economic entity that is a competitor of the seller. 
However, according to the comma 6 of the second section of the Annex 19, “Protocol on General 
Principles and Rules of Competition”, vertical agreements are permitted if: 1) they constitute 
commercial concession agreements; and 2) the share of each economic entity that is a party to 
such an agreement in the commodity market of the goods covered by the vertical agreement does 
not exceed 20%339. 
Returning to the examination of the article 74 of the Treaty and to complete its analysis, in the 
fourth comma is précised the possibility of the member-states to conduct agreed antitrust policy 
in relation to actions of economic entities of third countries if these affect the competition of the 
Union negatively. Moreover, the article 74 underlines as the previsions of this section may not 
prevent the single members of the Union to take personal initiatives in order to protect national 
security. In addition is reported too that the predispositions of article 74 are applied even to the 
natural monopoly.  
Continuing the report of the section XVIII of the Treaty, the article 77 introduces the state price 
regulation. This discipline as well of the entire section is implemented by the annex 19. 
Precisely, the section III of this Protocol explains the control over compliance with the rules of 
competition. Here is stressed that the authorities of the member-states are in charge for the 
suppression of the violations committed by the economic entities in follow of the principles listed 
in the article 76 of the Treaty; while the Commission is in charge for the suppression of the 
violations committed by the economic entities if such violations may have an adverse effect on 
competition in trans-boundary markets. Regarding the role of the Commission, this body of the 
Union should briefly for the subject of the section XVIII: 1) to review statements (materials) on the 
presence of signs of a violation of the general rules of competition; 2) to initiate and review cases 
of violations of the general rules of competition; 3) to issue rulings, adopt decisions binding for 
economic entities, including application of penalties to the market participants of the member-
states in the cases provided in the Section XVIII of the Treaty; 4) to request and receive 
information from state government and local authorities, other authorities or organizations of the 
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member-states exercising their functions, juridical persons and natural persons, including 
confidential information required for the exercise of powers to control compliance with the 
general rules of competition in trans-boundary markets; 5) to submit to the Supreme Council the 
annual reports on the competitive situation in trans-boundary markets and measures taken to 
suppress violations; 6) to post decisions on reviewed cases of violations of the general rules of 
competition on the official website of the Union; and 7) to exercise other powers required for the 
implementation of the provisions of Section XVIII of the Treaty and this Protocol340.  
The entire procedure for the examination of the violations as well for the procedure for 
investigation should be approved by the Commission, which must specifically approve: methods 
for assessing the competitive situation; for determining monopolistically prices; and for calculation 
the amount of penalties. Besides, the investigative task is operated by an unit of the Commission 
"the authorized structural unit of the Commission", which during its investigations and 
examinations, can require all the needed documents and information to state government 
authorities, local authorities, other authorities or organizations of the member-states, juridical and 
natural persons. The annex 19 provides for the counterparts that the acts and actions of the 
Commission in the sphere of competition and its decisions should be contested in the Court of the 
Union. 
As well, the Commission should impose penalties for violations for non-submission or late 
submission of requested data to the Commission or for submission of knowingly false information 
to the Commission. The penalties provided should be transferred to the budget of the member-
state of registration of the offender (for juridical people) or of the member-state of permanent or 
temporary residence of the offender (for natural people)341. 
The annex 19 in its fifth section stresses the importance of the cooperation between the 
participants of the Union in order to implement the law enforcement activities of the Union for 
the protection of competition. The member-states should communicate each other through: the 
notification of acts; sharing of information about the existence of entities that can prejudice the 
fair concurrence with the Union; and the exchange of information and methodological assistance, 
in order to create agreed antitrust policy. 
Additionally, the article 50 of the Protocol assures the possibility for the member-states that if a 
participant finds that any anti-competitive practice conducted on the territory of another member 
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adversely affect its interests, it may notify the fact to that member-state, with the explicitly 
request to this state to initiate appropriate law enforcement actions aimed to suppress the anti-
competitive practices342. Here, the notified member-state should decide on the initiation of the 
law enforcement actions or extension of those previously initiated law enforcement actions in 
respect of the anti-competitive practices specified in the notification. 
The Commission and the authorized authorities of the member-countries should interact and 
cooperate together during the examination of violations on general rules of the competition in 
order to assure cooperation between the institutions and harmonization of the entire legislation, 
through the organization of meetings. The decision to refer the statement on a violation of the 
general rules of competition for examination to the Commission may be taken by the authorized 
authority of a member-state at any stage of its examination. In the same way, the Commission, 
during the investigations, can submit to the authorities of the member-states requests for 
information and documents. 
Finally, the article 81 of the Protocol 19 indicates as the member-states should introduce state 
price regulation in commodity markets that are not in a situation of natural monopoly, exceptional 
cases, including emergencies, natural disasters, national security matters, provided that the 
problems that have emerged may not be eliminated through any measures having a less negative 
impact on the competitive situation343. As an interim measure, may be introduced from the 
members a state price regulation for certain types of socially relevant goods on certain territories 
for a determined period, which must not extend ninety days in a year. These provisions are 
however excluded for goods such: gas (natural and liquefied); electric energy; alcoholic beverages; 
pharmaceutical and tobacco products. 
In the process about the establishment of price regulation of a member-state, the Commission, if 
another member proves the negative impact of a regulation in assuring fair concurrence, may 
adopt a decision to delete the state price regulation in the cases it can create barriers for the 
accession to the market or when it can reduce the numbers of economic entities in a determined 
market. If the Commission establishes to cancel a state price regulation of a member and that 
country is not agree with the decision, the matter will be committed to the Supreme Council, 
which will adopt a resolute decision.  
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20 Natural monopolies 
The section XIX of the Treaty of the EEU, precisely at the article 78, disciplines the sphere of the 
natural monopolies within the Union. The subject is completed by the annex 20: “Protocol on 
Common Regulation Principles and Rules for Activities of Natural Monopoly Entities” and its two 
corresponding annexes: 1) “Spheres of Natural Monopolies in the Member States” and 2) “Spheres 
of Natural Monopolies in the Member States”.  
According to the article 78, the member-states should seek to harmonize all spheres of natural 
monopolies, presented in the annex 1 and 2 of the Protocol 20, through their reduction and 
identification for a transitional period. 
Figure 6: Annex 1 to Protocol 20: Spheres of Natural Monopolies in the Member-states 
Item. No.  The Republic of Belarus The Republic of Kazakhstan  Russian Federation 
1 Transportation of oil and 
petroleum products via 
main pipelines. 
Services to transport oil 
and/or petroleum 
products via main 
pipelines. 
Transportation of oil and 
petroleum products via 
main pipelines. 
2 Transmission and 
distribution of electricity. 
Services for the 
transmission and/or 
distribution of electricity. 
Services for the 
transmission of electricity. 
3 ------- Services for technical 
dispatching of supply and 
consumption of electricity; 
services for balancing the 
output and consumption 
of electricity; 
Services to ensure 
availability of electric 
power for the load 
(January 1, 2016). 
Services for operational 
dispatch management in 
the electric power 
industry. 
4  Services provided by 
railway transport 
communications ensuring 
the traffic of public 
transport, management of 
railway traffic and rail 
transportations. 
Services of main railway 
networks. 
Railway transportations. 
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Figure 7: Annex 2 to Protocol 20: Spheres of Natural Monopolies in the Member-States 
Item. No. The Republic of Belarus The Republic of Kazakhstan  Russian Federation 
1 Transportation of gas via 
main and spur pipelines. 
Storage services, 
transportation of 
marketable gas via 
connecting and main 
pipelines and/or gas 
distribution systems, 
operation of group tank 
units, as well as 
transportation of raw gas 
via connecting pipelines. 
Gas transportation via 
pipelines. 
2 Services of transport 
terminals, airports; 
Air navigation services. 
Services of air navigation; 
Services of ports and 
airports. 
Services at transport 
terminals, ports and 
airports. 
3 Public telecommunications 
and public postal services. 
Telecommunications services, 
in the absence of a 
competitive service provider 
due to the technological 
impossibility or economic 
infeasibility of the provision of 
these types of services, except 
for universal 
telecommunications services; 
services for property lease 
(rent) or charter of cable 
ducts and other fixed assets 
technologically related to 
connection of 
telecommunication networks 
to the public 
telecommunications network; 
public postal services. 
Public telecommunications 
services and public postal 
services. 
4 Transmission and 
distribution of thermal 
energy. 
Services for the 
production, transmission, 
distribution and/or supply 
of thermal energy. 
Services for the 
transmission of thermal 
energy. 
5 Centralized water supply 
and disposal. 
Water supply and/or 
disposal services. 
Water supply and disposal 
using centralized systems 
and utility infrastructure 
systems. 
6 ------- ------- Services for the use of the 
inland waterway 
infrastructure. 
7 ------- Railway services using 
railway transport under 
concession contracts.  
------- 
8 ------- Approach route services. ------- 
9 ------- -------  Icebreaker support of 
vessels in the waters of the 
Northeast Passage. 
 
The seventh comma of the article 78 delineates that the natural monopolies listed in the annexes 
1 and 2, may be expanded: a) in accordance with the legislation of the member-states, if a 
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participant of the Union intends to include in the sphere of natural monopolies a sector rated as a 
natural monopoly in another member; b) or by a decision of the Commission if the monopoly is 
not indicated in the list of the two annexes. 
The section about the natural monopolies of the Treaty however, as defined by the same article 
78, should be not applied in the bilateral international treaties between the member-states. 
Through this passage, the Legislator underlines from a hand the volition to regulate the 
monopolies within the Union properly; but from another hand the volition to not create conflict 
with this discipline for the international bilateral accords of the member-states, aimed to not 
prejudice their trade.  
Overall, the discipline of the natural monopolies is formalized in the annex 20, which has the aim 
to create a legal framework for the application of common principles and general rules for the 
regulation of activities of natural monopoly entities of the member-states in the spheres specified 
in Annex 1344. 
In regulation and control over activities of natural monopoly entities, the member-states should 
be guided by principles as: maintenance of a balance of interests of consumers and natural 
monopoly entities ensuring availability of services and their appropriate quality for consumers; 
improvement of the efficiency of the sector and consequently reduction of the number of natural 
monopolies to develop competition; use of flexible tariff regulation of natural monopoly entities 
taking into account indicators as industry specifics, scope of their activities, market conditions, 
medium-term (long-term) macroeconomic and industry forecasts; introduction of regulation when 
an analysis of the respective domestic market detects that the market is in a state of natural 
monopoly; application of regulation of activities of natural monopoly entities, ensuring 
independence of decisions, continuity, openness, objectivity and transparency; protection of 
interests of consumers, including with respect to various violations of natural monopoly entities 
associated with the use of tariffs for regulated services345. 
The procedure of the Treaty must be completed through the legislation of the member-states, 
that, other to set common tariffs, must determinate the rules of regulation, ensuring access to 
services of natural monopoly entities. The rules of ensuring consumer access to services of natural 
monopoly entities should include: the essential terms of contracts and procedure for their 
conclusion and execution; the procedure for determining the availability of technical capabilities; 
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the procedure for submitting information on services provided by natural monopoly entities, their 
cost, access terms, potential sales volumes, technical and technological capabilities of providing 
such services; the conditions for obtaining public information, in order to allow to the interested 
person to compare the terms of access; and the procedure for handling complaints and claims346. 
In connection with that, the authorities of the member-states are entitled to regulate and control 
activities of natural monopoly entities. Here they must set, according to the internal legislation: 1) 
the tariff regulation of services rendered by entities of natural monopolies; 2) the regulation to 
access to the services; to protect interests of consumers; and 3) in general to control the activities 
of the entities through examinations of their work.  
For the natural monopolies, the Commission has the tasks, other to adopt a decision on expansion 
of spheres of natural monopolies when a member intends to include in the sphere of natural 
monopolies, to: a) analyze and suggest methods to coordinate the development and 
implementation of decisions of national authorities relating to the spheres of natural monopolies; 
b) promote harmonization for the regulation measures of natural monopolies; c) submit for 
consideration to the Supreme Council the results of ongoing work; and d) control the 
implementation of the entire discipline of the section XIX347. 
20.1 The natural monopolies, a reflection  
Analyzing the section of the natural monopolies, it can be argued that the regulation of the natural 
monopolies and an anti-trust policy can be a key to facilitate the access to the market of the 
national producers of the member-states, which will facilitate the competition within the Union 
consequently. However, there are sectors, as the production of public good as transmission of 
electric and thermal energy, railroad transportation, centralized water supply and sanitation, the 
maintenance of transport terminals, ports, communication facilities, where the existence of 
monopolies are supposed to guarantee a better organization in providing services with a 
containment of the costs for the state and its public spending. 
According to the analysis of the Belarusian researcher Moskalevitsch, the natural monopolies of 
the members of the Economic Eurasian Union are respectively:  1) in Russia: RAO UES of Russia, 
Gazprom and the Ministry of Railways, Transgaz, Silvinit and Uralkali (which are the only 
potassium producers in Russia), etc. 2) In Belarus: Gomeltransneft Druzhba, Polotsktrans-Neft 
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Druzhba, Gazprom transgaz Belarus, Beltelecom, Belposhta, Belaeronavigatsia, Minsk National 
Airport, Belorusskaya Zheleznaya Doroga and others (a total of 27 subjects). 3) In Kazakhstan: 
Kazakhstan Electricity Grid Operating Company KEGOC, KazTransOil, Intergas Central Asia, North-
Western Pipeline Company Munai Tas, Kazaeron-Vigatsiya, Transtelecom, 
Mezhregionenergotransit and other. 4) In the Kyrgyz Republic: Alfa Telecom, Electric Stations, 
National Company Kyrgyz Temir Jolu, Kyrgyztelecom, Gazprom Neft Asia, etc348. 
As is possible to evince from the list above, the sphere of natural monopolies of the EEU includes 
mostly energetic and communication sectors. In this system, the work of the Eurasian Economic 
Commission – which takes decisions regarding the expanding of the scope of natural monopolies – 
is addressed to the implementation of the subjects and activities of the natural monopolies and its 
consequent harmonization.  
The aim of the EEU in its complex is to create a stable equilibrium between the members and their 
economic situation – although the actual economic situation of the participants of the Union 
nowadays rests considerably diversified. However, to regulate the economic systems, creating a 
situation of equilibrium, the countries of the Union are entitled to submit to the Commission 
proposals to the regulator of activities of subjects of natural monopolies on issues which may 
affect their activities and legal status.  
In follow of that, the regulation of the natural monopolies must be conducted between the 
national law of the member-states and the provisions of the EEU’s Treaty. According to their 
corresponding national law for natural monopolies, the member-states are not entitled to: 1) 
under the laws of the Russian Federation: to refuse to conclude an agreement with individual 
consumers for the production (sale) of goods in respect of which regulation is applied in 
accordance with this Federal Law, if the natural monopoly entity has the opportunity to produce 
(sell) such goods. 2) Under the legislation of the Republic of Belarus: to take actions that lead or 
may lead to the impossibility of rendering services related to the sphere of natural monopolies or 
to replace them with other services; to refuse to conclude an agreement with individual 
consumers for rendering services related to natural monopolies, provided they have the technical 
ability to provide such services; to charge for the services rendered a fee exceeding the amount 
established by the regulatory body for the activities of natural monopoly entities or by another 
state body authorized by the acts of the President of the Republic of Belarus; to impose conditions 
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on consumers for access to services related to the sphere of natural monopolies; and to commit 
other actions (inaction) leading to infringement of consumer rights and (or) contrary to the law. 3) 
Under the legislation of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic: to charge for 
regulated services (goods, works) a fee exceeding the amount established by the authorized body; 
to impose conditions for access to regulated services (goods, jobs) of natural monopoly entities or 
perform other actions leading to consumer discrimination; to refuse to provide regulated services 
(goods, works) to bona fide consumers due to non-payment by dishonest consumers of used 
volume of regulated services (goods, works); to include in the tariffs (prices, fee rates) or their 
limit levels for regulated services (goods, works) costs not related to their provision; to allow non-
targeted use of funds provided for in investment programs (projects) approved in accordance with 
the established procedure; to demand payment for the supplied regulated services (goods, works) 
that do not meet the quality requirements of the regulated services (goods, works) established by 
the state bodies within their competence; to subsidize the production and supply of goods (works, 
services) carried out on a competitive basis, at the expense of revenues derived from activities 
related to public regulation; to export of goods (works, services) with insufficient satisfaction of 
demand in the domestic market; and to alienate property intended for the production and sale of 
regulated goods (works, services), except for cases of transfer of property to state ownership349. 
In general is possible to consider that the maintenance of natural monopolies may have 
advantages as the reduction of costs for production of a unit of production; the adoption of the 
best techniques of scientific and technological progress or the use of intra-company hierarchy and 
a system of contractual relationships that allow to reduce losses associated with risk and 
uncertainty. But on the contrary monopolies can have even the negative significance to set higher 
prices for tariffs and goods, to give excessive power to determined companies and to eliminate the 
concurrence mostly. 
Thus, the states, as expressed objective of the EEU, should preserve competition in the sphere of 
natural monopolies, for example, by nationalizing the road and budget financing of its operation 
costs or through the setting of the price for transportation of oil through the pipeline. 
In connection with this theme, the representatives of the authorized authorities of the countries 
of the Union, during a table of discussion of the Eurasian Commission in December 2016, 
exchanged views about the legislative regulation and introduction of energy-efficient technologies 
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by natural monopoly entities of the member-states. The participants of the meeting reviewed 
issues related to the harmonization of the laws and practices of regulation in the field of natural 
monopolies in the territory of the EEU; and discussed the abilities to study integrated approaches, 
perspectives and prospects, competitiveness and sustainable development factors in this area350. 
Moreover, the consolidation of a roadmap for the regulation of the natural monopolies tends to 
allow the member-states to have a better harmonization of their rules in order to create an equal 
legal framework for the key sector of the EEU as the energetic and infrastructural one that can 
move the development of the Union further even in the global economic space. 
21 Energy Industry of the Union 
The member-states, as provided in the article 79 of the Treaty, should coordinate their energy 
policy and gradually form common energy markets within the EEU. The aim of the Legislator in this 
point is the volition to utilize the different energy resources of the member-countries accurately – 
oil, gas, electrical and petroleum products – in order to develop a coherent energy market, which 
could expand its investments worldwide, brining benefits to the entire Eurasian economy. 
According to the article 79, the creation of common efficient energy markets within the EEU must 
be based on the follow principles: “1) to ensure market pricing for energy resources; 2) to 
guarantee development of competition in the common markets of energy resources; 3) to avoid 
the application of technical, administrative and other barriers to trade in energy resources, 
equipment, technology and related services; 4) to develop transport infrastructures for the energy 
markets; 5) to create non-discriminatory conditions for economic entities of the member-states in 
the common markets of energy resources; 6) to develop favorable conditions for attracting 
investments in energetic sectors; and 7) to harmonize the national rules and regulation in the 
energetic sphere of all the participants351”. 
The importance of the last point about the harmonization is underlined in the second comma of 
article 79, which indicates as the member-states should regulate through their regulation all the 
relations of economic entities that operate in the energetic sphere and that are not contemplated 
in the Treaty. In regard of that, the priority of harmonization of all the national legislations of the 
participants assumes a priority, also because the energetic market of the Union represents the 
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economic core of the EEU and its success is essential for the impact of the Eurasian trade in the 
global scenario. 
Specifically, regarding the sectors of gas, oil and petroleum products, in the article 80 of the Treaty 
is stressed as the participants of the Union should utilize in the best way their aggregate energy 
potential and optimize the interstate energy suppliers. To achieve this aim, the authorities of the 
member-states should develop: 1) an indicative (projected) gas balance of the Union; 2) an 
indicative (projected) oil balance of the Union; and 3) an indicative (projected) balances of 
petroleum products of the Union352. 
In the development of the balances above mentioned, the member-states should cooperate with 
the Commission, following the methodology of calculation, according to the paragraph 1 of the 
article 104 of the Treaty: “In order to ensure the development of indicative (projected) balances of 
gas, oil and petroleum products of the Union, contributing to the efficient use of the aggregate 
energy potential and optimization of interstate supplies of energy resources, authorized authorities 
of the Member States shall draft and approve the methodology for preparing indicative (projected) 
balances of gas, oil and petroleum products before July 1, 2015353”.  
The volition to coordinate all the energetic markets of the members is successively underlined in 
the article 81 of the Treaty, where is defined that the participants should establish a common 
electric power market of the Union gradually, taking in account the previsions of article 104 in its 
second paragraph: “In order to create the common electric power market of the Union, the 
Supreme Council should approve its concept prior to July 1, 2015, and the program for its creation 
before July 1, 2016, providing a time frame for the implementation of the program until July 1, 
2018354”; and 3: “upon completion of the program for the creation of the common electric power 
market of the Union, the Member States shall conclude an international agreement within the 
Union on the establishment of the common electric power market of the Union, including the 
common rules of access to the services of natural monopoly entity in the electrical power sector, 
and shall ensure its entry into force no later than on July 1, 2019355”. 
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The plan of development of a common electric market must be programmed by the authorities of 
the member-states and approved by the Supreme Council. Consequently, in order to guarantee 
objectivity of the discipline, as explained in the comma 3 of article 81 and paragraph 3 of article 
104, the members should conclude an international treaty within the Union for the establishment 
of the common power market that includes the provisions decided between the member-states 
and approved by the Supreme Council.  
Furthermore, the article 82 defines as the member-states, in the development of power market, 
should ensure free access to the services of natural monopoly entities in the electric power 
sphere, in order to regulate primarily the electric market for the domestic needs of the members 
of the Union, based on the principles of equality, in respect with the internal legislation of ever 
member, assuring proper technical condition of electric power facilities. 
The article 82 and its rules and principles are completed by the annex 21 “Protocol on Ensuring 
Access to Services of Natural Monopoly Entities in the Electric Power Sphere, including 
Fundamental Pricing and Tariff Policy.” 
In the Protocol is underlined as the member-states should cooperate and interact in the sphere of 
electric power following determinate principles: 1) to use technical and economic advantages of 
the member-states in the conduction of parallel activities; 2) to avoid to create damages in the 
parallel operations; to create gradually a common economic market of the Union, based on 
equality, mutual benefit and avoidance of economic damage to any member; 3) harmonization of 
technical standards and regulations, using mechanisms based on market relations and fair 
competition; and 4) to ensure easy access to services of natural monopoly entities in the electric 
power sphere356. 
In order to guarantee unhindered interstate transmission of electricity (power) via electric power 
systems of the member-states, authorized authorities of the members should apply the common 
Methodology, contained in the annex to the Protocol 21, “Methodology for Interstate 
Transmission of Electricity (Power) between the Member States”. 
For the determination of tariffs and prices for services of natural monopoly entities in the electric 
power sphere, the comma 9 of annex 21 explains as their conduction should be in compliance with 
the legislation of the members of the Union. These, however, should not exceed similar domestic 
tariffs for subjects of their domestic electricity markets. By this statement the Legislator wants to 
                                                          
356
 Annex 21 to the Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union. Pp. 3-4 
205 
 
create an equal system for the power market of the Union, where the member-states may apply 
same tariffs in their national territories, based on same tariffs and rules. 
Continuing in the analysis, the Treaty of the EEU provides, next to the realization of a common 
electric market, the establishment of a common gas market, as précised in the article 83. The 
development of the program for the realization of the gas market of the Union should be done by 
the member-states and successively approved by the Supreme Council. After that, as for the 
power market, the member-countries should conclude an international treaty within the Union on 
the establishment of the common gas market based on the provisions of the approved concept 
and program of the Supreme Council, with the purpose to assure its efficacy. 
The comma 4 of the article 83 provides as the member-states, taking in account their technical 
capabilities, should unhindered access for economic entities of the other members to gas 
transportation systems located on the territories of the participants to enable gas transportation 
on the basis of common principles, conditions and rules357. 
The fourth comma of the article 104 provides, as for the electric market, even for the gas sector, 
the creation of a common gas market of the Union, whose program for its creation must be 
approved before January 2018 and implemented until January 2024. Also, in the fifth comma of 
the article 104 is established that the member-states, in order to create a gas market, should 
conclude an international treaty within the Union, ensuring its entry into force no later than on 
January 1, 2025. 
This discipline of the article 83 is completed by the annex 22, “Protocol on the Rules of Access to 
Services of Natural Monopoly Entities in the Sphere of Gas Transportations Using Gas 
Transportation Systems, including Fundamental Pricing and Tariff Policy”. 
The annex 22 has the target to establish the framework of cooperation in the gas sphere, setting 
the principles of collaboration and the fundamental provisions of pricing and tariff policies, for 
meeting the demands of the member-states. 
The principles that must be followed by the participants of the Union, in order to create a common 
gas market and a unified system of transportation, are indicated in the subparagraph 3 of the 
annex 22, namely: 1) the not application in mutual trade of import and export customs duties; 2) 
give priority in supply the domestic demands for gas of the member-states; 3) to set prices and 
tariffs for gas transportation services in accordance with the legislation of the member-states; 4) 
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to unify gas norms and standards of the member-states; 5) to ensure environmental safety; and 6) 
to exchange data based on the information including data on domestic gas consumption358. 
The Protocol establishes even the possibility to access in the gas sphere by natural monopolies 
entities, only after the implementation of the member-states, coordinated by principles as: the 
establishment of an information exchange system based on the information including data on 
domestic gas consumption; unification of gas-related norms and standards; and maintaining 
market prices to ensure commercial profitability of gas sales on the territories of Union. 
Another important point of the Protocol is the paragraph 6, where is précised as the member-
states should achieve equal-netback pricing on the territories of all member-states, obtaining a 
same gas price in the entire Union. 
Following, the member-states to achieve common rules in the gas market should develop long-
term mutually beneficial cooperation in areas such: gas transportation; construction, 
reconstruction of gas pipelines and other gas-related infrastructure; provision of services required 
to meet domestic gas demands of the member-states. 
Through these provisions, the Legislator fixed the aim to create a common and unified gas market 
for the Union, with the aim to develop an efficient system which can respond correctly to the 
personal demands of every member and that can equalize their tariffs in the gas regulation and 
transportation among the Union. 
The article 84 of the Treaty provides that the member-states, developing a common program, 
which must be approved by the Supreme Council, should establish a common market of oil and 
petroleum products of the EEU. 
This prevision is précised together with the article 104, which underlines, in its subparagraphs 6 
and 7, that the program for the creation of a common market of oil and petroleum products 
within the Union must be approved before January 2018 and implemented until January 2024. For 
the aim to create a common market of oil and petroleum products, the member-states should 
conclude an international treaty within the Union, ensuring its entry into force no later than on 
January 1, 2025. 
The procedure of the entire discipline is completed through the annex 23: “Protocol on 
Organization, Management, Functioning and Development of the Common Markets of Oil and 
Petroleum Products”. 
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This Protocol – developed taking in account the measures for the establishment of a common 
energy market of the Eurasian Economic Community of December 12, 2008 – determines the 
framework for cooperation in the oil sphere, the principles of establishing of the common market 
of oil and petroleum products of the Union, as well as the principles of access to services of 
natural monopoly entities in the sphere of transportation of oil and petroleum products.  
Fundamentally in the annex 23 is explained, as for the previous Protocols for the power and gas 
markets, that the member-states should not apply export custom duties in the mutual trade of oil 
products. 
In order to create a common oil market of the Union, the member-states should be guided by 
precise measures: 1) creation of an information exchange system based on customs information, 
including information on the supply, export and import of oil and petroleum products by all modes 
of transport; 2) establishment of control mechanisms to prevent violation; 3) unification of norms 
and standards of the member-states regarding oil and petroleum products359. 
Moreover, to implement in the best way the mechanism of the oil market, the authorities of the 
member-states should develop methodologies and determinate rules in the framework of the 
respective international treaties. 
The tariffs for services and for transportation of oil and petroleum products should be set from the 
member-states. For that, the paragraph 9 explains as the internal markets of oil and petroleum 
products of the member-states should be regulated by the national authorities of the member-
states. They should take in act measures to liberalize their markets for oil and petroleum products 
in accordance with the legislation of each member.360 
Concluding the discipline of the Treaty of the Economic Eurasian Union regarding the energy 
sphere of the Union, must be mentioned the article 85 which delineates the tasks of the 
Commission in this sphere. Precisely the Commission should monitor all the implementations of 
this section, guaranteeing control and assuring efficiency of all the measures adopted for the right 
working of the energy industry of the EEU. 
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21.1 Considerations about the common energy market of the EEU 
Before to continue with the analysis of the Treaty, is important to examine the energetic market of 
the Union, underlining the most important passages and objectives that have been planned and 
want to be reached by the participants of the EEU. 
Citing the analysts Pastukhova and Westphal, “A common energy market in the EEU would have a 
significant influence not only on its own member-states, but also on the European Union, on the 
Energy Community (which exports the energy-related Acquis Communautaire to the EU 
neighborhood and to which the Balkan states, Moldova and Ukraine also belong), and on the 
common neighborhood in the Black Sea and Caspian regions. The market would also reverberate 
on China’s Silk Road initiative361”. 
From this reasoning is clear as the establishment of a common market of the EEU in the energetic 
sphere is essential for the development of the Union and its members in the global economic area, 
especially in the relationship with the European Union and for its effects on the Silk Road project.  
Regarding the common electricity market, whose concept was approved on 8 May 2015 by the 
Supreme Eurasian Economic Council, will be realized in 2019. According to the analysis of 
Pastukhova and Westphal, the only new elements in the concept for the electricity sector are the 
introduction of a trading platform at the international level and the commitment to grant all EEU’s 
states nondiscriminatory access to national transmission grids362. The tariffs for EEU-wide long-
distance transmission, as underlined in the article 82 Treaty of the EEU and corresponding annex 
21, will be fixed in order to not exceed the national level.  
On 12 February 2016, during the session of the Council of the Eurasian Economic Commission in 
Moscow, the Council approved the concept for the development of the common gas market of the 
Eurasian Economic Union. The importance of the approval of this concept was remarked by  the 
Minister of Energy and Infrastructure of the EEC Danil Ibrayev: "This Concept has become an 
important decision, as, for the first time, we will facilitate an entry into the competitive market and 
market trading principles in a specific commodity such as natural gas. This is especially important 
given that key players and regulators of the gas market have agreed the provisions of the Concept, 
which confirms the correctness of the course of actions at the supra-national level. The common 
gas market is intended to ensure free movement of gas within the territory of the Union, access to 
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gas transmission infrastructure, stabilization of gas prices, uninterrupted gas supply for the 
economies and population, and enhancing the level of gas supply for the population in our 
countries. This should directly contribute to the processes of industrialization and improvement of 
the positions of industrial gas consumers which is very important for the growth of the real 
sector363". 
With the approval of the document, successively was elaborated by the Supreme Council a 
program for development of the common gas market, which includes provisions as: development 
of full-scale stock exchange markets and rules of mutual trade, including common rules for access 
to gas pipeline systems; and establishment of an information exchange system. All these features, 
in order to give efficiency to the realization of the common gas market, must be implemented by 
January 2024. 
On 6 June 2016, the session of the Advisory Committee for Oil and Gas of the Eurasian Economic 
Commission approved the structure of the Common Gas Market Program of the Eurasian 
Economic Union. As underlined by the Eurasian Economic Commission, the implementation of this 
structure will help to remove cross-border barriers, to ensure a phased transition to common 
market mechanisms for gas pricing, creation of favorable conditions for fair competition among 
participants of the common gas market of the Union364. 
In a general consideration of the gas and oil markets, these sectors, based on the agreements of 
the Customs Union of year 2010, will be successively implemented in 2024 and 2025 respectively, 
recovering the infrastructure of Soviet period, through the dismantling of their infrastructure, 
commercial and regulatory barriers. The elimination of the barriers, as précised in the Treaty, 
wants to allow the harmonization of the legislations of the participants in order to guarantee a 
barrier-free access to transport infrastructure. The advantage of this system – that represents the 
purpose of the EEU regarding the energetic sector – is the possibility to modernize the energetic 
sphere of the member-states, favoring in the same time the liberalization of the sector and the 
competition within. 
Taking into account the oil market, the most sensitive question regard the setting of price for 
crude oil and oil products. A common market price should be applied to oil, while the tariffs for 
pipeline transport will be nationally regulated. 
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However, the energetic market shows as the members of the Union still have controversial 
positions and interests. 
In fact, in the oil sector, Russia and Kazakhstan are interested above all in modernizing their 
refineries and petrochemical industries, in order to boost value added. In 2015 Moscow initiated a 
reform tax of the oil sector, which is shifting the financial burden from export tax to extraction tax. 
But, this mechanism is meeting troubles because of the devaluation of ruble and due of the EU' 
sanctions for the Ukraine case. Thus, in order to generate hard currency, Russia is exporting crude 
oil at high level as in the period after the Soviet Union. This system is however generating 
problems to the Belarusian interests, which is heavily dependent on refining and exporting Russian 
crude. Here we can see the two discordant interests of the counterparts in the EEU: from a side 
Minsk needs access to cheap oil, to preserve its strong refinery sector and processing industry; 
while, from the other side, Moscow wants a pricing mechanism that takes into account the 
specifics of the national markets. In this context, Belarus argues for a uniform oil price no higher 
than that determined by the international agencies, minus the transport and transit costs and 
customs duties incurred in export to third countries365. In consideration of these arguments, the 
Belarusian authorities hope that the common market will provide access to cheap and reliable 
supplies of natural gas from Russia.  
The energetic market represents a decisive point of interest of the EEU that better can explain for 
example the position of Minsk to be part of this association and of its mechanisms. Indeed, in the 
EEU scenario, the trade between Belarus and Russia is unique, because the export volume 
between these two countries for energetic market is the highest in the EEU. Specifically, according 
to Pastukhova and Westphal, in 2014 it amounted to 23.3 million tons of crude and 20.3 billion 
cubic meters of natural gas (representing 10.4% and 9.5% of Russian entire oil and gas exports). 
Moreover 90% of the electricity supply for Belarusian industry is generated from Russian gas; 
while Belarusian refineries process almost exclusively Russian crude with the products largely also 
re-exported to Russia366. 
Basing on these data, it is easy to understand as the regulation of the energetic market must be a 
priority in the system of the Eurasian Union (decisive key for the economic development of 
Belarus), in order to asset the entire mechanism correctly, reflecting and taking into account the 
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interests of all participants, assuring first of all equality in their trade and expansion of the intra-
trade within the Union. 
22 Transport Policy within the EEU 
The section XXI of the Treaty deals with transport policy of the Union. Precisely the article 86 
provides as the Union should conduct coordinated transport policy with the aim to ensure and 
facilitate the economic integration based on the principle of competition, transparence, security, 
reliability, availability and sustainability. 
Through the transport policy, the Legislator prefixed the aim to develop a consolidated system of 
exchange within the Union. In accordance with this reasoning, the transport policy is consequently 
connected from an hand to the volition to guarantee easily movement of goods and services in the 
territory of the Union, and from the other hand to allow the member-states to export without 
obstacles in the territory of the EEU and worldwide goods and service, being efficiently integrated 
with the global transport system. 
According to this purpose, the article 86 in its second comma, proposes the objectives of the 
coordinated agreed policy in the sphere of transport between the participants of the EEU: 1) 
establishment of a common market of services transportation; 2) adoption of common measures 
to ensure general benefits for the members of the Union in the transportation sphere; 3) 
integration of the transport system of the Union into the global one; 4) efficient use of the transit 
potential of the member-states; 5) improving the quality of transport; 6) ensuring safety in the 
transportation; 7) reduction of harmful effects generated by transport on the environment and 
human health; and 8) creation of favorable investment climate. 
The priorities of the coordinated transport policy, as underlined in the Treaty, should be: the 
realization of a common transport space, in order to process goods and services rapidly and 
through common regulation; establishment and development of Eurasian corridors to allow a 
better and coordinated import and export policy with the partners of the member-states; 
implementation of the transit channel of the Union to process every service properly; 
development of a coordinated transport infrastructure; establishment of common logistic center 
in the territory of the Union to optimize the transportation process; involvement, development 
and equal use of the workforce of the member-states; and development and use of new 
technologies for the transport367. 
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The transport policy should be developed together by the member-states, whose implementation 
must be determined by the Supreme Council. A further control of that is entrusted to the 
Commission, which exercises a monitor task to the effective realization of the designed 
executions. 
Further in the analysis, the article 87 provides the area of application of the transport policy, 
namely to road, air, water and rail transport. In order to establish a precise policy in this sphere, 
the member-states should grant a gradual liberalization of transport services, assuring and 
respecting safety requirements in respect of the conditions of the international treaties. This 
legislation is completed with the annex 24: “Protocol on Coordinated (Agreed) Transport Policy”.  
In the Protocol are diversified and explained the different areas of transport, where must be 
implemented a coordinated policy. Regarding the road transport, the member-states had to 
develop until the term of July 2015 a program of gradual liberalization of carriage of goods by road 
between locations on the territory of another member368. In order to favorite a coordinated 
policy, the member-states have to introduce precise measures in order to eliminate barriers that 
could damage the system transportation of the Union.  
For the air transport, the member-states should develop an agreed policy which establishes a 
common system of air transport. Here, the members must apply standards and recommended 
practices of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). The realization of the common 
market of air transport services should be based on the following principles: 1) ensuring 
compliance with international treaties and acts constituting the law of the Union, regulations and 
principles of the international law in the field of civil aviation; 2) harmonization of the legislation of 
the member-states in accordance with the principles of international law in the field of civil 
aviation; 3) ensuring fair and honest competition; 4) facilitating fleet renewal, modernization and 
development of the ground infrastructure; 5) ensuring flight safety and aviation security; 6) 
ensuring non-discriminatory access of aviation companies of the members to the aviation 
infrastructure; 7) expansion of air services between the participants of the Union369. 
However, in the Protocol is even specified that every country has its own sovereignty over the 
airspace above its territory, which must be recognized by all the other members.  
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For water transportation the members should develop a coordinated policy, in order to: 
harmonize the water transport legislation of the member-states; draft proposals on water 
transport liberalization and establishment of common water transport market; and to ensure a 
free passage of the ships of the member-countries in the territory of every other participant of the 
Union.  
Regarding the rail transportation, the member-states should follow the principles as: 1) gradual 
establishment of a common market of transport services in the sphere of rail transport; 2) 
ensuring access of consumers of the member-states to rail transport services in transportations on 
the territory of each member on the terms no less favorable than the terms established for 
consumers of that member-state; 3) maintaining a balance between the economic interests of 
consumers of rail services and the economic interests of rail transport organizations of the 
member-states; 4) enabling access of rail transport organizations of one member state to the 
domestic market of rail transport services of another member; 5) enabling access of carriers to 
infrastructure services of the member-states370. 
The procedure provided in the annex 24 is completed in its corresponding annexes: Annex 1 to the 
Protocol on Coordinated (Agreed) Transport Policy Procedure for Transport (Road) Control at 
External Border of the Eurasian Economic Union; Annex 2 to the Protocol on Coordinated (Agreed) 
Transport Policy Procedure for Regulating Access to Rail Transport Services, including Tariff Policy 
Framework; Annex 1 to the Procedure for Regulating Access to Rail Transport Services, including 
Tariff Policy Framework Rules for Access to Rail Transport Infrastructure within the Eurasian 
Economic Union; Annex to the Access Rules to the Rail Transport Infrastructure within the 
Eurasian Economic Union. Application for Access to Rail Transport Infrastructure within the 
Eurasian Economic Union; Annex 2 to the Procedure for Regulating Access to Rail Transport 
Services, including Tariff Policy Framework Rules for the Provision of Rail Infrastructure Services 
within the Eurasian Economic Union; and Annex to the Rules for the Provision of Rail 
Infrastructure Services within the Eurasian Economic Union List of Rail Infrastructure Services371. 
22.1 Advantages of the common transport system 
Through the section XXI is possible to evince that the aim of the participants of the Eurasian 
Economic Union is to establish a common transport policy in order to develop a functional 
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transport area, as instrument intended to improve the mutual trade of the participants. For that 
assumes priority the gradual liberalization of transport services between the member-states, as 
stressed by President Lukashenka, for the development of the member-countries: “Our mutual 
aim is gradual elimination of restrictions and exceptions followed by establishment of single 
markets in all possible sectors, including transport. We consider that introduction of a common 
market for transport service is one of the most important prerequisites for our countries’ goods to 
be competitive on the internal and external markets372”. This reasoning can be explained 
considering the potentiality of the Union in term of transport, which is really significant: on a 
territory of more than 20 million square km with a population of over 182 million there are: 1.6 
million km of road; 108 thousand km of railways (46% electrified); 107.5 thousand km of inland 
waterways in use; 793.5 thousand km of air routes373. 
The potential of the common transport of the Union is fundamental even in the relationship of the 
Union for its investments with the global partners. In this scenario, the development and 
consolidation of an Eurasian agreed transport policy and the building of the transport channel of 
the EEU in the establishment of the “Western Europe – Western China” international road 
corridor, would create 1) a land link connecting Europe and Asia, especially with the Silk Road 
project, as supported by Kyrgyz President Atambayev, and 2) to provide full range of competitive 
transport and logistics services. A further confirmation of that is possible to find in the words of 
President Nazarbayev: "We recognize the importance of the implementation of objectives set by 
Heads of States concerning the joint partnership between the Eurasian Economic Union and the 
«Silk Road Economic Belt» project in the field transport and infrastructure. The Eurasian 
Transcontinental Corridor, a new high-speed multimodal transport route, is to become a key 
element of the revived Silk Road374”. 
Generally, we can assert as the purpose of this project is to create a stable and safe transport 
system, which can diminish the costs and assure rapidity in the movement of the goods of the EEU 
in its intra and extra trade. 
Economically, the share of transport in gross value added in the EEU is about 8% and gross fixed 
capital formation – more than 1/5.  
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Figure 8: Cargo turnover (excluding pipelines) in the EEU, in bln tkm 
 
Source: Library of the Eurasian Economic Commission (2015): “Transport Potential of the Eurasian Economic Union”. P. 
8 http://www.eurasiancommission.org/ru/Documents/transport_eng.pdf (last view: 12.03.2017) 
According to the official data of the Economic Eurasian Union, from 2010 to 2014 the cargo 
turnover for all types of transport (excluding pipelines) increased by 13% to 3 107 billion tons 
kilometers. While in the period from January to September 2015 turnover of all modes of 
transport (excluding pipelines) decreased by 2.3% and amounted to 2 295 billion tons kilometers. 
Figure 9: Cargo transportation (excluding pipelines) in the EEU, in billion tons 
 
Source: Library of the Eurasian Economic Commission (2015): “Transport Potential of the Eurasian Economic Union”. P. 
9 http://www.eurasiancommission.org/ru/Documents/transport_eng.pdf (last view: 12.03.2017) 
The graphic above shows as in the EEU from 2010 to 2014 the volume of cargo transportation by 
all types of transport (excluding pipelines) increased by 15% to 10.7 billion tons. While, from 
January to September 2015 comparing to the same period 2014, the volume of cargo 
transportation by all types of transport (excluding pipelines) decreased by 4.4% to 7.4 billion tons. 
These data bring us to the result that, in consideration of the cargo market, after 2015, the 
transport market did not get a very increase, rather knew a slight decrease. In follow of that, the 
institution of a common transport market, as stressed by Lukashenka and from the other Heads of 
States of the EEU, is a priority in the working process of the Union in order to create a common 
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system of transport and modernize the channels of interaction between the members for their 
mutual trade and for their foreigner trade. For that, as provided in the annex 24 of the Treaty, on 
May 8, 2015 the Presidents of the member-countries approved the program of gradual 
liberalization of cargo transportation between points located on the territory of the EEU for the 
Period from 2016 to 2025. The aim of the Program is to facilitate the access for the EEU road 
freight transport to the Common Transport Market, regardless of nationality or the state of 
registration, through an establishment of a roadmap for the member-states, in order to share 
transport consumer costs, cut down the number and distance of empty runs and promote fair 
competition. 
Following, on March 31, 2016 in Bishkek the Consultative Committee on Transport and 
Infrastructure considered the preparation of the policy document of the EEU “Main Directions and 
Stages of the Coordinated (Agreed) Transport Policy of the EAEU Member States”. During the 
session, the participants agreed on the fundamental areas of integration by means of transport, 
discussed the issues related to the introduction of instruments and mechanisms, as well as defined 
milestones for the practical implementation of the transport policy. As proposed by Minister of 
the EEC Danil Ibrayev, was decided to support the establishment of a Scientific Expert Council at 
the Consultative Committee on Transport and Infrastructure, which would ensure the effective 
work in the promotion of the integration processes on the basis of analytical research and current 
practice375. Through the formation of this Committee, the member-states want to reach and 
create a system that can be stable and competitive in the world scenario. The investments in term 
of imports and exports are the core of the economy of the EEU, which can allow the development 
of the internal economies. Moreover a direct expansion of the Union worldwide, thus through the 
achievement of new economic and strategic partner, is dictated by economic factors, where the 
transport and the solidity of its system are prerogatives to the correct evolution and vision of the 
EEU in the world area. 
Thus, the member-states should make efforts in order to establish and conduct a coordinated 
transport policy, which gradually should form a common transport area. The objectives that the 
common area wants to reach in the long term can be summarized in three macro-areas:  
economy, population and business. For the economic side, the purposes are: to ensure a long-
term sustainable economic development; to increase transport services share in GDP; to ensure 
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cargo flows growth in mutual and foreign trade by providing better transport services; to perform 
major transport infrastructure projects and to create new industries and jobs. For the population 
this system would: to improve mobility and transport accessibility; to improve reliability and 
quality of transport services; to reduce negative impact of transport on human health; and to 
ensure transport tariffs transparency. The effects that would be reached for the business are: to 
reduce transport costs; to create competitive environment on the common transport market; to 
ensure fair access to the transport market; to develop multimodal logistics centers; to develop 
multimodal transport; to harmonize transportation rules and conditions; and to introduce long-
term tariffs policy to transport services376. 
However, the establishment of a common transport area for road, air, maritime and railway 
system should have first of all the priority to modernize the transport system of every member-
states, in order to equalize all the infrastructures of the countries, creating a coordinated system 
of transport exchange within the Union and to regulate the monopolies in the transport system 
through the application of an uniform tariff methodology which will provide to eliminate barriers 
and to ensure equal rights of consumers in the common area. 
23 State Municipal Procurement  
The section XXII of the Treaty, precisely in the article 88, delineates the objective and principles 
regarding the sphere of state (municipal) procurement. As reported in the article 88, the 
regulation of the procurements must be conducted through the legislation of the member-states 
and their international treaties, in order to ensure the use of resources dedicated to the 
procurement in a right manner, providing in the same time to the participants of the Union a 
national treatment in this sphere. The aim of that is to assure disclosure and transparency of the 
procurement, ensuring unhindered access of potential suppliers and suppliers of the member-
states to the participation in procurement procedures and availability of competent regulatory 
and supervisory authorities of the member-state in the sphere of procurement. Through this 
mechanism of interaction between the members of the Union, the Legislator wants to assure the 
development of an equal system of regulation which from a side determinates liability for 
violation of the procurement legislation; and from the other can promote the competition, as well 
as the fight against corruption and other abuses in the sphere of procurement. 
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However, the article 88 explains as this procedure should not apply for the details of procurement 
which constitute secret of state and for those procedures carried out by national (central) banks of 
the member-states, assuring thus a special tutelage for these institutions. Regarding the national 
banks, the Treaty indicates that these institutions should carry out procurement procedures for 
administrative and economic purposes, as well as for construction and repairs, in accordance with 
their internal procurement rules, “the procurement clause”. The procurement clause should not be 
contrary to the purposes and principles set out in the article 88. In particular, the regulations 
should ensure equal access for potential suppliers of the member-states377.  
To guarantee more transparency in the Union is even provided in the Treaty as the procurement 
clause and all the procedure regarding the national banks should be posted by the member-states 
in the website of their respective national banks. 
The procedure described in the article 88 is completed through the annex 25 “Protocol on the 
Procedure for Regulating Procurement”, which determinates the procedure for procurement 
regulation. 
In the second section of the Protocol is explained as the procurement in the member-states should 
be conducted using: an open tender; request for pricing; request for proposal; open electronic 
auction; exchange trading; and procurement from a single source or a single supplier. 
The tender-based procurement; the procurement based on request for pricing; the procurement 
based on requests for proposals, the auction-based procurement should be conducted taking into 
account the requirements in the annex 1 “Requirements to the Organization and Conduct of 
Tenders, Request for Pricing (Request for Quotations), Request for Proposals, Auctions and 
Procurement from a Single Source or a Single Supplier (Executor, Contractor)”; the annex 2 “List of 
Cases Requiring Procurement under the Request for Proposals Process”; the annex 3 “List of Cases 
Requiring Procurement from a Single Source or a Single Supplier (Executor, Contractor)”; the annex 
4 “List of Goods, Works and Services Procured using the Auction Process” to this Protocol. 
Generally, for this discipline, the member-states are entitled to determine in its procurement 
legislation a wider range of goods, works and services to be procured through the auction 
procedure. Also, they have the right to specify in its legislation the commodity exchanges allowed 
for procurement purposes and may, according to the paragraph 11 of the annex 25, unilaterally 
determine in its procurement legislation any specific features of the regime related to the need to 
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maintain confidentiality of information on potential suppliers before the end of the procurement 
process378.  
Furthermore, in order to tutelage the Union in its entire, the procurement legislation of a 
member-state should provide for the formation and maintenance of a registry of mala fide 
suppliers, containing information on: potential suppliers avoiding the conclusion of procurement 
agreements; suppliers non-performing or improperly fulfilling their obligations; suppliers non-
performing or improperly fulfilling their obligations under procurement agreements (contracts); 
and suppliers with those the customers have unilaterally terminated the procurement 
agreements, because the supplier did not provide all the requested documentation and 
information. Moreover, as explained in paragraph 15 of annex 25, the member-states should limit 
the participation in procurement by determining, in accordance with their procurement 
legislation, any additional requirements to potential suppliers and suppliers in the procurement of 
certain types of goods, works and services379. 
The subparagraph 29 of article 88 underlines that the member-states should ensure information 
openness and transparency of procurement, including: “1) the creation of a web portal by each 
member state; 2) publications on the web portal of procurement-related information and the 
registry of mala fide suppliers; 3) publication on the web portal of regulatory legal acts of the 
member-state in the sphere of procurement; 4) identification of a limited number of electronic 
trading platforms and/or a web portal as a single point of access to information on procurement in 
electronic format; 5) organizing free of charge and unhindered access to procurement-related 
information, the registry of mala fide suppliers and regulatory legal acts of the member-state in 
the sphere of procurement published on its website, as well as ensuring the widest possible search 
possibilities for such information, registry and acts380”. 
Every member-state should respect in this sphere the national legislation of every other 
participants of the Union and their suppliers for good and service. In exceptional cases and as 
determined in its procurement legislation, a member-country may unilaterally introduce 
exemptions from such national treatment for a period not exceeding 2 years. Here, the controlling 
authority should notify to the Commission and to each participant in writing form about adoption 
of such act, providing a rational explanation for its adoption. After the examination, the 
Commission may decide on the need to cancel the act establishing any exemptions adopted by the 
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member-state. If the Commission decides to cancel the above act, the member-state having 
adopted the act should ensure the introduction of respective changes into the act (its invalidation) 
within two months381. 
In the section IV of the annex 25 is stressed as each member-state is responsible to take measures 
to prevent, detect and stop violations of its procurement legislation, in order to protect the 
interest of national people and consumers. For this purpose, every member of the Union should 
ensure the availability of authorized regulatory and/or controlling authorities in the sphere of 
procurement. In this case, these functions may be performed by a single authority having the 
following powers: 1) control in the sphere of procurement (including through inspections); 2) 
examination of claims and applications against decisions and actions (omission) of customers; 3) 
prevention and detection of violations of the procurement legislation of the member-state; 4) 
establishing and maintaining the registry of mala fide suppliers382. 
The member-states should try to improve and harmonize their legislation about procurement. This 
objective should be reached through a public control and discussion of procurement; involvement 
of experts to organize better the common working and generally through a standardization of the 
national discipline.   
24 Intellectual Property within the Union 
The section XXIII disciplines the treatment of the intellectual property383 rights inside the EEU. 
Specifically, the article 89 provides that the member-states should follow a correct cooperation in 
the sphere of protection and enforcement of the intellectual property rights.  
The participants of the Union, in order to offer guarantee for the respect of the intellectual rights, 
must harmonize their legislation and cooperate in areas as: 1) support for scientific and innovative 
development; 2) improvement of the mechanisms of use of intellectual property; 3) creation of a 
favorable common environment for copyright; 4) introduction of a registration system for 
trademarks and service marks of the Eurasian Economic Union; 5) protection of intellectual 
property rights even on internet; 6) ensuring effective customs protection of intellectual property 
rights, including even a common customs registry of intellectual property of the member-states; 
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and 7) implementation of coordinated measures to prevent and combat trafficking in counterfeit 
goods384. 
To assure a complete control for the discipline of intellectual property, the article 89 provides also 
that the Commission should organize consultations between the participants of the Union, whose 
proposals will be examined and resolved for the correct working of the EEU. 
Thus, the member-states should coordinate and harmonize their legislation regarding the 
intellectual property. It has the consecutive significance, as reported in the article 90, that every 
citizen of the Union must be protected and guaranteed for the rights concerning the intellectual 
property in all the countries of the Union equally. The only exceptions that may be provided from 
the national legislation of the member-states must be commiserated in respect of juridical and 
administrative proceedings. Moreover, as expressed in the second comma of article 90, the 
participants of the Union, in order to assure a stronger higher treatment of the intellectual rights, 
may provide in their legislation any rules ensuring a higher level of protection and enforcement of 
intellectual property rights.   
The Legislator for the scope to give complete resonance to the discipline and to equalize the 
provisions of the Treaty to the international standards provides explicitly in the third comma, that 
the member-states should conduct their activities in the sphere of intellectual rights in accordance 
with the existing international treaties385. 
All the relations subject of protection and special features of treatment connected with the 
intellectual rights are disciplined in the annex 26 “Protocol on the Protection and Enforcement of 
Intellectual Property Rights”. 
In the second section of the Protocol is explained the copyright and related rights, that should be 
applied to works of science, literature and art. Here the member-states should ensure compliance 
with the periods of protection of the exclusive rights to works of an author, the exclusive rights to 
works of joint authorship, and the exclusive rights to works published after the author's death. The 
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protection of the right of author provided by the Protocol regards as well the programs for 
electronic computers, composite works (encyclopedias), derivative works (e.g. translations, 
adaptations or arrangements of music), cinematographic works and rights of performing activities 
(artistic work of e.g. actors or musicians).  
The third section of the annex 26 deals with trademarks, that should refer to a designation 
protected in accordance with the legislation of the member-state and its international treaties. 
The right holder of a trademark has the exclusive rights to use the trademark (valid after the 
registration for a period of 10 years) in accordance with the legislation of the member-country and 
to prevent other persons from using its trademark.  
In order to define the goods of the EEU properly, is provided in the section 8 of the annex 26 the 
discipline regarding the appellation of origin of goods: “A legally protected appellation of origin of 
goods shall refer to a designation representing or containing contemporary or historical, formal or 
informal, full or abbreviated name of a country, urban or rural settlement, locality or other 
geographical object as well as a designation representing a derivative thereof that has become 
known as a result of its use in relation to goods the special properties of which are exclusively or 
mainly determined by any natural conditions and/or human factors specific to such a geographical 
area386”. Regarding this point, the member-states should set precise legal remedies to prevent the 
false designation and geographical area of the original production of a good; and to avoid an 
unfair competition for the goods of the Union. 
Summarizing, the Protocol disciplines the patent rights (invention, utility model or industrial 
design), protected respectively: 20 years for inventions, 5 years for utility models and 5 years for 
industrial designs; and the production secrets (know-how), which refer to industrial, technical, 
economic information and data. 
To complete the section XXIII of the Treaty of the EEU, must be mentioned the article 91, which 
provides that the member-states should take enforcement measures to ensure effective 
protection of intellectual property rights in accordance with the customs code of the EEU, and 
with international treaties and acts constituting the law of the Union and governing customs legal 
relations. Moreover, the authorities of the associates of the EEU should collaborate together in 
order to coordinate precisely their actions of prevention and detection of possible violations in the 
field of intellectual property. 
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25 Industrial policy of the EEU 
The section XXIV delineates the manufacturing industry of the Union. In the article 92 is précised 
as the member-states, regarding the industrial cooperation, should independently develop and 
implement a national industry policy by the adoption of common industrial measures that 
successively should determinate precise ways and forms of the subsidies that are not in 
contradiction with the disposition of the article 93 of the Treaty387. 
Developing the industrial policies, the member-states should shape it through the implementation 
of a coordinated industrial cooperation, which, in order to be equal between all the members, 
must be approved by the Intergovernmental Council in consultation with the Commission. In the 
realization of this scope, the member-states should be guided by the principles of: equality and 
respect for the national interests of all members; mutual benefit; fair competition; non-
discrimination; transparency. 
The aim of the industrial policy, as prefixed by the Legislator, is the coordination in the 
development of a common industrial policy which can contribute to the improvement of the 
industrial sectors of the participants of the Union. This point reflexes exactly one of the mayor 
targets of the EEU, namely the modernization of the economic sectors of the Eurasian countries. 
For that the cooperation in industrial sector should be addressed to guarantee effective assistance 
between every participant, promoting innovation and new technologies of production through the 
elimination of all possible barriers in the industrial sphere. In order to achieve these objectives of 
the industrial policy, as indicated in the comma 4 of the article 92, the member-states should: “1) 
inform each other about their plan of developments; 2) hold regular consultations between their 
authorities for the implementation of the industrial policy; 3) develop and implement coordinated 
programs for the development of priority economic activities for industrial cooperation; 4) develop 
and agree on a list of sensitive goods; 5) implement joint projects aimed to improve efficiency of 
industrial policy and deepen their cooperation in the industrial sector; 6) develop process-related 
and information resources for the purposes of industrial cooperation; 7) conduct coordinated 
researches to promote high-tech industries; and 8) implement other measures with the purposes to 
remove barriers and develop mutually beneficial cooperation388”. 
In the Treaty is even stressed, that in necessary cases, to guarantee equality and efficiency, the 
implementations above can be developed by a decision of the Intergovernmental Council. 
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Moreover, this organ of the Union must approve the “main directions of the industrial 
cooperation” developed by the member-states. The Commission, inherent to the subject of this 
section, exercises a role of annual monitoring and analysis about the results of the main directions. 
The importance of the industrial policy within the Union is strongly affirmed in the seventh comma 
of article 92, where is indicated as the member-states for the development of any measures and 
the agreed policy in the principal spheres of trade, customs tariffs, competition, state 
procurement, technical regulations, business development, transportation, infrastructure, must 
take into account the common interests of industrial development. This statement confirms the 
priority that the Legislator has given in the development of the industrial policy, which is 
considered the significant sector for the economic development of the Union and thus of the 
improvement of the mutual trade of the participants of the EEU.  
Considering the treatment of sensitive good in consideration of the industrial policy, is affirmed as 
the member-states should inform each other of all planned implementation areas for the 
approved list of sensitive good and hold consultations for mutual consideration of their positions 
prior to the adoption of any industrial policy measures regarding this sector. 
Furthermore, the member-countries to achieve the aim of a common industrial cooperation 
within the Union should use some instruments as: a) the promotion of mutually beneficial 
industrial cooperation in order to create high-tech, innovative and competitive products; and b) 
the developing of common programs, projects and technological platform for their mutual benefit. 
Generally, we can notice as the scientific research, the coordination of the national plans through 
the holding of consultation and the implementation of common measures for mutual advantages 
are the cornerstones prefixed by the Legislator regarding the industrial policy within the Union. In 
addition, the members may create new instruments or documents that must be valued by the 
Commission, which, to achieve a better coordination in this discipline, provide consultations and 
coordination, to deepen more the cooperation.  
The discipline of the article 92 is completed by the annex 27 “Protocol on Industrial Cooperation”, 
which deals with tasks of the Commission for the industrial policy. 
Precisely, in the second paragraph of the Protocol are listed the powers of the Commission for the 
purpose of consultation and coordination of the activities of the member-states in the industrial 
sphere, that can be summarized as: 1) assistance in the exchange of information; holding of 
consultations and discussion of issues related to the development of the main directions of 
industrial cooperation; development of proposals to deepen the cooperation between the 
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members in the implementation of industrial policy within the Union. 2) Submission to the 
member-states of recommendations on further development of industrial cooperation; 
monitoring and analysis of implementation of the Main Directions of Industrial Cooperation within 
the Union; review of the international experience in industrial development in order to identify 
industrial development methods relevant for the member-states. Through a decision of the 
Intergovernmental Council, the Commission should: prepare draft provisions on the development, 
financing and implementation of common programs and projects; identify and eliminate 
administrative and other barriers in contrast with the development of industrial cooperation; 
monitor and analyze generally the industrial development of the member-states389. 
These tasks can however been extended by a decision of the Intergovernmental Council. 
26 Industrial subsidies 
The article 93 of the Treaty provides that, in order to enable stable and efficient development of 
the economies of the members of the Union, and to promote their mutual trade on the basis of 
fair competition, should be applied in the territory of the Union common rules for granting 
subsidies for industrial goods390. Here is important to stress as the discipline of the article 93 is 
related exclusively on the relationships between the members of the Union, excluding the 
correlation of a member-state with a third country.   
In the paragraph 3 of the article 93 is explained the concept of subsidy referring to the previsions 
of the Treaty, namely: a) financial contribution provided by a subsidizing authority of a member-
state, used for generating benefits and carried out through: direct transfer of funds, acquisition of 
a share in the authorized capital or an increase thereof, or an obligation to transfer such funds; 
and b) provision of goods or services, purchase of industrial good by: any other form of income or 
price support reducing the importation of industrial goods from the territory of any member-state 
or increasing the exportation of industrial goods into the territory of any member with advantage 
results391.  
The subsidies are conceded by the prefixed authority or any other organization which must be 
designated by the corresponding subsiding authority. The acts of the Heads of a member-state 
aimed to provide subsidies are considered as actions of the subsidizing authority. 
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In the sixth paragraph of the article 93 is defined the role of the Commission, which should ensure 
control for the discipline, exercising the powers: 1) to monitor and conduct comparative legal 
analysis of the legislation of the member-states for compliance with the provisions of this Treaty in 
respect of subsidies. 2) To facilitate the organization of consultations between the members in 
order to harmonize and unify their legislation on the provision of subsidies. 3) To adopt binding 
decisions for the member-states as: a) adoption of decisions on the admissibility or inadmissibility 
of specific subsidies in accordance with paragraph 6392 of Annex 28 to the Treaty; b) holding a 
hearing on provision of specific subsidies and adoption of related binding decisions in cases 
determined by the international agreement within the Union stipulated in paragraph 7393 of Annex 
28; and c) resolution of disputes on matters relating to implementation of the provisions. 4) To 
request and obtain information on subsidies granted in the procedure and on the terms 
determined under an international treaty within the Union stipulated in paragraph 7 of Annex 
28394, completed by the first paragraph of article 105 of the Treaty395. 
In the case of a dispute concerning the subsidies and its measures, the Treaty provides that the 
member-states should resolve it through consultations and negotiations, applying thus the 
principle of friendly resolution. But, if the negotiations did not bring a solution within sixty 
calendar days, the claimant is entitled to apply to the Court of the Union. In case that the Court of 
the Union responds positively to the request, the claimant state is entitled to take proportionate 
response measures. From the other side, the counterpart has a period of five years to challenge 
the decision of the Court of its violation against the previsions of the article 93 and its annex. 
The discipline of the article 93 is completed with the annex 28 “Protocol on the Common Rules for 
granting of Industrial Subsidies” and its corresponding annex “List of measures not subject to the 
provisions of the Protocol on the Common Rules for the Provision of Industrial Subsidies”. 
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In the second section of the Protocol 28 are indicated the specific subsidies: a subsidy, which use is 
limited to certain enterprises located within a designated geographical region forming a part of 
the territory of operation of the subsidizing authority, should be deemed specific396. Here is 
précised, that the subsidies can specific for an industrial enterprise or an industrial sector or for a 
group of industrial enterprises or industrial sectors.  
In the third section are determined the prohibited subsidies: export subsidy and a replacement 
subsidy. However, if the provision of a specific subsidy by a member-state results in damage with a 
sector of the national economy of another member, such subsidy should be prohibited. The same 
discipline is applied to the specific subsidies that may be prohibited if their provision leads to a 
serious infringement of the interests of any member-state. The Commission should not approve 
any prohibited subsidies as permissible. In the case a member-state has a reason to believe that 
the subsidizing authority of another state introduces a prohibited subsidy, has the right to apply to 
the counterpart, requesting an investigation and consultations on the cancellation of prohibited 
subsidies or measures397. 
All other subsidies, as explicated in the paragraph 19 of annex 28, that are not prohibited and do 
not represent specific subsidies according to the Protocol, should be recognized as permissible 
subsidies, if these, in addition, do not distort the mutual trade between the member-states398. 
The terms and the discipline presented in the Protocol as in the Treaty regarding the subsidies, is 
précised that must not prevent any member from taking any action it deems necessary to protect 
its essential security interests or any action in pursuance of its obligations under the Charter of the 
United Nations to preserve the world peace and international security.  
Finally, in the second comma of the article 105, transitional provision correlated to the section 
XXIV, is defined that the previsions of article 93 and annex 28 must be not applied to subsidies 
granted on the territory of the Union according to the predispositions of January 1, 2012. 
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27 Agricultural sector of the EEU 
The section XXV of the Treaty delineates the agricultural sector. The article 94 underlines as the 
member-states, in order to ensure the development of the rural areas of the Union in the interests 
of the population, must promote an agreed agricultural policy within the EEU according to the 
mechanisms of the Treaty and of the international treaties of the Union in the agricultural sphere. 
The main objective of the coordinated agricultural policy, as précised in the second paragraph of 
the article 94, is the effective use and implementation of the resource potential of the member-
states in order to strengthen the agricultural and food markets of the Union with the aim to 
increase the exports of this sector worldwide. For that, the agreed policy should: 1) balance the 
development of the food and agricultural products ensuring equality between the participants of 
the Union; 2) allow fair competition within the EEU and equal access to all the members in the 
agricultural market; 3) unify the regulation and requirements for the circulation of agricultural and 
food product in the territory of the Union; and 4) protect the interests of the manufactures of the 
member-states in the intra and foreign trade. 
Generally, the Legislator through the article 94 prefixes the aim to realize an agreed agro-
industrial policy which can implement the agricultural resources of the Union efficiently, 
optimizing from a side the competitiveness of the agrarian products within the Union and from 
the other side, increasing the economic investments of the agrarian sector in the global economy. 
Following the analysis, the article 95 lists the main directions that must be implemented for the 
agreed agricultural policy: forecasting in the agricultural sector; state support for agriculture; 
common agricultural market regulation; common requirements for the production and circulation 
of products; development of export of agricultural and food products; scientific and innovative 
development of the agricultural sector; and integrated information support of agriculture399. In 
order to achieve these purposes, the Commission should organize regular consultations between 
the members of the Union. 
Moreover, the Legislator provides that the participants of the Union in the realization of the 
agreed policy must take in account, other their industrial and agricultural significance, even the 
morphological, structural and climatic differences from their territories. 
In case of disputes between the member-states in the agricultural sphere, the Treaty provides that 
the states in conflict must settle their controversies through negotiations and consultations. If in 
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the period of sixty calendar days by the notification of a member-state to another for a 
disputation, this could not be resolved, the claimant is entitled to apply to the Court of the Union, 
which will decide on the issue. 
In the paragraph 7 of the article 95 are indicated the tasks of the Commission for the target of 
implementation of the agreed policy: “1) to develop, coordinate and implement the main 
directions of the agreed agricultural policy together with the member-states; 2) to coordinate the 
activities of the member-states in preparation of joint development forecasts for the agricultural 
sector, supply and demand for agricultural and food products; 3) to coordinate mutual 
presentation by the member-states of development programs for the agricultural sector and its 
branches; 4) to monitor the development of agricultural sectors of the members of the Union; 5) to 
monitor prices and analyze competitiveness of products manufactured based on the nomenclature 
agreed upon by the member-states; 6) to assist in the organization of consultations and 
negotiations on the harmonization of legislation of the member-states in the sphere of agricultural 
sector; 7) to monitor and conduct comparative legal analysis of the legislation of the member-
states in the field of state support for agriculture in terms of its compliance with the obligations 
assumed within the Union; 8) to prepare and submit to the member-states reviews of the state 
policy in the sphere of agricultural sector and state support, including recommendations on 
improvement of its efficiency; 9) to assist the member-states on issues related to the calculation of 
the amount of state support for agriculture; 10) to prepare recommendations on coordinated 
actions aimed at developing the export potential in the sphere of agricultural sector; 11) to 
coordinate the implementation by the member-states for scientific and innovative activities in the 
agricultural sector; 12) to coordinate the development and implementation by the member-states 
of the standardized requirements regarding the conditions of import, export and movement of 
products within the customs territory of the Union; 13) coordinate the development and 
implementation of the standardized requirements in the sphere of testing crop types and seeds, as 
well as coordinate mutual recognition by the member-states of documents certifying the varietal 
and sowing seed quality; and 14) to assist in ensuring equal competitive environments within the 
main directions of the agreed agricultural policy400”. 
The discipline about the agricultural sector of the Union is completed through the annex 29 of the 
Treaty “Protocol on Agricultural State Support Measures”.   
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In the second section of the Protocol are indicated the state measures that the participants of the 
Union should develop to support the agricultural sector, namely all those measures that do not 
produce distorting effects401 on the mutual trade between the member-states in the agricultural 
sphere.  
In the third section are defined the measures with no trade-distorting effect implemented in the 
interests of manufacturers of agricultural goods that should have the following basic criteria 
principally: 1) the support should be provided from the budget, including under state programs, 
but not at the expense of consumers' funds. Unclaimed revenues should refer to the amount of 
mandatory payments rejected by the member-state permanently or temporarily; and 2) the 
support should not result in the maintenance of manufacturers' prices402.  
In the subparagraph 14 is prefixed by the Legislator that state programs for the provision of 
general services should provide for allocation of budget funding for the provision of services or 
benefits to the agriculture or rural population. State programs can be carried out in areas such: 
scientific research; pest and disease control; staff training; dissemination of information; 
inspection services; services for marketing and promotion of agricultural products; infrastructure 
services. 
The fourth section of the annex 29 deals with measures with the most trade-distorting effect: 1) 
effecting direct payments to specific manufacturers; 2) sale or offer for export to the territory of 
another member-state of non-commercial stocks of agricultural goods at prices lower than the 
prices for similar goods offered to purchasers in the domestic market of the member-state; 3) 
effecting payments for export to the territory of another member of agricultural goods funded 
with support from the government, at the expense of state funds and other funds, including 
payments financed from the proceeds of levies on agricultural product or agricultural product 
used as the basis for the manufacture of product exported to the territory of another member; 4) 
provision of state support to reduce the cost of marketing and promotion of agricultural goods for 
export to the territory of another member-state; 5) setting domestic tariffs for transportation of 
agricultural goods intended for export to the territory of another member on more favorable 
terms than determined for the transportation of agricultural goods intended for domestic 
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consumption; and 6) provision of state support for agriculture depending on the inclusion of 
agricultural goods in the list of products intended for export to the territory of another member403. 
In the fifth section of the annex 29 to the Treaty is defined the calculation of the volume of state 
support for agriculture. Explicitly, in the calculation of the volume of state support for agriculture, 
should be taken into account: 1) direct transfer of funds; 2) provision of performance guarantees 
(e.g., loan guarantees); 3) acquisition by the state of goods, services, securities, companies 
(property complexes) or a part thereof, stakes in the authorized capital of a company (including 
the acquisition of shares), other property, intellectual property rights, etc., at prices exceeding the 
market prices; 4) full or partial waiver of the collection of payments due to the state budget and 
the budgets of administrative-territorial entities; 5) preferential or free provision of goods or 
services; and 6) price support combining measures aimed at maintaining the level of market 
prices.404  
In case of a direct transfer of funds, the amount of state support for the agriculture should 
correspond to the amount of funds provided free of charge. In the comma 29 is précised that, if 
funds are provided on a repayment basis on more favorable terms than those in the available 
market, the amount of the support should be determined as the difference between the amount 
that would be required to pay for the use of these funds if received in the market and the actual 
amount paid. Successively, in the paragraph 30 is indicated that, “The amount of state support for 
agriculture under a provided performance guarantee should be determined as the difference 
between the amount that would be payable on the basis of the tariff for the insurance risk for a 
default of the corresponding obligations on the available insurance market and the amount 
payable for the provision of the guarantee to the subsidizing authority405”.  
The successive comma defines that in case of acquisition by the state of goods, services, securities, 
companies (property complexes) or a part thereof, stakes in the authorized capital of a company 
(including the acquisition of shares), other property, intellectual property rights, etc., at prices 
exceeding the market prices, the amount should be calculated as the difference between the 
amount actually paid for the assets acquired and the amount that would be required to pay for 
these assets at prices prevailing in the market. While in the comma 32 is indicated that in case of a 
full or partial waiver of collection of payments due to the budgets of the member-states and 
administrative-territorial entities, the amount should correspond to the amount of outstanding 
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financial obligations of the manufacturer to the budget, including liabilities that might arise in the 
absence of such support.  
Besides, the comma 33 précises that in case of preferential or free of charge provision of goods or 
services, the amount should be calculated as the difference between the market value and the 
amount actually paid for the acquisition of the goods or services. Finally, in the comma 34 is 
defined that the amount of price support combining measures aimed at maintaining the level of 
market prices shall be calculated as the product of the amount of a particular type of agricultural 
goods in respect of which the price regulation was implemented or measures to control prices 
were applied by the difference between the domestic regulated price and the reference world 
price adjusted to the quality and the degree of processing of the goods (e.g., basic milk fat)406. 
Regarding the state support for agriculture, the discipline of the annex 29 and section XXV of the 
Treaty, is determined even through the article 106 of the Treaty. Specifically, the first paragraph of 
this article provides that had to be established a transitional period until 2016 for Belarus, during 
which this participant of the Union had to reduce the allowed amount of state support for 
agriculture as follows: in 2015 – by 12 percent; and in 2016 – by 10 percent. Continuing, the third 
comma précises that the obligations stipulated in favor of state support for agriculture should 
enter into force for Belarus not later than on January 1, 2025.407  
In order to give transparency to the agricultural activities of the Union, every member should 
notify to the other participants and to the Commission all programs of state support for 
agriculture planned in the current year, including information on the amount and procedure for 
the provision of the state support for agriculture.   
27.1 Objectives of the agricultural sphere of the EEU  
As indicated in the article 94, the development of coordinated agricultural policy, aimed to ensure 
balanced development of agricultural products and fair competition between the member-states, 
should be conducted through the disposition of the EEU’s Treaty and other international treaties 
within the Union in the sphere of agricultural sector by the submission, effectuated by every 
member-state, to the other countries of the Union and to the Commission of a manufacture 
development plan for each sensitive agricultural good originated by the member-states. In relation 
to the implementation of a common agricultural policy, the member-countries should hold 
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consultations in order to provide the application of interstate cooperation efficiently, as indicated 
in the first paragraph of article 95. 
The existing regulation of the agricultural sector as expressed in the articles 94 and 95 is the result 
of the Eurasian economic process of integration in the agricultural sphere began already at the 
end of the 1990s. Indeed, the actual discipline provided in the Treaty is only the last step of a 
procedure started with the “Treaty on the Customs Union and the Common Economic Space” of 
February 1999; “the Agreement on the Unified Rules of state support of agriculture” dated 
December 2010; the “Concept of an Agreed Agro-industrial Policy” approved by the Presidents of 
Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia on 29 May, 2013; and the Action Plan for its implementation 
decided by the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council in November 2014.  
Regarding the concept of the agreed agro-industrial policy, this document, with the precise aims 
to harmonize the economies of the participants of the Union, as well their coordination in the 
international level, defines nowadays the basis for the legislation of the Treaty of the Eurasian 
Economic Union in the agricultural sector. 
Generally, the different documents reflex the fact that the discipline of the agrarian policy of the 
Union was built in the time principally by the three founders of the EEU – Belarus, Russia and 
Kazakhstan – and stresses the necessity of its continuing implementation and coordination for the 
further improvement of this key sector of the member-states. For that, in the organogram of the 
Union this complex matter is hold by the Consultative Committee for the Agro-industrial Complex 
divided in departments (Division of Agro-industrial Policy, International Programs and Projects; 
Division of Agricultural Subsidies; Division of Monitoring and Analysis of the Development of Agro-
industrial Complexes; and Division of Interaction on Issues of Agro-industrial Policy) with precise 
tasks of development, implementation, coordination and monitoring of the decisions of the 
Commission and their exact application by the member-states in the territory of the EEU. In fact, 
only a constant application of the mutual obligations by the participants can really bring benefits 
for the development of the Union. 
Concentrating about the article 95, in order to achieve the regulation and development of the 
agreed agro-industrial policy, in this segment are defined the interstate cooperation of the 
member-states in the agricultural sphere: forecasting in the agro-industrial policy; state support of 
agriculture; common agricultural market regulation; establishment of the unified requirements for 
circulation of products; development of export of agricultural and food products; scientific and 
innovative development; integrated information support of the agro-industrial policy.  
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Through the forecasting system, the Commission together with the member-states can evaluate 
the mutual market and the specific demand of every participant, establishing security mechanisms 
and adequate solutions during the importing of food stuffs and agricultural products.  
However, the most significant area of the Agreed Agro-industrial Policy is the creation of rules for 
granting the state support, fixed in the “Agreement on the Unified Rules of State Support of 
Agriculture” developed on 9 December 2010 within the system of the Customs Union, and 
approved by decision No. 94 of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council on 21 November 2014. 
This “Agreed Agro-industrial Policy” has exactly the aim to adopt certain limits for state support of 
agriculture that may distort the competition within the Union.  
Precisely, the objective of the member-countries is to ensure free movements of goods and 
freedom in the conduction of economic activities, allowing a correct and fair functioning of the 
market of the Union, without any kind of distortions. For that, the agreed agro-industrial policy 
has the scope to limit and reduce the amount of support, banning the use of export and import 
subsidies that could undermine the competition in the market of the Union. In accordance with 
the regulations of the Treaty, a calculation methodology for the permitted level of the state 
support for agriculture having a distorting effect on mutual trade in agricultural goods between 
the members was developed on 18 October 2016 by the Council of the Eurasian Economic 
Commission with the decision Nr. 163408. The methodology defines the format and approaches to 
establish obligations for member-states in the field of state support for agriculture on the 
measures affecting mutual trade, defining from a side the assessment of the performance of these 
obligations, and specifying from the other side the procedure for calculating individual support 
indicators. The adoption of the methodology ensures that the Union has a unified calculation 
method of the volume and level state support measures for agriculture409. 
Examining this document specifically, in the comma 5 is expressed that the calculation of the 
distorting measures are calculated in relation with the paragraph 10 of the methodology taking 
into consideration the relationship between the national value and the US dollar410.  
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Before to retrace the comma 10, in the paragraph 8 is indicated as the allowable threshold level of 
the Union is calculated as the ratio of the volume of support measures distorting trade associated 
with a specific agricultural commodity, which amount to the total cost of good-production, which 
in turn is calculated on the cost of the process of production to the value of the corresponding 
type of agricultural item. In the comma 9 is defined that an allowable threshold level should be 
decided through negotiations of the member-countries, but it cannot be less than 5%.  
The comma 10 reports that when it is calculated the threshold of price support, it is used as 
reference the world price and fixed value (before the approval of the obligations of the member 
state for the allowed level of support it is equal to the value for the reporting period). A fixed 
reference world price is the average price on the terms of delivery of the FOB (Free on Board) of 
an agricultural commodity in the base period if the state-member is the net exporter of that 
commodity; or the average price on the terms of the CIF (Cost, Insurance and Freight) delivery of 
the agricultural product in the base period if the member-state is a net importer of that good; or 
taking into account other conditions of delivery in accordance with the data of customs statistics 
of the member-states. Successively, the comma 11 affirms that if the quantity of agricultural goods 
in respect of which price support is applied is not established in the legal act of the member-state, 
on the basis of which such support is provided, then the price support is calculated in relation to 
the total output of this agricultural commodity. Finally, in the paragraph 12 of the methodology is 
observed that the absolute value of the permitted level of support measures distorting trade is 
fixed in national currency or in US dollars411. 
Synthesizing, the member-countries can use without restrictions only state support measures that 
do not produce distorting effects on the agricultural trade of the other member-states. This 
methodology, in accordance with the criteria adopted by the WTO, provides that the authorized 
level of state support for agricultural is calculated as a percentage of the amount of state support 
for agriculture to the gross value of agricultural commodities produced in the whole and must not 
exceed 10 per cent412. 
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Figure 10: Obligations regarding the permitted levels of the state support which distorts the trade 
Countries Permitted level 
Belarus 10% 
Armenia 
 
in accordance with the 
terms of WTO membership: 5% 
Kazakhstan in accordance with the 
terms of WTO membership: 8.5% 
Kyrgyzstan in accordance with the 
terms of WTO membership: 5% 
Russia in accordance with the 
terms of WTO membership should reduce the 
maximum size from $9 
bn. to $4,4 bn. in 2018 
Source: Kireyeva Elena (2016): "Tax Regulation in Agriculture: Current Trends, Selection of a State Support Forms". In 
Journal of Tax Reform, 2016, vol. 2, no. 3, pp. 179–192. P. 189 
According to the article 106 of the Treaty of the EEU, in respect of the first indent of paragraph 8 
of the annex 29 on the Treaty, Belarus (not yet WTO member), in order to equalize its position to 
the other members of the Union, had to reduce firstly for the year 2015 its amount of state 
support in correlation to the gross value of agricultural output for agriculture by 12% and 
successively for the next year by 10%.  
Through the adoption of the methodology of 2016, we can assess that the EEU is making first 
sensible steps in direction to harmonize the legislation of the member-states. In fact, the 
document ensures that the Union has a unified common calculation method of the volume and 
level state support measures for agriculture, banning the most distorting effects on mutual trade 
in agricultural goods and limiting the distorting effects. The forms of notification are the same as 
those used in the framework of the WTO (stressing even the compatibility of the EEU with the 
international standards) and ensure the comparability of the data provided by member-states on 
state support for the sector413. This methodology recalls the previsions of the year 2013 of the 
level for state support for agriculture established in the Customs Union. Specifically, remanding to 
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the provisions of 2013, the level of the state support of agriculture in Belarus is 7.4% (2.0 USD 
billion), and in Kazakhstan to 2.8% (677 USD million), while the aggregated measurement of 
support in Russia accounts to 3.0% (6.9 USD billion)414. The goal of the EEU is the assessment of 
the level of state support taking into account the different conditions of economic production and 
development of the member-countries, in order to ensure competitiveness within the Union 
without penalizing the economically minor countries of the Union. In this schema, the authorities 
of the Commission have the primary role to supervise and render assistance in ensuring equal 
competitive conditions within the framework of the main directions for the agreed coordinated 
agricultural policy. Explicitly, the expressed volition to maintain stability in the mechanisms of the 
EEU finds a juridical confirmation in the sixth comma of the article 94, which defines that in case of 
dispute, this should be primarily settled through negotiations and consultations between the 
involved countries conducted with the participation of the Commission. If the resolution cannot 
occur by consultations, the claimant state is entitled to apply to the Court of the Union, which will 
decide the entity of the compensation.  
Hence, the regulation of the agricultural sector within the EEU presupposes harmonization and 
coordination about the application of state regulation measures of the market in order to 
maintain principally: a) equal competitive conditions; b) balanced development of agricultural 
production and agricultural markets; c) fair competition between the member-states, including 
equal access to the common agricultural market; d) protection of agricultural producers of the 
Union; and e) promotion of the development of exports of agricultural products415. Although 
nowadays we cannot talk about a complete competition between the member-states or about a 
balanced level of production within the Union, the EEU through the fixing of standards, as the 
state supports, is moving in the right direction.  
Summarizing, according with the XXV section of Treaty of the EEU, the development of a 
coordinated agricultural policy has the principal target to increment the internal production of the 
members countries with the containing of the costs of production and elimination of market 
distortions; and in consequence of that, the growth, through the setting of domestic tariffs, of the 
export quotas of agrarian and food products in mutual trade and with third states. Nowadays 
these conditions (although the realization of the methodology for common calculation) rest still 
difficult to realize, especially for the economic diversities of the member-countries and their 
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system of productions. However, the realization and putting into practice of these conditions in 
next years will show the real possibility of the Union to evolve its system in the direction of 
equalization of the level of production of its members. 
After this explanation can be noted as the principal purposes of the agreed agro-industrial policy 
of the Eurasian Economic Union are: 1) the mutual working; 2) the expenditure of the agrarian 
economy of the Union; and 3) the improvement of exports and its general reinforcing within the 
EEU. A confirmation of this statement is possible to evince, as reported in the study of Kirchner 
and Tochitskaya, from the words of President Lukashenka: “The Eurasian Economic Union should 
work for the welfare of its citizens. Conceptual solutions for its efficient functioning have been 
adopted. Today, it is exceptionally important that each of the Parties maintains a reasonable 
balance between their national priorities and international obligations. It is undoubtedly important 
to strengthen existing partnerships in the Eurasian space and further cooperation at all levels of 
business cooperation, working together towards a specific aim. Cooperation between our countries 
in the agricultural sector is crucial, since food security is dependent on its implementation. 
Promising areas of cooperation in the Agro-industrial Complex are livestock, seed production, and 
fisheries”; and from President Putin: “The countries of the Eurasian Economic Union have extensive 
experience of cooperation in the Agro-industrial Complex. Together we are launching new joint 
projects, including the assembly of tractors and other agricultural machinery. We are paying 
particular attention to the production of fertilizers and food. We foresee large reserves in 
expanding mutual supplies of food. It is hardly logical to import vegetables, fruit, milk, and meat 
products from distant countries, placing orders with foreign suppliers when our own producers are 
ready and willing to work and enter a common Eurasian market with products that are not inferior 
and, in fact, often superior in quality416”. 
To achieve the objectives expressed by Lukashenka and Putin, as well the predisposition of the 
articles 94 and 95 of the Treaty, the agricultural market of the Union and thus the internal agrarian 
sector of the member-states must be improved through the development of new technological 
instruments applied to the agricultural sphere that could improve the production of the 
participants of the Union, favoring a better competition in the Eurasian market. 
The purposes of modernization, expansion and coordination of the agricultural market as 
delineated in the section XXV of the Treaty and its annex 29 demonstrate the importance of the 
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agreed agro-industrial policy as a key pillar of the Eurasian Economic Union. The significance of 
this sector for the economic structure of the Union is easier to understand through the data of the 
Eurasian Commission, as reported by the Minister for Industry and Agro-industrial Complex of the 
EEC Sergey Sidorskiy: “by the production of wheat, milk and dairy products, the EAEU countries are 
the 4th largest in the world, by the production of potatoes – 3rd largest in the world; by the 
production of oats, barley and rye – 2nd largest in the world, by the production of sugar beet and 
sunflowers – 1st largest in the world417”. 
Regarding the aim of the export system development for the agricultural and food products, this 
objective is central for the evolution of the trade of the EEU, which is still dominated by a strong 
import quota from third countries for agrarian items.  
Figure 11: Foreign trade of agricultural raw materials and food of the member states in percentage 
2011-2014 
 
Source: (Edit.) Sidorskiy Sergey (2015): “Agroindustrial Policy of the Eurasian Economic Union”. In the Library of the 
Eurasian Economic Union. P. 23  http://www.eurasiancommission.org/ru/Documents/APK_ing_n.pdf (last view: 
11.04.2017) 
As is visible in the graphic, in the period 2011-14 the imports accounted for mostly the double of 
the exports, reaching in the period before the creation of the EEU a negative balance, which 
diminished sensibly just in 2014 (-22.7%).  
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In 2014 the countries of the Union exported agricultural and food products for 19.3 USD billion. 
However, only three groups of products (cereals – 42%, fish – 14.8%, and fats and oils of animal or 
vegetable origin – 11.6%), constitute the fundamental part of exports (2/3 of the total), where the 
main consumers of EEU products are the CIS countries (20.3%), the European Union (14.8%), 
Turkey (12.6%), Egypt (7.2%), and China (6.3%)418. In the year 2016, agricultural exports from the 
Eurasian states to third countries increased by 4.0% (USD 16,941 million); while imports of 
agricultural products from third countries into the EEU declined by 8.6% (USD 26,491.6 million in 
2016). Some progresses for the developing of the agricultural sector of the Union are nowadays 
even visible – although in lower way in comparison to the extra-trade, in the mutual trade of the 
EEU. Indeed, the share of agricultural products and food trade in the total mutual trade was 16.1% 
in 2016 (USD 6,847.2 billion)419 in comparison to 15.5% of the previous year. 
In its complex, the system of the Union, although slowly, is trying to reach the purposes to 
improve the mutual trade within the Union and to diminish the amount of the import (4%) in favor 
of an increasing of the exports (8.6%) of the agrarian items related to the trade with third 
countries. 
Lastly, must be even stressed that the EEU wants to guarantee a sustainable development and 
improvement of the competitiveness of its products abroad as symbol of quality through a 
modernization and introduction of innovative technologies for agricultural and food productions. 
An equal discourse can be applied in relation to the purpose about the realization of an integrated 
information support for the agricultural sphere, which should improve the efficiency and quality of 
management decisions, ensuring transparency and openness of information management for all 
interested parts. 
28 The labor migration within the Union 
The article 96 of the Treaty of the EEU provides the cooperation between the members of the 
Union in the sphere of labor migration. Precisely, the participants of the Union should create an 
agreed policy which can allow a right and equilibrate involvement of the citizens of the Union for 
their employment in the different work sectors of the member-states. 
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The cooperation between the states of the Union must be conducted through the interaction 
between the authorized authorities of every member-state. 
Here, as delineated in the paragraph 3 of the article 96, the cooperation should have principally 
the forms of: “1) agreement of common principles and approaches in the sphere of labor 
migration; 2) exchange of regulatory legal acts; 3) exchange of information; 4) implementation of 
measures aimed at preventing the spread of false information; 5) exchange of experiences, 
internships, seminars and training courses; and 6) cooperation in the framework of advisory 
authorities420”. 
Continuing in the examination of the previsions about the labor migration, the article 97 provides 
explicitly the possibility for the enterprisers and customers of works to employ workers from the 
territory of the Union without any restriction. This point stresses the freedom of work without 
limitation for the citizens of the EEU within the territory of the Union. Considering the article 97, 
its construct is a clear regulation of the migration work force of countries as Kyrgyzstan and 
Armenia for their workers especially in the Russian Federation. 
To reinforce this statement, in the second comma is précised that the member-states should not 
apply any restriction for the protection of their national labor market, if not clearly specified in the 
Treaty or only in the case if it is necessary to protect their national security. 
Furthermore, the third comma underlines as, in order to allow every employer of the Union to 
conduct economic activities in the territory of the EEU, the organization of education must be 
equalized between the participants of the Union through a common recognition of the education 
certificates, avoiding every kind of discrimination. To guarantee transparence in the entire 
process, the employers are entitled to ask translated documents of the certificates to every 
aspirant, in order to verify the verity of the title of education.  
The fifth comma of the article 97 disciplines the period of temporary stay of a worker of a 
member-state in another country of the Union, namely for the entire duration of the contract of 
work with the need of registration of the laborer in the country of occupation if the permanence 
will extend thirty calendar days. Concerning the extension of the thirty days of stay, every citizen 
of the Union, in the moment that enters in the territory of another state of the EEU, must use his 
migration card and exhibit a valid document for the board control. By this system of registration 
and showing of valid documents, the Legislator wants to avoid a massive and unregulated 
migration process of citizens moving in another member of the Union without a real place of work. 
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However, the ninth comma provides that in the case of a contract which should early terminate 
before ninety day, the worker has the right to rest in the territory of residence and find a new 
employment contract or a civil law contract within fifteen days. 
The article 98 enounces the rights and obligations of the worker, who is entitled to engage 
professional activities according to his qualification and specialization. The tutelage of the Treaty 
for the workers and his family establishes their rights of: possess, use and dispose of their 
property; protection of property; and free transfer of funds. 
The workers and their families in a state of the Union must be inserted in the social system of the 
state where they are employed for the obtaining of a social security on the same conditions of the 
national workers of that country of the Union. The pension benefits of workers and their family 
members should be governed by the legislation of the state of permanent residence. 
The fourth comma of the article 98, in accordance with the annex 30 “Protocol on Provision of 
Medical Treatment of Workers of the Member States and their Family Members”, deals with right 
of workers of the member-states and their family members to receive emergency medical care 
and other types of medical treatment. Precisely the paragraphs 3 and 4 of the annex 30 underline 
as: 1) the state of employment should provide medical treatment to workers of another member-
state and members of their families in accordance with the procedure and under the conditions 
that are determined by the legislation of the state of employment and by international treaties. 2) 
The member-states should grant to workers of and their family members the right to receive free 
emergency medical care and rescue emergency care in their territories in accordance with the 
same procedure and under the same conditions as to the nationals of the state of employment421. 
Returning to the examination of the article 98, the sixth comma indicates the right for the worker 
to require to the authorized authority of the state of employing all the information and conditions 
regarding his employment. In the same matter, the seventh comma indicates as the employer, due 
to a request of a worker of a member-state, should provide: certificate and documents that 
indicate the profession, the period of employment and wages within the terms determined by the 
legislation of the state of employment. 
In order to favorite the integration of the foreigner workers of a member-state in the territory of 
another member and in same time the respect of the culture of the country, the eighth and ninth 
paragraphs underline as the children of the workers are entitled to attend school in the country of 
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the father’s employment and that the family members are required to comply with the legislation 
of the state of employment, the culture and traditions of the people of the state of employment. 
Finally, the tenth comma provides that the salary of the worker is taxable in accordance with 
international treaties and legislation of the state of employment subject to the provisions of the 
Treaty of the EEU. 
29 Transitional Provisions of the EEU 
The part four of the Treaty is divided in the sections XXVII and XXVIII – transitional and final 
provisions. 
The article 99 indicates the general transitional provisions: 1) the international treaties signed by 
the member-states before January 2015 in the legal framework of the Customs Union and the 
Single Economic Space constitute part of the law of the Union. 2) Decisions of the Supreme 
Eurasian Economic Council, the Supreme Eurasian Economic and the Eurasian Economic 
Commission executed before the entry into force of the Treaty that may remain in force if are not 
inconsistent with the previsions of the Treaty.  
This passage testifies the volition of the Legislator to maintain effective the previsions and 
decisions that the authorities of the member-states before the entry in force of the Treaty of the 
EEU have stipulated, in order to give continuation to the Eurasian process started already with the 
CU and CES. 
In consideration of the previsions entered in force after the 1th January 2015, the third comma of 
article 99 provides that all functions and powers of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council and 
the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council effective in accordance with the Treaty on the Eurasian 
Economic Commission of November 18, 2011 should be carried out by the Supreme Council and 
the Intergovernmental Council. 
Moreover is précised that: the Eurasian Economic Commission established in accordance with the 
Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Commission of November 18, 2011, should operate in 
accordance with the Treaty; members of the Board of the Commission, directors and Deputy 
directors, appointed prior to the entry into force of this Treaty, should continue their work until 
the expiration of their official term of office422. 
Successively the fourth comma establishes that the respective international treaties listed in 
Annex 31 “Protocol on the Functioning of the Eurasian Economic Union within the Multilateral 
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Trading System” should apply within the Union: all corresponding relations should be governed by 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the Customs Union within the Multilateral Trading System of May 
19, 2011423. 
The article 100, which completes the discipline of the section VII of the Treaty, has been already 
analyzed during the examination of the corresponding parts of the document. 
The article 101, connected with the section VIII of the Treaty (customs regulations), establishes 
that, prior to the entry into force of the Customs Code of the Eurasian Economic Union, the 
customs regulations within the Union should be in accordance with the Treaty on the Customs 
Code of the Customs Union of November 27, 2009, and other international treaties of the 
member-states concluded in the establishment of the legal framework of the CU and the Common 
Economic Space governing the customs relations and forming part of the Union law in accordance 
with Article 99 of the Treaty424. Referred to this paragraph and its application, the third comma of 
the article 101 lists the restrictions that may be applied in the CU: non-tariff regulatory measures, 
technical regulation measures, export control measures and measures for military products, as 
well as sanitary, veterinary-sanitary and phytosanitary quarantine measures and radiation 
requirements applied in respect of goods transported through the customs border of the Union. 
The exclusion of such measures is provided in in the movement of goods across the customs 
border of the Union, including goods for personal use, and/or in customs clearance of goods. 
Summarizing, the successive paragraphs of the article 101 completes the discipline of the Customs 
Code of the CU (as e.g. the safeguard, anti-dumping, and countervailing duties), analyzing its 
admissibility and correlation in connection with some parts of the Code.  
The following transitional provisions were already analyzed in connection with their corresponding 
section and articles of the Treaty: article 102 with the articles 35, 36 and 37; article 103 with the 
disposition of the article 70; article 104 in connection with the section XX (energy industry); article 
105 with the section XXIV (manufacturing industry) and article 106 with the section XXV 
(agricultural sector). 
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30 Final Provisions of the Treaty 
The section XVVIII concludes the legal framework of the Astana Treaty with the final provisions. 
The article 107 refers to the social guarantees, privileges and immunities of the authorities of the 
member-states, indicating that on the territory of the Union all members of the Council of the 
Commission and Board, judges of the Court of the Union, officials and employees of the 
Commission and the Court of the Union should have all social guarantees, privileges and 
immunities required for the implementation of their powers and service duties425. 
This discipline is completed with the annex 32 of the Treaty “Regulation on Social Guarantees, 
Privileges and Immunities within the Eurasian Economic Union”. 
In the second comma of the first section of the Protocol is stressed the principle of transparence 
within the Union, underlining as the members of the Board of the Commission, judges of the Court 
of the Union, officials and employees in the exercise of their official service duties, should not seek 
or receive instructions from state government authorities or officials of the member-states, as well 
as from authorities of any state that are not members of the Union. They should refrain from any 
action incompatible with their status of international public servants426. 
Generally, in the Protocol are reported the immunities of the authorities of the Union during the 
exercising of their powers in the entire territory of the Union, as the exemption from taxes, duties, 
fees and other charges collected in the host state. 
The privileges and immunities of the authorities of the EEU cease at the time of the departure 
from the host state and with the end of their service. 
The article 108 disciplines the accession to the Union, stressing the opened nature of the Union to 
all the countries that share its objectives and principles on the terms agreed upon by the member-
states. 
When a state decides to candidate for the accession to the EEU, must send a corresponding appeal 
to the Chairman of the Supreme Council. The decision about the possibility of candidature of a 
state is then decided by the Supreme Council by consensus. After that, based on the decision of 
the Supreme Council, must be formed a working group consisting of representatives of the 
candidate state, the member-states and Bodies of the Union (working group) for examining the 
degree of preparation of the candidate to assume the obligations resulting from the law of the 
Union. In the procedure they will draft an action program for accession of the candidate state to 
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the Eurasian Economic Union. Further, must be drafted an international agreement on the 
accession of the state to the Union, which should determine the extent of the rights and 
obligations of the candidate state, as well as the format of its participation in the work of the 
bodies of the Union. The action program for the accession of a candidate state must be approved 
by the Supreme Council. The working group should regularly submit to the Supreme Council a 
report on the implementation of the action program by the candidate. When the working group 
concludes that the candidate has fulfilled the obligations, the Supreme Council must adopt a 
decision on the signing an international agreement of accession to the Union. After the 
ratification, the candidate state will become a member of the Union effectively.  
Thus, the Eurasian Economic Union is an organization opened to the admission of new members. 
This point reflects the aim of the integration and expansion of the Union, which would like to 
embrace the entire Eurasian scenario. A successive proof of this target is possible to evince by the 
analysis of the article 109, which provides the possibility for every state to demand the status of 
observer country of the Union, through a request to the Chairman of the Supreme Council. The 
final decision about the grant or refuse of the observer status is taken by the Supreme Council, 
which must take in account in its decision the interests of integration, development and targets of 
the Union in its complex. 
In order to favorite the integration and the evaluation of the admissibility of an observer state, its 
authorized authorities, as expressed in the third comma of the article 109, may take part at the 
meetings of the bodies of the Union and obtain, through invitation, documents of the EEU 
(excluded documents that contain any confidential information). 
However the observer status, as stressed in the Treaty, from a side does not allow the observer 
state to take any action in the decisional process of the Union; and from the other side obligate 
the state to not commit any action which could be against the interests of the Union and of its 
participants. 
Continuing in the report of the final provisions, the article 110 marks the official working language 
of the Union, namely the Russian language. All the international treaties stipulated between the 
member-states within the Union and the decisions of the Commission, as expressed in the second 
paragraph of the article 110, must be adopted in Russian, which a following translation into the 
national language of every member-state, if it is provided by the Commission.  
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In connection with the second paragraph, the third comma explains as: in case of conflicts 
between versions of international treaties and decisions referred to the second paragraph of the 
article 110 with regard to their interpretation, the Russian version must prevail427. 
The article 111 disciplines the access and publication of international treaties within the Union and 
the decisions of the Commission that must be officially posted on the official website of the Union 
in the procedure determined by the Intergovernmental Council. The entering in force of a 
decisions and a document within the Union starts from the moment of its publication. 
In the third comma of the article 111 is underlined that every decision of the bodies of the Union 
must be forwarded to the member-states within 3 calendar days from the decision. Besides, the 
bodies of the EEU must ensure preliminary publication of draft decisions on the official website of 
the Union (on internet at least) thirty calendar days prior to the planned adoption date. This 
procedure allows that before the official publication al interested people may submit to the bodies 
of the Union their comments and suggestions. 
In the sixth and seventh commas are explained the exceptions to the rules of publication: the 
decisions of the Court of the Union, that their entry into force and publication are governed by the 
Statute of the Court of the Eurasian Economic Union (Annex 2 to the Treaty); and for all those 
decisions where preliminary publication of drafts decisions may prevent their execution or is 
otherwise contrary to the public interest428. 
In case of dispute about the interpretation and/or application of the predispositions of the Treaty, 
the article 112 refers as these must be resolved through consultations and negotiations. If within 
three months after the official request to settle a dispute any results have been reached between 
the parts, the issue may be referred to the Court of the Union for a final decision. 
The article 113 set the entry in force of the Treaty of the EEU. Upon to the 1th January 2015, 
official data of the start of the Eurasian Economic Union, this article provided all international 
treaties concluded within the establishment of the Customs Union and the Common Economic 
Space had to be terminated, according to Annex 33 to this Treaty “Protocol on the Termination of 
the International Treaties Concluded within the Formation of the Customs Union and the Common 
Economic Space in Connection with the Entry into Force of the Treaty on the Eurasian Economic 
Union”. 
                                                          
427
 Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union. P. 132 
428
 Ibid. P. 134  
248 
 
The objective of the Legislator by the termination of all previous international treaties concluded 
within the establishment of the Customs Union and the Common Economic Space had the priority 
to begin through the EEU a successive step of integration. This aim can be reached through the 
settlement of a new progressive system of interaction and decision in order to allow the 
participants of the Union to cooperate through same rules, developing their economies gradually 
and arriving in an equal level of development. 
But, the EEU Treaty, as expressed in the article 114, does not exclude the possibilities for its 
participants to conclude international treaties that are not inconsistent with the objectives and 
principles of the Union, letting them even a grade of autonomy for their accords with third 
countries. 
Though, concerning the bilateral international accords and treaties stipulated by the members of 
the Union that may provide for the interested part any additional benefits, these may be 
concluded only if do not affect the rights and obligations of the other participants of the Union. 
This mechanism wants to prevent any actions of a member state that can preclude the interests of 
the counterparts within the Union, asserting the principle of equality of the EEU. 
Concluding the analysis about the Treaty, the article 115 provides the possibility to amend and 
supplement the Treaty through Protocols which must be considered integral part of the Treaty; 
the article 116, as underlined at the beginning of this analysis, affirms the necessity to register the 
Treaty with the Secretariat of the United Nations in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of 
the United Nations; and the article 117 explains as any reservation to the Treaty must be allowed. 
Finally, the article 118 provides the possibility for the member-states to withdraw from the Treaty. 
In case of withdrawal, the member of the Union must send a written notice of its intention to the 
depositary of the Treaty. The effect of the Treaty in respect of that state will cease after 12 
months from the date of receipt of the notice by the depositary. In the second comma of the 
article 118 is however provided for the state which expressed its volition to withdraw from the 
Treaty, the obligation to settle all financial obligations incurred in connection with its participation 
in the Treaty. These obligations will remain in force even after the withdrawal until their full 
implementation429. 
The withdrawal from the Treaty by a member state means the termination of membership in the 
Union and from all international treaties within the Union automatically.  
                                                          
429
 Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union. P. 136 
249 
 
31 Observations about barriers and obstacles of the Union 
After the report of all the previsions of the Astana Treaty and understood the scope of economic 
integration that the participants want to achieve through their cooperation, it is now essential to 
discover which mechanisms are working and which not in the actual scenario of the EEU.  
One the most important issue of the EEU is the gradual unification and removal of non-tariff 
barriers in mutual trade in goods and services, aimed to increase efficiency of the common 
market. Nowadays are still present barriers in the mutual trade that have not yet allowed a serious 
development of the mutual trade – in the first two years, the mutual trade of the Union registered 
low values especially in comparison with the extra-trade: for 2016 the mutual trade had a turnover 
of 14.2% against 85.8% of the trade with foreign countries430.    
Thus, the development of the EEU is firstly connected with the regulations of customs control, the 
abolishment of trade barriers in mutual trade and the application of technical regulation for the 
production of the member-states that could incentive the competitiveness within the territory of 
the Union. The purpose of this paragraph wants to give an overview about the progresses of the 
EEU in the regulation sector.  
Chronologically, from July 1, 2011, the customs control at the internal borders between Belarus, 
Kazakhstan and Russia has been fully removed and the introduction of single customs territory 
was completed. The paid duties were distributed into the state budgets of the triad in compliance 
with following agreed breakdown: Belarus — 4.7%; Kazakhstan — 7.33%; Russia — 87.97% (same 
values confirmed and reported in the Annex 5, section 2, paragraph 12 of the EEU Treaty in the 
distribution of the amounts regarding the import custom duties). On July 16, 2012 the Council of 
the Eurasian Economic Commission approved a new edition of the Commodity Nomenclature of 
the External Economic Activity and the Common Customs Tariff of the Customs Union with regard 
to terms of Russia’s joining the WTO, in order to simplify better the movement of goods within the 
territory of the Union431.  
Successively, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia on May 29, 2014 signed the Treaty establishing the 
EEU, which, with the following accession of Kyrgyzstan and Armenia, revised the quota of the tariff 
income, forming an acceptable ratio for all the members: Russia — 85.32%; Kazakhstan — 7.11%; 
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Belarus 4.55%; Kyrgyzstan —1.9%; and Armenia —1.11%.432 The revision of the tariffs was thought 
in order to distribute the costs towards the member-countries unequivocally, allowing a unified 
economic improvement of the region. In this context, must be considered even the possible 
effects of Russian accession to WTO (2012), which, according to Shepotylo and Tarr, has the 
potential to significantly boost the positive impacts of the Union in the region. In fact, the Russian 
applied tariffs in average will reduce to 7.6% level by 2020433, falling thus by about 40 to 50%. 
The Treaty also stipulated that in the internal market the member-states can trade freely with 
each other without the application of tariffs, non-tariff barriers, other protective measures and 
internal customs controls (articles 25 and 28). Here, the Treaty on the basis of annex 7 provides for 
a harmonized system of non-tariff trade regulation. Limitations may be applied exclusively for 
preservation of life and health; protection of government morality, law and order; preservation of 
the environment, animals and plants; preservation of cultural values; compliance with 
international obligations; and ensuring national defense and security. In these cases is possible, as 
provided by Annex 7, the introduction of non-tariff measures on imports and exports as: bans and 
quantitative restrictions; exclusive rights; automatic licensing; and authorizations. This choice of 
the Legislator in the addition of limitations is connected to the fact that the system of the EEU has 
as principal target the improvement of the national economies of its participants, for that its 
mechanisms were found by the three founders in order to not prejudice the national trade. 
Though, the accession to the EEU means even for every member responsibilities towards the other 
participants. Indeed the application of limitations should not constitute object of unjustifiable 
discrimination or disguised restriction on trade, because the other principal aim of the EEU is the 
correct application of competitiveness within its territory.  
The member-states have established general principles of technical regulation, and identified its 
order, rules and procedures (Annex 9), and general principles governing sanitary, veterinary-
sanitary and phytosanitary quarantine measures (Annex 12)434.  
After the listing of these facts, regarding the intra-trade of the Union, we can considerate that 
complications arise into the elimination of domestic regulatory and other non-tariff barriers to 
mutual trade, due especially to the fact that the member-countries present a different internal 
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legislation system, which explains the difficulties to apply a common legal framework for all the 
members. The harmonization of technical regulations is however a decisive stage for the 
integration of the member-states – e.g. companies operating in the territory of the Union are still 
subject to national-level inspection and certification of their produce, a thing that decelerates the 
trade-process overall. 
Quoting Dragneva and Wolczuck, “It is widely recognized, that the non-tariff barriers – such as 
technical standards, sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS), competition and public 
procurement issues – hinder free trade and pose the biggest challenge for any integration project”. 
Removing such barriers requires consensus amongst the member states for the Commission to 
decide on the process stipulating which barriers and when should be tackled. Non-tariff barriers 
form a strong impediment to free trade in the EEU. The ad valorem equivalents of such barriers 
range from 10–30 per cent of some countries’ export value”435, for that their gradual regulation is a 
decisive step for the economic success of the Union. 
In a classification of the NTBs from the list of the Eurasian Economic Commission, it was found that 
the greatest number of NTBs in the Customs Union and Single Economic Space are for SPS 
measures, technical barriers, price control measures and measures affecting competition. 
According to the analysis of the Russian researcher Vikunorov, the non-tariff barriers of the EEU 
can be divided into two groups. The first group includes such NTBs as sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures, technical barriers to trade, quotas, bans, and quantitative control measures. The 
second group comprises price control measures and measures that affect competition (special 
importers, restrictions on marketing and public procurement, subsidies). The barriers of the 
second groups should be eliminated because hinder the movement of goods and can have the 
most negative impact on trade436. In addition, estimates by the Eurasian Development Bank reveal 
that NTBs account are 15% of the value of intra-union trade flows. The effect of deep integration 
in the EEU will be even greater if any spillovers effect reducing NTBs for EEU’s major trading 
partners are present437.   
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A survey realized by the EEC and the EDB438, involving enterprises from Belarus, Kazakhstan and 
Russia, found that NTBs account for 15% to 30% of total export value. In other words, each dollar’s 
worth of export goods traded between EEU countries still includes 15 to 30 cents of NTB-related 
costs as of 2014. In the medium term, Belarus could, according to the forecasts of Dr. Vinokurov, 
benefit mostly from the reduction of NTBs: its real GDP may increase by 2.8%, and its wealth could 
rise by 7.3% on a cumulative basis. In Kazakhstan, wealth would rise by 1.3%, while real GDP may 
increase by 0.7%. The effects on Russia may be less impressive: wealth would rise by 0.5% on a 
cumulative basis, while real GDP would rise by 0.2%. This is attributable both to the large size of 
the Russian economy and to the fact that Russia relies on trade within the EEU less than it does on 
trade with the rest of the world439. 
Regarding this survey, it is possible to list the various recommendations aimed at reducing 
technical barriers, derived from the respondents answers, that can be a beginning for the EEU in 
order to gain positive welfare effects: 1) development and implementation of new standards and 
technical regulations in the CU: 2) adoption of international standards; 3) mutual recognition of 
conformity assessment procedures for products not covered by technical regulations of the CU; 4) 
harmonization/convergence of rules and regulations for marking, packaging and labeling within 
the CU; 5) development of standardized requirements and rules for handling goods; 6) other ways 
to reduce barriers related to standards and technical regulations440. 
In this direction, during 2016, the Commission, with the member-states, started to make progress 
in the removal of NTBs in the mutual trade. Here was developed and implemented a methodology 
to eliminate obstacles in the mutual trade in order to increase the effectiveness to identify 
obstacles, monitoring the observance of the legal framework of the Union law from its 
participants441. On November 30, 2016 all exemptions and restrictions were processed by the EEC 
in a comprehensive manner in the list of obstacles entitled “the White Paper” which contains 60 
obstacles, of which 17 are exemptions, 34 are restrictions, and 9 barriers442. Precisely, according to 
the terminology of the EEC, barriers mean the obstacles in violation of the EEU legislation; 
restrictions mean the obstacles caused by lack of legal regulation of economic relations, the 
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development of which is envisaged by the Union’s legislation; and exemptions mean the 
exceptions (departures) provided by the EEU legislation for non-application by a member-state of 
common rules for functioning of the domestic market of the Union443. 
Figure 12: Number of obstacles applied by member-states 
Member states Barriers withdrawals Limitations Σ 
Armenia 2 6 33 41 
Belarus 3 7 33 43 
Kazakhstan 3 8 33 44 
Kyrgyzstan 0 7 33 40 
Russia 6 8 34 48 
Source: Yevraziyskaya Ekonomicheskaya Komissiya (2016): “Bar'yery, iz'yatiya i ogranicheniya Yevraziyskogo 
Ekonomicheskogo Soyuza”. Doklad. P. 12 
The barriers and obstacles detected and listed in the document include for example: 1) lack of 
harmonized approaches between the member-states in the application of national (state) 
standards and interstate standards. 2) Contradictions in the provisions of the transport and 
customs legislation of the Union regarding the prohibition on the use of temporarily imported 
vehicles of international transport for the carriage of goods, passengers and (or) luggage when 
performing internal transportation within the customs territory of the Union444. 3) Lack of 
procurement information in Russian language (EEU’s official language) on the website of the 
public procurement of the Ministry of Finance of Armenia. 4) In Armenia was detected that certain 
normative legal acts do not correspond to Article 88 of the Treaty (Armenia is now working on the 
placement of information on public procurement in the amount established by the Treaty). 5) The 
obstacle of Russia for the software suppliers from other member-states that have no access to the 
information about public procurement (the Russian government is already working on the 
development of softwares that allowsother companies from the member-states to participate in 
the procurement procedures). 6) The necessity to eliminate barriers caused by the collection of a 
rent tax imposed on coal exports from Kazakhstan to the other members. Here, the Commission 
has found that the said tax was an equivalent to export duties that should not be applied in the 
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domestic market of the EEU, informing Kazakhstan to respect the rights of the Union. 7) The lack 
of free access for the vessels flying flags of the EEU’s members to the inland waterways of the 
Russian Federation was also recognized as a restriction (this problem is expected to be solved by 
adoption of a Shipping Agreement). 8) The lack of unified norms and rules for plant quarantine in 
the Union was also recognized as a restriction because it results in a number of challenges in 
selling the goods, in particular in selling vegetables and fruits445. 
The removal of barriers is thus a priority of the EEU in order to harmonize the legal framework of 
the member-countries. For that, through the work of 2016, the EEC eliminated a number of the 
most significant obstacles as: 1) the restriction caused by lack of the unified methodology for 
calculation of the authorized scope of state support of the agriculture, which had a distorting 
effect on the trade, eliminated on April 19, 2017 in order to protect the prices of manufacturers. 
2) The barrier associated with the non-recognition by the Russian Federation of the equivalence 
system of inspections of the objects of veterinary control (supervision) of Armenia. 3) Barrier in 
public procurement related to the access of goods of member-states to public procurement in the 
Russian Federation for the needs of the state defense order. Aimed to remove this barrier, was 
adopted by the Commission the Decision No. 31 of April 12, 2016: "On Recognizing the Violation 
by the Russian Federation of the Obligations Under Section XXII of the Treaty on the Eurasian 
Economic Union of May 29, 2014”, identifying the necessity to remove this barrier concretely. 4) 
The barrier in the field of labor migration associated with the problems of recognition in 
Kazakhstan of documents on the education of citizens of the member-states446. 5) Kazakhstan was 
maintaining a phytosanitary control in the Kazakh-Kyrgyz part of the state border. By the Decision 
of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council No. 6 of May 8, 2015, "On the abolition of sanitary-
quarantine, veterinary-sanitary and quarantine phytosanitary control (supervision) in the Kyrgyz-
Kazakh sector State border ", the barrier was eliminated. 6) Kyrgyzstan was requested to fill out a 
coupon on the passage of goods at the internal border between member-states. The Commission 
determined that the measures applied by the Kyrgyz Republic were contrary to the provisions of 
Articles 25 and 28 of the Treaty. The decision of the Board of the Commission of September 27, 
2016 No. 106 "On the fulfillment by the Kyrgyz Republic of its obligations within the framework of 
the functioning of the internal market of the Eurasian Economic Union" was adopted and the 
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barrier eliminated. 7) The Russian Federation was not ensuring to the temporarily staying workers 
of other member-states in its territory to receive medical assistance on an equal basis with Russian 
citizens. A barrier eliminated due to its contrast with the dispositions of the Treaty about the same 
treatment of the EEU’s citizens within the territory of the Union447. The Commission has thus 
started a progress regulation and elimination of barriers. The successive step to unify the system 
of the Union passes through the development of "Road maps" for elimination of exemptions and 
restrictions on the internal market of the Union, as stipulated by the decree of the Council of the 
Commission of October 18, 2016 No. 29 "On the progress in identifying and eliminating barriers, 
exemptions and restrictions On the domestic market of the Eurasian Economic Union448”, where 
the task of the Commission, together with the member-countries, is to find obstacles that can 
hinder the EEU trade. In follow of that, other obstacles were identified and eliminated as: a) in 
Belarus was introduced, in addition to the requirements of technical regulations of the EEU, a 
sanitary and hygienic examination procedure that were not provided in the Treaty. It is mandatory 
for food products, children's products, perfume and cosmetics, oral hygiene products, 
construction raw materials and materials, home appliances, automotive components, etc. b) The 
identification of a lack of uniform rules of charging a security payment in sale of alcoholic. Security 
payment is applied in all the member-states, except Armenia. While in Russia, it is higher for 
foreign suppliers than for domestic ones, in Belarus and Kazakhstan, it is charged only from foreign 
sellers, in Kyrgyzstan – only from suppliers from the EEU countries. This restriction was creating 
discriminatory conditions for exporters, for that was eliminated449. 
Regarding the commerce with third states, the EEU’s countries have concluded a separate accord 
concerning export duty rates to third countries, containing special rules on export duties. 
Precisely, every member state establishes its own list of certain goods in respect of which export 
duties may apply, which is communicated to the EEC. On that basis, the Commission maintains a 
consolidated list of products subject to export duties for all the EEU’s countries. The member-
states retain the power to adopt and amend the export duty rates applied on export of goods, 
contained in the consolidated list and originating in their territories. Similar rules are reflected in 
the Customs Code of the Customs Union. Export duty rates are subject to periodic amendments by 
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decisions of the governments of the member-states – although there is not an official public 
database at the EEU level where up-to-date export duty rates can be consulted450. 
This system allows every member-country to pursue an own commerce with third countries 
without special barriers. The target of this mechanism is to maintain a freedom in the extra-trade 
of the member-countries, in order to not compromise their position in the world trade. 
In detail, concerning the extra-trade of the Union, the article 36 provide the granting of tariff 
preferences in respect of goods originating from developing countries and/or least developed 
through the use of a common system of tariff preferences of the Union. Thus, to promote 
economic growth and welfare in developing and least developed countries, the EEU applies a 
Unified System of Tariff Preferences (USTP)451 that grants tariff preferences for goods originated in 
developing countries and imported into the customs territory of the EEU. The articles 36 and 37 of 
the EEU Treaty specify tariff preferences granted to developing countries (75 per cent and zero per 
cent of the most-favored nation rate, for developing and least developed countries, respectively) 
and refers to preferential rules of origin applied to such imports452.  
The article 39, to promote the worldwide economic expansion of the Union, provides the 
abolishment of restrictive measures in the trade with third parties. Here, the existing most 
prominent trade restrictions are of sanitary and phytosanitary nature, including bans on import of 
poultry and meat from the United States owing to a bird flu epidemic or because of zero-tolerance 
policy on residues of antibiotics and steroids. Other goods subject to extensive safety controls and 
requirements in the EEU include pork and other meat products from the European Union due to 
the alleged African swine fever outbreaks, certain wine and spirits from Georgia, cheese, certain 
detergents and confectionery from Ukraine, and other items. Parallel to this, all members of the 
Union make extensive use of stringent import licensing regimes for alcohol and 
pharmaceuticals453.  
The spillover effects of the NTBs reduction could have positive effects in the extra-trade too, 
especially in direction of the EU (first economic partner of the EEU). Indeed, according to a study 
conducted by Alexander Knobel in 2016, was simulated a 50% decrease in technical NTBs inside 
the EEU and a 20% spillover effect of reduction NTBs toward either the EU and USA or China. 
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According to Tarr and Turdyeva, the reduction of NTBs in trade with the EU and the USA 
dominates the comparable reduction of NTBs with China for all countries of the EEU in terms of 
the welfare gain. Armenia’s welfare gain with a spillover effect towards the EU is 1.1% of real 
consumption compared to 1.02% with a spillover effect towards China. Growth in welfare in 
Belarus will be 2.7% with EU spillover versus 2.5% with a spillover effect towards China. 
Kazakhstan’s gain in real consumption is also greater in the first (EU+USA) case: 0.86% versus 
0.66% (with spillover towards China). Russia’s gain in real consumption in the case of a spillover 
effect with the EU is 2.01% versus 0.63% in the case of China454. 
Generally, despite the intensive work of the Commission in detecting and eliminating barriers, still 
problems persist. Indeed, according to Dragneva and Wolczuck: “The progress in eliminating 
existing barriers is undermined by the explosion of new obstacles to free trade within the EEU. 
Most visible have been the “trade wars” such as the “milk and meat wars” between Russia and 
Belarus or the “potato wars” between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, where exemptions to free trade 
on the basis of alleged violations of food safety standards have been invoked. The effect of these 
“trade wars” by the back door is not easy to quantify, not only do they signal a continuous lack of 
predictability in intra-union trade relations but also result in the unraveling of previous 
achievements. For example, Belarus retaliated against Russia’s bans of its products by the re-
introduction of internal customs border controls in December 2014. The standing disputes have 
been aggravated by the wider dynamics of relations between Russia and Belarus in relation to gas 
prices and border controls, resulting in the unilateral re-introduction of a stronger border 
protection regime on the Belarusian–Russian border by Russia in February 2017”455. 
Nowadays that the removal of barriers and the necessity to create an harmonized legislation for 
the further cooperation of the member-countries is a target and a priority of the EEU, as even 
underlined by the Belarusian foreigner minister Makei during 2017, that called for efforts focused 
on the eliminations of restrictions in the mutual trade between the members of the Union: “We 
believe that we should pay more attention to deepening the integration. We should focus on the 
restrictions that persist in our mutual trade hampering our effective participation in this 
organization and our effort to create a single economic space. [...] We believe that we should pay 
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more attention to removing the barriers and restrictions in our internal trade within the single 
economic space456.”  
In this direction we can affirm as the work of the Eurasian Commission, focused on the 
identification and elimination of the barriers, especially in the intra-trade, must still better 
performed (the White Report of 2016 is the first sensible step that is showing the real working of 
the EEU and its volition to equalize the commerce within the territory of the Union). Here, it is 
essential the cooperation of the authorities of the member-states through their report of 
obstacles and barriers to the Commission, in order to remove them and move forward for a 
deeper integration. 
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Conclusion 
After the examination of the legal framework of the Eurasian Economic Union, we can trace some 
conclusions about its targets and operating. 
The preamble of the Treaty delineates the principles of interaction and cooperation on the basis of 
the economic integration: equal sovereignty; solidarity between all the members with respect on 
the national culture; volition to strengthen the economic interaction as condition to successive 
develop the integration; and the awareness that a common pacific cooperation is the basis to 
obtain a consolidated integration for further economic improvement.  
In this direction the Astana Treaty, intended as sequential step of economic interaction after the 
stage of the Customs Union, brings nowadays the actual member-states to a further level of 
integration that economically presupposes the principal objective to favorite the free movement 
of goods, services, labor, and capital within the territory of the Union. 
Considering its institutional conception, the EEU operates through supranational and 
intergovernmental institutions, where the Commission, the single states and national 
governments are the principal actors of the integration process. This hybrid character assumes its 
composition modeled on the system of the European Union similarly, which is dominated by a 
permanent executive body – the Eurasian Economic Commission. The Commission, however, in 
the exercise of its functions must abide by the resolutions of the Eurasian Intergovernmental 
Council and, in turn, it must abide by the decisions of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council. The 
organogram is completed by the Court of the EEU, which resolves the possible disputes between 
the members. From an economic point of view, must be considered that the foundation of the 
EEU is based on the Customs Union and Single Economic Space, thus naturally predicated on the 
elimination of internal customs barriers, and the adoption of a common tariff level for trade with 
third countries. All that had to be achieved in some form of balance with the provisions of the 
World Trade Organization457. 
The economic integration presupposes a full economic cooperation of the member-states without 
the presence of any barrier that could hinder their trade (within the participants there is still a 
persistent lack of harmonized legislation as in the mutual comparative assessments where 
procedures are different or there is a diverse application of principles as e.g. interstate standards 
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for customs tariffs and non-tariff regulations). The Union must thus achieve the perfect 
coordination of its participants. For that the strongholds of the EEU Treaty are: the harmonization 
of economic policies in the sphere of industry, agriculture, energy, transport, taxation, finance, 
through the application of non-tariff measures in mutual trade. 
To reach these targets, is necessary a total participation and acceptation of mutual obligation by 
the member-countries. According to this point, the Legislator in the article 23 stresses the 
importance to create measures that can facilitate the communication and integration process, as 
the creation of informatics channels, electronic communication through the national authorities of 
the member-states, or the creation of a database of the Union that can make easier the system of 
sharing of the Union. The members of the EEU are working on the share of information sensibly, 
especially because a deeper cooperation can reinforce the sense of confidence within the system 
of the Union. In fact the annex 3 of the Treaty “Protocol on Information and Communication 
Technologies and Information Exchange within the Eurasian Economic Union” confirms the priority 
to create an integrated information system of the Union in specific areas as customs tariff and 
non-tariff regulations; customs regulations; or technical regulations.  
Hence, the Union wants to favorite the economic integration of its members eliminating all trade-
barriers in the mutual trade (customs duties, non-tariff regulatory measures, safeguard, anti-
dumping and countervailing measures), as explicated in the comma 3 of the article 28. Although in 
the two first years of working, the mutual trade, due on the economic recession of the members, 
firstly Russia, has not yet showed a real increment, the objective of the Union is its regulation by 
the elimination of non-tariffs barriers and the application of technical regulations. It has the 
meaning that the member-countries, characterized by economic diversities in their national 
system, could through their economic interaction improve their economic status. Therefore, the 
Legislator, conscious of the economic diversities within the EEU, prefixed the objective to equalize 
the economic production by exchange of technologies, qualified personals and creation of 
infrastructure of connection, trying to incentive the competition between the member-countries. 
Actually, we must considerate as the steps in this direction in the first two years moved very 
slowly. Indeed, if from a side the “White Report” of the year 2016 started to identify and remove 
barriers in the mutual trade, from the other side rests still difficult to believe that companies of 
Kyrgyzstan could be competitive with their Russian counterparts.  
However, the Astana Treaty indicates the principles of the technical regulation, as precised in the 
article 51: determination of mandatory requirements to products and product-related 
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requirements to design, manufacture, construction, installation, commissioning, operation, 
storage, transportation, sale and disposal; determination of common mandatory requirements in 
technical regulations of the Union or national mandatory requirements in the legislation of the 
member-states to the products; compliance of technical regulations within the Union with the 
level of economic development of the member-states and the level of scientific and technological 
development; uniformity of researches rules and methods and all measurements during 
mandatory conformity assessment procedures; harmonization of interstate standards with 
international and regional standards; uniformity of rules and procedures for mandatory 
conformity assessments; implementation of agreed policy for ensuring uniformity of 
measurements within the Union. These objectives, still to be achieved, could start favoring a real 
economic coordination as basis for an increment of the national production in the next years. 
To favorite the competition and produce on a same equal basis is however the main point that the 
Treaty underlines as fundamental step for the integration. For that the article 62 affirms as the 
member-states should implement an agreed macroeconomic policy to achieve the aim of a 
balanced economic development by the establishment of common operation principles and the 
assurance of their effective interaction. Furthermore, the same Treaty in the article 63 indicates 
the main economic spheres that determinate the sustainability of the Union development. Here is 
précised that the member-states should conduct their economic policy using the quantitative 
values provides by the EEU, namely: annual deficit of the consolidated budget of a state-controlled 
sector should not exceed 3% of the gross domestic product; debt of a state-controlled sector 
should not exceed 50% of the gross domestic product; inflation rate (consumer price index) per 
annum (December to December of the previous year, in percent) should exceed the inflation rate 
in the member-state with the lowest value by not more than 5%. In this direction, progresses of 
the Union were made for the maintaining of lower inflation rate. For example, in 2017 Belarus 
received by the Commission Board the recommendation “on proposals of the Eurasian Economic 
Commission on measures aimed at reducing the level of inflation (consumer price index) in the 
Republic of Belarus”, finalized to reduce the growth of consumer prices in the country, as the 
reduction of the cost of producing and selling consumer goods and development of competitive 
consumer market, due to the fact that Belarus exceeded the quantitative threshold of the inflation 
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rate (in 2017 the inflation in Belarus reached 107%, which higher by 2.2% points than the value 
specified in the Treaty458). 
The regulation of economic sectors is thus essential in the development of a macroeconomic 
politic of the member-states. Specifically, the article 70 indicates the principles that the member-
countries should follow in the regulation of their financial sectors, as e.g. the necessity to create a 
common financial market within the Union (which will be realized just in 2022–2025), or to enable 
mutual recognition of licenses in the banking and insurance sectors.  
Therefore, in order to achieve progress and in the EEU, the member-states should: a) seek to 
harmonize all spheres of natural monopolies listed in the annexes 1 and 2 of article 78 (as 
transportation of oil and petroleum products via main pipelines or distribution of electricity, which 
harmonization seems however not an easy aim to reach because its harmonization could collide 
with the oligarchs interests especially in Russia); b) establish a common energetic market of the 
EEU (article 79), which but will be completed just in 2025 (electric market – 2019; oil market – 
2024; and gas market – 2025); c) create a coordinated transport policy with to ensure and 
facilitate the economic integration based on the principle of competition, transparence, security, 
reliability, availability and sustainability (in 2016 was but detected a barrier consisting of the 
prohibition on the use of temporarily imported vehicles of international transport for the carriage 
of goods, passengers and luggage when performing internal transportation within the customs 
territory of the Union, hindering thus the movement of goods); d) develop and implement a 
national industry policy by the adoption of common industrial measures (article 92); promote an 
agreed agricultural policy within the EEU (article 94) in order to ensure the development of the 
rural areas of the Union (the approval of the methodology of 2016 regulating the value of the 
state support for agriculture having distorting effects, trying to improve the competitiveness 
within the Union is a first concrete step in this direction); and e) provide the cooperation between 
the members of the Union in the sphere of the labor migration (article 96), creating an agreed 
policy that allow all citizens of the Union to move and work without barriers in the territory of the 
member-states (a system until 2016 not perfectly integrated, because the discovery of a barrier 
for example in Kazakhstan about problems of recognition of documents on the education of 
citizens of other member-states). 
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But, the harmonization of the frameworks of the member-states for the creation of common 
markets through the removal of persistent barriers and the realization of the energetic markets 
rest still the two biggest priority of the Union. Despite the common market of medicines launched 
on May 2017, the Union is however still far from the realization of an integrated common 
economic policy, especially in its most important sector, the energetic.  
In the development of common markets, the integration passes naturally through the application 
of same tariffs, abolishment of custom duties, and implementation of coordinated programs that 
respect the different economic levels of the participants of the Union and ensure a fair 
concurrence in the territory of the Union. The achievement of these targets can realize a 
determinant aim of the Union, namely the improvement of the internal trades of the Eurasian 
states in the worldwide economy. 
Considering the expansion of the EEU in the global scenario, the article 33 indicates as the foreign 
trade policy of the Union wants to promote sustainable economic development for the member-
states, economic diversification, innovative development, improvement of structures, acceleration 
of integration process, favoring principally the efficiency and competitiveness of the organization 
in the global economy. For that, as indicated in the article 36, the Union may grant tariff 
preferences in respect of goods originating from developing countries using the common system 
of tariff preferences of the Union and/or least developed countries using the common system of 
tariff preferences of the Union. 
Taking into account these considerations, from a side can be confirmed as the EEU represents the 
highest and institutionally most comprehensive stage of economic integration within the 
geography of the former Soviet Union; but from the other side this new level of integration, due 
especially on diverse national legal frameworks and different aims of its member-states (more 
political for Russia), has not yet known sensible steps.  
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Introduction  
The principal scope of the Eurasian Economic Union is the promotion of the regional economic 
integration between its members: Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia. The 
creation of a mechanism of economic regional coordination is seen nowadays as a necessity to 
respond to the slowdown of the global economy of last ten years. For this reason, the EEU has the 
aim to develop the national economies of its members, integrating them in a great economic 
entity that can in the best way afford the economic modern challenges, as the economic and 
global financial crisis started in 2008, trying to become one of the greatest commercial blocs of the 
world as the EU, NAFTA and ASEAN459. Effectively, the EEU has the right economic potential to be 
competitive in the worldwide economy, if we considerate the fact that, in 2015, the aggregated 
economic potential of the EEU’s members was first ranked in the world for the extraction of crude 
oil (14.2%), second for natural gas (16.6%); fourth for electricity output (5%); and sixth for coal 
production (6%)460. 
In order to avoid delimitation and tension effects between the regional integration of the 
member-countries, and for the purpose to promote the involvement of the EEU in the global 
trade, the Treaty that instituted the Union was prepared according to the rules of the World Trade 
Organization on the previous acquainted agreement of the Customs Union and Single Economic 
Space. Thus, the EEU proposes itself as a continuation of the previous forms of cooperation in the 
post-Soviet space.  
Taking into account the mutual sphere of the member-countries, in comparison to the CU and SES, 
with the EEU for the first time for example the parties agreed to pursue an agreed policy in the 
sphere of consumer protection on the territory of the Union. This policy is aimed at creating equal 
conditions for the member-states’ citizens, protecting their interests from unfair activities of 
business entities operating within the Union. It has been determined that the citizens of the 
member-states of the Union should enjoy the same legal protection in the field of consumer 
protection on the territory of other member-states as the citizens of every member-country461. 
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Observing the EEU in its specific economic significance, the member-countries want: 1) to 
guarantee free movement of goods, services, capital and labor within the territory of the Union; 2) 
to pursue a coordinated energy policy and common energy markets (electric energy, gas, oil and 
oil products); 3) to implement a coordinated agricultural policy; and 4) to create an agreed policy 
about the modernization and liberalization of transport carriages of the Union.  
The first already working market within the Union is the pharmaceutical common market of 
medicines, active since January 2016; while, referring to the energetic sphere of the Union, the 
single market of electric power will be completed in 2019, and the single market of mineral 
resources will be started in the year 2025.  
Regarding the transport sector, the Astana Treaty defines the main priorities of transport policy 
within the territory of the Eurasian Economic Union in the long term. Here, the member-states will 
conduct coordinated (agreed) transport policy aimed at ensuring economic integration, using a 
common transport space.  
In consideration of the industrial policy of the EEU, the aim of the Treaty is focused on joint 
development by the member-states of new types of export-oriented products, including by 
deepening cooperation, increasing localization of production and promoting import substitution; 
creation of new production chains and innovative industrial sectors; production modernization in 
traditional industries; and building-up jointly manufactured high-tech products export462.  
Another important passage defined in the Treaty is the macroeconomic policy, which provides for 
the development and implementation of joint actions of the EEU’s participants with the target to 
achieve balanced economic development.  
In respect of taxes and taxation, it is provided in the Treaty that the associates of the Union should 
define areas of cooperation in the tax policy for harmonization and improvement of tax legislation, 
including the mechanism for collection of indirect taxes in performance of works, rendering 
services, convergence of rates on the most sensitive excisable goods. The entire procedure is 
based on the principle of non-discrimination, which lies at the heart of the arrangements. It will 
have the scope to prevent unfair price competition in mutual trade in goods and services463. 
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Observing the actual financial situation of the Union, the EEU’s members have started to conduct 
consultations on the creation of an EEU financial regulator by 2022–2025, a supranational financial 
institution that would be responsible for enforcing common standards in the Union’s financial 
markets and for providing proper regulation and supervision464.  
On the whole, the EEU represents the last step of the economic integration of the Eurasian 
countries initiated since 1991 with the Commonwealth of the Independent States. By the words of 
Tigran Sargsyan, Chairman of Board of the Eurasian Economic Commission, can be more stressed 
the possibility to unite through the Union a consistent market under a coordinated agreed policy: 
“The Eurasian integration makes the domestic market more transparent and clear for businessmen 
and investors, within the Union, a market is being created with a population of more than 180 
million people living mainly under common transparent rules, with a common system of technical 
regulation and common customs and tariff regulations465.”  
It can be asserted that the energetic sector is without doubt the most representative key of 
development of the Eurasian Economic Union. In fact, the EEU is an “energy superpower”, and 
exactly to the right definition of the commerce of raw materials is connected the future evolution 
of the Union. In confirmation of this affirmation can be useful to add the words of Belarusian 
lecturer Yury Shevtsov and its expectations about the sectors of the Union: “Oil and Gas will be the 
most important sectors that will be improved and will give advantages for all the members. The 
military industry is another sector that could get advantages. It is already developed in Russia. The 
transport sector, that is very important for Russia and for all Eurasian countries especially for the 
connection with China. Agriculture sector is not developed everywhere in Eurasia. In Belarus it is 
very developed. In the agricultural sector, Belarusian exports consist mostly from dairy products 
and meat, while Russia exports mostly grain and bread that could be a potential investment for all 
the Union466”. 
In its complex, the Eurasian Economic Union must have the priority to consolidate and improve 
the economic relationships of its members, favoring the modernization of their national 
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economies and a concrete increase of their mutual trade. This must be the priority of the Union to 
develop successively its market worldwide.  
Therefore, we can summarize that the principal goal of the member-states through the 
mechanisms of the EEU is the development of their domestic economies and then to use their 
own capacities to expand the economic potential of the Union in the global scenario. 
I Methodology and objectives of the analysis 
In order to measure the economic efficiency of the EEU in the first years of its functioning, the 
following paragraphs will be dedicated to the analysis of the most important economic indicators 
of the Union and its members as: economic growth in term of Gross Domestic Product, poverty 
index, industrial sectors, investments, exports and imports in mutual and external trade, 
government budget and a final international comparison of the Union with the most performing 
world economies through a compared analysis of their GDPs467. 
Precisely, the study will be conducted through an accurate economic comparison between the 
members of the Eurasian Economic Union, with a focus on the Republic of Belarus. In this regard 
Belarus will be contextualized in the work as principal example in the explanation of the economic 
asset of the Union.  
The economic examination of the member-states will be articulated following the qualitative 
method about the analysis of the economic – and potentially even political – effects of the EEU 
through a descriptive research, which will consist of an analytic examination of the official 
economic statistics of the Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC), the report of the Eurasian 
Development Bank data and of the principal economic online databases as the Trading Economics, 
the figures of the World Bank and the data of the Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC).  
In detail, the principal confrontation of the member-states will follow the official statistics of the 
EEC. The choice to use as principal source the economic data of the EEC is dictated by the volition 
to value the model of the Union through the official reports of the Commission, in order to 
illustrate the economic ongoing development of the Union and its members from the internal 
perspective of this primary organ of the EEU. However, in order to present a complete economic 
overview, the data of the World Bank and of the OEC will give a clear impression and an effective 
comparison about the economic status of the member-countries.  
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The use of this methodology, through a data collection from different analytic texts and statistics, 
has from a side the scope to contextualize the economic situation of the Eurasian Economic Union 
and from the other side to confront the most determinant macroeconomic indicators of the 
member-countries. By the analysis of these elements, can be explained the actual economic status 
of the EEU, obtaining a pure imagine about the progress of the Union and about the economic 
diversifications, performances and growth of its participants unequivocally.   
The economic bloc of the EEU is a direct evolution of the CU of 2010. For that, in order to give 
uniformity, the period of examination of the economic indicators and confrontation between the 
internal economies of the member-states will be framed in the segment of time included in the 
period 2012-2016. For some economic aspects, where the official data of the EEC were not yet 
available468, will be considered the period 2011-2015. Regarding precise economic considerations, 
the research will be especially deepened in a direct comparison between the internal economies 
of the EEU’s countries in the period of time 2015-2016, with some clarifications for the first 
quarter 2017. The choice of this period of time has the objective to give an accurate evaluation of 
the development of the Union since its beginning to the first years of its functioning.    
Through this analysis, the objective to reach is to propose a detailed overview about the actual 
economic significance of the EEU and economic performance of its participants. This purpose will 
help us to understand which aspect is really working in the Union, how the trade of this Union is 
developing and, if the EEU can really play a predominant role in the global economic prospect. 
1 The Gross Domestic Product of the EEU and its members  
Before observing the Gross Domestic Product and the other economic statistics of the Eurasian 
Economic Union, a vital aspect that must be in primis considered is the Russian role. As was 
already during the Soviet Union or within the system of the CIS and the CU, even the EEU has is 
dominant economic actor in the Russian Federation. In an economic lecture, this aspect conduces 
our analysis to two leading considerations: 1) from a side the trade of the EEU depends on the 
Russian investments in the territories of the Union predominately – bringing liquidity to the target 
to modernize and develop the internal economies of the member-countries; and 2) from the other 
side can be argued that the economic trends of this organization are dependent on the effects of 
the Russian economic tendency and depend from its choices of international politics primarily, as 
e.g. the Ukrainian crisis. Consequently, in the global lecture and examination of the statistics of the 
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Eurasian Economic Union, two issues that will be determinant during the work to comprehend the 
actual economic difficulties of the Russian Federation, fulcrum of the EEU, and its direct effects on 
the other member-states, especially Belarus, is the drop of the oil price since June 2014 and the 
Russian embargo against the EU and USA. Concerning the fall of the oil price – 56 USD in 2016 
against the government price of 96 USD decided initially – this matter created difficulties for the 
Russian economy (oil and gas account for 70% of Russian export incomes), already in an stagnation 
phase since the global financial crisis of almost ten years ago, with the consequence of the 
devaluation of the Russian ruble, the increment of inflation (12.9% in 2015) and the general 
reduction of its GDP since 2013 constantly. Russia represents the economic core of the EEU and 
the other participants have in Moscow their principal economic partner. Thus, based on this 
observation, the report of the EEU statistics and its common actual (negative) economic status 
must be read through the direct influence of the actual Russian economic difficulties in Eurasia 
transversely. 
Figure 1: Gross Domestic Product in USD billion 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Armenia 10 619 11 121 11 610 10 529 10 547 
Belarus 65 428 74 761 78 536 55 317 47 165 
Kazakhstan 208 002 236 633 221 418 184 387 135 005 
Kyrgyzstan 6 606 7 335 7 469 6 678 6 552 
Russia 2 154 067 2 231 827 2 085 848 1 372 117 1 286 153 
EAEU 2 444 722 2 561 677 2 404 881 1 629 028 1 485 422 
Source: Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Yevraziyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz v Tsifrakh”. Kratkiy 
Statisticheskiy Sbornik. Moskva, 2017. P. 53  
Detecting the table above, the first aspect that rises is the marked economic diversities in term of 
GDP between the member-countries, e.g. 2016 the Russian GDP totalized 1 286 153 USD bn. while 
the Kyrgyz was 6 552 USD billion, manifesting a strong gap between these countries and in general 
within the system of the Union. Even between Belarus 47 165 USD bn. and Kazakhstan 135 005 
USD bn. is possible to mark a strong difference, stressing as within the Union the economic 
differences between its participants are evident and considerable. The lecture of this data leads us 
to considerate a first aspect, namely as the objective of the EEU for the equalization of the 
national economic structures will be in the next years difficult to achieve. Subsequently, the 
277 
 
economic divergences of the member-countries bring us to considerate a second aspect, that the 
sensible economic differences can involve a diverse weight in the decisional process of the Union 
between each participant, where stronger countries as Russia for example will always have a 
major impact on the decisional making process of the entire organization. 
Seeing the GDP of the EEU, it amounted for the year 2016 to 1 485 422 billion USD and decreased 
in comparison to the year 2015 (1 629 028 USD) by 0.1%. This deprecation was however more 
noticeable in a confrontation between 2015 and 2014 (2 404 881 USD), when the decline was 
2.3%469. 
Taking in analysis the GDP of the member-states in relation to the period of time 2012-2016, can 
be observed as their amounts in the considered period are really different. Indeed, considering 
Belarus, we can evince that the world economic financial crisis and the strong inflation rate of last 
ten years – which reached a peak of 23.08% in the first quarter of 2013470 – had negative effects 
about the fluctuation of its GDP, especially from 2014 to 2015, with a decline of -29.56%; and 
during 2015-2016, when the Belarusian GDP registered a notable reduction of -14.74%.  
Figure 2: GDP growth annual rate of the member-states 2011-2015 (in percentage) 
 
Source: “GDP growth annual rate”. Economic data of the World Bank: 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?end=2015&locations=AM-BY-KZ-KG-
RU&start=2010&view=chart  (last view: 25.05.2017) 
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The GDP growth rate of the countries of the Union declined during the period 2010-2015 
commonly. Considering the case of Kyrgyzstan, the Central Asian Republic recorded in 2013 a 
growth rate of 10.9% against the -0.1% of 2012. Although its growth rate is nowadays in expansion 
– mainly with the achievement of a surplus by 7.80% in the first quarter of 2017 over the same 
quarter of the previous year471, Kyrgyzstan remains the weakest economic force within the Union. 
Differently from the economic Kyrgyz growth, the Armenian economy shrank 1% year-on-year in 
the fourth quarter of 2016, following downwardly revised 0.1% contraction in the previous year472. 
Belarus, after 2015 and 2016 characterized by economic recession – reaching a negative peak of 
GDP growth by -4.4% in December 2015 – expanded its economy by 0.3% during the first quarter 
of 2017473. The positive economic trends about the GDP growth rate for 2017 of the EEU members 
are confirmed also in the case of Kazakhstan, whose economy advanced 3% year-on-year in the 
first quarter of 2017, compared to 0.2% contraction of the previous year474. Taking into account 
the Russian Federation, in the first quarter 2017 the Russian GDP advanced 0.5% year-on-year. 
These data show as: 1) the Russian economy returned to growth after a two-year recession that 
was mainly caused by low oil prices and sanctions imposed on Russian individuals and businesses 
in response to the annexation of Crimea475; and 2) that, commonly, the member-countries, after 
the economic difficulties caused by the general economic stagnation and financial crisis of last ten 
years, benefiting even from the Russian economic recovery, have started to know the first positive 
effects of their integration, testified in the economic surplus in term of GDP for the first quarter of 
the year 2017. 
However, the situation rests still complicated to talk about a real economic improvement within 
the Union, especially if we consider the time frame before the starting of the EEU, charachterized 
by an economic depression strongly. Indeed, in a further lecture of the GDP growth rate of the 
member-states, the most sensible decline in the period 2011-2015 is represented by Belarus and 
the Russian Federation that show a parallel flow of their economic growth, principally since the 
year 2014. A possible explication of the negative tendency of GDP growth can be discovered in the 
                                                          
471
 “Kyrgyzstan GDP Annual Growth Rate”. In Trading Economics http://www.tradingeconomics.com/kyrgyzstan/gdp-
growth-annual (last view: 25.05.2017) 
472
 “Armenia GDP Annual Growth Rate”. In Trading Economics http://www.tradingeconomics.com/armenia/gdp-
growth-annual (last view: 25.05.2017)  
473
 “Belarus GDP Annual Growth Rate”. In Trading Economics http://www.tradingeconomics.com/belarus/gdp-growth-
annual (last view: 25.05.2017) 
474
 “Kazakhstan GDP Annual Growth Rate”. In Trading Economics http://www.tradingeconomics.com/kazakhstan/gdp-
growth-annual (last view: 25.05.2017)  
475
 “Russia GDP Annual Growth Rate”. In Trading Economics http://www.tradingeconomics.com/russia/gdp-growth-
annual (last view: 25.05.2017)  
279 
 
Russian geopolitical choices that have caused effects on its internal economy, chiefly for the 
market of raw materials, with the devaluation of its currency. Belarus, which economy depends 
from Russia largely, suffered from the Russian economic troubles directly, recording a diminution 
of its GDP growth. Concerning the other members of the Union, we can assert as they registered a 
less marked decrease of their indexes, because from a side their economy is more connected with 
the Asian region and its economic development is especially linked to China (according to the data 
of the OEC, for example during the year 2015 China represented the first top destination of Kazakh 
exports with 5.4 USD billion, while the same amount to Russia was of 4.6 USD billion476); and from 
the other side because they have a less involvement, specifically of Armenia and Kyrgyzstan, in the 
world trade, with the consequence to be subjected in a lesser way to the effects of the global 
economy. 
On the whole, these indicators, although the slow economic recovery of the first quarter 2017, 
confirm however as the Eurasian Economic Union in its complex is still facing on a hard situation of 
economic crisis. Therefore, the priority of the Union, as expressed objective in the Astana Treaty, 
is to harmonize the economic areas of cooperation properly, in order to expand the collaboration 
between the Eurasian states. A deeper cooperation, which can be reached through the 
establishment of agreed policies on the economic areas of interaction of the EEU, must have the 
target to favorite the modernization of the internal economies of the member-countries. Truly, 
the cooperation within the Union should considerate the actual challenges of the EEU and namely 
the economic difficulties of its principal member, the Russian Federation. Through the vision of the 
GDP data and as initially underlined, Russia is the first economic force of the Union and its 
implications have direct effects on the entire Union. Considering this aspect, the member-
countries should concentrate more their cooperation in the stabilization and improvement of the 
internal market of the Union, aimed to develop a compact intra-trade, which could overcome the 
recession of last years. This aim can be achieved by the intensification of their mutual trade and 
elimination e.g. of additional costs in the transportation of goods or in border controls. Now, 
reflecting about this possibility, can be argued, as this facet assumes a particular significance, 
because from an hand brings the countries of the Union to develop more their economic internal 
mechanisms of interaction; and from another hand the intensification of the intra-trade instead of 
e.g. the choice to extend the Union in the world trade can be interpreted as the intention of the 
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member-countries to directly support the Russian economy, with the purpose to contrast the 
impacts of the actual economic sanctions against Russia – economic motor of the EEU.  
Figure 3: GDP, PPP of the member-countries 2011-2016 in USD 
 
Source: “GDP by purchasing power parity”. Economic data of the World Bank: 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.PP.CD?locations=AM-BY-KZ-KG-RU (last view: 25.05.2017) 
As it is possible to evince from the graphic above, the index of the GDP adjusted by purchasing 
power parity is almost equal in all the countries of the EEU with the exception of Russia that is 
greater than the other countries. Precisely, in the year 2015 this index amounted: in Armenia to 25 
405.30 USD million; in Belarus to 168 350.66 USD million; in Kazakhstan to 439 390.50 USD million; 
in Kyrgyzstan to 20 454.09 USD; and in Russia to 3 687 406.32 USD million.  
Figure 4: Gross Domestic Product of the EEU by type of economic activity in USD billion 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Gross Domestic 
Product 
2 444 722  2 561 677  2 404 881  1 629 028  1 485 422  
Gross value added 
(total of sectors): 
2 122 928  2 239 005  2 105 425  1 470 694  1 341 923  
Agriculture, forestry 
and fisheries 
85 453  93 087  92 317  71 096  66 938  
Mining and quarrying 216 084  219 002  198 597  142 896  126 961  
Manufacturing 288 676  304 119  283 438  201 981  185 129  
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industry 
Electricity, gas, steam 
and air conditioning; 
water supply; sewage 
system, control over 
Collection and waste 
distribution  
64 052  67 675  59 824  42 877  41 487  
Construction  157 087  158 420  146 213  95 737  83 908  
Commerce 360 638  364 701  341 817  243 004  215 746  
Accommodation and 
food services 
19 575  20 946  18 922  13 125  11 900  
Transport and 
storage; Information 
and communication 
175 628  188 065  173 526  122 798  110 894  
Financial and 
insurance activities 
(including indirectly 
measured financial 
intermediation 
services) 
84 354  98 327  92 451  56 940  58 662  
Transactions with real 
estate; professional, 
scientific and 
technical activities; 
administrative 
activities and 
additional services in 
this field 
358 560  373 272  358 572  249 006  225 688  
State administration 
and defense, 
Compulsory social 
insurance 
138 041  152 651  153 578  102 428  96 303  
Education 58 870  64 823  58 694  40 332  36 643  
Health and social 
services 
68 930  78 926  76 990  51 710  48 569  
Other economic 
activities 
46 980  54 991  50 486  36 764  33 095  
Taxes on products 321 794  322 672  299 456  158 334  143 499  
Source: Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Yevraziyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz v Tsifrakh”. Kratkiy 
Statisticheskiy Sbornik. Moskva, 2017. Pp. 64-65  
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Analyzing in the specific the GDP of the Eurasian Economic Union for economic activities, must be 
stressed as between the years 2014 and 2015 for all economic sectors of the member-countries  
was registered a general decrease. Accurately, the aggregate gross value of all economic activities 
of the EEU amounted in the year 2014 to 2 105 425 USD billion; while in the year 2015 the same 
value was of 1 470 694 USD billion, with a difference of 634 731 USD million (-30.15%) between 
the last two years. Equal negative trend, although lower, was registered between 2015 and 2016 
with a minus of 128 771 USD million (-8.76%). 
Examining in detail some key sectors of the EEU, in the period between 205-2016 the most 
sensible differences can be recognized especially in the sectors of: a) agriculture 66 938 USD bn. in 
2016 with a -5.85% in comparison to 2015 (71 096 USD billion); b) the manufacturing industry with 
185 129 USD bn. (2016) in comparison to 201 981 USD bn. of 2015 (-8,34%); c) construction sector 
with 83 908 USD bn. in 2016 against 95 737 USD bn. in 2015, with a sensible decline of -12.36%; d) 
transport and communication with 110 894 USD bn. in 2016 in comparison to 122 798 USD bn. of 
2015 (-9.69%); or e) the health and social services with a value of 48 569 USD bn. in 2016 against 
51 710 USD bn. in 2015 (-6.07%). 
Figure 5: Contribution of the member-states to the GDP of the EEU for the year 2016 (percentage 
of the total) 
 
Source: Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Ob osnovnykh sotsial'no-ekonomicheskikh pokazatelyakh 
Yevraziyskogo Ekonomicheskogo Soyuza”. Yanvar' 2017 g. Analiitscheskiy obzor 10 marta 2017 g. P. 3 
The decisive importance of the Russian Federation for the future growth of the Union can be 
confirmed taking into exam the proportion between the contribution of the Russian Gross 
Armenia; 0,7 Belarus; 3,2 
Kazakhstan; 9 
Kyrgyzstan; 0,5 
Russia; 86,6 
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Domestic Product to the aggregate GDP of the EEU. For example, according to the official data of 
the EEC, in the year 2016 the Russian Federation totalized a GDP of 1 286 153 USD billion, 
constituting de facto the 86,6% of the total GDP of the EEU (1 485 422 USD bn.).  
Figure 6: Gross domestic product per capita in USD billion 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Armenia 3 512 3 680 3 852 3 504 3 525 
Belarus 6 913 7 898 8 289 5 829 4 964 
Kazakhstan 12 387 13 891 12 807 10 510 7 509 
Kyrgyzstan 1 234 1 342 1 338 1 171 1 078 
Russia 15 042 15 552 14 278 9 372 8 769 
EAEU 13 728 14 331 13 235 8 931 8 115 
Source: Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Yevraziyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz v Tsifrakh”. Kratkiy 
Statisticheskiy Sbornik. Moskva, 2017. P. 81 
Reflecting about the data of the GDP per capita, namely the GDP indicator divided for the number 
of population, this index can give us a clearer overview about the contemporary economic 
situation of the member-countries. Specifically, in a confrontation of the period 2015-2016, was 
recorded a general decrease of the GDP per capita for almost all the members of the Union – 
excluded Armenia which performed a tenuous increase of the value between 2015 (3 504 USD) to 
2016 (3 525 USD) by 0.60%. In consideration of the deprecation of the GDP per capita, the most 
accentuated index is visible in Kazakhstan with a total of 7 509 USD bn. in 2016 against 10 510 USD 
bn. in 2015 (-28.55%).  
In general, the aggregated GDP per capita of the EEU, registered a marked decrease between the 
last five years: 13 728 USD bn. (2012) and 8 115 USD bn. (2016) with a difference of -40.89%, 
testifying the financial and economic difficulties that the members of the Union are facing since 
especially last decade.  
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Figure 7: GDP per capita, PPP of the member-countries 2011-2016 in USD 
 
Source: “GDP per capita by purchasing power parity”. Economic data of the World Bank: 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD?end=2015&locations=AM-BY-KZ-KG-RU&start=2011 (last 
view: 25.05.2017) 
According to the data of the World Bank, the GDP per capita by purchasing power parity of the 
member-countries in relation to the year 2015 was respectively: Armenia – 8 418.7 USD; Belarus – 
17 740.5 USD; Kazakhstan – 25 044.9 USD; Kyrgyzstan – 3 433.7 USD; Russia – 25 186.2 USD. In the 
period 2011-2015 all the countries of the EEU performed almost positively, increasing slowly their 
index and maintaining a stable situation approximately – the biggest increase between the years 
2011-2015 was recorded in Kazakhstan by 17.70% – showing some positive data about their 
economic tendency.  
2 Economically active population and unemployment rate of the EEU 
The EEU covers a surface of 20 million square km (the 14% of the world land surface) and 
comprises a population of 183 362.3 people (2017), whose biggest percentage is constituted by 
the Russian population 146 804.4 (2017)477, which in turn represents the two-third of the entire 
Union’s population.    
                                                          
477
 Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Yevraziyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz v Tsifrakh”. Kratkiy 
Statisticheskiy Sbornik. Moskva, 2016. P. 27 
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Figure 8: Number of permanent residents in the member-countries (beginning of the year; 
thousands people) 
 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Armenia 3 026,9 3 017,1 3 010,6 2 998,6 2 986,5 
Belarus 9 463,8 9 468,2 9 480,9 9 498,4 9 504,7 
Kazakhstan 16 909,8 17 160,8 17 417,7 17 670,5 17 926,5 
Kyrgyzstan 5 663,1 5 776,6 5 895,1 6 019,5 6 140,2 
Russia 143 347,1 143 666,9 146 267,3 146 544,7 146 804,4 
EAEU 178 410,7 179 089,6 182 071,6 182 731,7 183 326,3 
Source: Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Yevraziyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz v Tsifrakh”. Kratkiy 
Statisticheskiy Sbornik. Moskva, 2017. P. 27  
Taking into account the number of residents in the countries of the EEU, can be observed as 
Kazakhstan in term of population has the second biggest percentage calculated on every thousand 
people of the Union with 17 926.5 inhabitants; while Armenia represents the member with the 
smallest number of citizens living in its territory – 2 986.5 people.  
Considering the Union in its aggregate, another statistic that can be detected is its demographic 
trend, which registered a continuous growth rate of 2.76% in the last five years. 
Figure 9: Number of economically active population in the age of 15-65 (beginning of the year; 
thousands people) 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Armenia 1.440,9 1.418,3 1.388,4 1.375,7 1.316,4 1.227,5 
Belarus 4.722,7 4.640,6 4.601,8 4.572,8 4.537,3 4.450,3 
Kazakhstan 8.774,6 8.981,9 9.041,3 8.962,2 9.074,9 8.964,1 
Kyrgyzstan478 2.490,1 2.496,8 2.468,7 2.504,4 2.544,3 … 
Russia 75.779,0 75.676,1 75.528,9 75.428,4 76.587,5 76.636,1 
EAEU 93.207,3 93.213,7 93.029,1 92.843,5 94.060,4 … 
Source: “Economically active population at the age 15-65”. Data elaborated through the official statistics of the 
Eurasian Economic Commission 
http://www.eurasiancommission.org/ru/act/integr_i_makroec/dep_stat/econstat/Pages/labor_market.aspx (last 
view: 02.05.2017) 
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 No available data of the Eurasian Economic Commission for Kyrgyzstan in relation of the year 2016. 
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The EEU has in its complex a relative active economic population in proportion to the number of 
its inhabitants. For example, Belarus during the year 2016 censed 9 498.4 permanent residents in 
its territory, whose 4 537.3 were employed citizens, registering an index of 47.7% of employed 
people in proportion to the total of its population. However, due to the financial difficulties of 
2011, in all the member-countries was registered a decrease of the number of active population 
(especially from 2012 to 2014).  
Instead, in the period comprised between 2014 and 2015 was recorded a regrowth – although 
very restrained – of the employment, showing a positive signal against the current economic 
recession. For example, the Russian Federation had an increase between 2014 (75 428.4) and 
2015 (76 587.5) of 1.54%.  
Same results are visible in consideration of the Eurasian Economic Union as a whole, with a 
decrease between the year 2013 (93 029.1) and 2014 (9 843.5) firstly; and a sensible increase in 
the year 2015, when the number of employed population of the Union increased slightly (0.9%) 
compared to 2014, amounting to 88.9 million people479. 
These data reported by the Eurasian Economic Commission symbolize that the countries of the 
EEU, after the difficult economic trends of last years, slowly are increasing again their economic 
capacities, incrementing the demand of work, that even thank to the launching of cooperation and 
harmonization of their structures in the territory of the Union could in future bring a better 
development of the employment. In terms of gender confrontation, according to the analytic 
statistics of the EEC, in the year 2015, the economically active population included 48.6 million 
men (51.6% of the total economically active population) and 45.6 million women (48.4% of the 
total economically active population)480. 
In general, the number of people employed in the Union during the course of 2015 was 26.0% of 
the average number of employees in large and medium-sized enterprises. The highest turnover of 
personnel was observed in Kazakhstan and Russia: 49.2% and 57.6% of the average number of 
employees respectively. Regarding the flow of workers attracted from other countries, this index 
in Belarus decreased by 16.1% compared to 2014 and amounted to 31.8 thousand people; in 
                                                          
479
 Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2016): “O rynke truda v Yevraziyskom Ekonomicheskom Soyuze”. 
Analiitscheskiy obzor 31 Oktjabra 2016 g. P. 2 
480
 Ibid. P. 1  
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Russia – by 43.5% (1 868.7 thousand people); while in Kazakhstan Increased by 14.6% (37.9 
thousand people)481.  
With regards to the different sectors of activities of the EEU’s countries in the year 2015, can be 
analyzed the data of active citizens in the key sectors of the member-states: Armenia reached its 
peak of 120.8 active population in industrial sector; Belarus 1 051.0 in the same sector: Kazakhstan 
recorded its maximum with 1 553.4 workers in the sector of agriculture, forestry and fisheries; 
Kyrgyzstan recorded 689.3 employees in the agricultural sector; and Russia totalized its maximum 
of employment with 14.183 workers in the industrial sector482.    
Figure 10: Unemployment rate in the countries of the Eurasian Economic Union 2012-2016 (% of 
total labor force) 
 
Source: “Unemployment rate”. Economic data of the World Bank: 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS?end=2016&locations=BY-AM-KZ-KG-
RU&start=2012&view=chart (last view: 07.05.2017) 
According to the International Labor Organization, the unemployment rate of the Eurasian 
Economic Union for the year 2015 was 5.7%, increasing of 0.3% in comparison to the previous 
year. However, the unemployment rate of the EEU’s members in 2015 was restrained for almost 
all countries of the Union (with the exception of Armenia which recorded a negative index of 
                                                          
481
 Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2016): “O rynke truda v Yevraziyskom Ekonomicheskom Soyuze”. 
Analiitscheskiy obzor 31 Oktjabra 2016 g. Pp. 5-6 
482
 “Different sectors of activities”. Official statistics of the Eurasian Economic Commission 
http://www.eurasiancommission.org/ru/act/integr_i_makroec/dep_stat/econstat/Pages/labor_market.aspx (last 
view: 04.5.2017) 
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18.5%). Kazakhstan performed in 2015 better than the other members, maintaining its 
unemployment rate by 5%.  
In the year 2016, the unemployment rate of the Union attested on the rates of the previous year 
nearly. Armenia performed in 2016 a decrease of its unemployment rate (16.76%) in comparison 
to the preceding year, while the other members did not registered any considerable changing of 
their unemployment index: Belarus (0.53%); Kazakhstan (5.23%); Kyrgyzstan (7.69%); and Russia 
(5.72%)483. 
Figure 11: Number of unemployed registered in state employment services (at the end of the year; 
thousands people) 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Armenia 62,4 56,0 65,9 77,0 80,5 
Belarus 24,9 21,0 24,2 43,3 35,5 
Kazakhstan 34,6 30,0 33,4 34,6 37,5 
Kyrgyzstan 60,4 58,4 58,2 56,0 55,6 
Russia 1 064,7 917,7 883,3 1 001,1 894,6 
EAEU 1 247,0 1 083,1 1 065,0 1 212,0 1 103,7 
Source: Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Yevraziyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz v Tsifrakh”. Kratkiy 
Statisticheskiy Sbornik. Moskva, 2017. P. 43 
In the territory of the Eurasian Economic Union, the rate of the unemployment based on the 
number of unemployed registered in state employment services increased from 2014 (1 065.0) to 
2016 (1 103.7) by 3.63%. This index at the end of December 2016 amounted to 1 103.7 people 
(1.2% of the economically active population of the EEU). In a precise comparison of the same 
values with December 2015, the unemployment rate of the Union knew an increment of 4.5%484.  
However, in a confrontation with the other most developed world economies, must be asserted 
that the EEU has in its law unemployment rate a point of force and not distant from the values of 
other world economies: e.g. Germany 3.9% (November 2016); Greece 23.0% (October 2016); 
                                                          
483
 “Unemployment rate” Economic data of the World Bank: 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS?end=2016&locations=BY-AM-KZ-KG-
RU&start=2012&view=chart  (last view: 07.05.2017)  
484
 Cf. Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “O bezrabotitse v Yevraziyskom Ekonomicheskom Soyuze”. 
Dekabr’ 2016 goda. Ekspress-informatsiya 30 yanvarya 2017 g. P. 1 
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Poland 8.3% (December 2016); the United States 4.7% (December 2016); France 9.5% (November 
2016) or Japan 3.1% (November 2016)485. 
These data assume a better connotation if compared with the percentage of unemployed citizens 
inscribed in the state employment service. In fact, according to the unemployment rate calculated 
on the basis of the number of unemployed registered in the state employment services, in January 
2017 this percentage was: 0.9% in Belarus, 0.6% in Kazakhstan, 2.2% in Kyrgyzstan and 1.2% in 
Russia. As a whole, the percentage of registered unemployment in the Union was 1.2% of the 
economically active population. As response to the economic regrowth of the Union of the current 
year, must be underlined as always in January 2017 the number of free jobs declared by 
enterprises and organizations in the employment services of the population increased by 10.2% in 
comparison to January 2016486, demonstrating an increase of job-places in the Union. 
Figure 12: Poverty level within the Union487 (percentage) 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Armenia 35,0 32,4 32,0 30,0 29,8 
Belarus 7,3 6,3 5,5 4,8 5,1 
Kazakhstan 5,5 3,8 2,9 2,8 2,7 
Kyrgyzstan 36,8 38,0 37,0 30,6 32,1 
Russia 12,7 10,7 10,8 11,2 13,3 
Source: Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2016): “Yevraziyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz v Tsifrakh”. 
Statisticheskiy Yezhegodnik. Moskva, 2016. P. 60 
To frame better the unemployment rate, this index must be read together with the value of 
poverty of the members of the Union. Specifically, agreeing with the statistics of the EEC, between 
the years 2011 and 2015, the level of poverty in the member-states decreased generally. Though, 
in the years 2014-2015 this index increased for Belarus, Kyrgyzstan and Russia. For example, in the 
Russian Federation the growth was very high by 18.75% from 2014 to 2015; while decreased in 
Armenia and Kazakhstan – e.g. in Armenia was registered a diminution of poverty rate by -0.67%.   
                                                          
485
 Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “O bezrabotitse v Yevraziyskom Ekonomicheskom Soyuze”. 
Dekabr’ 2016 goda. Ekspress-informatsiya 30 yanvarya 2017 g. P. 2   
486
 Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Ob osnovnykh sotsial'no-ekonomicheskikh pokazatelyakh 
Yevraziyskogo Ekonomicheskogo Soyuza”. Yanvar' 2017 g. Analiitscheskiy obzor 10 marta 2017 g. Pp. 39-40 
487
 Assessing the level of poverty in Armenia, the share of the population with consumption below the uppermost 
poverty line was used; In Belarus - with disposable resources below the subsistence minimum; In Kazakhstan - with 
incomes below the subsistence minimum; In Kyrgyzstan - with consumer spending below the poverty line; In Russia - 
with cash incomes below the subsistence minimum.  
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3 Labor migration of the EEU 
The articles 96 and 97 of the EEU’s Treaty discipline the labor migration of the Union. Here is 
concretely affirmed that the member-countries should cooperate together in order to create an 
agreed policy which establishes a single labor market for all the workers of the Union. Moreover, is 
stressed the freedom of the citizens of the Union to move within the territory of the EEU and work 
on the same conditions of the native citizens of every member-state without restrictions.  
Thus, we can interpret the labor market of the Union as a fundamental step for the integration, as 
asserted by EEC Minister Karine Minasyan: “The best answer to the question, what the Eurasian 
integration gives to citizens of the Union, is the removal of barriers in the labour market488". 
Economically, the implementation of this system is especially one reason that attracted Kyrgyzstan 
in the mechanism of the EEU. In fact, according to the data published by Kyrgyz Natstatscom, as 
reported in the Eurasian Development Bank, in 2011 the migrant workers of Kyrgyzstan amounted 
to 457,000, whose 416,000 (92%) were working in Russia489. Consequently, we can confirm as the 
volition of Kyrgyzstan, through its accession in the EEU, is to stabilize its flow of workers especially 
to Russia and Kazakhstan, in order to achieve for these employees the same conditions of work as 
for the other citizens of the Union. Therefore, we can explicitely affirm as for countries as 
Kyrgyzstan or Armenia, the establishment of a coordinated and free movement of workers, is one 
key-condition that has conducted these countries to be part of the integration project of the EEU. 
Figure 13: International population migration490 (number of people registered with the internal 
affairs agencies after the changing of the permanent place of residence, people)491 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Armenia 
Arrived … … 13 022 2 160 … 
Left … … 4 267 3 041 … 
Belarus 
                                                          
488
 “The EEC Minister, Karine Minasyan: "The best answer to the question, what the Eurasian integration gives to 
citizens of the Union, is the removal of barriers in the labour market". In Eurasian Economic Commission. 11.05.2017 
http://www.eurasiancommission.org/en/nae/news/Pages/11-05-2017-1.aspx  (last view: 20.06.2017) 
489
 Eurasian Development Bank: (2013): "Labor Migration and Human Capital of Kyrgyzstan: Impact of the Customs 
Union". EDB Centre for Integration Studies Saint Petersburg 2013. P. 4 
490
 The statistics of the Commission for the migration regarding the member-countries refer to the international 
migration, thus to migrants from all over the world. 
491
 No available data for Armenia (2012 and 2013) and Kazakhstan (2013). 
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Arrived 18 040  19 435  24 941  28 349  21 038  
Left 8 712  7 792  9 219  9 855  13 098  
Kazakhstan 
Arrived 28 296  24 105  16 784  16 670  … 
Left 29 722  24 384  28 946  30 080  … 
Kyrgyzstan 
Arrived 5 532  4 349  3 928  3 559  3 160  
Left 13 019  11 552  11 685  7 788  7 125  
Russia 
Arrived 417 681  482 241  578 511  598 617  575 158  
Left 122 751  186 382  308 475  353 233  313 210  
Source: Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Yevraziyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz v Tsifrakh”. Kratkiy 
Statisticheskiy Sbornik. Moskva, 2017. P. 30 
Taking into account Belarus and its statistics concerning all migrants that entered in the country, 
during 2015 arrived in its territory 28 349 people. Precisely, considering the migration flow of this 
amount, 7.225 Chinese, 2.209 Russians, 1.707 Uzbekistanis and 657 Turks came during 2015 to 
Belarus492. While, in the year 2016, 21 038 people arrived in the country (7 311 less than in 2015), 
against 13 098 people that left the country. These data help us to reflect, that Belarus, although is 
not one of the first powers of the Union, in comparison for example to Kazakhstan (16 670 arrivals 
for the year 2015), has known especially during 2014 and 2015 an increase of the numbers of 
migrants arriving in its territory. In strengthening of this point, must be asserted as near the 
economic migrants, another factor that had an enormous impact on the migration statistics of 
Belarus was the Ukrainian civil war. In fact, according to Astapenia Ryhor, between 2014 and 2015 
more than 100,000 Ukrainians made their way to Belarus, increasing the country's population by 
more than 1%493. In a lecture of these data, we can assert as Belarus, despite the economic 
difficulties of last ten years, rests an attractive pole for Eurasian migrants. 
Considering Kyrgyzstan, the number of people that have left the country since 2012 has constantly 
decreased, passing from 13 019 (2012) to 7 125 (2016) with a diminution by -45.27%. This 
reduction is attributable to the Russian economic difficulties of the last year principally. However, 
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 Dzesiatava Galina (2016): "Migration and National Security in Belarus". In Belarus Digest, 4.5.2016 
http://belarusdigest.com/story/migration-and-national-security-in-belarus/ (last view: 23.08.2017) 
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 Astapenia Ryhor (2015): “Migrants From Eastern Ukraine Put Pressure On Belarus”. In Belarus Digest, 03.08.2015 
http://belarusdigest.com/story/migrants-eastern-ukraine-put-pressure-belarus-22949 (last view: 03.06.2017) 
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despite the Russian economic recession of last years, the accumulative number of people that 
have set their residence in Russia since 2012 (417 681) to 2016 (575 158) increased generally. As in 
Belarus, even in Russia, the increase in relation of the year 2014 and 2015 is possible to conduct to 
the flow of Ukrainians from the Donbass region to the Russian Federation, due to the internal 
Ukrainian instability. 
Figure 14: Balance of international migration (people)494 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Armenia -9 400 -24 400 -21 800 -25 900 … 
Belarus 9 328 11 643 15 722 18 494 7 940 
Kazakhstan -1 426 -279 -12 162 -13 466 … 
Kyrgyzstan -7 487 -7 203 -7 757 -4 229 -3 965 
Russia 294 930 295 859 270 036 245 384 261 948 
Source: Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Yevraziyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz v Tsifrakh”. Kratkiy 
Statisticheskiy Sbornik. Moskva, 2017. P. 31 
In contemplation of the year 2015, from a hand Armenia, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan recorded a 
negative balance in proportion between people that have come to the country and those citizens 
that have left the state. From another hand, in examination of the same period of time, Belarus 
and Russia registered a surplus of people that arrived in the country, 18 494 and 245 384 
respectively. 
Retracing the Treaty of the EEU in regard of the labor migration, the article 96 stresses the 
importance of the participants of the Union to cooperate in order to assist the organized 
recruitment and involvement of workers of the member-states for their employment in the 
territory of the Union, encouraging their possibility to occupation in different areas of work 
without barriers. Similar opportunity is expressed in the free movement of capital that should 
allow the national enterprisers of the member-states to settle their company in other regions of 
the Union. It would mean even the relocation of national personal in another member of the 
Union, with the consequence to increase the migration flow. Unfortunately, in the first years of 
the EEU, due to the economic recession, this system, especially in the investments and movement 
of capital, has not yet developed concretely.   
                                                          
494
 In Armenia the data refers to an evaluation based on the results of the Integrated Household Living Conditions 
Survey. No available data for Armenia and Kazakhstan in consideration of the year 2016. 
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4 Wages and pension retributions in the countries of the EEU 
The migration process within the Union can be better comprehended through the analysis of the 
amount of salaries and pensions in the countries of the Eurasian Economic Union. Here, the aim of 
this paragraph is to show the differences between the members of the Union and to have a clear 
image about the incomes of its population. 
The diversification of the population of the member-states generates different effects on the 
amounts of the incomes and social costs inside the single societies of every participant, where, 
although the objective of the leaders of the Union is the damping of the diversities of the 
population of the EEU, the differences for each country, especially in the value of salaries, remain 
nowadays still marked. 
Figure 15: Average nominal monthly wage in USD 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Armenia 282 358 381 359 393 
Belarus 439 564 590 413 361 
Kazakhstan 679 717 675 568 416 
Kyrgyzstan 228 234 229 209 207 
Russia 857 936 856 561 549 
Source: Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Yevraziyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz v Tsifrakh”. Kratkiy 
Statisticheskiy Sbornik. Moskva, 2017. P. 35 
The nominal wage of the EEU’s members had in 2016 its maximal value in the Russian Federation 
(549 USD) and the minimal index in Kyrgyzstan (207 USD). A significant aspect to considerate is the 
trend of the nominal monthly wage of the countries of the Union, which has known in the period 
of time between 2014 and 2016 a sensible decrease in all the member-countries – excluded 
Armenia that in the considered period recorded an increment by 3.5%.  
Reflecting about the Russian Federation, this country, due on the deprecation of the ruble in 
December 2014, registered economic and financial problems, that had direct impact on the 
nominal monthly wage – the difference between 2014 (856 USD) and 2015 (561 USD) testifies the 
Russian difficulties precisely. Indeed, quoting Eberhardt and Menkiszak, the devaluation of the 
Russian currency generated in the national economy losses in the import-dependent branches of 
the economy that were mainly selling in the domestic market (such as the machine building 
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industry). Besides, energy giants as Gazprom and Resent decreased their capitalization 
respectively by more than 50% (to less than 60 USD bn.) and by 38% to 50 USD billion. Financially, 
even the capitalization of banks decreased, for example Russia’s largest state-owned bank, 
Sberbank, reported a decline for 2014 of nearly 70%495.     
This deteriorating economic situation had direct consequences in the decreasing of the monthly 
nominal wage by -35.86%, followed by an increment of the consumer prices in the country with an 
average inflation rate by 15.5% in 2015496.  
Though, confronting the period 2012-2016, we can observe as the member-countries are 
obtaining progresses in the balancing of their average wages mostly, reaching, as expected by the 
system of the EEU for the target of level equalization of the internal economies, light differences 
of month salary in the year 2016: Armenia – 393 USD; Belarus – 361 USD; Kazakhstan – 416 USD; 
Kyrgyzstan 207 USD; and Russia – 549 USD. 
Figure 16: Monetary income per capita (per month) in USD497 
 
Source: Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Yevraziyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz v Tsifrakh”. Kratkiy 
Statisticheskiy Sbornik. Moskva, 2017. P. 35 
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 Cf. Eberhardt A., Menkiszak M. (2015):"The economic and financial crisis in Russia. Background, symptoms and 
prospects for the future". Centre for Eastern Studies, Warsaw. February, 2015. Pp. 17-18 
496
 “Inflation Russia 2015”. In Inflation.eu. http://www.inflation.eu/inflation-rates/russia/historic-inflation/cpi-
inflation-russia-2015.aspx (last view: 26.05.2017) 
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 No available data for Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, and for the common aggregate of the EAEU in consideration of the year 
2016. 
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Armenia 97 104 120 110 0
Belarus 338 434 451 304 256
Kazakhstan 348 371 348 304 215
Kyrgyzstan 68 69 74 63 0
Russia 747 815 731 502 460
EAEU 656 716 648 452 0
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
U
SD
 
295 
 
In view of the year 2015, the average income earned pro person in the countries of the Union, 
although continues to be extreme diverse in a direct a comparison between i.e. Kyrgyzstan (63 
USD) and the Russian Federation (502 USD), for countries such Belarus and Kazakhstan was equal, 
recording for both countries 304 USD. Still, through this value can be underlined as inside the 
territory of the EEU, the differences of standard of living of the member-countries changed in the 
last 4 years vividly. In fact, taking into account the example of the Belarusian Republic, we can 
underline as the fluctuation of the monetary income during the period 2012-2016 was 
changeable: increasing from 2012 (338 USD) to 2014 (451 USD); and decreasing from 2015 (304 
USD) to 2016 (256 USD) – suffering as well by the course of the Russian economy.    
Figure 17: Average monthly nominal wages by main types of economic activity in 2016498 (as 
percentage of the national average wage) 
 Armenia Belarus Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Russia 
National average 100 100 100 100 100 
Agriculture, 
forestry and 
fisheries 
63,7 70,3 63,5 64,9 58,4 
Mining and 
quarrying 
193,1 157,5 128,1 183,0 189,6 
Manufacturing 
industry 
94,2  106,4  91,2  93,0  94,6  
Electricity, gas, 
steam and air 
conditioning 
150,3  114,6  64,8  185,7  107,8 
water supply; 
Sewage system, 
control over the 
collection and 
distribution of 
waste 
100,5  89,4  49,3  83,6  ...  
                                                          
498
 No available data for Russia in consideration of some activity sectors. 
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Construction 111,9  105,8  100,5  98,4  87,6  
wholesale and 
retail trade; Repair 
of motor vehicles 
and motorcycles 
79,9  96,3  71,1  108,6  80,4  
Transport and 
storage 
83,4  109,8  84,4  146,3  113,7 
Accommodation 
and food services 
65,8  74,8  85,8  77,5  60,1  
Information and 
communication 
207,8  300,2  88,5  187,0  …  
Financial and 
insurance activities 
217,9  178,6  117,1  219,4  213,1  
Real estate 
transactions 
83,7  77,6  83,0  85,6  119,8 
Professional, 
scientific and 
technical activities 
97,0  138,7  71,1  113,3  174,3 
Administrative 
activities and 
additional services 
in this field 
75,2  75,1  94,0  90,9  …  
Public 
administration and 
defense; 
Compulsory social 
security 
120,7  115,8  74,7  120,4  118,7  
Education 65,8  70,7  60,1  75,3  76,5  
Health and social 
services 
74,8  79,0  68,1  66,5  81,2  
Art, entertainment 60,8  76,9  52,2  62,8  98,8 
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and recreation 
Other types of 
services 
76,5  77,8  54,2  91,6  …  
Source: Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Yevraziyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz v Tsifrakh”. Kratkiy 
Statisticheskiy Sbornik. Moskva, 2017. P. 37 
Through the table above, we can see that the sectors of extraction of raw materials (193.1% in 
Armenia), the transport (146.3% in Kyrgyzstan), as well the information and communication 
(300.2% in Belarus) are the economic sectors that better provide to the population of the 
member-countries  a higher salary in comparison to the other economic activities. 
Figure 18: Minimum wage in USD (at the end of the year) 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Armenia 80 111 108 114 114 
Belarus 136 162 167 121 122 
Kazakhstan 116 121 110 66 68 
Kyrgyzstan 16 17 15 13 15 
Russia 150 158 100 86 121 
Souce: Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Yevraziyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz v Tsifrakh”. Kratkiy 
Statisticheskiy Sbornik. Moskva, 2017. P. 39 
Analyzing the minimal salary of the countries of the EEU, it is possible to evince that the 
differences between Belarus and Russia in comparison e.g. with Kyrgyzstan in the year 2016 are 
more marked, respectively 122 USD, 121 USD and 15 USD. The most important facet visible in the 
course of the minimum wage is the extreme fluctuation between 2014 and 2016 for countries as 
Kazakhstan or Belarus. In consideration of this last country, the trend of the minimal salary for the 
Belarusian citizens decreased from 167 USD of 2014 to 122 USD of 2016, registering a difference 
of -45 USD in three years.  
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Figure 19: Average amount of pension in USD (at the end of the year)  
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Armenia 74 71 86 85 84 
Belarus 220 233 240 156 151 
Kazakhstan 197 207 198 121 127 
Kyrgyzstan499 90 92 81 65 … 
Russia 302 300 197 158 291 
Source: Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Yevraziyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz v Tsifrakh”. Kratkiy 
Statisticheskiy Sbornik. Moskva, 2017. P. 40 
The pension system of the EEU reflects likewise the equal values of the minimum wages. During 
2016 the average pension in Russia was 291 USD (the highest in the panorama of the Union), while 
Belarus had 151 USD, Kazakhstan 127 USD, Armenia 84 USD and Kyrgyzstan 65 USD (2015).  
On the whole, these statistics reveal the still existing economic problematic of the member-
countries and the difficulties to increase the minimal and average salary in last years. The EEU’s 
states present still marked difference in the amount of salaries and pensions (Kyrgyzstan is the 
most emblematic case). In this context, although first progresses are been achieved in last five 
years, the complete equalization of salaries and pensions rests still a priority within the Union, as 
precondition to reach the harmonization of the internal economic status of all participants. 
5 Industrial Production of the Union 
The industrial field of the Eurasian Economic Union is a key sector of production for the 
development of the internal economies of the member-countries and for the entire evolution of 
the community in the global economy. Indeed, the purposes of the EEU, as expressed in the article 
92 of the Treaty, is the creation of a common industrial policy through the harmonization of the 
national policies and their implementation for the achievement of targets such: 1) a coordinated 
policy for the modernization of the industrial sectors by the promotion of new technologies of 
production; and 2) the abolishment of barriers in the industrial sphere of production between the 
participants of the Union in order to increase the concurrence in the internal market of the EEU. 
In consideration of the volume of the industrial production, the measurement of this index from 
the EEC, that will be used in this analysis, includes the volume of industrial products of the 
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 No available data for Kyrgyzstan in consideration of the year 2016. 
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member-states, which is formed by large, medium, small (including microenterprises and 
organizations), individual entrepreneurs and households engaged in the production of products 
(works and services) In the field of industrial manufacture. 
Figure 20: Structure of industrial products by types of economic activity 
(at current prices, as a percentage of the total) 
Armenia 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Industry 100 100 100 100 100 
Mining and quarrying 17,2 15,8 15,0 16,4 17,9 
Manufacturing 
industry 
62,3 62,6 65,7 62,5 61,9 
Electricity, gas, steam 
and air conditioning 
18,9 20,2 17,9 19,5 18,6 
water supply; Sewage 
system, control over 
the collection and 
distribution of waste 
1,6 1,4 1,4 1,6 1,6 
Source: Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Yevraziyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz v Tsifrakh”. Kratkiy 
Statisticheskiy Sbornik. Moskva, 2017. P. 85 
Armenia has in the manufactory sphere the most important sector of its entire industrial 
production – 61.9% in 2016. The mining and quarrying, as well the energy sector represented for 
the year 2016 respectively 17.9% and 18.6% of the Armenian industrial production. Nowadays, in 
relation of the first quarter 2017, Armenia registered a general increased of its industrial 
production by 17.20%500. 
Belarus 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Industry 100 100 100 100 100 
Mining and quarrying 1,3 1,4 1,3 1,2 1,3 
Manufacturing 90,5 89,3 88,6 87,1 86,6 
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 “Armenia Industrial Production”. In Trading Economics http://www.tradingeconomics.com/armenia/industrial-
production (last view: 10.05.2017)  
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industry 
Electricity, gas, steam 
and air conditioning 
6,7 7,6 8,3 10,0 10,4 
water supply; Sewage 
system, control over 
the collection and 
distribution of waste 
1,5 1,7 1,8 1,7 1,7 
Source: Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Yevraziyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz v Tsifrakh”. Kratkiy 
Statisticheskiy Sbornik. Moskva, 2017. P. 85 
As Armenia also Belarus has in the manufacturing industry the core of its industrial production, 
which in the year 2016 represented the 86.6% of its entire industrial sector.  
Analyzing the contemporary Belarusian industrial production, this sector, according to the 
statistics of the trading economics, increased generally by 4.3% year-on-year from January to 
March 2017, compared with a 4.3% drop in the same period of the previous year. Manufacturing 
output grew 5.1%, mainly due to increases in production of chemical products (23.5%), machinery 
and equipment (9.8%), and basic metals, fabricated metal products, except machinery and 
equipment (5.6%); while output of coke and petroleum products continued to contract sharply (-
32%). Meanwhile, mining and quarrying went up 2.1% and electricity, gas, steam, hot water and 
conditioning supply rose 1.8%; while water supply, waste management and remediation activities 
fell by 3.5%501. 
Kazakhstan 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Industry 100 100 100 100 100 
Mining and quarrying 60,8 60 59,7 50,4 50,1 
Manufacturing 
industry 
32,3 32,8 32,9 40,0 41,5 
Electricity, gas, steam 
and air conditioning 
5,9 6,3 6,5 8,4 7,4 
water supply; Sewage 1,0 0,9 0,9 1,2 1,0 
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 “Belarus Industrial Production”. In Trading Economics http://www.tradingeconomics.com/belarus/industrial-
production  (last view: 10.05.2017) 
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system, control over 
the collection and 
distribution of waste 
Source: Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Yevraziyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz v Tsifrakh”. Kratkiy 
Statisticheskiy Sbornik. Moskva, 2017. P. 85 
The Kazakh industrial production is based principally in the mining and quarrying sector 50.1% 
(2016), as well in the manufacturing industry 41.5% (2016).  
In the first quarter of 2017, the industrial production in Kazakhstan rose by 8.3% in comparison to 
the previous year. Especially in a direct comparison between February and March 2017, the 
growth rate was in its complex of 4%, divided by: mining and quarrying (10% in March from 2.3% 
in February); manufacturing (6.8% from 6.5%); electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning (6.8% 
from 2.7%) and water supply and sewerage system rebounded (0.4% from -2.5%)502. 
Kyrgyzstan 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Industry 100 100 100 100 100 
Mining and quarrying 4,4  3,0  3,3  4,4  5,6  
Manufacturing 
industry 
77,3  83,2  82,0  77,7  78,2  
Electricity, gas, steam 
and air conditioning 
17,4  13,0  13,8  17,0  15,4  
water supply; Sewage 
system, control over 
the collection and 
distribution of waste 
0,9  0,8  0,9  0,9  0,8  
Source: Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Yevraziyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz v Tsifrakh”. Kratkiy 
Statisticheskiy Sbornik. Moskva, 2017. P. 86 
The most important contribute to the industrial production for Kyrgyzstan arrived in year 2016 
from the sectors of manufacturing industry (78.2%) and the electricity, gas, steam and air 
conditioning (15.4%). Kyrgyzstan registered in comparison to the other EEU’s members the most 
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 “Kazakhstan Industrial Production”. In Trading Economics 
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/kazakhstan/industrial-production  (last view: 10.05.2017) 
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sensible increase of its industrial production in the first years of 2017 by 60%. For the Kyrgyz 
Republic it was the strongest increase since October 2013, as production rose at a faster pace for 
manufacturing (65.2% in March from 8.8% in February); mining and quarrying (68.6% from 66.5%) 
and electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning (29.2% from 13.1%). In contrast, output fell for 
water supply and sewerage (-2.4% from -2.2 %)503. 
Russia 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Industry 100 100 100 100 100 
Extraction of 
minerals 
23,4 22,7 22,0 22,8 23,1 
Manufacturing 
industry 
65,7  66,2  67,3  67,4  66,7  
Production and 
distribution of 
electricity, gas and 
water 
10,9  11,1  10,7  9,8  10,2  
Source: Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Yevraziyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz v Tsifrakh”. Kratkiy 
Statisticheskiy Sbornik. Moskva, 2017. P. 86 
The manufacturing sector of the Russian Federation constitutes the basis of its industrial 
production 66.7% (2016). But, in comparison to the other countries of the EEU, the Russian 
industrial production knew in first quarter 2017 only a tenuous increase by 0.8% (March 2017), 
recovering from a 2.3% drop in the previous month, but missing market expectations of 1.2% gain 
and confirming its actual economic troubles. Though, by the report of the Trading Economics, the 
growth rate of the industrial sectors in a direct comparison between February and March 2017 
was: manufacturing (1% in March from -5.1% in February): distribution of water, sewage (3.4% 
from -19.3 %); production and distribution of electricity and gas rose by 0.4%; and mining output 
edged up 0.2% (after showing no growth in February)504. 
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 “Kyrgyzstan Industrial Production”. In Trading Economics http://www.tradingeconomics.com/kyrgyzstan/industrial-
production (last view: 10.05.2017) 
504
 “Russia Industrial Production”. In Trading Economics http://www.tradingeconomics.com/russia/industrial-
production (last view: 10.05.2017)  
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Eurasian Economic Union 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Industry 100 100 100 100 100 
Mining and quarrying 25,2  24,7  23,8  23,6  23,7  
Manufacturing 
industry 
64,4  64,6  65,7  66,4  66,1  
Electricity, gas, steam 
and air conditioning; 
water supply; sewage 
system, control over 
the collection and 
distribution of waste 
10,4  10,7  10,5  10,0  10,2  
Source: Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Yevraziyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz v Tsifrakh”. Kratkiy 
Statisticheskiy Sbornik. Moskva, 2017. P. 86 
The manufacturing industry 66.1% (2016) is the primary sector of the industrial production of the 
Eurasian Economic Union.  
In general in the panorama of the EEU after a recession of the industrial production between 2014 
and 2015, in the year 2016 and in first quarter 2017 the industrial sector of the Union is now in a 
slow phase of regrowth.  
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Figure 21: Structure of industrial production in 2016 (in current prices, as a percentage of the 
total) 
 
Source: Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Yevraziyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz v Tsifrakh”. Kratkiy 
Statisticheskiy Sbornik. Moskva, 2017. P. 87 
In figures, taking into account the development of the industrial production of the Union, 
according to the data of the EEC, the volume of industrial production of the Union in January 2017, 
compared to January 2016, increased by 2.7% (in January 2016 compared to January 2015 was 
recorded a decrease of 1.2%). Specifically, in January 2017 Russia accounted for 88.3% of the total 
industrial production of the EEU’s members, while Kazakhstan – 6.7%; Belarus – 4.4%; and both 
Armenia and Kyrgyzstan – 0.3%505.  
In an effective comparison between January 2017 and 2016 of the structure of industrial 
production of the EEU, in January 2017 the largest share was occupied by the manufacturing 
industry (58.4%). Its share decreased by 2.6% compared to January 2016. The share of mining and 
quarrying amounted to 28% (increased by 5.3%). The share of electricity, gas, steam and air 
conditioning was 12.2% (a decrease of 2.5%). The water supply; sewage system, control over 
collection and distribution of waste decreased by 0.2% and amounted to 1.4% in January 2017506. 
Nowadays, considering the industrial production of the Eurasian Economic Union, the 
manufacturing sector rests the primary resource of the economic development of the Union. In a 
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 Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Ob osnovnykh sotsial'no-ekonomicheskikh pokazatelyakh 
Yevraziyskogo Ekonomicheskogo Soyuza”. Yanvar' 2017 g. Analiitscheskiy obzor 10 marta 2017 g. Pp. 4-5 
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 Ibid. g. P. 6 
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direct study of the member-countries, after the general decrease of internal industrial production 
in the period 2014-2015 (the first initial stage of the Union), in the period 2015-2016, the 
participants of the Union have known a tenuous economic recovery of their industrial production, 
which had increased further during the first quarter 2017 (especially for Kyrgyzstan by 60%). On 
the other hand, the Russian Federation had in comparison to the other members just a very 
sensible increase at the beginning of 2017, registering a growth rate by 0.8%. 
We can assert as the further improvement of the industrial production of the Union would be 
possible through the application of economic subsides in the production of industrial goods, as 
provided by the article 93 of the Astana Treaty. Indeed, the direct concessions of subsides to the 
member-states can favorite in the next years the expansion of the production of the entire Union 
and have a positive impact in the mutual trade between the participants of the EEU. Moreover, 
the conduction of an agreed policy within the Union could improve in better terms the entire 
production of the participants, with positive consequences in the modernization of their economic 
apparatus, as the upgrading of their infrastructures and instruments of production.   
5.1 Electric and oil market 
The article 79 of the Treaty précises as the member-states should coordinate their energy policy 
and gradually form common energy markets within the Union. 
Observing the industrial production of the Union, two principal parts of it require a consideration: 
the common electricity market of the EEU – which should be realized in 2019 – and the markets 
for oil and gas – that should work from 2024 and 2025 respectively. The choice of these periods 
provides the previous realization of new modern technological infrastructures as pipelines and 
electric systems; the progressive dismantling of commercial and regulatory barriers; and the 
realization of a better integration and coordination of the participants in terms of system 
harmonization.  
Examining the electric market of the Union, in the article 81 of the Treaty is defined that the 
member-states should gradually establish a common electric power market of the Union. Exactly, 
as underlined by Pastukhova and Kirsten, “The framework of the EEU is based on existing (from the 
Soviet era) infrastructure and on agreements dating from 2010, signed in the context of the CU. 
The only new elements in the concept for the electricity sector in the framework of the EEU are: a) 
the introduction of a trading platform at the international level and the commitment to grant all 
EEU’s states non-discriminatory access to national transmission grids; and b) the not exceeding of 
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the EEU’s tariffs for wide long distance transmission to those at national level. These objectives are 
also relevant for third countries, because, according to Pastukhova and Westphal, a quasi EEU-
wide grid could contribute not only to the development of an electricity market within the region, 
but also to its transit potential507”. 
Figure 22: Production of electricity (Billion kWh) 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Armenia 8,0 7,7 7,8 7,8 7,3 
Belarus 30,8 31,5 34,7 34,1 33,1 
Kazakhstan 90,6 92,6 94,6 91,6 94,5 
Kyrgyzstan 15,2 14,0 14,6 13,0 13,1 
Russia 1 069,3 1 059,1 1 064,2 1 067,5 1 087,1 
EAEU 1 213,9 1 204,9 1 215,9 1 214,0 1 235,1 
Source: Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Yevraziyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz v Tsifrakh”. Kratkiy 
Statisticheskiy Sbornik. Moskva, 2017.  P. 93 
The electric market capacity of the Union amounted for the year 2016 to 1 235.1 kWh bn., 
increasing from the previous year (1 214 kWh bn.) by 1.74%. In a general comparison between the 
member-countries, since 2012 all the actual participants of the EEU improved their electric 
production. For example Belarus managed a light improvement by 2.3 kWh bn. between 2012 
(30.8 kWh bn.) to 2016 (33.1 kWh billion). 
On the whole, the electric market of the Union can be more implemented through the creation of 
equal conditions for commercial entities that consequently could allow the possibility for the 
member-countries to sell electricity in the common market under the framework of a competitive 
system and successively to expand the sale of electricity to third countries. This purpose finds a 
confirmation in the words of Belarusian Energy Minister Vladimir Potupchik, who asserted: “If we 
create a common market and we have equal conditions, very good prospects of selling electricity 
on the common market of the Eurasian Economic Union and to third countries will open up before 
us. Naturally, we will grab the opportunity since the performance factor of our power-generating 
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 Cf. Pastukhova Maria and Westphal Kirsten (2016): "A Common Energy Market in the Eurasian Economic Union. 
Implications for the European Union and Energy Relations with Russia". In German Institute for International and 
Security Affairs Comments 9 February 2016. P. 2 
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installations has improved substantially, including taking into account the commissioning of the 
Belarusian nuclear power plant508". 
Thus, Belarus, that is developing now a nuclear power plant, hopes that the guideline under a 
common regulation of the electric power could increase its trade about the export of energy in the 
mutual trade within the Union and in the commerce with third countries under the regulation of 
the Free Trade Zones of the EEU. 
The article 84 of the Treaty provides that the member-states, through the agreement on a 
common program of development, should establish a common market of oil and petroleum 
products within the Union. Already in September 2015 an agreement on the methodology for 
preparing indicative balances for oil and gas products in the Union was approved by the Eurasian 
Economic Commission. Though, the realization of the common market for gas and oil needs a 
precise regulation about price liberalization and the determination of the competition in the 
sector. According to the analysis of Pastukhova and Westphal, “the central question – alongside 
the creation of joint infrastructure – is the pricing method for crude oil and oil products. Market 
prices are to apply to crude oil and oil products, while tariffs for pipeline transport will be subject to 
national regulation, with the pricing question remaining a matter of controversy – price formation 
is to be based on market mechanisms and fair competition, but will take national conditions into 
consideration. Another point of dispute, which shows the not yet absolute compactness of the 
internal market of the EEU, is the harmonization of quality standards and norms for crude oil and 
oil products. Belarus and Kazakhstan regard this as necessary, while Russia believes it to be 
unrealistic. Furthermore all technical and administrative trade barriers are to be dismantled, while 
commercial exchange and physical infrastructure are to be expanded. While favorable conditions 
for investment are also to be created. Indicative balances of consumption, production and 
transmission are to be harmonized and shared509”. 
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 “Belarus looks forward to common energy markets in Eurasian Economic Union”. In Belta. 29.12.2016 
http://eng.belta.by/economics/view/belarus-looks-forward-to-common-energy-markets-in-eurasian-economic-union-
97598-2016/ (last view: 28.05.2017) 
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 Cf. Pastukhova Maria and Westphal Kirsten (2016): "A Common Energy Market in the Eurasian Economic Union. 
Implications for the European Union and Energy Relations with Russia". In German Institute for International and 
Security Affairs Comments 9 February 2016. P. 3 
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Figure 23: Extraction of certain types of minerals in the EEU 
 Coal (million tons) 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Armenia - - - - - 
Belarus - - - - - 
Kazakhstan 120,5 119,6 114,6 107,3 102,4 
Kyrgyzstan 1,2 1,4 1,8 1,9 1,8 
Russia 356,8 353,2 357,0 372,1 385,4 
EAEU 478,5 474,2 473,4 481,3 489,6 
Source: Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Yevraziyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz v Tsifrakh”. Kratkiy 
Statisticheskiy Sbornik. Moskva, 2017.  P. 87 
The coal production of the EEU reached for the year 2016 489.6 million tons against the 481.3 
million tons of 2015, knowing an increment of 8.3 million tons more. 
Crude oil, including gas condensate (million tons) 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Armenia - - - - - 
Belarus 1,7 1,6 1,6 1,6 1,6 
Kazakhstan 79,2 81,8 80,8 79,5 78,0 
Kyrgyzstan 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 
Russia 518,7 521,7 526,1 533,7 548,6 
EAEU 599,7 605,2 608,6 614,9 628,3 
Source: Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Yevraziyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz v Tsifrakh”. Kratkiy 
Statisticheskiy Sbornik. Moskva, 2017.  P. 87 
Russia is the primary force of the Union for the production of oil and gas condensate with 548.6 
million tons in 2016. Since 2012, Russia performed an increase of its oil production, improving it in 
last five years by 29.9 million tons. The results are visible in the aggregated amount of the EEU 
which totalized in 2016 a production of 628.3 million tons. Nowadays, unfortunately, due on the 
drop of the oil price, Russia is suffering economically, registering not only an internal economic 
recession, but even a diminishing of its economic force in the global scenario. 
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Natural gas, billion m3 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Armenia - - - - - 
Belarus 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 
Kazakhstan 40,3 42,4 43,4 45,5 46,6 
Kyrgyzstan 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,03 
Russia 654,7 667,6 642,2 633,6 639,4 
EAEU 695,2 710,2 685,8 679,3 686,2 
Source: Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Yevraziyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz v Tsifrakh”. Kratkiy 
Statisticheskiy Sbornik. Moskva, 2017. P. 88 
The production of natural gas of the EEU reached 686.2 billion m3 in 2016, improving slightly in 
comparison with 2015 (679.3 billion m3) by 1.02%. Russia represents even for the natural gas, the 
most important force of the Union with a production in the year 2016 of 639.4 billion m3 – an 
amount that improved in the period of time 2015-2016 by 0.92%. 
Iron ore concentrate (million tons) 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Armenia - - - - - 
Belarus - - - - - 
Kazakhstan 14,1 14,7 14,9 11,6 10,1 
Kyrgyzstan - - - - - 
Russia 104,0 102,0 101,7 101,0 101,4 
EAEU 118,1 116,7 116,6 112,6 111,5 
Source: Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Yevraziyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz v Tsifrakh”. Kratkiy 
Statisticheskiy Sbornik. Moskva, 2017. P. 88 
The iron ore production of the Union amounted to 111.5 million tons in 2016, declining from 2012 
(118.1 million tons) to 2016 by -6.6 million tons. 
Before to complete the paragraph is useful make a consideration about the energetic sector and 
trade between two founders of the EEU: Belarus and Russia. Precisely, reflecting about the role of 
Belarus in accordance with the gas and oil sector of the Union, an aspect that must be stressed is 
the participation of Belarus in the mechanism of the Union as aim to achieve advantages in its 
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trade with Russia, obtaining low-priced Russian oil for the Belarusian petroleum refineries, and 
facilitations for the import of Russian gas with diminishing of the price paid to Russia. 
According to Tochitskaya and Kirchner, “The participation of Belarus in the EEU will entail benefits 
extended beyond preferential prices on oil and gas. It is also important for Belarus that in the 
framework of the creation of a common oil and gas market, the member-states – within the 
existing and available technical capacities – should provide unrestricted access of EEU economic 
entities to gas and oil transport systems for transit purposes. It will expand Belarus’ oil and gas 
import opportunities in the future510”. 
Concerning the gas market, Belarus pays nowadays to Russia 132.77 USD per 1000 cubic meters. 
However, the biggest issue that remains is the Belarusian gas debt with Russia. As stated by 
Gazprom, reported in the Reuters portal: “In late May 2016, Belarus’ debt for gas totalized 250 
USD million. Minsk denied the debt, and demanded to change the calculation formula and to half 
the gas price, due to the fall in oil prices on the world market. By reducing oil supplies to Belarus, 
Russia anticipates to get a refund for underpayment for gas supply to Belarus. But, if Russia 
reduces oil supplies by 5 million tons, Belarus’ GDP fall will accelerate. Belarusian oil industry is 
likely to reduce production by 22%, instead of the projected growth at 3-4%. Given the high 
proportion of oil processing in industrial production, a further decline in industrial output indicators 
is likely to follow – by at least 3% compared with the current situation. Oil products attribute to 
about 40% in the wholesale trade, the influence of which on GDP is estimated at 7%-8%. The 
reduction in oil supplies will lead to a drop in pipeline and railway transport performance511”. 
In April 2016, the Russian Deputy Prime Minister Arkady Dvorkovich asserted as Belarus has 
agreed to pay Russian gas firm Gazprom more than 720 USD million in arrears for gas supplies, 
that as Russia renewed oil supplies to Belarus of 24 million tons a year and that Gazprom would 
give Belarus discounts on gas supplies in 2018 and 2019512. Nowadays, as stressed by Belarusian 
Vice-Premier Vladimir Semashko after the talks in Moscow with Russian counterpart in April 2017, 
“the price for the Russian gas for Belarus will be 129 USD per 1,000 cubic meters in 2018 and 127 
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USD in 2019513”, showing however the volition of both parts to continue the purchase of gas in 
favorable conditions, giving even a concrete signal of economic integration within the Union.  
6 The agricultural sector 
In a brief analysis of the article 95, it is possible to observe as the regulation in the sphere of agro-
industrial production is aimed at creating conditions for the sustainable development of 
agriculture, agricultural market stability, food security, support and protection for the agricultural 
producers of the country. A standardization of the requirements in the sphere of the circulation of 
seeds of agricultural plants and livestock for breeding is the way to create equal conditions for the 
economic entities’ access to the common agricultural market and the development of mutual 
trade. 
Thus, the objective of the member-countries is to ensure free movements of goods and freedom 
in the conduction of economic activities, allowing a correct and fair functioning of the market of 
the Union, without any kind of distortions.  
In the economical complex of the Eurasian Economic Union, the agricultural turnover of the 
member-states includes about 300 million hectares of land in a common market of 182.1 million 
consumers. For that the agricultural sphere is automatically a vital sector for the trade of the 
Union that must be regulated and expanded through the investments and coordination of the 
member-states. 
Specifically, in the period 2010-2014 the average share of agricultural production in the Gross 
Domestic Product was: Armenia – 20%; Kyrgyzstan – 15%; Belarus – 8%; Kazakhstan – 4.5% and 
the Russian Federation – 3.5%514. 
Considering the mutual trade for the agricultural products and agricultural raw materials during 
the year 2015, it accounted just for 15.5% of the mutual trade515 and in 2016 by 16.1%516. It means 
that the agrarian market between the member-countries is not yet a really developed sector 
within the Union (during 2016 its percentage in the mutual trade was inferior to the raw material 
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 “Belarus to pay $129 for Russian gas in 2018, $127 – in 2019”. In Belta 17.04.2017 
http://eng.belta.by/politics/view/belarus-to-pay-129-for-russian-gas-in-2018-127-in-2019-100492-2017/ (last view: 
05.06.2017)   
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 (Edit.) Sidorskiy Sergey (2015): “Agroindustrial Policy of the Eurasian Economic Union”. In the Library of the 
Eurasian Economic Union. P. 20 http://www.eurasiancommission.org/ru/Documents/APK_ing_n.pdf (last view: 
11.04.2017) 
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 Vinokurov Evgeny (2017): “Eurasian Economic Union: Current state and preliminary results”. In Russian Journal of 
Economics 3 (2017). P. 62 
516
 Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Yevraziyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz v Tsifrakh”. Kratkiy 
Statisticheskiy Sbornik. Moskva, 2017. P. 150 
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market – 27.1% and the machinery sector – 17.5%) and shows in the same time the large 
dependence of the Union for agricultural items from third countries. Indeed, for the year 2014 the 
amount of imported agricultural products of the EEU exceeded 42 USD billion. In this period, the 
Russian imports of agricultural products amounted to 85.5% of the total volume of the Union, the 
Belarusian imports to 8.3% and the Kazakh imports to 6.2%517. Regarding the year 2016, the EEU-
trade with third states related to agrarian items amounted for the 5.5% of the entire exports of 
the Union, while the import quota of agricultural products from third countries amounted to 
13.2%518. This unbalanced relationship between the import and export quota underlines the 
strong dependence of the members of the Union from third countries (thus from imports). 
According to the statistics of the EEC, the EEU, in order to diminish this value and to develop 
better the internal market of the Union, for the successive years has the aims: 1) to increase its 
grain exports to 34.6 million tons; and 2) to decrease its imports of meat and meat products to 1.5 
million tons, and milk and sugar to 5.9 million tons and 0.1 million tons respectively. Consequently, 
the Union countries should strive to increase production of basic foodstuff, increase the volume of 
mutual trade and reduce import content519. 
Figure 24: Production of agricultural items in USD million 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Armenia 2 095 2 243 2 388 2 095 1 889 
Belarus 11 553 11 790 12 788 8 329 7 631 
Kazakhstan 13 406 15 685 14 108 14 915 10 568 
Kyrgyzstan 3 562 3 545 3 647 3 057 2 819 
Russia 107 531 115 873 113 750 85 158 84 096 
EAEU 138 147 149 136 146 681 113 554 107 003 
Source: Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Yevraziyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz v Tsifrakh”. Kratkiy 
Statisticheskiy Sbornik. Moskva, 2017. P. 95 
Focusing on the agrarian products of the EEU, we can observe as the effects of the economic crisis 
are nowadays visible in the production of the countries of the Union. In fact, in a direct 
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 (Edit.) Sidorskiy Sergey (2015): “Agroindustrial Policy of the Eurasian Economic Union”. In the Library of the 
Eurasian Economic Union. P. 26 http://www.eurasiancommission.org/ru/Documents/APK_ing_n.pdf (last view: 
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 Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Yevraziyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz v Tsifrakh”. Kratkiy 
Statisticheskiy Sbornik. Moskva, 2017). P. 148 
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 Cit. Loc. (Edit.) Sidorskiy Sergey (2015). P. 30 
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comparison between the years 2015 and 2016, all the countries registered a decrement of their 
production: Armenia -9.83%; Belarus -8.38%; Kazakhstan -29.15%; Kyrgyzstan -7.79%; and Russia -
1.25%. 
Same negative results are possible to evince in the annual turnover of the EEU for the production 
of agricultural items (107 003 USD million during the year 2016) in decline by -5.77% in 
confrontation with the previous year (113 554 USD million). 
Figure 25: Belarus GDP from Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery 
 
Source: “Belarus GDP from Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery”. In Trading Economics 
https://tradingeconomics.com/belarus/gdp-from-agriculture (last view: 20.10.2017) 
Regarding the negative data of the last two years, we can take into account the concrete case of 
Belarus. Here, through the data of the Trading Economics based on the statistics of the National 
Statistical Committee of the Republic of Belarus, we can observe that its GDP from agriculture, 
forestry and fishery between 2015 and 2016 reached its positive peaks in October 2015 with 30 
858 BYN bn. and in October 2016 with 10 549 BYN billion. In a direct comparison between these 
two months Belarus knew a diminishing of its index by -65.81%, attesting the economic difficulties 
of last years. Nowadays, the situation is improving, with a recording for Belarus in January 2017 an 
index of 34 774 BYN billion. 
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Figure 26: National contribution of the member-states to the volume of the agricultural 
production of the EEU 2016 (as a percentage of the total) 
 
Source: Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Yevraziyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz v Tsifrakh”. Kratkiy 
Statisticheskiy Sbornik. Moskva, 2017. P. 96 
The Russian Federation with the biggest percentage (78%), followed by Kazakhstan (10%) and 
Belarus (7%) contributes mostly to the agricultural production of the Eurasian Economic Union. 
In detail the principal agricultural items of production of the EEU are: grains and legumes that 
amounted for the year 2016 by 151 215 thousand tons with the principal producer Russia – 120 
672 thousand tons; sugar beet (fabric production) – 56 695 thousand tons, where for example 
Belarus totalized a production of 4 278 thousand tons in 2016; sunflower (in grain) – 11 798 
thousand tons, whose Kazakhstan had a national production of 755 thousand tons during 2016; 
potatoes that amounted to 42 760 thousand tons in 2016, contributed for example by Kyrgyzstan 
by 1 388 thousand tons; fruits and berries – 4 758 thousand tons, where Armenia produced 243 
thousand tons during 2016; and vegetables that amounted to 24 029 thousand tons during 
2016520.  
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Figure 27: Yield of main crops of the countries of the EEU 2016 (all categories of farms; quintals 
per hectare) 
 Armenia Belarus Kazakhstan  Kyrgyzstan Russia 
Cereals and 
legumes 
31  32  13,5  30  26,0  
Sugar beet 173  446  286  623  425  
Sunflower 16  15  9,3  12  15,1  
Potatoes 215  205  190  166  153  
Vegetables 304  276  250  194  227  
Fruits and 
berries 
66  84  72  49  85,6  
Source: Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Yevraziyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz v Tsifrakh”. Kratkiy 
Statisticheskiy Sbornik. Moskva, 2017. P. 103  
Although in the year 2016 was registered a general decline of the agrarian production, must be 
underlined as in the first half of 2016 the agricultural production of the Union increased at 
constant prices by 2.7% if compared to the first half of 2015. The biggest growth was observed in 
Armenia and Belarus by 3.3%. The increase in Kazakhstan was 2.7%; in Kyrgyzstan 2.9% and in 
Russia 2.6%. In the first half of 2016, production of major livestock products also increased. In the 
same period, the turnover of livestock and poultry increased by 5.4% (more than 8 million tons); 
milk by 0.6% (22.5 million tons); and eggs by 2.3% (26.6 million tons)521. 
Figure 28: Number of cattle (on farms of all categories, at the beginning of the year, thousands of 
heads) 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Armenia 661,0 677,6 688,6 701,5 702,5 
Belarus 4 367,0 4 321,2 4 363,7 4 356,5 4 302,4 
Kazakhstan 5 690,0 5 851,2 6 032,7 6 183,9 6 247,2 
Kyrgyzstan 1 367,5 1 404,2 1 458,4 1 492,5 1 527,8 
Russia 19 930,4 19 564,0 19 264,3 18 992,0 18 686,9 
EAEU 32 015,9 31 818,2 31 807,7 31 726,4 31 466,8 
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 Cf. Eurasian Economic Commission (2016): “Eurasian Economic Integration: Facts and Figures”. Library of Eurasian 
Integration. P. 19 
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Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Yevraziyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz v Tsifrakh”. Kratkiy 
Statisticheskiy Sbornik. Moskva, 2017. P. 104 
The cattle in the EEU demonstrate also the importance of this sphere in the total of the agrarian 
production of the Union. In fact, in the year 2016 the Union in its entire totalized an elevate 
livestock amounting to 31 466.8 thousands heads. 
However, we can assert that the agrarian production represents one of the economic pillars of the 
Union. This is possible to evince e.g. in the production of milk which amounted to 45 443 thousand 
tons during 2016 and whose highest percentage was constituted mostly by the Russian Federation 
with a production of 30 724 thousand tons; and eggs production with an amount of 53 090 million 
pieces during 2016522. 
Figure 29: EEU production, trade and consumption of grains in million tons 
 
 
 Source: (Edit.) Sidorskiy Sergey (2015): “Agroindustrial Policy of the Eurasian Economic Union”. In the Library of the 
Eurasian Economic Union. P. 32 http://www.eurasiancommission.org/ru/Documents/APK_ing_n.pdf (last view: 
11.04.2017) 
Observing the production of grains of the countries of the EEU, between 2014 and 2016, was 
registered an increment of the production from 132.6 million tons to 133.9 million tons. The 
positive increase in 2016 is visible even: in the mutual trade (0.8 million tons in 2016) and in the 
exports of grains (34.6 million tons). 
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Statisticheskiy Sbornik. Moskva, 2017. Pp. 106-107  
132,6 
0,7 
34,4 
133,9 
0,8 
34,6 
Production Mutual Trade World Export
2014 2016
317 
 
Figure 30: EEU production, trade and consumption of milk and dairy products in million tons 
 
Source: (Edit.) Sidorskiy Sergey (2015): “Agroindustrial Policy of the Eurasian Economic Union”. In the Library of the 
Eurasian Economic Union. P. 32 http://www.eurasiancommission.org/ru/Documents/APK_ing_n.pdf (last view: 
11.04.2017)  
The diary production knew a growth too during the years 2014-2016. Especially, the production 
increased from 41.9 million tons in 2014 to 43.5 million tons in 2016. The negative trend was 
registered in the mutual trade, where was recorded a slight decrease by -1% between 2014 (6.9 
million tons) to 2016 (5.9 million tons). 
Figure 31: EEU production, trade and consumption of meat and its derivatives in million tons 
 
Source: (Edit.) Sidorskiy Sergey (2015): “Agroindustrial Policy of the Eurasian Economic Union”. In the Library of the 
Eurasian Economic Union. P. 33 http://www.eurasiancommission.org/ru/Documents/APK_ing_n.pdf (last view: 
11.04.2017)  
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The production of meat increased too in the period 2014-2016. Precisely, the members of the EEU 
totalized a production of 11.7million tons in 2016; a mutual trade of 1.7 million tons and an 
increment of exports from 0.4 million tons in 2014 to 0.5 million tons in 2016. 
Figure 32: EEU production, trade and consumption of sugar in million tons 
 
Source: (Edit.) Sidorskiy Sergey (2015): “Agroindustrial Policy of the Eurasian Economic Union”. In the Library of the 
Eurasian Economic Union. P. 33 http://www.eurasiancommission.org/ru/Documents/APK_ing_n.pdf (last view: 
11.04.2017)  
The agrarian production in the EEU between 2014 (6.4 million tons) and 2016 (6.6 million tons) 
increased by 0.2%. A tenuous decrease was recorded in the mutual trade, which totalized during 
the year 2016 an amount of 0.1 million tons. 
As a whole, according to the official data of the EEC, in January 2017 the production of 
agricultural, forestry and fishery products of the EEU was 3.7 bn. USD and increased in constant 
prices by 0.8% compared to January 2016. Specifically, for the countries of the Union, in January 
2017, in comparison with January 2016, the Russian share in the total output of agriculture of the 
EEU increased by 2.9%; while the share of Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Armenia decreased 
by 1.5%; by 0.6%; and by 0.4% (Armenia and Kazakhstan) respectively523.  
In a general consideration, we must stress as until now however the system of the EEU related to 
the agrarian market of the member-states has not brought any decisive effects for their 
development: a) the production in 2016 was 107 003 USD million, decreasing by -16.12% in 
comparison to the previous year (113 554 USD million); and b) the trade with foreign countries is 
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more developed in comparison to the intra trade of the member-states, which registered in 2016 a 
turnover of 6.8472 billion. As positive fact, we can underline as the EEU is trying to decrease the 
imports from third countries in favor to favorite the exports, which in 2016 represented 
respectively 4% and 8.6%. 
Examining the GDP from agriculture, forestry and fishery of the member-states, we can discover as 
the first two years of the EEU were marked by a sensible decline of this index for all the 
participants. It means that the system of the Union must still be developed for a better expansion 
of the agrarian sector.  
Explicitely, the increment of the agrarian turnover can be better pursued through the 
improvement of new technologies of production in the territory of the EEU principally. In addition, 
the harmonization of the different systems of production and elimination of barriers in the mutual 
trade of the member-states will provide for a better development of the agricultural production in 
the entire Union. 
Summarizing, according to the XXV section of Treaty of the EEU, the development of a coordinated 
agricultural policy has the principal target to increment the internal production of the members 
countries with the containing of the costs of production and elimination of market distortions; and 
in consequence of that, the growth, through the setting of domestic tariffs, of export quotas of 
agrarian and food products in mutual trade and with third states. Nowadays, these conditions rest 
still difficult to realize, especially for the economic diversities of the member-countries and their 
system of productions. However, the realization and putting into practice of these conditions in 
next years will show the real possibility of the Union to evolve its system in the direction of 
equalization of the level of production of its members. 
7 Investments in the EEU 
The investments of the member-states in the territory of the Union are finalized from a side in the 
contribution to the economic growth of the local economies of the other participants; and from 
another side these are addressed to the reinforcement of regional ties between the associates of 
the Union, with the aim to cooperate together in the modernization of the internal economic 
structures through e.g. the creation of new technological equipment of production. These 
passages represent parts of the principal targets of the integration, namely the equalization of the 
level of productions of the EEU’s members and a sensible reduction of their economic differences 
that can contribute to the improvement of their trade consequently. Indeed, the achievement of 
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the harmonization and modernization of the markets of the Union is possible thanks to the 
investments of national and international enterprisers, organizations, banks and state apparatus 
that, through the input of capitals, can recover the initial costs of the creation and modernization 
of fixed assets as: new construction, expansion, reconstruction and modernization of structures in 
the internal territory of the EEU. 
Figure 33: Investments in fixed assets in USD Million 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Armenia 1 193 1 107 1 115 957 828 
Belarus 18 453 23 361 21 956 12 745 9 038 
Kazakhstan 36 706 39 918 36 785 31 681 22 559 
Kyrgyzstan 1 558 1 711 2 011 1 975 1 908 
Russia 405 088 422 698 366 148 229 100 218 832 
EAEU 462 998 488 795 428 015 276 458 253 165 
Source: Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Yevraziyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz v Tsifrakh”. Kratkiy 
Statisticheskiy Sbornik. Moskva, 2017. P. 109 
Analyzing the table above can be argued that the effects of the global financial crisis initiated since 
2008, and the Ukrainian crisis since 2014 with its repercussions to the Russian economy, had 
played in last five years a notable impact in the investments of the EEU’s members, especially in 
the period 2014-2015. Here, the most striking example is possible to evince in Belarus: 21 956 USD 
million during 2014 and 12 745 USD million in the year 2015, recording a decrease of investments 
by -41.95%. Same situation is visible in Russia, where the difference between 2014 and 2015 was 
by -37.43%. In 2016 the investments of the Eurasian Economic Union amounted to 253 165 USD 
million, that in a confrontation with 2012, registered a sensible decline by -45.32%. 
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Figure 34: Contribution of the member-states to the investments in fixed assets of the EEU 2016 
 
Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Yevraziyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz v Tsifrakh”. Kratkiy 
Statisticheskiy Sbornik. Moskva, 2017. P. 110 
In the year 2016 the Russian Federation accounted for 86.4% of the total investment in the fixed 
capital of the EEU; Kazakhstan – 8.9%; Belarus – 3.6%; Kyrgyzstan – 0.8%; and Armenia – 0, 3%.  
Figure 35: Investments in fixed capital per capita in USD 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Armenia 395 366 370 318 277 
Belarus 1 950 2 468 2 317 1 343 951 
Kazakhstan 2 186 2 343 2 128 1 806 1 267 
Kyrgyzstan 278 299 345 332 314 
Russia 2 829 2 945 2 506 1 565 1 492 
EAEU 2 600 2 735 2 356 1 516 1 383 
Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Yevraziyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz v Tsifrakh”. Kratkiy 
Statisticheskiy Sbornik. Moskva, 2017. P. 111 
 
The value of acquisitions of new or existing fixed assets by the business sector and governments of 
the member-countries for the year 2016 amounted to 1 383 USD. The Russian Federation with 1 
492 USD and Kazakhstan with 1 267 USD had the highest indexes of the Union. The investments in 
fixed capital per capita knew a marked deprecation in last five years in all the countries of the EEU: 
2 600 USD (2012) and 1 383 USD (2016) with a difference of -1 217 USD (-46.81%). 
Armenia; 0,3 Belarus; 3,6 
Kazakhstan; 8,9 
Kyrgzystan; 0,8 
Russia; 86,4 
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According to the statistics of the ECC, the main financing sources of investments in the EEU’s 
countries for the year 2016 were: 1) budgetary funds that amounted e.g. in Russia for 1 750,4 
milliard Russian rubles; 2) personal funds of enterprises and organizations that totalized e.g. in 
Kazakhstan to 4 172,4 milliard Kazakh tenge; 3) contribution of the population that accounted e.g. 
in Belarus to 2,4 milliard Belarusian rubles; and 4) loans of banks and borrowed funds of other 
organizations that amounted e.g. in Armenia to 59,8 milliard drams524.  
Figure 36: Structure of investment in fixed assets by types of economic activity in the EEU (in 
current prices, as a percentage of the total) 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Investments in fixed assets 
including: 
100 100 100 100 100 
Agriculture, forestry and 
fisheries 
4,3  4,3  4,0  4,0  4,3  
Industry 38,6  39,2  40,3  42,0  41,6  
Construction 2,6  3,0  3,1  2,6  2,8  
Commerce 3,6  3,8  3,9  3,7  4,1  
Accommodation and food 
services 
0,4  0,7  0,8  0,7  0,8  
Transport and storage; 
information and 
communication 
25,5  23,9  20,8  17,5  18,5  
Financial and insurance 
activities 
1,5  1,5  1,8  1,8  1,5  
Transactions with real estate; 
professional, scientific and 
technical activities; 
administrative activities and 
additional services in this field 
15,5  16,1  19,1  22,1  20,3  
Education 1,8  1,8  1,9  1,9  1,6  
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 Cf. Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Ob osnovnykh sotsial'no-ekonomicheskikh pokazatelyakh 
Yevraziyskogo Ekonomicheskogo Soyuza”. Yanvar' 2017 g. Analiitscheskiy obzor 10 marta 2017 g. P. 111 
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Health and social services 2,1  1,8  1,6  1,5  1,5  
Other economic activities 4,1  3,9  2,7  2,2  3,0  
Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Yevraziyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz v Tsifrakh”. Kratkiy 
Statisticheskiy Sbornik. Moskva, 2017. P.118 
The three principal sectors of the Eurasian Economic Union mostly subsided during the year 2016 
were the industry (41.6%); the professional, administrative and technical activities (20.3%); and 
the transport and communication system (18.5%). 
Generally, in January-December 2016, 253.2 USD bn. were invested in fixed assets, that in 
constant prices is 1% below in proportion to the level of January-December 2015 (2015 compared 
to 2014 was 8.7% less)525.    
Observing the investments in the EEU, another statistic to take into examination is the number of 
organizations in the territory of the Union with participation of foreign capitals of the other 
member-states that contribute to the local investments of the country-members. 
Figure 37: Number of organizations with participation of capital of the member-states (units; at 
the end of the year)526 
 2011 2012  2013  2014  2015  
Belarus 
Armenia 21  52  63  69  64  
Kazakhstan 13  23  31  35  38  
Kyrgyzstan …  4  4  2  3  
Russia 2 117  2 670  2 746  2 712  2 556  
Kazakhstan 
Armenia 20  20  25  101  114  
Belarus 53  68  73  158  170  
Kyrgyzstan …  337  368  364  375  
Russia 2 626  2 648  3 201  5 649  5 853  
Kyrgyzstan 
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 Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Ob osnovnykh sotsial'no-ekonomicheskikh pokazatelyakh 
Yevraziyskogo Ekonomicheskogo Soyuza”. Yanvar' 2017 g. Analiitscheskiy obzor 10 marta 2017 g. P. 16 
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 No available data for Kyrgyzstan in relation of Belarusian investment for the year 2013; and for the Kazakh 
investments in Kyrgyzstan for the year 2013. 
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Armenia 4  4  5  6  6  
Belarus 14  8  8  6  8  
Kazakhstan 399  401  438  474  454  
Russia 555  561  581  629  667  
Russia 
Armenia 142  153  177  204  78  
Belarus 894  1 726  3 230  3 283  931  
Kazakhstan 505  469  542  535  206  
Kyrgyzstan 56  57  71  62  51  
Source: Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2016): “Yevraziyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz v Tsifrakh”. 
Statisticheskiy Yezhegodnik. Moskva, 2016. P. 303 
The lecture about the organizations with participation of capital of the member-countries inside 
the territory of the Union demonstrates as the Russian Federation is the principal investor in the 
EEU. Specifically, taking into account the Belarusian-Russian number of organizations, the Republic 
of Belarus for the year 2015 had 2 556 units of organizations with a Russian capital investing in its 
territory. In the same year, Russia had 931 organizations with Belarusian capital. However, the 
biggest amount of organizations with Russian capital is possible to discover in Kazakhstan where at 
the end of 2015 there were 5 853 of Russian organizations. These data illustrates two fundamental 
arguments about the EEU: 1) the involvement of the troika in their respective territories is higher 
than Kyrgyzstan and Armenia; 2) Russia is the principal investors in the entire territory of the 
Union, a reason which confirms more as the economic trend of the EEU depends on the Russian 
economic choices straightly. 
Still, considering the investments of the member-countries in Russia is possible to discover as their 
amount is very narrow. In fact, by January 2014, the members invested less than 2 USD billion in 
Russia, accounting for only 0.35% of the total of the investments. According to Ziguo Li, this 
phenomenon can be explained mostly because: “1) Russia and Kazakhstan are both resource 
producers; Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan are energy and chemical producers and exporters. All 
countries have the need for trade on raw materials, but the manufactures are of the same kind 
rather than complementing each other; 2) big countries as Russia and Kazakhstan are short of 
money. They have neither the funds for foreign investment, nor the spare capacity for outward 
transfer. 3) Resource producers are more willing to do processing locally, rather than doing it in 
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other countries. And 4) generally, all member-states are technology-importing countries, which 
need technical cooperation with external countries rather than other EEU members527”. 
If from a side the mutual investments are not so considerable, from the other side the foreign 
investors of the EEU are nowadays increasing in the Union definitely, especially due to the 
possibility of the containment of the costs for the investors in the territory of the EEU (an aspect 
that can be even read as direct consequence mostly because of the devaluation of the ruble of last 
years). In a practice example we can considerate the field of foreign investments in relation of 
Belarus. The Belarusian regulation provides foreign companies with a wide range of preferences as 
the introduction of special commercial conditions for doing business on the territory of one of six 
special economic zones (0% profit tax for 5 years; 10% VAT). Here, the establishment of special 
zones – the High-Tech Park (where both VAT and income tax make up 0% for first 15 years); or the 
Belarusian-Chinese Industrial Park (with income tax for first 10 years is 0% as well)528 – wants to 
have the aim to help the foreign companies that have decided to produce in Belarus to success in 
their business. This key has already allowed Belarus to attract investors in its territory, 
contributing to the development of the country. Moreover, this strategy can cope in future, if the 
mutual investors of the EEU should continue to diminish due to the economic troubles as was 
especially during the period 2014-2015, the modernization of Belarus through international 
investments. Observing the actual status of Belarus in term of investors, nowadays there are 
several companies investing in the country as: Heineken, Velcom, EPAM Systems, Raiffeisen Bank. 
In detail, the group of companies Kronospan is realizing nowadays three projects (production of 
chip boards, hard boards, medium density fiberboards, oriented strand boards, resins, floor 
covering, wood chips and fuel biomass) in the area of wood processing estimated at about 980 
USD million. The Holding “VMG” created vertically integrated wood processing complex, including 
three plants: chip boards production, veneer and bent glued details, furniture under IKEA trade 
mark (investments are estimated at about 117 Euro million). Chinese company “Geely” in 
cooperation with Belarusian companies since 2012 have been implementing the project on 
organization of motor cars assembly with the total amount of investment of 369 USD million. 
Austrian company “Kapsch TrafficCom AG” is realizing a project on creation and operation of 
                                                          
527
 Cf. Ziguo Li (2016): “Eurasian Economic Union: Achievements, Problems and Prospects”.  In China Institute of 
International Studies, 19.08.2016.http://www.ciis.org.cn/english/2016-08/19/content_8975486.htm  (last view: 
15.9.2017)  
528
 “Investment potential of Belarus”. In Belarus Facts. Foreign mission of Belarus. Possibilities for business 
cooperation. http://belarusfacts.by/en/belarus/economy_business/business_opportunities/open_investors/ last view 
(29.05.2017) 
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electronic fee collection system in the mode of free multiband traffic, applied for vehicles on 
certain roads of the Republic of Belarus (“ETC-Systems”) on the sum of 267 USD million.  The Swiss 
company Stadler Rail AG organized railway and municipal passenger electric transport production; 
the amount of investments has been estimated at about 50 USD million. Specifically, Belarus for its 
investments uses credits, obtained from foreign banks by the Government and under the 
Government’s guarantees for investment projects realization with total amount of 17.05 USD 
billion, including such large projects as Belarusian nuclear power station construction – 10.82 USD 
billion, cellulose manufacture plant – 0.65 USD bn. and rolled steel production – 0.16 USD 
billion529.  
In a general way, the investments in the territory of the Union must be implemented in a historical 
period of economic crisis as nowadays through the attraction of foreign investors as is doing 
Belarus; and by the share of capital between local companies of the member-states. In fact, the 
improvement of the investments results to be important for the development of the Union in its 
complex and for the reduction of the economic differences of its participants. The attraction of 
foreign capitals, as the Chinese, could represent an important step in order to achieve more 
investments e.g. in the modernization of the infrastructure structure and better realization of 
technological instruments of production for the member-countries. 
8 The construction sector of the Union 
The development of new mechanisms of production and the modernization of infrastructures are 
decisive steps for the creation of a common system of interaction between the EEU’s members. In 
the sector of building, as reported by the official statistics of the EEC, are included work performed 
by organizations as reparation, reconstruction, modernization of residential and non-residential 
buildings and engineering facilities, connected primarily with the economic activities of the 
associates of the Union. The overview about the building sector of the member-states has the 
target to observe the expansion of the Union in terms of construction and infrastructures. 
 
 
 
                                                          
529
 The MFA of Republic of Belarus (2015): “Belarus’ Presidency in the EAEU bodies in 2015. 40 frequently asked 
questions”. Pp. 15-16  
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Figure 38: Volume of completed construction works in USD Million 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Armenia 501 471 479 379 326 
Belarus 8 212 10 588 10 283 5 676 3 853 
Kazakhstan 5 202 16 035 14 885 12 903 9 451 
Kyrgyzstan 609 756 780 777 989 
Russia 183 911 189 174 161 317 101 358 92 442 
EAEU 208 435 217 024 187 744 121 093 107 061 
Source: Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Yevraziyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz v Tsifrakh”. Kratkiy 
Statisticheskiy Sbornik. Moskva, 2017.  P. 120 
In the period 2015-2016 all the countries of the EEU registered a decrease of the volume of 
building sector, e.g. Belarus by -32.12% or Kazakhstan by -26.75%.  
In overview of the Union, the marked connation of this decline for the aggregated volume of the 
member-states is visible in the comparison between the year 2012 (208 435 USD million) and the 
year 2016 (107 061 USD million) with a notable difference of -48.64%. 
Figure 39: Belarus and Russia GDP from Construction in Belarusian and Russian rubles 
 
Source: “Belarus Russia GDP from Construction”. In Trading Economics https://tradingeconomics.com/belarus/gdp-
from-construction and https://tradingeconomics.com/russia/gdp-from-construction (last view: 22.10.2017) 
The graphic above, apart to marks the correlation between Belarus and Russia, shows as these two 
countries experienced together a same fluctuation in last three years: after a positive first quarter 
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for Belarus with a peak of 260242.5 BYN billion, followed by a serious decrease in second quarter 
2015; While Russia, which experienced in 2015 and 2016 negative values as well, knew its 
regrowth of GDP for construction just in fourth quarter 2016 by 1646.20 RUB billion. The 
improvement of the situation arrived for Russia in second quarter 2017 with 1082.10 RUB billion 
from 739.60 RUB billion in the first quarter of 2017. Same positive results of increment are visible 
even in Belarus, GDP from construction increased to 13285 BYN billion in the second quarter of 
2017 from 9686 BYN billion in the first quarter of 2017. 
Figure 40: Contribution of the member-states to the volume of completed construction works of 
the EEU in 2016 (as a percentage of the total) 
 
Source: Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Yevraziyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz v Tsifrakh”. Kratkiy 
Statisticheskiy Sbornik. Moskva, 2017. P. 121 
The Russian Federation with 86.4% contributed in the year 2016 to the volume of completed 
construction of the Union largely, followed by Kazakhstan (8.8%) and Belarus (3.6%). The lowest 
indexes were represented for the same period of time by Kyrgyzstan (0.9%) and Armenia (0.3%), 
confirming their weakest role within the system of the EEU. 
 
 
 
Armenia; 0,3 
Belarus; 3,6 
Kazakhstan; 8,8 
Kyrgyzstan; 0,9 
Russia; 86,4 
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Figure 41: Volume of completed construction works by types of ownership for the year 2016 in 
USD Million  
 Armenia530 Belarus Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Russia 
volume of 
completed 
construction 
works by forms 
of: 
325,6  
 
3 853,1  
 
9 450,7  
 
988,5  
 
92 442,4  
 
State … 666,8  
 
33,0  
 
45,8  
 
2 171,9  
 
Private … 3 126,8  
 
6 498,6  
 
942,2  
 
29 704,2  
 
Source: Cf. Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Yevraziyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz v Tsifrakh”. Kratkiy 
Statisticheskiy Sbornik. Moskva, 2017.  Pp. 122-123 
During the year 2016, the aggregated volume of building of the member-countries totalized 107 
060.3 USD million. Specifically, the private enterprisers contributed to the volume of the 
construction in all countries of the EEU decisively (e.g. in Russia it amounted to 29 704.2 USD 
million against 2 171.9 USD million of the state investments). 
Considering the actual situation of the Union, in January 2017 the volume of construction works 
amounted to 4.9 USD billion, which is 4.2% less than in January 2016 (January 2016 compared to 
January 2015 was -7.9% less). In January-October 2010, 6.1 million square meters of the total area 
of housing was commissioned in the EEU, which corresponds to 9.7% less than in January 2016531. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
530
 No available data of the Eurasian Economic Commission for Armenia in specific consideration of the State and 
Private sector. 
531
 Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Ob osnovnykh sotsial'no-ekonomicheskikh pokazatelyakh 
Yevraziyskogo Ekonomicheskogo Soyuza”. Yanvar' 2017 g. Analiitscheskiy obzor 10 marta 2017 g. P. 14 
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Figure 42: Contribution of the member-states to the total of the commissioned house of the EEU 
2016 (as percentage of the total) 
 
Source: Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Yevraziyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz v Tsifrakh”. Kratkiy 
Statisticheskiy Sbornik. Moskva, 2017.  P. 124 
In the year 2016, Russia accounted for 84,6% of the total housing commissioned by the members 
of the Union, Kazakhstan – 8,9%, Belarus – 5%, Kyrgyzstan – 1,2%, Armenia – 0.3%.  
Through the lecture of these data is possible to note that the situation of expansion of the Union 
in terms of construction is nowadays in a phase of stagnation, with a diminution of the 
commissioned area of building. It can be argued that the problems connected with the decrease of 
the building sector within the Union is an effect of the economic troubles of the global economic 
crisis of last ten years, that have declined especially the number of private investors in the 
construction sector of the member-countries. 
9 Transport sphere of the Union 
The improvement of the transport sphere plays a decisive role in the system of communication of 
the EEU since it is seen as decisive step for the integration of the member-countries and for the 
proper development of their mutual trade. In fact, the coordination of the transport sector, 
defined in the article 86 of the Treaty, is the basis to achieve the target of ensuring a more distinct 
economic integration. Specifically, in the Annex 24 to the  EEU Treaty, as reported by Kirchner and 
Tochitskaya, are précised the objectives of the transport sector: “1) creation of a single transport 
space; 2) development of Eurasian transport corridors; 3) development of the transit potential of 
Armenia; 0,3 Belarus; 5 
Kazakhstan; 8,9 
Kyrgyzstan; 1,2 
Russia; 84,6 
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member-states; 4) coordination of the development of transport infrastructure; 5) creation of 
logistics centers and transport organizations providing transportation process optimization; 6) 
promotion innovation on transport; and 7) liberalization of transport services between member-
states532”. 
Consequently, a common transport policy within the Union wants to guarantee the possibility for 
its members, through the establishment of a common market of services transportation (the 
single transport space), to increase their mutual trade in terms of export and import; and 
successively, to expand their commerce with other world economic partners, that could profit too 
of a coordinated and efficient transport system of the Union, in order to simplify their business 
with the EEU’s participants. 
Furthermore, in the relationship between the Union and third countries, the development of a 
coordinated transport policy (Eurasian transport corridors) and the modernization of the transport 
channels within the Union have the potential to unite the Economic Eurasian Union with the West 
(especially with the European Union) and the East (as reviewing the Silk Road), reaching the aim to 
create a bridge between Lisbon to Vladivostok. A statement which underlines the world 
significance of the EEU, as stressed by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov: “A serious element 
of a bridge between Europe and the Asia-Pacific Region533”.  
The priority about the formation of common policy for transport is actual in the panorama of the 
Union, as confirmed by the meeting of the Eurasian Council on May 8, 2015, when was approved 
the program of gradual liberalization of cargo transportation between points located in the 
territory of the EEU; and on March 31, 2016 when was prepared the document containing the 
directions and stages for the decision about the fundamental areas and mechanisms of integration 
connected with the transport field.   
Figure 43: Cargo transportation by pipeline (million tons) 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Armenia 1,8 1,7 1,7 1,6 1,6 
Belarus 137,4 134,2 130,6 132,5 126,1 
Kazakhstan 213,2 225,9 225,0 215,4 205,4 
Kyrgyzstan 0,3 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 
                                                          
532
 Kirchner Robert and Tochitskaya Irina (2014): "Belarus’ membership in the Eurasian Economic Union: An 
Assessment". In German Economic Team Belarus IPM Research Center. Policy Paper Series [PP/05/2014]. P. 10 
533
 Dobbs Joseph (2015): “The Eurasian Economic Union: a bridge to Nowhere?” European Leadership Network. P. 2 
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Russia 1 096 1 095 1 078 1 071,0 1 088,0 
EAEU 1 448,7 1 457,0 1 435,5 1 420,7 1 421,3 
Source: Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Yevraziyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz v Tsifrakh”. Kratkiy 
Statisticheskiy Sbornik. Moskva, 2017.  P. 128 
The pipeline streaming occupies a reasonable role for the transportation sphere of the Eurasian 
Economic Union, amounting for the year 2016 to 1 421.3 million tons. In comparison to the year 
2015 (1 420.7 million tons), there was a very tenuous increase of the index by 0.04%, that however 
interrupted the decrease registered from 2013 (1 457 million tons) to 2015, when the difference 
was by -2.49%. 
Figure 44: Cargo transportation by railway (million tons) 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Armenia 3,5 3,3 3,1 2,5 2,6 
Belarus 153,7 140,0 141,4 131,4 126,8 
Kazakhstan 294,8 293,7 390,7 335,1 332,3 
Kyrgyzstan 1,1 1,4 1,5 1,3 1,7 
Russia 1 421 1 381 1 375 1 217,9 1 227,0 
EAEU 1 874,1 1 819,4 1 911,7 1 688,3 1 690,3 
Source: Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Yevraziyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz v Tsifrakh”. Kratkiy 
Statisticheskiy Sbornik. Moskva, 2017.  P. 128 
The cargo transportation through railway system of the EEU amounted to 1 690.3 million tons 
during the year 2016, knowing a positive index of 0.12% in comparison to the previous year (1 
688.3 million tons). Though, in a direct confrontation between 2015 and 2016, Belarus and 
Kazakhstan registered a deprecation of cargo transportation by railways, respectively by -3.50% 
and -0.84%. 
Figure 45: Cargo transportation by automobile (million tons) 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Armenia 6,8 7,3 5,4 6,9 16,2 
Belarus 189,3 192,5 191,7 180,2 175,3 
Kazakhstan 2 718,4 2 983,4 3 129,1 3 174,3 3 181,1 
Kyrgyzstan 38,4 39,4 27,2 28,2 29,3 
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Russia 5 842 5 635 5 417 5 040,6 5 138,2 
EAEU 8 794,9 8 857,6 8 770,4 8 430,2 8 540,1 
Source: Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Yevraziyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz v Tsifrakh”. Kratkiy 
Statisticheskiy Sbornik. Moskva, 2017.  P. 128 
The transportation by vehicles within the Union constitutes the biggest amount related to the 
transport sphere in comparison to the other types of transportation with 8 540.1 million tons 
during 2016. These data confirm the necessity for the member-countries to modernize their 
streets and to create new infrastructure in order to offer a better efficiency in the road 
transportation. Considering the vehicles transportation, it was registered between 2015 (8 430.2 
million tons) and 2016 (8 540.1 million tons) an increment by 1.30%. 
Figure 46: Cargo transportation by air (million tons) 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Armenia 12,3 10,4 10,4 10,2 18,3 
Belarus 14,0 11,0 40,9 38,8 56,6 
Kazakhstan 22,0 23,9 19,1 17,0 18,1 
Kyrgyzstan534 0,7 0,5 0,2 0,2 … 
Russia 1 234,4 1 210,2 1 256,9 1 064,2 974,1 
EAEU 1 283,4 1256,0 1327,5 1 130,4 1 067,1 
Source: Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Yevraziyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz v Tsifrakh”. Kratkiy 
Statisticheskiy Sbornik. Moskva, 2017.  P. 128 
The air transport is the lowest part of the transportation system of the Union with 1 067.1 million 
tons for the year 2016. In a direct comparison between the years 2015 and 2016, the total amount 
registered a difference by -5.60%. 
Overall, the aggregated sum of all kind of transports within the EEU for the year 2016 amounted to 
11 796.4 million tons, formed specifically by: Armenia – 20.5 million tons; Belarus – 430.4 million 
tons; Kazakhstan – 3 722.6 million tons; Kyrgyzstan – 31.2 million tons; and Russia - 11 796.4 
million tons535.   
 
                                                          
534
 No available data for Kyrgyzstan in relation to the year 2016. 
535
 Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Yevraziyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz v Tsifrakh”. Kratkiy 
Statisticheskiy Sbornik. Moskva, 2017. P. 128 
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Figure 47: Dynamics of cargo transportation (without pipeline transport) of the EEU (as percentage 
of the corresponding period of the previous year) 
 
Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Ob osnovnykh sotsial'no-ekonomicheskikh pokazatelyakh 
Yevraziyskogo Ekonomicheskogo Soyuza”. Yanvar' 2017 g. Analiitscheskiy obzor 10 marta 2017 g. P. 19 
Referring to the actual situation, in January 2017, according to the EEC, the volume of goods 
transported by the member-states amounted to 839.2 million tons, registering an increase by 
3.8% in a comparison to the same period in 2016. The volume of cargo transportation (without 
pipeline transport) for January 2017 period increased by 4.3% and amounted to 700.2 million tons.  
Figure 48: Transportation of passengers by all types of transport (Millions of passengers) 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Armenia 248,5 241,3 225,8 208,9 206,1 
Belarus 2 453,2 2 451,2 2 255,4 2 094,0 1 963,4 
Kazakhstan 18 484,6 20 004,3 21 281,2 21 839,1 22 338,2 
Kyrgyzstan536 603,1 619,0 638,6 653,1 682,2 
Russia 21 370 19 652 19 558 19 122 12 226,4 
EAEU 43 159,4 42 967,8 43 959,0 43 917,1 37 416,3 
Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Yevraziyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz v Tsifrakh”. Kratkiy 
Statisticheskiy Sbornik. Moskva, 2017.  P. 135 
                                                          
536
 No available data for Kyrgyzstan in relation to the year 2016 
335 
 
The potential of the transport system of the Union is also visible through the analysis of the 
number of passengers of the EEU in last years: 43 917.1 million of passengers (2015) and 37 416.3 
million of passengers (2016), with the biggest contribution totalized by Kazakhstan with 22 338.2 
million of passengers during 2016.   
Figure 49: Dynamics of passenger transportation of the EEU (a percentage of the corresponding 
period of the previous year) 
 
Source: Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Ob osnovnykh sotsial'no-ekonomicheskikh pokazatelyakh 
Yevraziyskogo Ekonomicheskogo Soyuza”. Yanvar' 2017 g. Analiitscheskiy obzor 10 marta 2017 g. P. 23 
In January 2017, by the statistics of the Eurasian Commission, the passenger traffic amounted to 3 
billion people, which was 1.1% more than January 2016. The increase of passengers and 
movement within the territory of the Union in first quarter 2017 can be read as the first concrete 
working of the freedoms of movement within the EEU. An increment of people moving from a 
member-country to another could incentive even for example the tourism sector of the Union 
with positive effect on its entire trade. 
Generally, the further development of the economic integration in the transport sphere should be 
conducted by the Eurasian Economic Commission, as provided in the XXI section of the Treaty 
through principally: 1) development of proposals for legislation harmonization of member-
countries; 2) implementation of the Coordinated (Agreed) Transport Policy by the member-states; 
3) elimination of exemptions, limitations and barriers to the functioning of the internal Union 
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transport market; 4) monitoring the performance of treaties and the Union legal acts by the 
members of the Union; 5) assessing the regulatory impact of the draft Union legal instruments; 6) 
interacting with the member-states public authorities regarding transport, infrastructure and 
natural monopolies; and 7) investigating violations of railway cargo tariff changes within marginal 
levels (price caps)537. 
10 Small business and retail trade within the EEU 
In this paragraph will be examined the trade of the member-states concerning the sale of 
consumer goods operated inside the territory of the Union through small enterprisers, aimed at 
obtaining a clear overview about the actual situation for the aim of improvement of the national 
economies that are in large measure represented by small enterprisers. 
In detail, according to the Eurasian Economic Commission, the biggest number of small 
enterprisers and micro-organization of Armenia538 for the year 2015 was recorded for the sectors 
of: wholesale and retail trade; and reparation of cars and motorcycles – 16 844 units; 
manufacturing industry – 2 286 units; and accommodation and food services – 1 818 units539. In 
Belarus540 in the same year was registered the most consistent number of small enterprisers in the 
sector of: trade, repair of cars, household goods and personal items – 40 429 units; manufacturing 
industry – 14 658 units; and transactions with real estate, renting and provision of services to 
consumers – 14 283 units541. In 2015 Kazakhstan542 had the biggest amount of the small 
organization in the sectors of: wholesale and retail trade; repair of cars and motorcycles – 54 236 
                                                          
537
 The tasks of the EEC for the developing of a coordinated transport policy are indicated in the section XXI of the 
Treaty of the EEU. The points here underlined are summarized by the EEC, as reported in the document of 2015 of the 
Library of the Eurasian Economic Commission: “Transport Potential of the Eurasian Economic Union”. P. 19 
http://www.eurasiancommission.org/ru/Documents/transport_eng.pdf (last view: 12.03.2017) 
538
 In Armenia small-scale, commercial organizations and individual entrepreneurs include those enterprisers whose 
average number of employees does not exceed five people; small commercial organizations and individual 
entrepreneurs include those companies whose average number of employees does not exceed: in industry and other 
branches of material production - 50 people; in the field of construction and energy - 25 people; in the field of science 
and education - 25 people; and in the field of transport, trade and services - 15 people. 
539
 Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2016): “Yevraziyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz v Tsifrakh”. Statisticheskiy 
Yezhegodnik. Moskva, 2016. P. 295 
540
 Small business in Belarus include: Individual entrepreneurs registered in the Republic of Belarus; 
microorganizations registered in the Republic of Belarus with an average number of employees for a calendar year up 
to maximal 15 people; small organizations registered in the Republic of Belarus with an average number of employees 
for a calendar year from 16 to 100 people. 
541
 Cit. Loc. Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2016). P. 296   
542
 Small business in Kazakhstan are: individual entrepreneurs without the formation of a legal entity with an average 
annual number of employees of not more than fifty people; and legal entities that carry out private business, with an 
average annual number of employees of not more than fifty people and an average annual value of assets for the year 
not exceeding sixty thousandths of a monthly calculation index. 
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units; building – 31 023 units; and professional, scientific and technical activities – 14 852 units543. 
For Kyrgyzstan544 in the same year the three most important sectors of small business were: 
wholesale and retail trade; repair of cars and motorcycles – 3 401 units; industry – 2 134 units; and 
manufacturing industry – 1 610 units545. The most consistent part of Russian small business546 was 
formed by: wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles, household products 
and personal items – 80.5 thousand units; transactions with real estate, renting and provision of 
services to consumers – 46.2 thousand units; and manufacturing industry – 33.9 thousand units547. 
Through these data we can evince that the small business in the countries of the Union is mostly 
conducted for the retail of vehicles and manufacturing industry. 
Figure 50: Turnover of small enterprisers in USD Million 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Armenia 2 608 2 201 2 423 2 311 2 186 
Belarus 17 660 18 865 20 449 20 349 13 804 
Kazakhstan 9 857 10 371 12 299 44 686 46 002 
Kyrgyzstan 1 374 1 866 1 821 1 737 1 542 
Russia 770 366 755 188 778 806 695 130 285 078 
EAEU 801 865 788 491 815 798 764 213 348 612 
Source: Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2016): “Yevraziyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz v Tsifrakh”. 
Statisticheskiy Yezhegodnik. Moskva, 2016. P. 300 
The turnover of the small producers of the EEU knew its peak of growth during the year 2013 (815 
798 USD million) and a drastic decrease during the year 2015 (348 612 USD million), with a 
difference between 2013 and 2015 of -467 186 USD million. Examining the member-countries, 
during 2015 Kyrgyzstan recorded the lowest turnover of the entire Union with 1 542 USD million. 
Instead, Kazakhstan with 46 002 is the country of the Union that mostly made the biggest turnover 
                                                          
543
 Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2016): “Yevraziyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz v Tsifrakh”. Statisticheskiy 
Yezhegodnik. Moskva, 2016. P. 297  
544
 The classification of small enterprises in Kyrgyzstan is carried out according to the prevailing form, i.e. whose share 
is the largest in the annual volume of turnover or the annual volume of revenue for the previous year. 
545
 Cit. Loc. Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2016). P. 298 
546
 Small businesses in Russia are entities (including temporarily suspended economic activity for a period of not more 
than 2 years), whose average number of employees is up to 100 people; and effetuate the sale of goods (works, 
services) for the previous year Without VAT - with no more than 400 million rubles. Microenterprises are distinguished 
among small enterprises for a number of employers up to fifteen people. 
547
 Cit. Loc. Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2016). P. 299  
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between the participants of the Union for the year 2015: 46 002 USD million with a sensible 
increment in comparison with 2014 (44 686 USD million) of 1 316 USD million. 
Figure 51: Retail trade turnover in USD Million 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Armenia 3 542 3 669 3 662 2 816 2 666 
Belarus 24 172 29 876 31 003 21 364 18 102 
Kazakhstan 30 633 35 984 35 338 29 567 22 392 
Kyrgyzstan 4 085 4 624 4 902 4 558 4 394 
Russia 688 591 744 372 694 183 453 975 420 614 
EAEU 751 023 818 525 769 088 512 280 468 168 
Source: Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Yevraziyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz v Tsifrakh”. Kratkiy 
Statisticheskiy Sbornik. Moskva, 2017.  P. 141 
Regarding the retail trade, the EEU totalized during the year 2016 a turnover of 468 168 USD 
million, knowing a sensible decrease in comparison with 2015 (512 280 USD million) by -8.61 and a 
more marked difference in a direct confront with 2014 (769 088 USD million) by -39.13%. The 
sensible turnover decline of the internal demand of goods is a clear index of the economic 
difficulties that the countries of the Union in last two years had to deal with. In a general overview 
of the member-countries, in the period included between the years 2014-2016 was registered a 
common decrease, especially for Belarus -41.61% and Russia -39.41%. All these aspects led us to 
considerate as the small enterprisers are nowadays suffering from the economic difficulties of last 
ten years sensibily. In this concern, a development of the national economies with the basis to 
improve the local companies rests for the EEU still an objective to be realized. 
Figure 52: Retail trade turnover per capita (USD) 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Armenia 1 171 1 214 1 215 937 891 
Belarus 2 554 3 156 3 272 2 251 1 905 
Kazakhstan 1 824 2 112 2 044 1 685 1 258 
Kyrgyzstan 728 808 840 765 723 
Russia 4 809 5 187 4 752 3 101 2 867 
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EAEU 4 217 4 579 4 233 2 809 2 557 
Source: Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Yevraziyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz v Tsifrakh”. Kratkiy 
Statisticheskiy Sbornik. Moskva, 2017.  P. 141 
The data of the turnover retail per capita show as in the year 2016 the aggregate sum of the 
members of the Union amounted to 2 557 USD. Russia had the biggest value with 2 867 USD, 
followed by Belarus with 1 905 USD. 
Looking in detail the structure of the turnover of the retail of the member-countries, for the year 
2016 in consideration of food items and non-food products, the Armenian turnover was 41.1% for 
the non-food products and 58.9% for food product; Belarus totalized 48.6% for non-food products 
and 51.4% for food items; while Kazakhstan 64.3% for non-food items and 35.7% for food 
products, being the only country of the five members of the EEU that had a very marked turnover 
for non-food products in the subdivision of the total. Kyrgyzstan had a turnover of 49.6% and 
50.4% for non-food products and food items respectively. The Russian turnover was 51.3% for 
non-food items and 48.7% for food products. The general turnover of the retail of the Eurasian 
Economic Union for the year 2016 was 51.7% for not-food items and 48.3% for food products548.  
In January 2017 the turnover of retail trade (through all sales channels) of the member-states of 
the EEU amounted to 40.3 billion USD. In confrontation to the corresponding period of 2016, the 
volume of retail sales decreased by 2.1%549.  
11 Mutual trade of the member-states 
The leading target of the EEU is the promotion and increase of the regional trade between the 
Eurasian countries. For this reason, the countries of the Union, under the framework of the EEU, 
pursue the objective to improve their economic investments, through an agreed policy, which has 
the task to abolish the customs duties in the import and export of goods and services in the 
mutual trade by the adoption of a privileged tariff system. The successive target, after the 
unification of the system of economic interaction without barriers, is the assessment of the 
investments within the Union, which acquires a notable significance as goal to increase the 
concurrency inside the territory of the EEU – equal conditions of work may allow all countries to 
produce and export their goods on same standards, reducing the diversities of their economic 
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levels. Moreover, the possible growth of mutual trade, through the abolishment of export and 
import customs duties, can increase the demand of work in the member-countries, that 
consequently have the basis to create more places of work in their territories and thus contribute 
to the internal economic development of the Union directly. These targets find their confirmation 
exactly in the third comma of the article 28 of the EEU Treaty, which explicitly provides the 
abolishment of duties (taxes and fees having equivalent effect), non-tariff regulatory measures, 
safeguard, anti-dumping and countervailing measures) in the mutual trade of the participants of 
the Union. The elimination of barriers in the mutual trade would have the effect to simplify the 
commerce of the member-states, with the aim to achieve two principal targets: a) the creation 
and solidification of a strong trade between the member-countries that can represent a further 
step in the process of regional integration; and b) the deepen of the economic cooperation within 
the EEU with the effects to intensify the competition in the mutual trade and consequently the 
possibility to increase the national capital of the member-states, investing in the modernization of 
the internal economies.   
Figure 53: Volumes of mutual trade in goods (USD Million) 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Armenia-Belarus 45,4 41,0 38,3 34,6 36,1 
Armenia-Kazakhstan 4,5 8,1 7,3 4,8 6,3 
Belarus-Kazakhstan 898,7 928,7 940,8 578,6 395,6 
Belarus-Kyrgyzstan 153,1 110,8 95,3 61,0 52,0 
Kazakhstan-Kyrgyzstan 1 035,9 1 054,0 1 206,5 752,6 651,2 
Kazakhstan-Russia 23 096,6 23 847,0 20 196,2 15 413,8 12 936,1 
Kyrgyzstan-Armenia 0,9 1,1 0,5 0,6 1,0 
Kyrgyzstan-Russia 1 853,2 2 182,1 1 856,8 1 460,3 1 164,9 
Russia-Armenia 1 194,5 1 332,1 1 397,0 1 295,8 1 328,2 
Russia-Belarus 43 861,1 39 744,3 37 374,0 26 003,2 25 965,0 
EAEU 72 143,9 69 249,2 63 112,7 45 605,3 42 536,4 
Source: Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Yevraziyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz v Tsifrakh”. Kratkiy 
Statisticheskiy Sbornik. Moskva, 2017.  P. 149 
The mutual trade of the EEU’s members was influenced, especially in last two years, by the 
reduced demand in the main export market, Russia, which has led to a sharp reduction in the 
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supply of goods from Armenia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. In consequence of that, observing the 
evolution of the mutual trade of the participants of the Union since the last five years is possible to 
notice that the market of the Eurasian Economic Union is still affronting an intensive economic 
decrease. Clearly, considering the exports and imports of the troika, their amounts registered a 
sensible diminution mostly between the years 2014-2016: Belarus-Kazakhstan 545.2 USD million (-
57.95%); Belarus-Russia 11 409 USD million (-30.53%); and Kazakhstan-Russia 7 260.1 USD million 
(-35.95%). According to Dr. Vinokurov, in relationship to the mutual trade between Kazakhstan 
and Russia, an aspect to be considered is that: “The Russian ruble’s devaluation in 2014 caused a 
“mirroring” of the structure of mutual trade between Russia and Kazakhstan, and temporarily 
reinforced Kazakhstan’s status as a raw-materials supplier in the EAEU. This situation persisted for 
approximately one year until Kazakhstan put its currency under a floating exchange rate 
regime550.” 
Commonly, the mutual trade of the member-states for the period 2012-2016 is a concrete proof 
that the members of the Union diminished their mutual imports and exports, mainly in a direct 
confrontation between the year 2014 (69 249.2 million) and 2016 (42 536.4 USD million) with a 
difference of -32.60%. These data have the concrete significance that nowadays, due mostly to the 
economic recession, the countries of the Union are still facing on problems to the development of 
their mutual trade. 
Taking into examination the turnovers of the member-states, can be observed that the EEU has its 
principal investors in Russia and Kazakhstan. Belarus occupies also a notable position in the intra-
trade of the Union; while Armenia and Kyrgyzstan are the weakest parts of the entire territory – a 
reason which confirms as their accession to the EEU has a more geopolitical strategic connation 
than economic.  
But, regarding Kyrgyzstan, according to the EEC, in 2015 it was the only country that increased its 
supply to the Russian market. Indeed, according to the EDB, A significant increase in exports to 
Russia was noted for such groups as: goods like footwear, plastics and articles thereof, and 
chemical products. However, Kyrgyzstan's total exports decreased by 10.4%, where without gold 
the fall was even more significant and amounted to 21%551.   
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In the year 2016, the most important trades were registered between Russia-Kazakhstan (12 936.1 
USD million) and Belarus-Russia (25 965.0 USD million); while the other internal trades of the 
Union registered only 3635.3 USD million of the total turnover of the Union that amounted to 42 
536.4 USD million. 
Figure 54: Share of the total volume of exports in the mutual trade of goods between the 
countries of the EEU for 2016 (as a percentage of the total) 
 
Source: Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Yevraziyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz v Tsifrakh”. Kratkiy 
Statisticheskiy Sbornik. Moskva, 2017. P. 149 
Russia (62.4%) confirmed its first place during 2016 as principal exporter of goods in the internal 
market of the EEU. Belarus, thanks to the exports of food items and dairy products particularly, 
contributed to the 26.5% of the total amount of the exports of the Union – e.g. in the year 2016 
Belarus exported to Russia meat and meat byproducts for 678 USD million; and milk and dairy 
products for 1 745.4 USD million552. 
Accurately, concerning the volume of export supplies in the bilateral trade for the year 2016, the 
countries of the EEU totalized respectively: Armenia – 74.8 USD million; Belarus – 4 991.8 USD 
million; Kazakhstan – 1 803.7 USD million; Kyrgyzstan – 104.3 USD million; and Russia – 11 904.9 
USD million. In its total, the export volume of the EEU intra-trade was 18 979.5 USD million553. 
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Figure 55: Share of the total volume of imports in the mutual trade of goods between the 
countries of the EEU for 2016 (as a percentage of the total) 
 
Source: Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Yevraziyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz v Tsifrakh”. Kratkiy 
Statisticheskiy Sbornik. Moskva, 2017. P. 149 
Observing the imports of the EEU, Belarus (36.6%) imported in largest measure from the other 
countries of the Union during the year 2016. The figures confirm the high dependence of Belarus 
especially from Russia – connected with the import of crude oil (3 958 USD million, 2016) and 
natural gas (2 547 USD million, 2016)554. According to these statistics, an evaluation that can be 
asserted is that the EEU for Minsk represents a right economic choice for the development and 
coordination of its economy in a proper way through the economic facilitation mostly in its 
commerce with Moscow. Especially the elimination of customs duties in the intra-trade of the 
Union, that for a country as Belarus – that holds the highest percentage of imports in mutual trade 
from the Russian Federation (15.3 USD bn. – 55.5% during 2016) – could have in the future 
positive effects to improve its internal economic status. However, the data shows even as Russia 
amounted during the year 2016 for a consistent quota (34.1%) of the EEU members’ imports, 
especially for the imports of food items from Belarus (in 2016 Belarus exported 10.8 USD bn. of 
goods to Russia), demonstrating as the Russian commerce (also in consideration to the European 
and American embargo) depends also on the trade with its neighboring states consistently. 
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Figure 56: Structure of the member-states in the mutual trade of the EEU by commodity aggregate 
2016 (Million USD) 
 EAEU Armenia  Belarus Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Russia 
Total of exports, 
consisting of: 
42 536,4  392,1  11 255,1  3 917,6  417,5  26 554,1  
Mineral products 11 521,0  4,1  298,1  1 309,0  115,1  9 794,7  
Machinery, 
equipment and 
vehicles 
7 462,9  18,4  3 125,3  208,8  25,6  4 084,8  
Food products 
and agricultural 
raw materials 
6 847,3  260,7  3 594,0  423,6  108,4  2 460,6  
Chemical 
products 
5 288,1  9,5  1 350,1  743,2  11,8  3 173,5  
Metals and 
articles thereof 
4 826,1  3,1  761,6  1 007,0  4,6  3 049,8  
Textiles products 
and footwear 
1 777,8  48,5  933,6  156,3  126,0  513,4  
Wood, pulp and 
paper products 
1 175,9  0,4  332,9  18,3  3,9  820,4  
Other goods  3 637,3  47,4  859,5  51,4  22,1  2 656,9  
Source: Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Ob osnovnykh sotsial'no-ekonomicheskikh pokazatelyakh 
Yevraziyskogo Ekonomicheskogo Soyuza”. Yanvar' 2017 g. Analiitscheskiy obzor 10 marta 2017 g. P. 32 
Generally, the exports of mineral products totalized 11 521.0 USD million in the mutual trade of 
the countries of the EEU during the year 2016, constituting de facto the chief sector for the intra-
trade of the Union. Armenia and Belarus exported mostly food products, respectively 260.7 USD 
million and 3 594.0 USD million – profiting expressly from the Russian embargo against the EU to 
export food items to Russia; Kazakhstan (1 309.0 USD million) and Russia (9 794.7 USD million) 
exported raw materials principally; while Kyrgyzstan has its economic fulcra in the textile sector 
with an amount of 126.0 USD million in 2016. 
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Figure 57: Structure of mutual trade by commodity aggregate in 2016 (as a percentage of the 
total) 
 
Source: Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Yevraziyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz v Tsifrakh”. Kratkiy 
Statisticheskiy Sbornik. Moskva, 2017.  P. 150 
Overall, the raw materials (27.1%), the machinery and vehicles (17.5%), and the agrarian products 
(12.4%) constituted the three principal categories of the mutual trade of the EEU in terms of 
exports and imports for the year 2016, and represent also the pivot areas for the progressive 
development of the Union on its whole. 
Considering the first two years of the EEU, we must assert as this period of time was characterized 
by a defined falling of the mutual trade between its participants, opening serious doubts about the 
possibility of the Union to real improve the trade of its participants. But, the first quarter 2017 has 
started to show as this tendency is changing and the member-countries are nowadays registering 
an economic recovery and a slow improvement of their mutual trade: for example the volume of 
mutual trade in goods of the EEU for January-March 2017 amounted to 11 765.9 USD million, 
which, if compared with the index of January-March 2016 of 8 963.1USD million, shows a surplus 
of 2 802.8 USD billion. According to the statistics of the EEC, this increment of the volume of 
mutual trade in the first quarter of 2017 by 31.3% was recorded due to the growth of average 
prices for goods (by 19.5%) and by a clear rise in the physical volume of trade (by 9.9%)555. In 
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detail, it is possible to see as the countries of the EEU, according to the data of the EEC, in the 
period January-March 2017 have increased their mutual trade in a direct confrontation to January-
March 2016: Armenia-Belarus from 5.9 USD million (2016) to 6.6 USD million (2017); Armenia-
Kazakhstan from 0.5 USD million to 1.0 USD million; Armenia-Kyrgyzstan from 0.1 USD million to 
0.2 USD million; Armenia-Russia from 283.7 USD million to 359.3 USD million; Belarus-Kazakhstan 
from 70.6 USD million to 126.8 USD million; Belarus-Kyrgyzstan from 11.5 USD million to 13.8 USD 
million; Belarus-Russia from 5 548.8 USD million to 6 987.6 USD million; Kazakhstan-Kyrgyzstan 
from 155.8 USD million to 173.1 USD million; Kazakhstan-Russia from 2 603.8 USD million to 3 
712.0 USD million; and Kyrgyzstan Russia from 282.4 USD Million to 385.5 USD million556. 
Nonetheless, despite these encouraging results, the years 2015 and 2016 have not showed 
significant results for a real improvement of the mutual trade as expected by the participants of 
the Union. It means as the mechanisms of the EEU for the mutual trade must still be refined 
through the abolishment of barriers in the internal trade of the Union and with the institution of 
the common markets, especially for the energetic sector.  
11.1 The effects of the Russian embargo and American sanctions on the mutual trade 
Concerning the intra-trade of the member-states, a further aspect to take in analysis is the Russian 
import ban on EU’s products established since 2014 due on the Ukrainian dispute. The annex 7 of 
the EEU’s Treaty provides as every member may also adopt sanctions and embargoes at the 
national level for the protection of national security interests, in cases of balance of payments 
difficulties and on other reasons similar to general exceptions of the WTO Agreements as well as in 
exceptional situations, that are not clarified further in the EEU Treaty. The application of the 
embargo should be accepted and tolerated by the other member-countries557. Chronologically, 
the Russian embargo was introduced through the Presidential decree No. 560, dated 6 August 
2014 "On the application of certain special economic measures to ensure the security of the 
Russian Federation558". This unilateral measure instituted a ban on import into the Russian 
                                                          
556
 Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): "Ob itogakh vzaimnoy torgovli tovarami Yevraziyskogo 
Ekonomicheskogo Soyuza". Yanvar' – mart 2017 goda. Analiticheskiy Obzor 25 maya 2017 g. P. 2 
557
 Cf. Borovikov E., Evtimov B. and Danilov I. (2017): "The Eurasian Economic Union". In Getting the Deal Through. 
https://gettingthedealthrough.com/area/51/article/29132/trade-customs-eurasian-economic-union (last view: 
31.08.2017)  
558
 European Commission (2017): "Russian import ban on EU products". 
https://ec.europa.eu/food/safety/international_affairs/eu_russia/russian_import_ban_eu_products_en (last view: 
03.07.2017)  
347 
 
Federation of agricultural products, raw materials and food559, originating from the United States, 
the countries of the European Union, Canada, Australia and Norway. The embargo – planned at 
the beginning for only one year – was then extended until 5 August 2016 by the Russian 
government decision No. 625, dated 25 June 2015. In addition, this decree extended the ban on 
other products as meat, fishes, milk and dairy products and vegetables. Successively, by the 
Russian Presidential Decree No. 305 of 29 June 2016, was decided a further prolongation of the 
embargo until the 31 December 2017.  
Examining the impact of the embargo in the scenario of the EEU, Belarus reacted to these 
developments immediately. Precisely, on 7 August 2014 the Deputy Minister of Agriculture Leanid 
Marynič said in an interview with RIA Novosti that Belarus was ready to replace the banned 
products for Russia. The head of the Russian Agricultural Control Agency Sergei Dankvert arrived in 
Minsk on 12 August and urged Belarus to increase agricultural exports to Russia. Dankvert 
reported that Belarus would be allowed to process EU food products and export them to Russia. In 
consequence of that, as underlined by expert Vadzim Smok, EU businesses started to demonstrate 
renewed interest in investing into Belarus as channel of trade to export in Russia. Indeed, several 
EU producers have offered Belarus to cooperate in processing and selling EU goods to Russia, 
which was permitted by Moscow560. Though, as underlined by Dr. Libman, “The introduction of the 
sanctions started comporting a massive increase of smuggling activity from the EU to Russia, using 
Belarus as the point of entry. Russia attempted to limit these informal and semi-formal imports, re-
introducing checks at the Belarus border, calming it to be particularly concerned with the transit of 
goods from Belarus to Kazakhstan561”. 
In economic terms, the immediate effect of these measures was the increment of food items 
export from Belarus to Russia. In fact, the Belarusian exports of food products to Russia amounted 
during the first five months of 2015 around 916.400 tons in comparison with the 568.300 tons in 
the same period of 2014562, registering an increment of 348.1 tons.  
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This trend for Belarus is still nowadays confirmed by an observation of its actual situation for food 
export in its aggregate intra-trade with the other participants of the Union. Indeed, the total of the 
Belarusian export within the Union concerning food and agricultural products amounted in the 
period January-March 2017 to 982.6 USD million, corresponding to an increment by 129.1% in 
confrontation to the same period of the previous year563. Through this data of the EEC, it can be 
argued that Belarus, as principal exporter of food and agricultural items to Russia, is mostly 
profiting from the Russian ban, increasing its export quota within the territory of the Union 
consequently. The same reasoning in the panorama of the EEU is possible to apply to the other 
countries of the Union: Armenia, whose exports of food and agricultural material in first quarter 
2017 amounted to 66 USD million, with an increment in comparison to same period of previous 
year of 139%; Kazakhstan with 96.6 USD million (103.8%) and Kyrgyzstan with 39.4 USD million 
(166.7%)564. This tendency finds corresponding attestation in the import of Russia for food and 
agricultural items in the mutual trade of the EEU. Indeed, Russia during the first quarter 2017 
imported food products for 990.7 USD million, corresponding to an increase by 129.1% in 
confrontation to January-March 2016565.  
Through these statistics can be stressed as the member-countries in the first quarter 2017 have 
increased the amount of their exports for food items generally. This affirmation can be explained 
as the ban introduced by Russia for European food and agricultural products contributed to the 
increment of its import from the participants of the Union. Moreover, analyzing the situation from 
the Russian side, the decision to ban the imports of EU’s products could have a positive meaning in 
a politic lecture as well. Indeed, we can argue that the embargo allows Russia to pursue its 
geopolitical strategy against the West, attesting as the other members of the Union can cope 
better its requirements for import of food and agricultural material. 
Regarding the economic sanctions introduced by the USA as measure to punish Russia by invading 
the sovereignty of Ukraine, these were principally addressed to Russia’s energy sector – the most 
vulnerable sector of the country – with a special targeting on the three major state oil firms: 
Rosneft, Transneft and Gazprom Neft, the oil unit of gas giant Gazprom566, generating since 2015 a 
drop of the oil price and slowdown of Russian economy. Indeed, as stressed by the analysis of 
                                                          
563
 Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): "Ob itogakh vzaimnoy torgovli tovarami Yevraziyskogo 
Ekonomicheskogo Soyuza". Yanvar' – mart 2017 goda. Analiticheskiy Obzor 25 maya 2017 g. P. 10 
564
 Ibid. P. 9 
565
 Ibid. P. 10 
566
 Cf. “How far do EU-US sanctions on Russia go?” In BBC news, 15.09.2014 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
europe-28400218 (last view: 07.07.2017) 
349 
 
Starr Terrell Jermaine, “The result of sanctions and low oil prices generated a contraction of 
Russia’s GDP by 3.7% in 2015, forcing Moscow to make budget cuts in last two years567”. Thus, the 
American sanctions have generated a diminishing of the economic growth rate of Russia in the 
biennium 2015-2016, when the GDP growth rate recorded a passivity by -2.8% in January 2015, 
reaching a negative peak in July 2015 by -4.5%, and knowing a regrowth just in January 2017 by 
0.3%568. 
Considering these facts, we can observe that from a side the Russian embargo against the EU can 
have a positive effect in the increment of the mutual trade within the EEU of the member-
countries in their trade with Russia (as for Belarus in its food export). But, from another side the 
American sanctions against Russia have had a serious impact on the Russian economic growth, 
with a serious decrease of its GDP. Specifically, seeing this facet and that the Russian economy is 
the principal power in the scenario of the EEU, the consequences of its negative status have had 
naturally repercussions on the economic growth of the other members of the Union that depends 
from Russia principally. In addition, the Russian embargo and the American measures against 
Russia can have also a negative impact on the enlargement and global ambitious of the EEU to 
cooperate economically worldwide. Truly, the European countries and the USA can be considered 
the two most important economic blocs in the global economy and undoubtedly a further 
expansion of the economic trade of the Union in next years must take into consideration a 
dialogue with United Sates of America and the European Union.  
12 Foreign trade of the Union with third countries 
Parallel to the internal development of the member-countries, the Union has the aim to 
implement its expansion in the global economy. To achieve this scope, the objective of the 
member-states, under the legal framework of the Union, is to create a unique system of 
cooperation that could deal with all principal world economies. In order to reach this goal, the five 
members of the EEU want to increase, through the establishment of Free Trade Zones, their trade 
regime with those third countries, that are interested to cooperate with the EEU, facilitating their 
investments by a reduction of the costs for export and import for goods and services.  
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In fact, the successive stage of the development of the internal economies of the member-states is 
connected with the increment of the profits that the Union could reach in its global trade with 
third countries. This volition is confirmed in the article 33 of the Treaty, where is expressed that 
the EEU wants to favorite the efficiency and competitiveness of its associates in the global 
economic scenario, developing their trade worldwide through a direct interaction with third 
countries. 
Figure 58: Volumes of foreign trade of goods with third countries in USD Billion 
Armenia 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Turnover 4,3 4,4 4,5 3,4 3,6 
Export 1,1 1,1 1,2 1,2 1,4 
Import 3,2 3,3 3,3 2,2 2,2 
Balance -2,1 -2,2 -2,1 -1,0 -0,8 
Source: Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Yevraziyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz v Tsifrakh”. Kratkiy 
Statisticheskiy Sbornik. Moskva, 2017.  P. 145 
According to the data of the EEC, during the period 2012-2016 Armenia maintained its turnover of 
extra trade stable, registering a drop from 2014 to 2015 of -24.44% and an upturn of 5.88% from 
2015 to 2016. 
Figure 59: Armenian exports in USD million 
 
Source: “Armenia Exports”. In Trading Economics https://tradingeconomics.com/armenia/exports (last view: 
25.10.2017) 
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The Armenian exports in the period 2015-2016, increased constantly, reaching a peak of almost 
159 USD million in June 2015 and in November 2016 a maximum of around 170 USD million. The 
positive increment is visible even in 2017, where the aggregated Armenian exports increased, 
especially in March 2017 by 10.6% to 168.80 USD million from 152.20 USD million in February 
2017, with a peak of 199.60 USD Million in August of 2017. 
Figure 60: Armenian imports in USD million 
 
Source: “Armenia Imports”. In Trading Economics https://tradingeconomics.com/armenia/imports (last view: 
25.10.2017) 
The imports of Armenia had their maximum in December 2015 with an amount of 335.7 USD 
million and in November with 343.6 USD million. In May 2017 was reached a peak of 405 USD 
million, testifying the high necessity of Armenia to import from third countries. 
Giving a general overview about the country trade, and according to the data of the Observatory 
of Economic Complexity (OEC), the top exports of Armenia are: copper ore (326 USD million), gold 
(196 USD million), rolled tobacco (170 USD million), aluminum foil (101 USD million) and hard 
liquor (93.3 USD million). While the Armenian top imports are: petroleum gas (389 USD million), 
refined petroleum (185 USD million), cars (117 USD million), packaged medicaments (93.7 USD 
million) and diamonds (90.1 USD million). Apart Russia which with 230 USD million represents the 
first Armenian exporter, the Caucasian state exports principally to: Canada (211 USD million), 
China (172 USD million), Germany (145 USD million) and Iraq (USD 130 million). Regarding the 
import quota, after the Russian Federation (230 USD million), the top world Armenian partners for 
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imports are: China (306 USD million), Iran (185 USD million), Germany (184 USD million) and 
Georgia (151 USD million)569.  
The balance of the Armenian investments registered a negative trend in last five years, with a 
slight increase between 2015 (-1.0 USD bn.) to 2016 (-0.8 USD billion). 
Belarus 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Turnover 47,5 39,4 38,1 28,8 24,4 
Export 28,8 19,4 19,9 15,7 12,2 
Import 18,7 20,0 18,2 13,1 12,2 
Balance 10,1 -0,6 1,7 2,6 0,0 
Source: Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Yevraziyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz v Tsifrakh”. Kratkiy 
Statisticheskiy Sbornik. Moskva, 2017.  P. 145 
As is possible to evince from the table above, during the period 2012-2016 Belarus knew a gradual 
decline of its turnover, totalizing in the year 2016 a value of 24.4 USD bn. against a turnover of 
47.5 USD bn. during 2012, with a sensible difference of -23.1 USD billion. Comparing the exports 
and imports of Belarus, in the period 2012-2016 the exports decreased sensibly from 2014 (19.9 
USD billion) to 2016 (12.2 USD billion); while the imports in the considered period had a decline of 
-32.97%. However, Belarus, according to the data of the EEC, achieved in the year 2016 a balanced 
trade of its investments. 
Figure 61: Belarusian exports in USD million 
 
Source: “Belarus Exports”. In Trading Economics https://tradingeconomics.com/belarus/exports (last view: 
25.10.2017) 
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 The Observatory of Economic Complexity: “Armenia”. http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/arm/ (last 
view: 14.05.2017) 
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During June 2015, Belarus totalized 2 640.6 USD million of exports, reaching with this amount its 
peak for the year 2015. In 2016, Belarus knew its highest value in terms of exports during June 
2016 with 2 195.7 USD million, recording a deprecation of its maximal value between June 2015 
and 2016 by -16.85%. Observing the contemporary situation in the Belarusian Republic, the total 
amount of its exports increased to 2 348.30 USD million in March 2017 from 1 956.40 USD million 
in February of same year. On May 2017, Belarus reached a peak of exports of 2 539.6 USD million, 
showing an economic recovery for its foreign trade. 
Figure 62: Belarusian imports in USD million 
 
Source: “Belarus Imports”. In Trading Economics https://tradingeconomics.com/belarus/imports (last view: 
25.10.2017) 
In November 2015 Belarus recorded a maximal index of imports for 2 661.8 USD million. 
Approximately on the same value, the Belarusian Republic reached a peak of imports during 
December 2016 with 2 588.5 USD million. Nowadays, precisely in August 2017, Belarus reached its 
maximal value of imports by 2 731.3 USD million, maintaining its import quota in last three years 
stable. 
In detail, in line with the data of OEC, the structure of exports of Belarus is constituted by refined 
petroleum (6.76 USD bn.), potassium-fertilizers (2.7 USD bn.), cheese (638 USD million), crude 
petroleum (579 USD million) and delivery trucks (578 USD million). After Russia with an 
aggregated of 10.1 USD billion of exports in 2015, the world top export destinations of Belarus are: 
the United Kingdom (2.95 USD bn.), Ukraine (2.53 USD bn.), the Netherlands (1.15 USD bn.) and 
Germany (1.12 USD bn.). While, the Belarusian top imports are: crude petroleum (5.6 USD bn.), 
petroleum gas (2.63 USD bn.), apples and pears (540 USD million), refined petroleum (477 USD 
million) and packaged medicaments (395 USD million). The top import origins are – after Russia 
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with 15.5 USD bn. in 2015 – China (2.05 USD bn.), Germany (1.39 USD bn.), Poland (1.19 USD bn.) 
and Ukraine (888 USD million)570. 
Kazakhstan 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Turnover 107,9 107,9 98,6 60,2 48,3 
Export 79,6 78,1 72,3 40,8 32,8 
Import 28,3 29,8 26,3 19,4 15,5 
Balance 51,3 48,3 46,0 21,4 17,3 
Source: Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Yevraziyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz v Tsifrakh”. Kratkiy 
Statisticheskiy Sbornik. Moskva, 2017.  P. 145 
In its foreign trade with third countries, Kazakhstan totalized in the year 2016 a turnover of 48.3 
USD billion, resulting in the panorama of the EEU the second biggest economy of the Union after 
the Russian Federation. Though, as for the other countries of the Union, in the period 2012-2016, 
also Kazakhstan registered a decrement of the amount of its exports: 79.6 USD bn. (2012) against 
32.8 USD bn. (2016) with a difference of 46.8 USD billion. The same discourse is applicable for its 
imports: 28.3 USD bn. (2012) and 15.5 USD bn. (2016), with a depreciation of 12.8 USD billion. But, 
referring to the year 2016, the Kazakh balance between export and imports was positive – 
although in diminution in comparison to the previous years – accounting to 17.3 USD billion.  
Figure 63: Kazakh exports in USD million 
 
Source: “Kazakhstan Exports”. In Trading Economics https://tradingeconomics.com/kazakhstan/exports (last view: 
25.10.2017) 
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 The Observatory of Economic Complexity: “Belarus”. http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/blr/ (last view: 
15.05.2017)  
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During January 2015 was registered for the Kazakh exports a maximal value of 4 803.4 USD million. 
The situation in 2016 showed a firm decrease of exports, where, but, the peak of the year was 
reached only in December 2016 with 3 986.7 USD million. Referring to the beginning of 2017, 
exports in Kazakhstan increased in February to 3629 USD million from 3276.40 USD million in 
January, reaching a peak in May 2017 of 4 151.1 USD million.  
Figure 64: Kazakh imports in USD million 
 
Source: “Kazakhstan Imports”. In Trading Economics https://tradingeconomics.com/kazakhstan/imports (last view: 
25.10.2017) 
In the year 2015 Kazakhstan reached its peak of imports in June with an index of 2 859.1 USD 
million, knowing after a general decrease of its imports from third countries. In 2016, a sensible 
increase of imports was visible from July, reaching a maximal value in December with 2 543.6 USD 
million. In the actual scenario, imports increased in February to 2 051.80 USD million from 1 
987.20 USD million in January of 2017, reaching a peak in May 2017 with an amount of 2 667.7 
USD million.  
In a precise outline about the Kazakh exports and imports, the country exports mostly crude 
petroleum (19.8 USD bn.), refined copper (2.54 USD bn.), petroleum gas (2.5 USD bn.), radioactive 
chemicals (2.42 USD bn.) and ferroalloys (1.4 USD bn.); while the top imports consist of large iron 
pipes (1.17 USD bn.), refined petroleum (1.13 USD bn.), packaged medicaments (916 USD million), 
cars (868 USD million) and planes, helicopters, and/or spacecraft (556 USD million). The top export 
destinations of Kazakhstan are (apart Russia with 4.66 USD bn. for the year 2015): China (5.53 USD 
bn.), the Netherlands (3.55 USD bn.), France (3.01 USD bn.) and Italy (2.93 USD billion). While the 
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top import origins (after Russia with 10.5 USD bn.) are: China (5.61 USD bin.), Germany (1.74 USD 
bn.), the United States (1.37 USD bn.) and France (1.21 USD billion)571. 
Kyrgyzstan 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Turnover 4,2 4,8 4,4 3,1 3,4 
Export 1,3 1,5 1,3 1,1 1,1 
Import 2,9 3,3 3,1 2,0 2,3 
Balance -1,6 -1,8 -1,8 -0,9 -1,2 
Source: Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Yevraziyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz v Tsifrakh”. Kratkiy 
Statisticheskiy Sbornik. Moskva, 2017.  P. 145 
Kyrgyzstan, the weakest economy of the EEU and the 141st largest export economy in the world, 
totalized in the year 2016 a turnover of 3.4 USD billion, divided between 1.1 USD bn. of exports 
and 2.3 USD bn. of imports.  
Figure 65: Kyrgyz exports in USD million 
 
Source: “Kyrgyzstan Exports”. In Trading Economics https://tradingeconomics.com/kyrgyzstan/exports (last view: 
25.10.2017) 
Between the last two years, the course of the Kyrgyz exports was characterized by a situation of 
strong fluctuation, obtaining a maximal index first in December 2015 with 182.7 USD million and 
then during December 2016 with 205.2 USD million. In the first quarter of 2017 exports increased 
to 143.80 USD million (February) from 89.70 USD million (January). In March 2017 Kyrgyzstan 
achieved a maximal turnover of 119.8 USD million, showing a sensible growth of the national 
economy.  
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 The Observatory of Economic Complexity: “Kazakhstan”. http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/kaz/ (last 
view: 23.08.2017)  
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Figure 66: Kyrgyz imports in USD million 
 
Source: “Kyrgyzstan Imports”. In Trading Economics https://tradingeconomics.com/kyrgyzstan/imports (last view: 
25.10.2017) 
The Kyrgyz economy, especially due on its geographic position in central Asia, depends mostly on 
imports. In the year 2015, specifically in December 2015, Kyrgyzstan reached a peak of 445.7 USD 
million of imports. The situation in 2016 was really high between April and November, with a peak 
of 392.2 USD million in June of the import quota. Although in the first quarter of 2017 imports in 
Kyrgyzstan decreased to 255 USD million in February from 263.90 USD million in January, this 
index rests very high in comparison to the value of the exports, where Kyrgyzstan reached a 
maximal value of 387.3 USD million during August 2017. 
Based on these observations, we can assert that the negative balance of Kyrgyzstan between 
exports and imports from 2012 (-1.6 USD bn.) to 2016 (-1.2 USD bn.) principally, confirms from a 
side its scarcity of resources and from the other side its necessity to import for the development 
of its internal economy. Precisely, Kyrgyzstan for the year 2015 imported mostly: refined 
petroleum (676 USD million), light mixed woven cotton (215 USD million), packaged medicaments 
(130 USD million), synthetic filament yarn woven fabric (102 USD million) and rubber footwear 
(86.5 USD million). As exports, the resources that Kyrgyzstan mostly exports are: gold (547 USD 
million), refined petroleum (69.4 USD million), dried legumes (46 USD million), planes, helicopters, 
and/or spacecraft (38.9 USD million) and vehicle parts (31.5 USD million). The top export 
destinations of Kyrgyzstan are: Switzerland (441 USD million), Kazakhstan (204 USD million), the 
United Arab Emirates (97.8 USD million), Turkey (95.9 USD million) and Uzbekistan (95 USD 
million). While the top import origins (apart Russia with 1.27 USD bn. and Kazakhstan with 535 
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USD million in 2015) are: China (1.67 USD bn.), Turkey (216 USD million) and the United States 
(119 USD million)572. 
Russia 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Turnover 774,9 781,1 727,5 483,8 430,0 
Export 481,9 486,4 460,9 315,0 260,9 
Import 293,0 294,7 266,6 168,8 169,1 
Balance 188,9 191,7 194,3 146,2 91,8 
Source: Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Yevraziyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz v Tsifrakh”. Kratkiy 
Statisticheskiy Sbornik. Moskva, 2017.  P. 145 
Even though Russia is the economic power of the EEU, between the years 2012-2016 its turnover 
of exports and imports decreased considerably by -44.51%. The most marked difference in the 
export sector was registered between 2014 (460.9 USD bn.) and 2015 (315.0 USD billion), with a 
difference of -145.9 USD billion, confirming the Russian economic decrease, due especially to the 
economic financial crisis and the costs of the Ukrainian conflict. These data find a confirmation 
even in the balance of the Russian Federation for the year 2016: 91.8 USD bn. against the 146.2 
USD bn. of 2015 with a minus of 54.4 USD billion.  
Figure 67: Russian exports in USD million 
 
Source: “Russia Exports”. In Trading Economics https://tradingeconomics.com/russia/exports (last view: 25.10.2017) 
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 The Observatory of Economic Complexity: “Kyrgyzstan”. http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/kgz/ (last 
view: 15.05.2017) 
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In 2015 Russia reached its maximal value of export in March with 32 894 USD million. The year 
2016 was characterized by a strong stagnation of the Russian exports, reaching a peak only in 
December by 31 295 USD million. During the first quarter 2017, Russia reached a peak of exports 
in March with an amount of 31 328 USD million, showing a tenuous increase of Russian exports. 
In general, Russia during 2015-2016 decreased its exports, due to the European embargo and 
especially because of the decline in oil price (the oil prices for 2016 was set to 56 USD pro barrel573 
against the initial price decided by the Government for 2016 to 96 USD574). Regarding the import 
quota, in a direct comparison between last two years, this index registered a same amount 
approximately: 168.8 USD bn. in 2015 and 169.1 USD bn. in 2016, attesting China (31.1 USD bn.) as 
the first importer partner of Russia, and Belarus (15.5 USD bn.), especially considered to 
agricultural items, as principal partner within the EEU. However, the most drastic change for the 
Russian trade is visible in the comparison between the biennium 2014 and 2015, where the 
exports decreased by -31.66% and the imports by -36.68%, as direct effects of the reduction of oil 
price and the embargo against the EU. 
Figure 68: Russian imports in USD millions 
 
Source: “Russia Imports”. In Trading Economics https://tradingeconomics.com/russia/imports (last view: 25.10.2017) 
The imports for the year 2015 were stable with a maximal value in December of 17 428 USD 
million. After a flexion of imports in the first quarter 2016, due especially on the EU’s embargo and 
American sanctions, from August 2016 the index of the imports restarted to rise, reaching a peak 
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 Mauldin John (2016): "Low Oil Prices Will Make Russia More Aggressive In 2017". In Forbes, 27.12.2016. 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnmauldin/2016/12/27/low-oil-prices-will-make-russia-more-aggressive-in-
2017/#97aabe17367c (last view: 30.08.2017) 
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 Grushevenko Ekaterina (2015): "The Effects of Lower Oil Prices on Russia". In NBR, 14.05.2015 
http://nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=561 (last view: 30.08.2017) 
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in December with 19 476 USD million (almost complimentary to December 2015). In July 2017 
Russia reached a peak of 22 354 USD million, increasing its import quota in comparison to the 
previous period of time overall. 
Russia represents, according to the OEC, the 13th largest export economy in the world. In 2015, 
the top exports of Russia amounted in goods such: crude petroleum (90.1 USD bn.), refined 
petroleum (57.5 USD bn.), petroleum gas (25.4 USD bn.), coal briquettes (10.4 USD bn.) and raw 
aluminum (7.02 USD bn.). While the top imports are represented by: cars (7.73 USD bn.), packaged 
medicaments (7.01 USD bn.), vehicle parts (5.05 USD bn.), computers (4.05 USD bn.) and planes, 
helicopters, and/or spacecraft (3.45 USD billion). Although the embargo with the European Union, 
the top export destinations of Russia rest currently: the Netherlands (32.2 USD bn.), China (31.1 
USD bn.), Germany (18.5 USD bn.), Italy (15.5 USD bn.) and in the panorama of the EEU, Belarus 
with 15.5 USD billion. While, the top import origins are: (apart Belarus with 10.2 USD bn. in 2015): 
China (34.5 USD bn.), Germany (22.4 USD bn.), the United States, despite the economic sanctions 
(10.2 USD bn.), and Italy (7.71 USD billion)575.  
However, nowadays in Russia, as evinced even in the other members of the EEU, started since 
2017 an improvement of the economic situation, where the in the first quarter 2017, was 
registered a sensible increase of the Russian exports to third countries: 37.2% (27.3 USD bn.) in 
March from 28.5% in February. Almost equal positive trend is possible to see in the trade with CIS 
countries, which was 24.6% in February and 23% in March 2017. According to the data of the 
Russian Customs Statistics, Russian exports rose mainly for: fuels and energy products (46.8% to 
19 USD bn.) followed by metals (37.8% to 3.8 USD bn.); chemical products (18.8% to 2.4 USD bn.); 
foodstuffs and raw materials (40.8% to 2 USD bn.); and machinery and equipment (1.2% to 1.7 
USD billion)576. Regarding the imports, these went up 21.8% to 18.7 USD bn. in March 2017 from 
15.4 USD bn. compared to one year earlier. Imports from non-CIS countries climbed 20.1% to 16.6 
USD bn. (from 18.8% in February) and those from CIS countries advanced by 36.6% to 2.1 USD 
billion. The imports rose for: machinery and equipment (21.5 % to 8.1 USD bn.) followed by 
chemical products (22.7% to 3.5 USD bn.); foodstuffs and raw materials (15.9% to 2.4 USD bn.); 
textiles and footwear (26% to 1.1 USD bn.) and metals (30.3% to 1.2 USD billion)577. 
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 The Observatory of Economic Complexity: “Russia”. http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/rus/ (last view: 
15.05.2017) 
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 “Russia Exports”. In Trading Economics http://www.tradingeconomics.com/russia/exports (last view: 25.10.2017) 
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Eurasian Economic Union 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Turnover 938,8 937,6 873,1 579,3 509,7 
Export 592,7 586,5 555,6 373,8 308,4 
Import 346,1 351,1 317,5 205,5 201,3 
Balance 246,6 235,4 238,1 168,3 107,1 
Source: Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Yevraziyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz v Tsifrakh”. Kratkiy 
Statisticheskiy Sbornik. Moskva, 2017.  P. 145 
In its complex, the EEU reflects the tendency of the member-countries of last five years: a general 
decrease of its turnover of export and import with the third countries in the period 2012-2016, 
with a marked difference of -33.65% in a direct comparison between the turnover of the years 
2014 (873.1 USD bn.) and 2015 (579.3 USD billion). Also in a comparison between 2015 and 2016, 
is possible to notice the strong decrease of the exports (-17.50%) and the light diminution of the 
imports (-2.04%) with a balance for the year 2016 of 107.1 USD bn. against the same index of the 
previous year that amounted to 168.3 USD bn. (-61.2 USD billion). The clear deteriorating of the 
exports, most visible in the period 2014-2016, is an index of the difficult economic situation of the 
member-countries, started already since the global economic crisis of 2008 and as consequence 
from the sharp decline in hydrocarbon prices principally.  
Figure 69: Principal foreign trade partners of the EEU 2016 (in percentage) 
 
Source: Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Yevraziyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz v Tsifrakh”. Kratkiy 
Statisticheskiy Sbornik. Moskva, 2017.  P. 147 
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Though, despite the economic difficulties of last years, the Eurasian Economic Union wants to 
compete with the most developed economies of the world, in order to enhance its economic 
importance in the global scenario and facilitate the commerce with third countries through a 
system of Free Trade Zone.  
According to this target, we can list the principal trade partners of the EEU. Accurately, the three 
top partners of the Union are: China (15.4%), Germany (8.8%) and the Netherland (7.3%). 
According to the data of the EEC, in terms of export and import, the EEU exported to China during 
the year 2016 32.9 USD bn. and imported 45.7% USD billion. This segment allows us to stress as 
China is one of the most strategic economic partner of the Union and as the successive expansion 
of the Union must take into account the cooperation with China in direction Far East. Specifically, 
during the year 2016 the EEU totalized a trade balance respectively: Germany (22.6 USD bn. of 
exports and 22.5 USD bn. of imports); the Netherland (33.5 USD bn. and 3.5 USD bn.); Italy (19.5 
USD bn. and 9.4 USD bn.); USA (10.1 USD bn. and 12.9 USD bn.); Turkey (14.7 USD bn. and 3.9 USD 
bn.); Japan (10.0 USD bn. and 7.4 USD bn.); France (6.6 USD bn. and 9.5 USD bn.); South Korea 
(10.3 USD bn. and 5.7 USD bn.); Poland (10.4 USD bn. and 5.4 USD bn.); Ukraine (10.1 USD bn. and 
5.5 USD bn.); United Kingdom (8.9 USD bn. and 4.0 USD bn.); and Finland (6.8 USD bn. and 2.7 USD 
billion)578. 
Considering the foreign trade of the EEU and its regime of FTZ, we can list the other key partners 
of the Union, according to the foreign trade volume totalized by the countries of the Union for the 
year 2015: India (8.8 USD bn.); Vietnam (4.3 USD bn.); Egypt (4.3 USD bn.); Singapore (3.2 USD 
bn.); Israel (2.8 USD bn.); Iran (2.3 USD bn.); and Chile (0.8 USD bn.).  
In consideration of the international associations, the EEU had for the 2015 its principal partners 
in: the European Union with a foreign trade volume of 283.1 USD billion; MERCOSUR (Argentina, 
Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela) with an index of 8.2 USD billion; and ASEAN (Brunei, 
Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam) 
with a turnover of 15.1 USD billion579. 
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Figure 70: Structure of exports of the member-states in foreign trade with third countries by 
commodity aggregate 2016 (USD Million) 
 EAEU Armenia  Belarus Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Russia 
Total of 
exports, 
consisting of: 
308 444,9  1 390,8  12 162,5  32 858,0  1 126,0  260 907,6  
Mineral 
products 
187 055,6  466,8  4 759,2  22 579,3  97,8  159 152,5  
Metals and 
articles thereof 
32 279,1  217,6  853,2  5 148,8  33,1  26 026,4  
Chemical 
products 
20 583,9  17,1  3 087,4  1 910,8  19,2  15 549,4  
Food products 
and agricultural 
raw materials 
16 941,1  262,9  310,8  1 705,7  77,8  14 583,9  
Machinery, 
equipment and 
vehicles 
13 007,3  27,7  1 179,4  415,4  103,4  11 281,4  
Wood, pulp and 
paper products 
9 885,1  2,7  680,2  229,9  0,4  8 971,9  
Textiles 
products and 
footwear 
837,8  47,5  305,1  79,9  19,5  385,8  
Other goods 27 855,0  348,5  987,2  788,2  774,8  24 956,3  
Source: Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Ob osnovnykh sotsial'no-ekonomicheskikh pokazatelyakh 
Yevraziyskogo Ekonomicheskogo Soyuza”. Yanvar' 2017 g. Analiitscheskiy obzor 10 marta 2017 g. P. 28 
For the year 2016 the biggest contribute for the exports of the EEU was connected with the 
mineral sector (308 444.9 USD million): Armenia – 466.8 USD million; Belarus – 4 759.2 USD 
million; Kazakhstan – 22 579.3 USD million; Kyrgyzstan – 97.8 USD million; and the Russian 
Federation with the biggest value – 159 152.5 USD million. 
364 
 
Figure 71: Structure of exports of the EEU with third countries by commodity aggregate in 2016 (as 
a percentage of the total, rounded up by excess) 
 
Source: Cf. Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Yevraziyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz v Tsifrakh”. Kratkiy 
Statisticheskiy Sbornik. Moskva, 2017.  P. 148 
The three principal goods that the EU exported during the year 2016 were: mineral products 
(60.6%); metals and its derivatives (10.5%); and chemical products (6.7%). 
Figure 72: Structure of import of the EEU by commodity aggregate with third countries in 2016 
 (USD Million) 
 EAEU Armenia  Belarus Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Russia 
Total of 
imports, 
consisting of: 
201 344,6  2 169,7  12 205,9  15 508,9  2 374,4  169 085,7  
Machinery, 
equipment and 
vehicles 
87 117,2  536,0  3 992,3  6 802,4  684,4  75 102,1  
Chemical 
products 
37 260,1  354,7  2 292,7  2 451,7  317,2  31 843,8  
Food products 
and agricultural 
26 491,6  414,1  3 094,1  1 693,0  159,1  21 131,3  
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raw materials 
Metals and 
articles thereof 
12 953,9  123,7  904,7  1 952,3  128,1  9 845,1  
Textiles 
products and 
footwear 
12 722,0  244,5  839,0  691,3  801,6  10 145,6  
Wood, pulp and 
paper products 
3 724,0  79,5  246,6  257,0  34,1  3 106,8  
Mineral 
products 
2 558,7  155,5  123,0  662,6  18,9  1 598,7  
Other goods 18 517,1  261,7  713,5  998,6  231,0  16 312,3  
Source: Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Ob osnovnykh sotsial'no-ekonomicheskikh pokazatelyakh 
Yevraziyskogo Ekonomicheskogo Soyuza”. Yanvar' 2017 g. Analiitscheskiy obzor 10 marta 2017 g. P. 29 
In relation of the import quota of the member-countries for the year 2016, the machinery, 
equipment and vehicles constituted the main sector of imports of the EEU (201 344,6 USD million): 
Armenia – 536,0 USD million; Belarus – 3 992,3 USD million; Kazakhstan – 6 802,4 USD million; 
Kyrgyzstan – 684,4 USD million; and Russia – 75 102,1 USD million. 
Figure 73: Structure of imports of the EEU by commodity aggregate with third countries in 2016 
(as a percentage of the total, rounded up by excess) 
 
Source: Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Yevraziyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz v Tsifrakh”. Kratkiy 
Statisticheskiy Sbornik. Moskva, 2017.  P. 148 
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The top three goods that the EEU imported during the year 2016 were: machinery, equipment and 
vehicles (43.3%); chemical products (18.5%); and food and agricultural raw materials (13.2%). 
Figure 74: Contribution of the EEU members to the import with third countries in first quarter 
2016 (as percentage of the total) 
 
Source: Eurasian Economic Commission (2016): “Eurasian Economic Integration: Facts and Figures”. Library of 
Eurasian Integration. P. 16 
Considering the first quarter 2016, The Russian Federation was the first country of the Union for 
the quota of imports with third countries (83.2%). The other members of the EEU contributed to 
the imports of the Union respectively: Armenia – 1.1%; Belarus – 6.2%; Kazakhstan 8.2%; and 
Kyrgyzstan – 1.3%. 
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Figure 75: Contribution of the EEU members to the export with third countries in first quarter 
2016 (as percentage of the total) 
 
Source: Eurasian Economic Commission (2016): “Eurasian Economic Integration: Facts and Figures”. Library of 
Eurasian Integration. P. 16 
After the lecture of the figures about the extra-trade of the Union, the principal element that 
stands out is that the Russian Federation (84.2% in first quarter 2016) represents the core of the 
export of the entire Union. It explains, because its economic trends have direct influence on the 
other countries of the EEU. Indeed, during the first quarter 2016 the other member-states 
contributed to the export quota of the Union with third countries in comparison to Russia slightly: 
Kazakhstan – 10.7%; Belarus – 4.4%; Armenia – 0.4; and Kyrgyzstan – 0.7%. This passage means 
that the resolution of the economic challenges of last years must be a priority for the governments 
of the member-states in order to improve their internal economy and consequently of the Union 
entirely.  
12.1 Considerations about the mutual trade of the Union and trade with third countries 
After have examined the statistics of the intra and extra trade of the EEU, the following aim is to 
understand if the mechanisms of the Union are really working, and if in the first two years the 
member-countries have known positive effects in their mutual trade. 
As thought by the three founders of the EEU, the Union, through the establishment of common 
markets, has the main target to modernize the national economies of the member-states and to 
improve their commerce, increasing the intra-trade of the Union directly. But, taking into account 
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the data of the EEC, the EEU has not yet developed a consolidated system of interaction between 
its associates and the import and export quotas in the mutual trade rest lower than the values of 
the extra-trade. In consideration of these aspects, the aim of this paragraph, through the 
examination of precise figures, wants to demonstrate the actual slow influence of the EEU on the 
internal trade of its members. 
Figure 76: Percentage of the shares of the member-states in the total volume of imports in the 
mutual trade of goods 2012-2016 
 
Source: Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Yevraziyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz v Tsifrakh”. Kratkiy 
Statisticheskiy Sbornik. Moskva, 2017. P. 149 
The imports of the member-countries in the period 2012-2016 have not identified special changes 
in their mutual trade – only a tenuous increment in Armenia from 1.5% (2012) to 2.6% (2016) and 
Russia from 31.7 (2015) to 34.1% (2016). Instead, Belarus and Kazakhstan have diminished their 
import quotas from the other participants of the Union, registering in the period 2012-2016 a 
difference by -1.6% and -1.9% respectively. 
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Figure 77: Percentage of the shares of the member-states in the total volume of exports in the 
mutual trade of goods 2012-2016 
 
Source: Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Yevraziyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz v Tsifrakh”. Kratkiy 
Statisticheskiy Sbornik. Moskva, 2017. P. 149 
That the EEU’s internal market has met difficulties in its development, is even possible to discover 
in the volume of exports between the period 2012-2016, where only Belarus registered an 
increment of its exports in the territory of the Union from 24% (2012) to 26.5% (2016). A part 
Belarus, whose slow increment can be justified because of the re-export of agricultural items to 
Russia due to the Russian economic embargo against the EU, the other members of the Union 
have diminished their export quotas within the Union – significant is the value of Russia, that, due 
to the economic shocks of last years, decreased its export quota from 65.2% (2012) to 62.4% 
(2016). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0,4 0,9 
24 
26,5 
9,5 9,2 
0,9 1 
65,2 
62,4 
2012 2016
Armenia Belarus Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Russia
370 
 
Figure 78: Mutual trade of the member-countries for goods in million USD 2012-2016 
 
Source: own calculation through the data of the Eurasian Economic Commission as reported in: Yevraziskaya 
Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Yevraziyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz v Tsifrakh”. Kratkiy Statisticheskiy Sbornik. 
Moskva, 2017.  P. 149 
In figures, this negative trend, especially since 2013, is confirmed observing every country of the 
EEU (even for Belarus which economy is connected to Russia predominantly) and analyzing the 
aggregated volume of mutual trade of the Union for goods, that from 2012 to 2016 recorded a 
progressive drop of its turnover: from 72 143.9 USD million (2012) to 42 536.4 USD million (2016) 
with a decrease by – 29 607.5 USD million.  
Concerning these data, we can make two considerations: 1) the statistics of the EEC show as the 
intra-trade between the country-members is almost inexistent – especially if we considerate the 
turnover of the year 2016 for trade between Armenia-Belarus (36.1 USD million), Belarus-
Kyrgyzstan (52 USD million) or Kyrgyzstan-Armenia (1 USD million); and 2) the tenuous progresses 
about the improvement of the mutual trade is a proof that the economic integration between the 
member-countries is moving slowly – instead to enhance their mutual trade in the first years of 
the functioning of the Union, the member-states have known an increment of their trade with 
foreign countries. In fact, in the first two years of work of the EEU, the Union has not known an 
increment of the export quotas of its members in the mutual trade, confirming consequently the 
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necessity for the Union to import from third countries – a factor that still marks the market of the 
EEU subordinated to the other world economies. 
Figure 79: Distribution of intra and extra trade for goods of the EEU in 2016 (as a percentage of the 
total) 
 
Source: Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Yevraziyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz v Tsifrakh”. Kratkiy 
Statisticheskiy Sbornik. Moskva, 2017. P. 150 
Taking into analysis the year 2016 and confront the intra and extra trade of the Union, it can be 
immediately notated the enormous difference between the aggregated volume of the mutual 
trade of the EEU (14.2%) and the trade with foreign countries (85.8%). This fact demonstrates as 
the member-countries depend on imports from third countries largely and consequently as the 
actual participants have not profited from the internal market of the Union seriously. In 
confirmation of these assertions, can be reported the thesis advanced by Professor Zagorsky: “The 
amount of reciprocal trade between the member states of the EEU is not particularly significant. 
The lion’s share of economic exchange between EEU members falls to third countries580”. This 
affirmation can be explained considering the fact that within the Union are still present obstacles 
that hinder the economic cooperation between its members, penalizing their mutual trade 
subsequently. It means that there are barriers that must be eliminated. In a classification of these 
obstacles, the “White Report” of the year 2016 has already detected numerous barriers, and the 
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Commission has started its work of removal consequently. In general, quoting the analysis of Li 
Ziguo, we can identify the principal obstacles in the mutual-trade: “1) “quota limit”. Belarus looks 
forward to the complete elimination of limits to the quota of tariff-free oil supplied by Russia as 
soon as possible. But the energy producer insists that the quota system should be kept until 2025. 
2) “Technical barriers”. For example, Kazakhstan is a large alcohol producer. But the protection of 
their own wine markets by Russia and Belarus makes it difficult for its alcohol products to be 
exported in large quantities to the two countries. And Kyrgyzstan complains that its quarantine 
certificate is not recognized by other countries. 3) “Connected but not smooth”. To prevent 
sanctioned Western goods from entering Russia through Kazakhstan and Belarus, Russia has 
strengthened its border checks. Due to Russia’s sanctions on Turkey, goods exported from countries 
like Kazakhstan cannot travel through Russia581”. 
Considering these data, it can be argued that the EEU since 2015 has not played a decisive role on 
the economic development of its associates. A partially justification can come from the adverse 
world economic conditions of last years, as the drop of oil price or the Russian embargo against 
the EU, that have caused an economic stagnation on all the member-countries, limiting their 
economic expansion because their direct linkage to the Russian market. 
The first conclusion that we can trace is the circumstance that the EEU during 2015-2016 has 
known a slow process of unification of the legislations of the member-states that, in addition to 
the economic recession, has affected the mutual trade negatively, bringing any considerable effect 
in the development of their mutual commerce in the first biennium of the Union. In consequence 
of that, we should ascertain that the EEU has still the core of its commerce in the extra-trade, 
testifying a strong dependence of imports to exports – a reason that gives serious doubts about 
the possibility of the Union to occupy a determinant place in the world market in next years.  
13 The expansion of the EEU through the Free Trade Zones 
Before continuing the economic examination of the Eurasian Economic Union is essential to 
considerate the necessity for the Union to cooperate with third countries economically, because 
the extra-trade, still representing the most consistent part of the commerce of the member-
countries, is thus essential for the economic growth of the Union in the world economy. Indeed, as 
underlined by Dr. Vinokurov: “The EAEU with a GDP of $2 trillion (just the 3.2% of global GDP) and 
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a population of 182 million people (including 93 million gain fully employed people) is not a self-
sufficient market”582. For this reason the Union requires to cooperate economically with the other 
world economies in order to promote the expansion of its trade worldwide. To achieve this target, 
the EEU is moving through the creation of free trade zones that have the advantage to form a 
network of interaction with foreign countries by the introduction of agreed economic facilitations 
by the utilization of a facilitated fiscal regime and reduction or elimination of custom duties.  
Institutionally, the negotiations about the realization of a free trade zone are conducted both by 
the EEC and any of the member-states that may initiate negotiations between the Eurasian 
Economic Union and a third country. A potential partner may also make a proposal to start 
negotiations. The initiator of such negotiations should provide a statement of reasons, indicating 
the possible advantages for the establishment of a FTZ Agreement. After receiving the statement, 
the EEC makes an expert assessment and collects the opinions of the participants. If all members 
agree that the prospects of the agreement are interesting, they form a joint research group (JRS) 
comprising the representatives of the EEU’s countries, the EEC, and the interested partner. The 
work carried out by the JRS is the preparation for negotiations; here, experts study the economies 
of the parties and the parameters of their external and mutual trade, and search for the areas that 
are of mutual interest for the participants. After that, their taks is to develop a draft scheme of 
future arrangements. Following the results of its work, the JRS presents a detailed report about 
the feasibility of negotiations regarding the FTZ. On the basis of this report, the Presidents of the 
EEU’s countries decide on the launch of negotiations. If the decision is positive, the EEC Council 
approves the directives for negotiations at the level of vice prime ministers. Then, the 
representatives of the EEC, the member-states and the future FTZ partner elaborate the text of 
the agreement and decide on future obligations and concessions. The negotiation process itself is 
a good background for the development of mutual trade on a bilateral basis by the participating 
states. Based on the expected simplification of market access, the entrepreneurs start to actively 
establish business contacts and elaborate establishing a distribution network in order to be the 
first ones to take the advantages of the free trade583. 
                                                          
582
 Vinokurov Evgeny (2017): “Eurasian Economic Union: Current state and preliminary results”. In Russian Journal of 
Economics 3 (2017). P. 66 
583
 Library of the Eurasian Economic Commission (2016): “Eurasian Economic Integration: Facts and Figures”. P. 64 
http://www.eurasiancommission.org/ru/Documents/%D0%91%D1%80%D0%BE%D1%88%D1%8E%D1%80%D0%B0%2
0%D0%A6%D0%B8%D1%84%D1%80%D1%8B%20%D0%B8%20%D1%84%D0%B0%D0%BA%D1%82%D1%8B%20%D0%
B8%D1%82%20(%D0%90%D0%BD%D0%B3%D0%BB).pdf (last view: 23.04.2017) 
374 
 
In this direction, the first concrete accomplishment is represented by Vietnam, whose FTZ was 
ratified in November 2015584. From the side of the EEU, according to the former Chairman of the 
Board of the Eurasian Economic Commission Viktor Khristenko, the comprehensive agreement, 
which will reduce and in some cases eliminate customs duties on 87% of goods traded between 
the two parties, is expected to boost trade between Vietnam and Eurasia to more than 10 USD bn. 
by 2020 from its present level around 4 USD billion. For Vietnam, the trade agreement is expected 
to open new markets in Eurasia for a range of goods: farm products, seafood, textiles, footwear, 
and processed food. The EEU members, particularly Russia, are looking to sell technology, mineral 
resources and cars in Vietnam585, with the intent to expand their technological market. Legally, the 
agreement provides that by 2025 the average customs tariff rate in the EEU will decline from 9.7% 
to 2%; and in Vietnam from 10% to 1%. According to the agreement, the import duties are slashed 
to zero for approximately 60% of mutual trade positions. After the transition period until 2020, the 
share of zero-duty items will have increased to 88%586. 
Nowadays, according to Veronika Nikishina, Minister in charge for Trade of the EEC, the trade 
between the EEU and Vietnam, is developing constantly: “Over just five months of 2017, the total 
goods turnover between the EEU and Vietnam amounted to almost USD 2 billion, demonstrating 
26.6% growth587”. In consequence of that, we can evaluate positive the first FTZ of the EEU. 
Figure 80: Ongoing work on EEU trade and economic agreements as of November 1, 2016 
Active FTA Vietnam (November 2015) 
Negotiating mandates China (mandate for a non-preferential treaty 
granted in May 2016); Iran and Israel 
Potential candidates 
(work teams, expression of 
interest, memorandums) 
Egypt; India; Cambodia; Mongolia (joint research 
group in operation); Peru; Singapore; Chile; South 
Korea (joint research group in operation); New 
Zealand (advanced negotiations cancelled in 2014) 
Source: Vinokurov Evgeny (2017): “Eurasian Economic Union: Current state and preliminary results”. In Russian 
Journal of Economics 3 (2017). P. 66 
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In general, the system of the FTZs of the EEU works together with the free trade zones and 
territories with privileges of the member-states, aimed to attract more foreign companies. These 
areas provide investors with tax and customs privileges, allowing saving up to 25-30% of expenses 
on the stage of project’s realization. The business regulation in FTZs, except for customs 
regulation, is referred to the national competence of the EEU’s member-states. It means 
application of different sets of privileges and preferences in the national territory. Belarus for 
example, through its facilitated tax regimes for foreign investors, already started to adopt 
initiatives on facilitating the investment conditions actively: 1) tax free profits on all goods and 
services for five years, then a 50% discount. The discounted rate cannot exceed 12%; 2) 50% 
discount on VAT – this does not extend to the VAT at a preferential rate of 10 (9.09) % and 0%; 3) 
no customs duties and taxes on imported equipment and goods to be used within the FEZ (Free 
Economic Zone). The manufactured goods are freely exported; 4) preferential terms of land lease; 
and 5) free disposition of currency earnings588. Nowadays, practically all the Belarusian territory is 
the complex of successfully functioning preference zones with these favorable investment 
conditions, i.e.: FEZs589, industrial park “Great Stone” and other zones including those located in 
small towns and countryside590. 
In the panorama of the Union, the creation of a preferential agreement network to ensure 
beneficial trade relations with partners in different regions of the world is a priority task in the 
area of the EEU’s trade policy, as instrument to expand its commerce worldwide. Indeed, In 
accordance with the initiative of the President Nazarbayev, the year 2016 was declared the “Year 
of Deepening Economic Relations of the Union with Third Countries and Key Integration 
Associations.” The meaning of this concept is that the Eurasian Economic Union should become an 
open economic community, organically integrated in the global economic system as a reliable 
bridge between Europe and advancing Asia591.   
This idea, as proposed by Nazarbayev, would have the goal to create a favorable integration of 
third countries in their economic cooperation with the EEU easily. Unfortunately, such system of 
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open economy rests sill nowadays difficult to reach. Principally because it requires, as underlined 
even by the Kazakh President, the adjustment of the internal regulation of the Union, as the 
improvement of the customs regulations in the Union's Customs code, the simplification of 
customs administration procedures for participants of foreign economic activity, or the creation 
and implementation of "single window" mechanisms for export and import transactions. Thus, 
agreeing with Nazarbayev, the still present problem of the member-states for their national and 
world expansion is the lack of use of tools as technical, customs and tariff regulation that could 
facilitate the diversification of the economies of the member-states, in full conformity with the 
WTO rules592. Consequently, we can assert as the system of the EEU rests still incomplete for its 
expansion world-wide because of the still existing diversification of the national economies and 
legislation of the participants of the Union. The Belarusian economy for example, remains mostly 
state controlled (the 70%593); while for example in Russia the interests of the oligarchs could 
collide with a facilitated import and export tariff with third countries, that could be contrast with 
their economic monopolies (especially for the energetic market) in the country and in all Eurasian 
region.  
However, this volition to maintain a differentiated regime in the trade with third countries finds a 
direct confirmation in the article 102 of the Treaty, which expresses as “Notwithstanding the 
provisions of Article 35 of this Treaty, the Member States may unilaterally grant preferences in 
trade with a third party on the basis of an international treaty concluded by the respective Member 
State with such a third party before January 1, 2015 or an international treaty to which all the 
Member States are participants594”. These previsions give thus preference to bilateral accords 
between every member-state and a third country. A justification of the Legislator for this 
arraignment can be explained as the volition to not collide with the own interests of the member-
countries in their foreign trade, without prejudicing them by a rapid application of a general 
regulation that could bring negative effects for their trade with foreign countries, but instead to 
allow them to continue the concession of preferences in their commerce with third countries in 
order even to not demotivate their accession and participation to the Union. 
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Though, the aim of the EEU is to expand its economic apparatus compactly and to create FTZs in 
order to further enlarge its role in the world scenario. For that the Commission is trying to 
encourage the member-states to renegotiate existing bilateral trade agreements and conclude 
new ones according to the interests of the EEU, intended as an economic block.  
In this direction another example is represented by Iran, whose Free Trade Zone agreement 
should be finalized at the end of 2017. Specifically, the FTZ with Iran, which will apply lower import 
duties on a number of agricultural goods from Iran – including pistachio nuts, dates and raisins –, 
as stressed by Zamir Kabulov, head of the second Asian department of Russia’s Foreign Ministry, 
could give a serious impetus to the development of bilateral economic ties between Iran and the 
EEU595. In August 2017 Iran and Armenia, in the context of the EEU, have signed a memorandum 
of understanding to broaden cooperation between Iran’s Aras and Armenia’s Meghri free trade 
zones. According to the report from Arka, as reported in the article of Lee John, the establishment 
of the free economic zone in the southern Armenian Meghri, near the border with Iran, is 
estimated to cost 32 USD million, of which 28 USD million is capital expenditure. The free 
economic zone is expected to create 2.500 new jobs and increase Armenian exports by 30%596. 
From its side Iran hopes too that through the FTZ with the Union its agricultural market, especially 
in direction of Russia, exploiting the actual Russian embargo against the EU, could increase 
positively, creating a solid link in the axis Moscow-Tehran. In fact, as stressed by Foy Henry, the 
Iranian country represents even an important pawn for the geopolitical strategy of Moscow. 
Nowadays, the two countries co-operate on a number of geopolitical issues, most notably in the 
war in Syria. Moreover, they have sought to deepen their relationship since the EU and US 
imposed sanctions on Moscow in 2014597. In this sense, Iran can play a double role in the scenario 
of the EEU: from a hand can expand the partnerships of the community, and from the other side 
can be a solid ally of Russia for its geopolitical ambitions and an economic reliable partner.  
Also Indonesia, as confirmed by Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs Retno Marsudi during his 
speech with the Belarusian Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Vladimir Lopato-
Zagorsky in July 2017, expressed its volition to access in the preferential economic system of the 
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EEU, quoiting Belarus as a key partner of Indonesia among the other members of the Union598. 
Belarus shares with Indonesia a trade turnover of 101.2 USD million, with 83.9 USD million of 
exports in 2016599. A possible negotiation of FTZ with Indonesia would be hence promoted from 
Belarus according to the agricultural market, creating a privileged tariff for the imports and 
exports of agricultural items between the two countries principally. For the entire EEU the 
accession of Indonesia – with a GDP of 932.259 USD bn. and a population of 261 million 
inhabitants600 – could have a positive significance too in order to have a new economic trade-
partner and to further expand its trade in direction Southeast Asia.       
13.1 The cooperation with the European Union, possible to achieve? 
A deep and stable economic integration with the European Union would be extremely important 
for the Eurasian Economic Union, especially in consideration of the fact, that a consistent part of 
the economic partners of the Union are European countries: in 2015 the EEU-EU foreign trade 
recorded a volume of 283.1 USD billion, accounting the EU for over 50% of total exports and over 
40% of total imports of the EEU601.   
Concerning a possible cooperation between these two organizations, we must reflect about the 
relationship between Russia and the EU firstly. In this background, is possible to observe, that, 
apart the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), which entered into force in December 
1997 and wanted to provided Russia the perspective of participation in the EU's internal market 
through sectorial agreements in the fields of steel, transit, energy and textile; and the strategy of 
June 1999 "Common strategy of the EU towards Russia", to try inserting Russia in the European 
social economic space; the relationship between the two parts did not develop significantly. 
Rather the contacts between the two parts knew moments of tensions as: during Russian 
intervention in Georgia in August 2008, seen from Brussels as a tentative of Russian aggression to 
Georgia; or the gas crisis between Russia and Ukraine in 2009 that led to a level of mistrust within 
the EU about the reliability of Moscow as an energy supplier. From the European side, the launch 
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of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) and the Eastern Partnership (EAP) in 2009 for six 
countries of the former Soviet Union (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and 
Ukraine), with the aim to promote democratic, human rights, rule of law and market oriented 
reforms, was seen from Moscow, according to the study of Schäffer, as an European tentative to 
encircle Russia in the post-Soviet area602.  
Politically, it means, that, starting from a presupposition of contrast between the EU and Russia 
and the volition of Russia to occupy a consolidated leadership in the Eurasian Region without 
external obstacles that could weaken its position towards the post-Soviet states, the relationship 
of Moscow to Brussels rests still nowadays distant (i.e. the ENP and the EAP have never found an 
application in Russia); and the relationship Russia-EU is maintained for economic interests 
exclusively (Russia is one of the EU's largest suppliers of energy. In 2013, it accounted for 39% of 
its natural gas imports603). Therefore, regarding these facts, can be confirmed that the realization 
of the EEU is a clear tentative of Russia to incorporate post-Soviet states in a mechanism similar to 
the EU, contrasting in the same time the possible interaction and involvement of the EU in the 
national systems of the Eurasian states, giving thus only Russia a straight domain over the post-
Soviet region.  
For the truth, must be even ascertained as the European implications through the EAP in the 
actual associates of the EEU, Armenia and Belarus, did not know during the last decade an 
extraordinary progress. Indeed, Armenia decided in September 2013 to not sign the Association 
Agreement with the EU, acceding afterwards to the Eurasian Economic Union, in order to have a 
military support from Russia for the ongoing Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. For Belarus, although the 
existence of a European financing in favor of the country connected with the ENP, in order to 
promote democracy and human rights, a serious development of the European-Belarusian 
relationship is not yet occurred. In fact, considering the European amount in favor of Belarus (from 
5 million Euro of 2007 to 15.8 million Euro in 2013), programmed in the “country strategy paper 
2007-2013 and national indicative program 2007-2011”, just a very low part of the sum was used: 
specifically in favor of the civil society and to help the areas located in the south of the country, as 
Gomel oblast, contaminated after the Chernobyl-disaster. The problem with Belarus is a 
fundamental mismatch and contradiction in values, goals and instruments between the European 
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and the Belarusian side. Moreover, Minsk remains an historic ally of Moscow, another reason that 
has excluded an involvement of Belarus in the European politics and conduced Minsk to sign the 
Treaty of the Eurasian Economic Union.  
In addition, Armenia and Belarus (the two countries geographically further West of the actual 
participants of the EEU and that could have a direct implication in the EU’s policy), that, according 
to the World Bank, totalized in 2016 a GDP of 47.43 USD bn. and 10.547 USD billion respectively, 
rest two economic models still different from the European counterparts, a reason that justifies 
their accession to the EEU than a possible implication in European politics. Precisely, if from a side 
Belarus produces relatively stable (its GDP is e.g. higher than its neighbors: Lithuania 42.74 USD 
bn. or Latvia 27.68 USD bn.), from the other side must be stressed as the still Sovietized Belarusian 
system of production (more incline to Russian standards of production that to the Europeans) or 
the political misunderstandings between Minsk and Brussels (regarding especially democratic 
issues), are principal issues that are still blocking a further cooperation between Belarus and the 
EU – as even considered by the tenuous utilization of the European budget of the EAP in the 
country in the previous years. In the case of Armenia, its economic model, already with Kyrgyzstan 
the weakest in the context of the EEU, could thus meet difficulties in its integration with the 
European standards of production. In this direction, we can argue that the accession to the EEU, 
with the possibility to develop its market with Russia and the opportunity for its inhabitants to 
work in the Russian territory without barriers, can be interpreted as a suitable choice for Armenia, 
in order to obtain privileges in the Eurasian market especially from Russia. 
Considering Russia, although the turbulent relationship between Moscow and Brussels, the two 
parts, specifically for their economic interests (despite the embargo, in 2016 the European Union 
exported goods for a total of 72.4 Euro bn. to Russia, which in turn exported goods for 116.7 bn. 
Euro to the EU604), need to find a compromise. Actually, as reported by Dr. Vinokurov, during the 
EU-Russia summit of January 2014, President Putin had advanced the idea about the 
establishment of a FTZ through the system of the EEU with the EU, underlining the important 
position of the European countries for the development of the EEU trade. This proposal was 
embraced in February 2014 by Nazarbayev, showing a direct interest of the EEU to institute a 
particular tariff regime with the EU. Successively, in September 2014, former European 
Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighborhood Policy, Štefan Füle, started to support the 
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possible negotiation of a free trade with the EEU officially, recognizing that the problems of 
Eastern partnership cannot be solved without the Russian participation605. 
But, analyzing the current situation, the Ukrainian crisis has further mined the relationship 
between Moscow and Brussels, with the consequence that the economic expansion of the EEU 
toward the West Europe is nowadays in a stagnant phase. In fact, the last Russian geopolitical 
decisions were hardly criticized by Brussels. Precisely, Viktor Khristenko, during his charge of 
Chairman of the EEC, formally requested negotiations with the European Commission in October 
2015. But, the European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker responded with a letter to 
President Putin in November 2015 that held out the possibility of cooperation with the EEU under 
certain conditions. The most controversial points criticized by the European Union are: 1) the 
dispute over Crimea’s status and the conflict in eastern Ukraine; 2) Russia’s opposition to decisions 
by Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia to pursue political association and economic integration with 
the EU; and 3) the desire of non-Russian EEU members to maintain or enhance bilateral relations 
with the EU, rather than negotiate through the EEU606.  
Reflecting about the Crimea annexation, as reported in the study of Hans-Jürgen Zahorka, this 
event has brought about an internal division in the geopolitical debate in the relationship EU-EEU 
between who sees the EEU as a model of engagement, as the Socialism and Democratic Party, that 
support the idea that the creation of a common economic area “from Lisbon to Vladivostok” could 
democratically contribute to the amelioration of their relations; and who, as the Alliance of 
Liberals and Democrats for Europe, that valuate the EEU as a model of containment for the 
relations between EU and Russia, that through a deeper economic cooperation could make further 
steps for the respect of democracy in Russia607.  
Taking into account the desire of the EEU’s members to maintain bilateral relations with the EU, 
Armenia has decided to cooperate within the mechanisms of the EEU for more military than 
economic reasons, but the EU remains Armenia’s main trading partner, accounting for around 26% 
of Armenia’s total trade. The EU continues to be Armenia's biggest export market with 29.6% 
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share in total Armenian exports and 24% share in total imports608. For that, Armenia would like to 
continue cooperating through bilateral accords with the EU that represents, even due to the low 
influence of the EEU mutual trade on its national economy, a reliable economic partner. Same 
discourse and volition to conduct free bilateral accords with the EU is possible to apply for Belarus: 
the EU is Belarus' second main trade partner with almost a one third share in the country's overall 
trade609, and Belarus for that cannot renounce to its trade with the European countries. Moreover, 
Belarus, due to its geographical position, considered as bridge between the East and West, and its 
predisposition to organize events with European representatives (especially of economic 
interaction but even politic as host country for the pacific resolution of the Ukrainian conflict 
through the Minsk-Protocol), has become since last years an important platform to connect the 
EEU with the EU, as underlined by Tatyana Valovaya, Member of the Board for Integration and 
Macroeconomics of the Eurasian Economic Commission, “Minsk is becoming an important point of 
the Union where major international events are arranged610”. Through this staatment, can be 
ascertained, that the organization of events and the volition to cooperate with the European 
authorities could be a significant step for a better interaction not just for Belarus but even for the 
other member-countries with their European counterparts, promoting a direct economic 
collaboration. 
The economic cooperation could be favorable also for the EU. In fact, observing the economic 
situation from the European side, the EU is the largest trade partner for Russia and Kazakhstan: 
more than one half of the Russian Federation’s trade volume is attributable to the EU; and Russia, 
in turn, is the European Union’s third largest trade partner.  
Specifically, according to Dr. Vikokurov, for the EU a close economic cooperation with the EEU 
assumes a fundamental importance too: “1) the EEU is the European Union’s third-largest trading 
partner after the U.S. and China. 2) Security issues, including those of our shared neighborhood, 
can only be addressed within the scope of cooperation with EEU countries. 3) Ongoing structural 
dependence on Eurasian hydrocarbons. 4) In general, the free trade regime with the EEU will 
provide the EU producers with an opportunity not only to strengthen their competitiveness on this 
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important market but also to enhance terms of trade on the markets adjacent to the Eurasian 
Union. The combination of the EU and EEU competitive advantages will create a change to realize 
the ‘double rent’ – both technological rent for the EU and the resource rent for its Eurasian 
counterpart. This will lead to higher competitiveness of all economies adjacent to the Lisbon to 
Vladivostok framework611”. In this direction, according to the Centre for Integration Studies of the 
Eurasian Development Bank and the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis it is 
essential to step up efforts to normalize and develop relations between the European Union and 
the Eurasian Economic Union612. 
Concluding, in consideration of these facts we can recognize that a possible cooperation EEU-EU 
would be profitable for both parts. Indeed the EU, through a FTZ with the EEU (by a reduction in 
non-tariff barriers, the removal of restrictions on trade in services, capital movement and labor 
flows or the application of trade facilitation policies principally) could increase its investments in 
Eurasia, playing a decisive role in modernizing the countries of the Eurasian integration project613.  
Nowadays Germany, the Netherland and Italy, represent a considerable part of the trade of the 
member-states of the EEU. Though, must be affirmed that at the moment the situation of further 
expansion rests blocked and not just because of the Ukrainian crisis or misunderstanding between 
Moscow and Brussels, but even because a complete negotiation between the EEU and the EU will 
be possible only when all the member-countries will be part of the WTO (thus after the accession 
of Belarus). Moreover, according to Dr. Vinokurov, a realistic estimate of the duration of EU-EEU 
negotiations would take from 5 to 8 years: “In order to have a chance at toasting a signed 
agreement in the mid-2020s, it is vital to sit down to the negotiating table as soon as the political 
situation allows”614. In general the relationship between the two organizations would be profitable 
for both parts economically, although its realization is not yet easy to be achieved, at least in the 
short period.   
13.2 The partnership with China 
In consideration of the actual difficulties for the EEU to deal with the EEU, the most considerable 
relationship in the global economic scenario for the Union is actually represented by China. 
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Indeed, China has a great significance for the trade of the member-countries (15.4% of the EEU 
turnover is connected with China), so a straight cooperation can be profitable for both parts: China 
is already a particularly important partner for Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan; while for China 
the Central Asian states are decisive for its economic plan to implement the Silk Road Economic 
Belt, which crosses Central Asia to Europe and has for this aim a budget of 40 USD billion of 
promised investments in infrastructure for trade routes from Western China through Central Asia 
and Russia to the Middle East and Europe615. 
Besides, according to Dr. Popescu, for China the partnership with the Union has at least positive 
effects to not perturb the status quo in Central Asia: “Its calculation is that the EEU would not 
disrupt its projects and investments in the states of Central Asia – from acquisitions of raw 
materials to the building of gas pipelines, roads and railways – which are not subject to tariff 
restrictions. And the states of Central Asia, from either inside the EEU or outside, would continue 
hedging and navigating between Russia and China. *…+ Thus, from a Chinese perspective the EEU is 
not necessarily seen as a positive development, but at the end of the day its effects are still 
manageable616”. 
Comprehensively, the cooperation between China and the member-countries is developing since 
2012 concretely, when were signed two Memoranda of Cooperation with the Chinese Ministry of 
Commerce on trade and cooperation in the field of anti-dumping, countervailing and safeguard 
measures. In 2013-2014, due to regular expert consultations, the parties managed to settle some 
disputable mutual trade issues at the initial stage. Furthermore, the interests of both 
manufacturers from the Union countries and Chinese exporters were taken into account. Since 
2012, the Eurasian Economic Commission has been working on the arrangement of information 
exchange with China. In autumn 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced the launch of “Silk 
Road Economic Belt” (SREB) project. The main objective of the project is cooperation in trade, 
transport and investment, reinforcing, modernizing and expanding transport infrastructure. 
In practice, the functioning and development of international transport corridors, connecting 
Siberia with central and western regions of China as well countries of Central and South Asia, 
involve coordinated policy aimed at the elimination of administrative, technological, technical and 
economic burdens. For EEU members the SREB provides an inflow of investment in modernization 
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of transport infrastructure to strengthen mutual trade between the countries of the Union and 
increase their investment attractiveness617. 
In May 2015, the Presidents of the member-states of the Eurasian Economic Union decided to 
negotiate with China an agreement on trade and economic cooperation for further progress in the 
area of trade simplification and elimination of non-tariff barriers. Successively, in June 2016, the 
EEC Minister in charge of Trade Veronica Nikishina and the Chinese Minister of Commerce Gao 
Hucheng signed a joint statement on the transition to the negotiation stage of the Agreement 
development, with the target to promote cooperation, and ensuring operation of the developed 
cooperation institutions on a broad cooperation agenda618. Specifically, according to the words of 
Nikishina, "The parties plan to comprehensively develop bilateral trade rules in a number of key 
areas, including technical regulations, customs regulations, intellectual property and others619". In 
this regard, the aim of the EEU is to create a solid level of cooperation with China, in order to 
strengthen their trade. 
In consideration of the Silk Road project, in the year 2015 Russian President Vladimir Putin and 
Chinese leader Xi Jinping have signed a decree on cooperation in tying the development of the 
Eurasian Economic Union with the Silk Road economic project. The importance of this agreement 
is possible to evince from the words of Putin: “The integration of the Eurasian Economic Union and 
Silk Road projects means reaching a new level of partnership and actually implies a common 
economic space on the continent620”. The positive side for the EEU connected with this project, is 
that China will invest 5.8 USD billion in the construction of the Moscow-Kazan High Speed Railway. 
The building of this infrastructure will have the positive meaning to facilitate the transport field of 
the Union and consequently its economic trade. To further stress the compact base of cooperation 
between Russia and China, can be mentioned the agreement between Gazprom and China’s 
National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) that in 2015 fixed the basic conditions of gas supplies 
from Russia to China through the Western route, determining the main technical and commercial 
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parameters of supply along the prospective Power of Siberia 2 pipeline. Afterward, this agreement 
was completed on July 4, 2017, when Gazprom and CNPC signed a Supplementary Agreement to 
the Sales and Purchase Agreement for Russian gas supplies via the eastern route, defining the 
starting date for the deliveries. According to this document, gas supplies to China via the Power of 
Siberia gas trunk line will begin in December 2019621.  
From the financial side, to give exactly more a solid center to the relationship between Russia and 
China within the mechanisms of the EEU, in 2015 the Russian Sberbank – Russia’s biggest lender – 
signed a facility agreement with China’s Development Bank in the amount of 966 USD million622. 
The consolidation of a Eurasian market with the help of China could even intensify the partnership 
through the EEU and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). This could have the advantage 
to further expand the Union to the East, attracting other central Asian states, as Azerbaijan or 
Uzbekistan, for a possible accession to the Union. In consideration of this aspect, could be argued 
that the volition of China is to maintain an economic control over Eurasia, letting a more political 
integration of the Asian states under the control of Moscow. Indeed, the two parts do not want 
obstacle each other in Eurasia; rather their objective is to cooperate and embrace the Eurasian 
states together economically (China) and politically (Russia). The agreement with Gazprom for the 
Russian supply of gas to China, the Silk-road project and the negotiations for a Chinese FTZ with 
the EEU, are examples that show as the two countries want to collaborate in the heart of Eurasia 
without collisions. 
In addition, the benefits of the Chinese partnership with the EEU and its importance for a further 
development of the member-countries can be attested analyzing their economic relationship with 
Beijing. Belarus, which met especially in last decade difficulties to create a politic dialogue with the 
Western due on the conditions of democracy imposed, found in China a reliable and less critic 
partner for the development of the country. Here, can be observed that also China has its own 
aims to invest in the territory of the Union, trying to invest its export credits in railway, highway 
construction and development of industrial zones principally, in order to create an environment of 
communication and economic channel of interaction to the West part of Europe. Regarding 
Belarus – next to the biggest opera about the creation of Chinese Industrial Park in Belarus – 
already in 2011, as attested by the reaserch of Prysmakova Palina, “The Chinese ExIm Bank started 
to credit the Belarusian Railway for the import of Chinese electric freight locomotives and the 
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electrification of the railway on the sections Homieĺ-Žlobin- Asipovičy and Žlobin-Kalinkavičy. 
Further, in spring 2013, the Belarusian Ministry of Finance redirected the Chinese loan of more 
than 322 million US dollars from Export-Import Bank to its Mahilioŭ  oblast’s department 
“Mahilioŭaŭtadar”. The export credit has been used for reconstruction project of the highway M-5 
/ E 271 Minsk - Homieĺ on the site Babrujsk – Žlobin. In addition, Chinese and Belarusian parties 
signed a 102 USD million loan for Intelligent Transport System in Minsk, which involves 
improvement projects on M-2 highway that leads to Minsk National Airport and M-9 highway, 
which is a ring road around the capital623”. The Chinese investments in Belarus can increase in 
successive years considerably, if would be even taken into consideration the future construction of 
the largest industrial park of Europe “Great Stone”, with a Chinese investment of 5.5 USD billion. 
The project is aimed at the potential of Belarus as a communication link between the CIS and 
Europe, China and Europe with a prevision in the long term that the annual exports can reach 50 
USD billion624. 
Even the economic relationship between Kazakhstan and China is nowadays solid, concerning the 
fact that China is one of Kazakhstan’s four major countries-trade partners (in 2016, trade turnover 
between the two countries constituted 16% of Kazakhstan’s total foreign trade volume). In the 
period January-September 2016 the Chinese investment in the country amounted to 623.9 USD 
million – seven times higher than in 2015625. In confirmation of this positive trend, must be 
observed, as reported by Aliyeva Kamila, that the trade with China amounted to 1.313 USD billion 
in January-February 2017, including 717.553 USD million of Kazakhstan’s exports and 595.631 USD 
million of Kazakhstan’s imports626.  
Nowadays, in order to increase the economic dialogue, the Kazakh and Chinese governments are 
planning to increase the capacity of international border crossings Dostyk-Alashankou and 
Altynkol-Khorgos. Moreover, the parts have agreed to construct a railway connecting the Altai and 
Tacheng counties. Besides, as explained by Omirgazy Dana, under the One Belt, One Road 
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initiative, the volition of the two parts is to establish more terminals in the international logistics 
zones at Lianyungang port, Inche-Burun station and Bandar Abbas port627.  
Taking into account Kyrgyzstan, as underlined by First Deputy Prime Minister of Kyrgyzstan 
Mukhammetkaly Abulgaziev, China is among the main trade partners of Kyrgyzstan and Chinese 
investments have in the years contributed to the economic development of the country 
significantly. China is Kyrgyzstan’s second-largest trading partner after Russia. Chinese investments 
in Kyrgyzstan amounted to 120 USD million in the first 8 months of 2016, 57.5% more compared to 
the same period in 2015. Among the Chinese investment projects in the country, can be 
underlined the Junda and Tokmok oil refineries in the Chui province, Taldybulak Levoberezhny 
deposit, construction of the North-South motor road, reconstruction of the Bishkek thermal power 
plant, rehabilitation of the street network in Bishkek, and construction of a hotel in Osh in the 
south of the country628 – all projects that demonstrate the strong Chinese engagement in the 
country. 
In general, after the lecture of these data, is possible to assert, that China is a great investor in the 
countries of Eurasia with a constant increasing amount of its investments (as in Kazakhstan) 
yearly, exploiting from a side the Russian economic difficulties of last years, to exercise an 
economic domain in the region; and counterpoising from the other side the strong Russian 
position mostly toward the smallest countries of the Union, as Kyrgyzstan. Thus, China represents 
decisive partner for the economic development of the EEU. It is mostly because of: 1) the 
geographical position of China as direct neighbor partner of the Union; 2) the grandeur of the 
Chinese market as investor in the territory of the EEU; and 3) the volition of China to expand its 
economy using the channel of the Union to reach the Western market easily.  
14 The Eurasian Development Bank and the banking sector of the member-states 
Concerning the banking sector of the Union, must be before introduced and analyzed the Eurasian 
Development Bank and its role. The EDB, located in Almaty, was conceived by the Presidents of 
the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan and established in 2006 officially. Armenia, Belarus and 
Kyrgyzstan became full members of the Bank respectively in 2009, 2010 and 2011 (Tajikistan 
enjoyed the Bank too in 2009). In the first article of the Agreement establishing the Eurasian 
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Development Bank, is précised the scope of this organization: “The Eurasian Development Bank 
(hereinafter “Bank”) is hereby established to foster the strengthening and development of market 
economy in the member states of this Agreement and to enhance trade and economic integration 
among them by engaging in investment activities. The Bank shall promote international financial 
and economic co-operation through participation in the activities of other international financial 
and banking institutions and unions629”.  
Consequently, the aims of the Bank that can be read nowadays in relationship to the EEU are 
principally: 1) the financial coordination of the member-states in order to develop their internal 
economy; and 2) to favorite their economic integration. 
The functions of the EDB are listed in the second article of the Annex to the Agreement 
Establishing the Eurasian Development Bank dated 12 January 2006: “The Bank should have the 
following functions: engaging in investment activities for the benefit of socioeconomic 
development of the member states, by financing projects and programs, providing guarantees, and 
holding interest in authorized capital of other organizations, using for that purpose its own capital, 
funds raised on international or national financial markets, or other available resources; consulting 
the member states in matters related to economic development, efficient use of resources, and 
enhancing trade and economic ties, and collecting and analyzing information in the area of 
national and international finance; liaising with international organizations, states, national 
institutions and entities of the member states or other countries interested in financing economic 
development; and other activities not contradicting its purpose, as stated in the Agreement, 
bilateral agreements made between it and the member states or their central (national) banks or 
other authorized bodies, or international banking practices630”.  
On the whole, the Bank has a function of financing projects for the development of the countries 
of the Union, providing loans in hard currencies and the national currencies of the member-states. 
The Bank may provide loans jointly with international financial institutions, commercial banks, or 
other interested institutions. Moreover, it provides as banks guarantee and hold interest in 
authorized capital of other organizations.  
In the article 5 of the Annex is indicated the capital of the Bank: “The authorized capital stock of 
the Bank shall be one billion five hundred million (1,500,000,000) US dollars divided into one 
million five hundred thousand (1,500,000) shares having a par value of one thousand (1,000) US 
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dollars each. Each paid share shall confer the right to cast one vote”631. On May 2017, the 
cumulative investment portfolio of the Eurasian Development Bank was 5.604 USD billion, and its 
current investment portfolio amounted to 2.450 USD billion632. Currently, the Bank’s charter 
capital totals 7 USD billion, including 1.5 USD bn. of paid-in capital and 5.5 USD bn. of callable 
capital. The Bank has provided financing totaling more than 5.3 USD bn. to investment projects in 
its member-states633.  
On 24 May 2016, the Bank's Council approved the EDB's revised strategy for 2013-2017 focused 
on projects with an integration effect, in particular in the industrial sector. The Bank will 
concentrate its efforts on financing two types of projects: 1) projects with a strong integration 
effect and 2) national development projects. The priority areas for the Bank's investments are: the 
power sector; mechanical engineering; the chemical sector; mining; oil and gas; and infrastructure. 
The Bank's current investment portfolio is expected to total 3.3 USD bn. at end of 2017634. 
Nowadays, the current key projects of the EDB are: construction of Unit 3 at Ekibastuz GRES in 
Kazakhstan (361 USD million); construction of the Tikhvin Freight Car Building Plant in Russia (170 
USD million); construction of the Western High-Speed Diameter road in Russia (PPP project; 176 
USD million); construction of a rolling mill at Belarusian Steel Works in Belarus (154 USD million); 
enhancement of iron ore outputs with the reserves from the lower levels of KMAruda’s Korobki in 
Russia (90 USD million); financing production expenses of the Sokolov-Sarbai Mining Production 
Association (SSGPO) (Kazakhstan, 95 USD million); and construction of hydropower plants 
Beloporozhskaya HPPs 1 and 2, in Karelia (Russia, 72 USD million)635.  
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Figure 81: Investment portfolio by sectors of the EDB 
 
Source: Eurasian Development Bank (2017): “Investing in Development and Integration”. 01.05.2017. P. 9 
The EDB provides even to guarantee protection from some of the risks resulting from changes in 
legislation and bank regulation in its member-states. Currently, according to the official data of the 
EDB, the investment portfolio of the Bank for the countries of the Union is so subdivided: 
Kazakhstan – 44.7%; Russia – 35%; Belarus – 17.6%; Armenia – 0.5%; and Kyrgyzstan – 0.2%636. 
In consideration of the financial sector of the EEU, the participants of the Union determine the 
areas, forms and ways of harmonization of legislation related to taxes, affecting the mutual trade 
(first of all indirect taxes), including harmonization (convergence) of excise rates on most sensible 
excisable goods and further improvement of VAT levy system in mutual trade (including use of 
information technologies). Further, must be underlined as the improvement of the internal 
economies of the countries of the EEU depends even on their national banks and financial 
organizations. 
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Figure 82: number of banks in the member-states (at the end of the year, units) 
Armenia 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Banks 21  22  22  22  19  
Under foreign 
control 
15  15  14  13  9  
Bank branches 477  485  509  522  523  
Representation 
of banks 
abroad 
2  3  3  3  3  
Source: Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Yevraziyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz v Tsifrakh”. Kratkiy 
Statisticheskiy Sbornik. Moskva, 2017.  P. 154 
Next to the Central Bank of Armenia, the bank system of Armenia is formed principally by: 
Armbusinessbank, ACBA-Credit Agricole Bank, Araratbank, Ameriabank, Ardshinbank, 
ArmEconomBank, ArmSwissBank, Artsakhbank, Anelik Bank and Unibank. In the year 2016 
Armenia had in its territory 19 official banks, with 523 branches. The banks under foreign control 
in the same year amounted to 9 and the Armenian banks in foreign countries were just 3. In a 
comparison between 2015 and 2016, the number of diverse banks presents in the Armenian 
territory decreased slightly, -3 banks; and -4 foreign banks. 
Belarus 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Banks 32  31  31  26  24  
Under foreign 
control 
23  22  20  16  14  
Bank branches 105  94  65  41  39  
Representation 
of banks 
abroad 
8  8  9  9  8  
Source: Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Yevraziyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz v Tsifrakh”. Kratkiy 
Statisticheskiy Sbornik. Moskva, 2017.  P. 154 
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With the National Bank of the Republic Belarus, the other principal banks operating in the 
Belarusian territory are: Belarusbank, Belinvestbank, BPS-Sberbank, Belagroprombank, Priorbank, 
Absolutbank, Alfa-Bank, Bank Moscow–Minsk, Bank of Investment Technologies, Bank of 
Reconversion and Development, Belagroprombank, Belarusian–Russian Belgazprombank, 
Belarusky Narodny Bank, Idea Bank, MTBank, Paritetbank, Trade Capital Bank, VTB Bank (Belarus) 
and Zepter Bank. 
In the period 2012-2016 the numbers of banks in Belarus diminished constantly, passing from 32 
banks in the year 2012 to 24 banks in 2016. However, the biggest decrease is visible in the 
branches of banks, that decreased from 2012 (105) to 2016 (39) by -66 banks. Focusing on Belarus, 
Russia is the biggest investor in the country and an important player in Belarus’ banking sector. 
According to the Belarusian Statistics Committee, as reported by Astapenia and Balkunets, half of 
investments in the country come from Russia. Russian banks’ finances played a significant role in 
the Belarusian economy especially at times of the economic crisis637, subsidizing the country in the 
period of austerity. 
Kazakhstan 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Banks 38  38  38  35  33  
Under foreign 
control 
19  17  16  15  14  
Bank branches 362  378  395  346  343  
Representation 
of banks 
abroad 
13  12  11  8  6  
Source: Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Yevraziyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz v Tsifrakh”. Kratkiy 
Statisticheskiy Sbornik. Moskva, 2017.  P. 154 
The Kazakh bank sector is determined predominantly by: Kazkommertsbank, Halyk Savings Bank of 
Kazakhstan JSC, Bank Center Credit, ATF Bank, Eurasian Bank, Kaspi Bank, Subsidiary Bank 
"Sberbank of Russia", Citibank Kazakhstan, Nurbank, Tsesnabank, Fortebank, House Construction 
Savings Bank of Kazakhstan, Subsidiary Bank "Alfa-Bank", Kazinvestbank, Delta Bank, Subsidiary 
                                                          
637
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Bank "Bank of China in Kazakhstan", Astana-Finance Bank JSC, Industrial and Commercial Bank of 
China in Almaty, AsiaCredit Bank, Shinhan Bank Kazakhstan and Qazaq Bank. 
In a comparison between 2015 and 2016, the number of banks in Kazakhstan varied slightly: 35 
(2015) against 32 (2016). The same tenuous changings are visible even in the number of foreign 
banks (-1) and in the bank branches (-3) present the Kazakh territory. 
Kyrgyzstan 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Banks 23  24  24  24  25  
Under foreign 
control 
9  11  11  13  11  
Bank branches 278  287  293  314  324  
Representation 
of banks 
abroad 
…  1  1  2  2  
Source: Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Yevraziyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz v Tsifrakh”. Kratkiy 
Statisticheskiy Sbornik. Moskva, 2017.  P. 154 
The National Bank of the Kyrgyz Republic or the local banks of Manas represent mostly the 
banking system of Kyrgyzstan. In detail between 2012 and 2016 for Kyrgyzstan there were not so 
many significant changings in the bank system, a part the diminishing of the bank branches (-10) 
from 2015 to 2016.  
Russia 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Banks 956  923  834  733  623  
Under foreign 
control 
117  122  113  106  86  
Bank branches 2 349  2 005  1 708  1 398  1 098  
Representation 
of banks 
abroad 
40  44  42  39  30  
Source: Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Yevraziyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz v Tsifrakh”. Kratkiy 
Statisticheskiy Sbornik. Moskva, 2017.  P. 154 
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Between the numerous banks in Russia, the principal are: Sberbank, VTB, Gazprombank, 
Rosselkhozbank, Bank of Moscow, Alfa Bank, Nomos Bank, Unicredit, Rosbank, Promsvyazbank 
and Raiffeisenbank. 
In the period 2012-2016 also the presence of banks in the Russian territory knew a drop, passing 
from 956 (2012) to 623 (2016) with a -333 institutes of credit. An important decrease in the 
considered period is possible to observe even in the foreign banks operating in the territory of 
Russia in 2016 (-31) and in the representation of the Russian banks abroad for the same period (-
10). 
EAEU 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Banks 1 070  1 038  949  840  724  
Under foreign 
control 
183  187  174  163  134  
Bank branches 3 571  3 249  2 970  2 621  2 288  
Representation 
of banks 
abroad 
…  68  66  61  49  
Source: Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Yevraziyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz v Tsifrakh”. Kratkiy 
Statisticheskiy Sbornik. Moskva, 2017.  P. 154 
The most consistent part of the banking system of the Eurasian Economic Union is represented by 
the Russian institutes of credit (especially the branches of Sberbank). Between the years 2015 
(840) and 2016 (724), the decrease of banks in the Union was -116. In general during the year 
2016 the foreign banks in the territory of the Union amounted to 134, the bank branches 2 288, 
with a representation in third countries of 49 banks. 
Figure 83: Assets of the banks in USD billion 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Armenia 6 7 7 7 8 
Belarus 37 41 42 35 32 
Kazakhstan 92 101 100 70 77 
Kyrgyzstan 2 2 2 2 3 
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Russia 1 630 1 754 1 380 1 139 1 325 
EAEU 1 767 1 906 1 532 1 253 1 445 
Source: Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Yevraziyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz v Tsifrakh”. Kratkiy 
Statisticheskiy Sbornik. Moskva, 2017. P. 155 
In the year 2016 the assets of the banks in the EEU, e.g. cash and balances with treasury banks or 
net investments, totalized 1 445 USD billion, whose biggest part was represented from Russia with 
1 325 USD billion, followed by Kazakhstan 77 USD billion, and Belarus 32 USD billion. Instead, 
Armenia with 8 USD bn. and Kyrgyzstan with 3 USD bn. are still confirming currently their weak 
role within the Union even for the bank asset.  
Figure 84: Liabilities of the banks in USD billion 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Armenia 5 6 6 6 7 
Belarus 32 36 36 31 28 
Kazakhstan 79 87 87 63 68 
Kyrgyzstan 2 2 2 2 2 
Russia 1 429 1 539 1 239 1 075 1 170 
EAEU 1 546 1 669 1 371 1 117 1 275 
Source: Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Yevraziyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz v Tsifrakh”. Kratkiy 
Statisticheskiy Sbornik. Moskva, 2017. P. 155 
During the year 2016, the liabilities of the banks of the EEU, e.g. borrowings and deposits, 
registered 1 275 USD billion, increasing their passivity by 258 USD bn. in comparison to the 
previous year. In a general confrontation of the countries of the Union for the period 2015-2016, 
the member-states maintained constant values about their liabilities. The biggest changing was 
registered in Russia, passing from 1 075 USD bn. (2015) to 1 170 USD bn. (2016), with an 
increment of 95 USD billion. 
15 Prices, exchange rate and inflation in the EEU 
Observing the monetary policy of the Union, it is crucial for EEU countries to pursue coordinated 
macroeconomic policies, in order to: 1) support macroeconomic stability; 2) contribute to the 
uniformity of principles governing the operation of the economy; and 3) ensure that the major 
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economic indicators are coordinated to boost sustainability and deepen the economic integration 
of the member-states. 
The Astana Treaty provides the following three mandatory indicators: debt-to-GDP ratio, inflation 
rate, and budget deficit – although still nowadays the Union does not have a clearly defined 
mechanism that could be used to enforce these criteria638.  
Figure 85: Consumer price index of the member-states 2007-2016639 
 
Source: “Consumer price index (2010 = 100)”. Economic data of the World Bank 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FP.CPI.TOTL?end=2016&locations=AM-BY-KZ-KG-RU&start=2008&view=chart    
(last view: 07.09.2017) 
According to the data of the World Bank, from the year 2008, corresponding to the beginning of 
the financial crisis, the prices within the territory of the Union knew a considerable growth, with a 
strong increase especially in Kazakhstan from 87% (2007) to 157.1% (2016) and in Russia from 
83.8% (2008) to 162.2% (2016). 
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Figure 86: Trend of consumer prices of the EEU (as percentage to the corresponding month of the 
previous year) 
 
Source: Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Ob osnovnykh sotsial'no-ekonomicheskikh pokazatelyakh 
Yevraziyskogo Ekonomicheskogo Soyuza”. Yanvar' 2017 g. Analiitscheskiy obzor 10 marta 2017 g. P. 33 
In the first years of the EEU, the index of the consumer prices has continued to growth constantly, 
especially in Armenia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. Precisely, according to the EEC, in January 2017, 
compared with December 2016, the largest increase in consumer prices in Armenia, Belarus and 
Kazakhstan accounted for food products (respectively, 6.7%, 1.2% and 1.2%) and in Kyrgyzstan for 
paid services (1.9%). Concerning Russia, the increase in consumer prices was very slight and 
accounted mainly for food products (0.9%)640. 
Analog discourse is applicable to the manufacturers of industrial products, whose prices in last 
period increased for the Union generally: in January 2017 compared with December 2016 
increased by 3.5%, from January 2016 by 13.2%641.  
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Figure 87: Trend of producer price of industrial products of the EEU (as percentage to the 
corresponding month of the previous year) 
 
Source: Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Ob osnovnykh sotsial'no-ekonomicheskikh pokazatelyakh 
Yevraziyskogo Ekonomicheskogo Soyuza”. Yanvar' 2017 g. Analiitscheskiy obzor 10 marta 2017 g. P. 36 
According to the Eurasian Economic Commission, for January 2017, the growth rate of producer 
prices of industrial products was higher than in the same period of the previous year. The largest 
increase was observed in Kazakhstan – by 25.1% (in mining and quarrying – by 34.2%); Russia – by 
12.7% (in extraction of minerals – by 25.2%); and in Belarus – by 9.8% (for water supply, sewage 
system, control over waste collection and distribution – by 22.1%; and in manufacturing industry – 
by 11.1%)642. 
Figure 88: Exchange rates of the Union 2012-2016 (per year, per unit of currency) 
 Armenian 
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Russian 
ruble 
12,94  268,28  267,92  4,80  1,51  –  
USD 401,76  8 335,86  8 369,71  149,11  47,00  31,07  
Euro 516,38  10 713,07  10 777,94  191,67  60,44  39,94  
2013 
Russian 
ruble 
12,88  278,85  278,40  4,78  1,52  –  
USD 409,63  8 875,83  8 971,06  152,13  48,44  31,82  
Euro 544,12  11 782,47  11 833,72  202,09  64,36  42,27  
2014 
Russian 
ruble 
10,98  269,00  266,28  4,76  1,41  –  
USD 415,92  10 215,50  10 260,18  179,19  53,65  37,97  
Euro 552,11  13 574,50  13 220,30  238,10  71,27  50,46  
2015 
Russian 
ruble 
7,89  260,57  262,37  3,61  1,06  –  
USD 477,92  15 864,62  16 253,61  221,73  64,46  60,66  
Euro 530,60  17 610,33  17 827,81  245,80  71,58  67,43  
2016 
Russian 
ruble 
7,19  0,0297  0,0298  5,11  1,05  –  
USD 480,49  1,99  2,00  342,16  69,91  66,90  
Euro 531,85  2,20  2,20  378,63  77,39  74,06  
Source: Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Yevraziyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz v Tsifrakh”. Kratkiy 
Statisticheskiy Sbornik. Moskva, 2017.  P. 163 
In a general overview about the exchange rate of the EEU countries, the Russian ruble maintained 
a same value in the exchange rate of the other countries of the Union. A sensible change is 
perceivable in the Kyrgyz currency, where the exchange rate in proportion to the Russian ruble 
passed from 1.51 (2012) to 1.05 (2016). A marked change is possible to observe in Armenia, whose 
dram in relation to the Russian ruble had a fluctuation from 12.94 (2012) to 7.19 (2016). Russian 
detains the highest index of the Union, if compared to the other national currency of the other 
countries of the Union. It demonstrates from a side as the fluctuation of the prices in the member-
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states depends from the course of the Russian ruble principally. For example in Kyrgyzstan, the 
negative output dynamics in Russia and devaluation of the Russian ruble led to the plunge of 
remittances in dollar terms by 25.8% in 2015, which in turn caused a decline in household 
consumption and private investment643. From the other side, the attenuation of the exchange 
rates of the EEU’s countries in proportion to the Russian ruble can have the positive side to 
increment the mutual trade of the Union – especially the possibility for the smallest countries of 
the Union, as Armenia or Kyrgyzstan, to lead better their business with Russia. 
Going further in the analysis, another statistic to examine is the inflation of the member-countries. 
These data have assumed since the global economic crisis of 2008 a notable negative significance 
within the Union, because of the devaluation of the Russian ruble, which comported in last years 
the stagnation and decreased of the diverse internal economies of the member-countries. 
Figure 89: Inflation on consumer prices of the member-countries (%) 
 
Source: “Inflation on consumer prices”. Economic data of the World Bank 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG?contextual=default&end=2016&locations=AM-BY-KZ-KG-
RU&start=2012&view=chart (last view: 31.05.2017) 
According to the data of the World Bank, in the period 2012-2016, the countries of the Union have 
decreased their inflation index sensibly, excluding Russia, which index passed from 5.1% in 2012 to 
7.1% in 2016. The most marked decreased is visible in Belarus, that registered a changing of the 
index from 59.2% (2012) to 11.8% (2016). 
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As established in the EEU Treaty, the countries of the Union should implement the 
macroeconomic policy within the framework of indicators that define the sustainability of the 
economic development. In particular, according to the EEC, the inflation rate (consumer price 
index) per annum (December to December of the previous year) should exceed the inflation rate 
in the member-state with the lowest value by not more than 5%644. 
Looking in detail the countries of the Union, in the last five years consumer price index dynamics in 
Armenia has been affected by a prolonged decline of energy and food prices, as well as an 
appreciation of the real effective exchange rate645. Armenia decreased its inflation rate from 2.6% 
(2012) to -1.3% (2016). However, nowadays consumer prices in Armenia increased 1.2% year-on-
year in April of 2017, following a 0.1% drop in the prior month. It was the first rise in consumer 
prices since November of 2015, driven by higher cost of food and non-alcoholic beverages (5.9% 
from 3.4 percent in March 2017); transport (0.7 percent from -1%) and restaurants and hotels 
(0.2% from -0.6%)646. 
Belarus experienced a high inflation rate from 2011 (53.2%) to 2012 (59.12), recording a firm 
decline only since 2013 (18.3%). These indexes confirm the high financial correlation of Belarus to 
Russia. Indeed, the high inflation rate in the Belarusian country can be read as a direct effect of 
the devaluation of the Russian ruble that comported a serious increment of the index of prices in 
Belarus. In 2015, the transition to the monetary targeting regime and flexible exchange rate 
facilitated the return of the real effective exchange rate to its equilibrium level. This helped to 
restore exports competitiveness, decreased inflation expectations and reduced current account 
deficit647. Now, consumer prices in Belarus increased 6.3% year-on-year in April of 2017, following 
6.4% rise in the previous month. Exactly, inflation was steady for food (7.5%) and accelerated for 
services (8.3% from 7.7%)648. Regarding the Belarusian Republic, on 14 March 2017 the 
Commission Board adopted the recommendation “On proposals of the Eurasian Economic 
Commission on measures aimed at reducing the level of inflation (consumer price index) in the 
Republic of Belarus”. These recommendations, aimed to reduce the growth of consumer prices in 
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the country, as the decrease of the cost of producing and selling consumer goods and 
development of competitive consumer market, were developed due to the fact, that Belarus 
exceeded the quantitative threshold of the inflation rate, established by the EEU Treaty, which 
amounted to 112.8% in the 1st quarter of 2016, 112.1% in the 2nd quarter of 2016, 111.1% in the 
3rd quarter of 2016, and 110.6% in the 4th quarter of 2016. Though, although a first drop of the 
inflation rate, the inflation in Belarus remains still high. Indeed, in February 2017 the inflation 
reached 107%, which is higher than the value specified in the Treaty by 2.2% points (p.p.)649. 
The inflation in Kazakhstan passed by 5.1% (2012) to 8.5% (2016). Specifically, the tenge 
depreciation in the second half of 2015 and beginning of 2016 alongside transition to a floating 
exchange rate regime led to a spike in imported goods prices (especially of nonfood products). As 
result, inflation reached 11.9% in the fourth quarter of 2015650. Nowadays, consumer prices in 
Kazakhstan increased 7.5% year-on-year in April of 2017, following 7.7 % rise in March, staying 
however at its lowest level since September 2015 as cost rose at a slower pace for: household 
equipment (6.8% from 7.2% in March); clothing and footwear (7.6% from 8%) and transport (9.1% 
from 9.4 %)651. 
Kyrgyzstan knew in the period 2012-2016 a decrease of its inflation rate, decreasing its percentage 
from 2.7% to 0.4% respectively. Observing the actual situation in the country, consumer prices 
rose by 3.8% year-on-year in April of 2017, compared to 2.8% increase in the previous month. It 
was the highest inflation rate since November of 2015, driven by higher prices of: non-alcoholic 
beverages (4.3% from 1.8% in March); transport (0.5% from 0.1%) and restaurants and hotels 
(1.7% from 1.6%)652. 
The negative trends of the Russian economies of last years – basically connected with the drop of 
oil price – had negative impact on the economic growth of the country as well on the inflation 
rate653, which rate increased from 5.1% (2012) to 7.1% (2016). Currently, consumer prices in 
Russia increased by 4.1% year-on-year in April 2017, easing from a 4.3% rise in the previous month 
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 Eurasian Economic Commission (2015): “The Eurasian Economic Commission recommended measures for the 
Republic of Belarus to reduce inflation.” 15.03.2017 http://www.eurasiancommission.org/en/nae/news/Pages/15-03-
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 Eurasian Economic Commission, Eurasian Development Bank (2016): “Economic Forecast for Member States of 
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and below market expectations of 4.2%. It was the lowest inflation rate since May 2012, as prices 
increased at a slower pace for housing and utilities, clothing and footwear and transport654. 
After the analysis of the consumer index prices that since 2008 have constantly increased within 
the Union, due principally to the economic Russian difficulties, and the strong dependence of the 
other members on the fluctuations of the Russian economy, can be ascertained, as the situation 
for the member-countries to reach an equal financial equilibrium within the EEU is still complex to 
be achieved. The increment of prices since 2008 has generated a consequential increment of the 
inflation rate, mostly in Belarus – which index started to decrease only since 2012, achieving 
however in 2016 always an elevate value of 11.8% and exceeding the previsions of the article 63 of 
the EEU Treaty. In result, the Eurasian Commission determined in 2017 measures for Belarus 
established to decrease the inflation-index through the reduction of the costs of production and 
selling of goods. Reflecting about this measure – as about the other recommendations for the 
other members of the Union: for Kyrgyzstan and Armenia to reduce the debt for public sector; 
while for Kazakhstan to reduce the level of inflation – in general they symbolize the efforts of the 
Union to equalize the economic production and to determinate sustainability of the economic 
development of the member-countries. But, if from a hand it underlines as the Commission is 
really trying to balance the economic level of all participants of the Union, and thus the attempt to 
refine the improvement of the EEU intra-trade; from the other hand, cannot be denied, that the 
not yet achieved equilibrium of the EEU parameters (as the still existing high inflation rate of 
Belarus or the not equilibrated exchange rate within the Union with a strong influence of the 
Russian ruble); and the necessity of the Commission consequently to dictate recommendations to 
the member-countries to respect the parameters, are factors that stress as the objectives of the 
Astana Treaty, as the harmonization of the economies of the member-states and the reaching of a 
fiscal equilibrium within the Union, are still currently far to be reached. These passages highlights 
as the EEU after two years of function is still in a static stage of growth. 
16 Government financial situations of the member-countries  
To deepen the research in the internal economies of the countries of the EEU and have a more 
precise overview about the economic efficiency of the Union, this paragraph is dedicated to the 
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report of the internal costs covered by the budgets of the member-states, with the aim to have a 
clear overview about the results of their transactions effectuated during the last five years. 
Figure 90: Balance of trade goods of the member-states 2015 in USD Million 
 
Source: Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2016): “Yevraziyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz v Tsifrakh”. 
Statisticheskiy Yezhegodnik. Moskva, 2016. P. 336 
Before analyzing the government budget, can be useful to have an image about the balance of the 
member-countries for the first year of the Union. Exactly, during the year 2015, Kazakhstan and 
Russia registered a positive balance of their trade in goods, respectively of 12 679.3 USD million 
and 148 512.7 USD million. In the same year Belarus recorded a balance of -2 142.5 USD million, 
composed by 26 164.3 USD million of exports and 28 306.8 USD million of imports. Armenia and 
Kyrgyzstan reported in 2015 a negative balance respectively of -1 186.4 USD million and -1 984.0 
USD million. 
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Figure 91: Balance of service of the member-states 2015 in USD Million 
 
Source: Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2016): “Yevraziyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz v Tsifrakh”. 
Statisticheskiy Yezhegodnik. Moskva, 2016. P. 337 
Observing the trade of service for the year 2015, between the members of the Union was 
registered a positive balance only for Belarus by 2 274.0 USD million, formed by 6 645.2 USD 
million of exports and 4 371.2 USD million of imports. Russia had the most negative balance -36 
874.6 USD million; while Armenia recorded a negative balance of -94.5 USD million; Kazakhstan of 
-5 123.1 USD million; and Kyrgyzstan of -113.7 USD million, giving a further proof of the negative 
status of the EEU’s countries at the beginning of their economic integration. 
Indeed, these data show as the first year of functioning of the EEU registered for the member-
countries a passivity of balance especially for the service sector with effects on the state 
investments – confirming also the difficulties of the effectiveness of the Union in the development 
of the national economies. 
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Figure 92: Rendition of the government budget of the member-states655 (in billions of national 
currency units656) 
Income 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Armenia 946,2 1 071,4 1 144,8 1 167,7 1 155,0 
Belarus 95 182,0 105 803,7 128 201,7 167 213,0 17,8 
Kazakhstan 4 763,4 5 179,5 5 908,8 6 137,0 7 662,2 
Kyrgyzstan 77,6 89,3 105,3 113,9 115,8 
Russia 12 855,5 13 019,9 14 496,9 13 659,2 13 460,1 
Source: Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Yevraziyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz v Tsifrakh”. Kratkiy 
Statisticheskiy Sbornik. Moskva, 2017. P. 173 
Generally, the government budget of the member-states, which accounts for all payments 
received by government (taxes and other fees) and the payments made by government (purchases 
and transfer payments), in relation of the income was almost stable for all the countries of the 
EEU in the period 2015-2016, registering a particular increase especially in Kazakhstan by 24.85%. 
In consideration of Belarus, since 2012 to 2016 was registered a gradual increase of the income, 
reaching a peak in the period between 2014 (128 201.7 bn. Belarusian rubles) and 2015 (167 213 
bn. Belarusian rubles) with an increment of 39 011.3 bn. Belarusian rubles.  
Costs 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Armenia 1 006,1 1 142,9 1 235,1 1 409,0 1 325,5 
Belarus 95 883,6 108 061,6 122 779,8 152 141,2 16,8 
Kazakhstan 5 669,9 5 897,5 6 990,1 7 049,1 8 403,4 
Kyrgyzstan 97,8 92,1 107,4 120,4 136,7 
Russia 12 895,0 13 342,9 14 831,6 15 620,3 16 416,4 
Source: Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Yevraziyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz v Tsifrakh”. Kratkiy 
Statisticheskiy Sbornik. Moskva, 2017. P. 173 
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The payment effectuated by the central governments of the EEU’s countries increased 
progressively from 2014 to 2016 in almost all the territory of the Union (a part Armenia which 
registered a diminution of the costs in 2016). The most considerable growth of the costs in 
consideration of the period 2015-2016 is visible in Kazakhstan by 19.21% and in Kyrgyzstan by 
13.54% mostly. As was for the income, also the costs increased since 2012 for all the members of 
the Union gradually. Observing Belarus, the increment was more marked between 2014 (122 
779.8 bn. Belarusian rubles) and 2015 (152 141.2 bn. Belarusian rubles) by 29 361.4 bn. Belarusian 
rubles.  
Deficit / surplus 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Armenia -59,9 -71,5 -90,3 -241,3 -170,5 
Belarus -701,5 -2 257,9 5 421,8 15 071,8 1,0 
Kazakhstan -906,5 -718,0 -1 081,2 -912,1 -741,2 
Kyrgyzstan -20,2 -2,8 -2,1 -6,5 -20,9 
Russia -39,4 -323,0 -334,7 -1 961,0 -2 956,3 
Source: Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Yevraziyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz v Tsifrakh”. Kratkiy 
Statisticheskiy Sbornik. Moskva, 2017. P. 173 
Apart Belarus that in the period 2014-2016 totalized a surplus of its government budget, the other 
countries of the Union registered in the same period a deficit of their national budgets. Though, in 
a confrontation between the first two years of functioning of the EEU (2015 and 2016) Armenia 
decreased its deficit by -29.34%, and Kazakhstan by -18.74%. Conversely, in the same period of 
time, Russia increased its state deficit by 50.75%. 
In detail, according to the data of Trading Economics, and referring to a comparison between the 
government budget and the internal GDP for the year 2015, Armenia recorded a government 
Budget deficit equal to 4.80% of the country's Gross Domestic Product657. While Belarus recorded 
a surplus of the government budget equal to 1.80% of the country's Gross Domestic Product of the 
corresponding year658. Referring to the year 2016, Kazakhstan recorded a government budget 
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deficit equal to 2% of the country's GDP659. While Kyrgyzstan recorded in the same year a deficit 
equal to 4.60% of the country's GDP660. Even Russia during 2016 recorded a government budget 
deficit equal to 3.70% of the country's GDP661. Nowadays, the government debt of the Eurasian 
Economic Union amounts to 284.187 USD million, as aggregate sum of: Armenia – 4.530 USD 
million; Belarus – 29.873 USD million; Kazakhstan – 28.204 USD million Kyrgyzstan – 3.833 USD 
million; and Russia – 217.748 USD million662. 
Overall, the years 2015-2016 registered a situation of deficit for all the countries of the Union – 
excluded Belarus, which, according to the statistics of the EEC, in 2016 performed a surplus of 1 
bn. Belarusian rubles. Regarding the common condition of deficit, it can be argued that the 
organization of the resources of the member-states and their use should be better consolidated in 
the system of the EEU, creating a common mechanism of distribution of the funds for the internal 
activities of the states. In this context, the countries of the Union should better use the intrinsic 
economic potential based on their governmental resources to improve their services, 
infrastructures and methods of production. The correct use of the governmental budget by the 
countries of the Union has the scope to be a determinant step in order to achieve the principal 
aim of the EEU, namely the modernization of their internal economies.  
Figure 93: Revenues of the government budget of the member-states (in billions of national 
currency units) 
Armenia 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Income including: 946,2  1 071,4  1 144,8  1 167,7  1 155,0  
Taxes on profits 
(income) 
118,7  124,6  103,6  103,7  127,2  
VAT 369,7  401,9  440,4  423,9  391,1  
Excises 49,3  52,1  50,6  49,0  59,7  
Income from 43,0  46,3  48,4  61,5  55,4  
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foreign economic 
activity 
Others 365,5  446,5  501,8  529,7  521,5  
Source: Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Yevraziyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz v Tsifrakh”. Kratkiy 
Statisticheskiy Sbornik. Moskva, 2017. P. 175 
In the year 2016 Armenia registered an income of its state budget of 1 155.0 Armenian drams. In a 
comparison between 2015 and 2016, was registered an increase in taxes by 22.6% and excises by 
21.84%. 
Belarus663 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Income including: 95 182,0  105 803,7  128 201,7  167 213,0  17,8  
Taxes on profits 
(income) 
5 481,8  5 233,3  6 566,8  8 173,3  0,7  
VAT 32 298,2  39 356,3  48 182,2  50 142,9  5,7  
Excises 11 190,7  17 518,6  21 230,9  19 441,7  2,2  
Income from 
foreign economic 
activity 
25 474,9  23 327,5  18 415,1  39 186,4  3,4  
Others 20 736,4  20 368,0  33 806,7  50 268,8  5,7  
Source: Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Yevraziyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz v Tsifrakh”. Kratkiy 
Statisticheskiy Sbornik. Moskva, 2017. P. 175 
In the year 2016 Belarus had an income of 17.8 billion of Belarusian rubles. In a confrontation 
between 2015 and 2016 just the income from foreign economic activities decreased, totalizing in 
2016 3.4 billion of Belarusian rubles. 
Kazakhstan 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Income including: 4 763,4  5 179,5  5 908,8  6 137,0  8 881,9  
Taxes on profits 
(income) 
1 041,2  1 032,7  1 169,7  1 224,6  1 437,4  
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VAT 914,4  1 327,6  1 198,2  944,4  1 495,7  
Excises 25,9  33,6  45,7  60,8  77,8  
Income from 
foreign economic 
activity 
744,4  880,0  1 054,1  880,1  951,8  
Others 2 037,4  1 905,4  2 441,3  3 027,0  4 919,2  
Source: Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Yevraziyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz v Tsifrakh”. Kratkiy 
Statisticheskiy Sbornik. Moskva, 2017. P. 175 
Kazakhstan registered an income of 8 881.9 billion tenge in the year 2016. Comparing the years 
2015 and 2016 all the resources of the government budget recorded an increment, especially 
visible in the increase of the VAT by 58.38%. 
Kyrgyzstan 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Income including: 77,6  89,3  105,3  113,7  115,8  
Taxes on profits 
(income) 
4,1  4,3  4,3  4,1  3,7  
VAT 25,8  30,1  32,7  33,2  39,3  
Excises 2,8  4,1  6,3  7,8  9,1  
Income from 
foreign economic 
activity 
9,4  11,9  13,8  9,7  13,8  
Others 35,5  39,0  48,2  58,9  49,9  
Source: Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Yevraziyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz v Tsifrakh”. Kratkiy 
Statisticheskiy Sbornik. Moskva, 2017. P. 175 
The increment for Kyrgyzstan of its income in a comparison between 2015 (113.7 billion soms) and 
2016 (115.8 billion soms) was by 1.85%. Especially the incomes from the foreign activities 
registered in the period above considered a very considerable increment by 42.27%, testifying a 
tenuous growth of the Kyrgyz economy. 
Russia 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
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Income including: 12 855,5  13 019,9  14 496,9  13 659,2  13 460,1  
Taxes on profits 
(income) 
375,8  352,2  420,5  491,4  491,0  
VAT 3 545,8  3 539,0  3 931,7  4 233,6  4 571,0  
Excises 395,3  524,4  592,4  581,9  694,2  
Income from 
foreign economic 
activity 
4 962,7  5 011,0  5 463,4  3 295,3  2 606,0  
Others 3 575,9  3 593,3  4 088,9  5 057,2  5 097,9  
Source: Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Yevraziyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz v Tsifrakh”. Kratkiy 
Statisticheskiy Sbornik. Moskva, 2017. P. 176 
In the scenario of the EEU, the Russian Federation is the only country which registered between 
the years 2015 (13 659.2 billion rubles) and 2016 (13 460.1 billion rubles) a slight decrease of its 
total income of the government budgets -1.46%. Mostly the part connected with the foreign 
activity recorded the lowest decrease in the period considered -20.92%, testifying the actual 
Russian economic problems in its trade especially with the West.  
Figure 94: Government debt of the member-states (at the end of the year, in billions of national 
currency units) 
Armenia 
 Total Including In % of GDP 
internal external 
2012 1 763,4 254,3 1 509,0 44,1 
2013 1 860,3 278,7 1 581,6 40,8 
2014 2 108,6 310,7 1 797,9 43,7 
2015 2 455,4 367,4 2 088,0 48,8 
2016 2 872,2 546,6 2 325,6 56,7 
Source: Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Yevraziyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz v Tsifrakh”. Kratkiy 
Statisticheskiy Sbornik. Moskva, 2017. P. 182 
Armenia recorded a government debt in 2016 equal to the 56.7% of its Gross Domestic Product, 
showing the financial problematic of the country and confirming its difficulties to be able to make 
future payments on its debt. In the case of Armenia, the socio economic indicators of the country 
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are not growing and the economic situation of the country rests critical. In fact, for the year 2017, 
according to the data released by the Armenian Finance Ministry, the state debt of the country 
was 5 961.2 USD million in February, which increased by 35 USD million in March. About 5 478.3 
USD million of the current total debt is the debt of the Armenian government – it has increased by 
28.3 USD million since February 2017. Meanwhile, the external debt of Armenia was in May 2017 
more of 7.9 USD million than it was compared to April 2017. In turn, the internal debt increased by 
20.4 USD million664. 
Belarus665 
 Total Including In % of GDP 
internal external 
2012 128 755,3 25 848,6 102 906,7 24,3 
2013 154 008,6 35 696,3 118 312,4 23,7 
2014 197 455,0 48 379,8 149 075,1 24,5 
2015 328 558,9 97 443,3 231 115,5 36,5 
2016 37,0 10,2 26,7 39,2 
Source: Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Yevraziyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz v Tsifrakh”. Kratkiy 
Statisticheskiy Sbornik. Moskva, 2017. P. 182 
Belarus registered for the year 2016 an increment of its government debt in correspondence to 
the GDP by 39.2%. Observing in detail the contemporary situation in Belarus, in April 2017, the 
external state debt totaled 13.6 USD billion, down by 65.2 USD million (0.5%) from the beginning 
of the year. In January-March 2017, the external state borrowings totaled 169 USD million, 
including 111.3 USD million borrowed from the Russian government and banks, 28.1 USD million 
from Chinese banks, 27.3 USD million from the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD), and 2.3 USD million from the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD) and the Nordic Investment Bank (NID). In January-March 2017 Belarus spent 
308.5 USD million to repay the external state debt, including 107.1 USD million paid to the Russian 
government, 98.9 USD million to Chinese banks, 13.3 USD million to the IBRD, 88.3 USD million to 
the Eurasian Fund for Stabilization and Development, 0.7 USD million to the U.S., 0.2 USD million 
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to the EBRD and the NID. As of 1 April 2017 Belarus' state debt totaled 35 bn. Belarusian rubles, 2 
bn. Belarusian rubles (5.3%) down from 1 January 2017. The internal state debt amounted to 9.6 
billion Belarusian rubles as of 1 April 2017, decreasing by 0.7 billion Belarusian rubles (6.4%) from 
the beginning of the year666.  
Kazakhstan  
 Total Including In % of GDP 
internal external 
2012 3 828,3 3 098,6 729,7 12,3 
2013 4 417,2 3 633,7 783,6 12,3 
2014 5 655,4 4 220,4 1 435,0 14,3 
2015 9 022,2 4 706,0 4 316,2 22,1 
2016 11 436,6 6 816,0 4 620,6 25,0 
Source: Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Yevraziyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz v Tsifrakh”. Kratkiy 
Statisticheskiy Sbornik. Moskva, 2017. P. 182 
The increase of the state debt is visible even in the situation of Kazakhstan, which index in 
correspondence of the GDP for the year 2016 amounted to 25%. In 2016 Kazakhstan public debt 
was 28204 million dollars with a decrease of 12139 million since 2015667. Nowadays, the 
government debt in Kazakhstan decreased to 13757039 USD thousand in the second quarter of 
2017 from 13830818 USD thousand in the first quarter of 2017668.  
Kyrgyzstan 
 Total Including In % of GDP 
internal external 
2012 156,7 13,0 143,7 50,5 
2013 167,4 11,9 155,6 47,1 
2014 214,8 12,4 202,4 53,6 
2015 288,8 15,5 273,3 67,1 
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2016 281,5 22,3 259,1 61,5 
Source: Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Yevraziyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz v Tsifrakh”. Kratkiy 
Statisticheskiy Sbornik. Moskva, 2017. P. 182 
Kyrgyzstan registered in 2016 the highest percentage between the member-countries in the 
correspondence between the state debt and the GDP of 61.5%, although decreased in comparison 
to the year 2015 (67.1%). In 2016 the size of the national debt of Kyrgyzstan amounted to 4 105 
USD billion. In the same year the domestic public debt amounted to USD 322.7 million and the 
external to 3 782.74 USD billion669.   
Russia 
 Total Including In % of GDP 
internal external 
2012 5 267,3 4 071,3 1 196,1 7,9 
2013 5 885,4 4 432,4 1 453,0 8,3 
2014 7 853,9 5 475,7 2 378,2 10,1 
2015 8 351,9 5 573,1 2 778,8 10,3 
2016 8 495,2 6 100,3 2 394,8 9,9 
Source: Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Yevraziyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz v Tsifrakh”. Kratkiy 
Statisticheskiy Sbornik. Moskva, 2017. P. 182 
Between the years 2015 and 2016 Russia registered a decrease of its government debt in 
correspondence of the GDP respectively 10.3% and 9.9%. Concerning the external debt, thus owed 
to creditors outside the country, this value, according to the data of the database of Trading 
Economics, in Russia increased to 529.70 USD bn. in the first quarter of 2017 from 518.70 USD bn. 
in the fourth quarter of 2016670.     
17 The EEU in the global economic scenario   
At this point of the analysis can be asserted as the EEU, in the first two years of functioning, has 
economically moved slowly. Indeed, the common markets for raw materials that must be still 
realized, and an economic growth lower than the European counterparts, are demonstrating that 
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the EEU has not yet showed its entire economic potential in the global economy. In fact, 
worldwide the Union is still weak and the concrete possibility of its further expansion in the global 
scenario is connected with the increment of the trade volume between the member-countries 
mainly. In this context, a direct comparison with the European Union will show marked difference 
between the EEU and the EU, as is possible to evince by a confrontation: during 2016 the EEU 
recorded a GDP  based on purchasing power parity of currencies of 4 104.2 USD bn. against the 
GDP of the EU-28 that was of 19 904.4 USD billion671. 
However, according to Dr. Vinokurov, “If the bar of comparison is set lower, with the EEU placed 
alongside other regional integration projects with varying levels of depth and success — NAFTA, 
MERCOSUR, ASEAN, Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, South African Customs 
Union — then a more adequate framework for analyzing the relative standing of the EEU becomes 
feasible672”. In this regard, if it is for example considerated the GDP of MERCOSUR for the year 
2015, it was 2 485.7 USD billion against 1 629 028 of the EEU. Equal discourse is possible to apply 
regarding the ASEAN, that totalized a GDP of 2 033.9 during 2015673. This statement confirms as 
the Union, although the economic troubles and the fact that is a young organization, has the 
potential in next years to occupy a considerable position in the world economy. 
In addition, the political issues that Russia – the principal force of the Union – is currently 
affronting with the West are not allowing a serious external development of the EEU and generally 
have produced a stagnation of the economy of the Union in its entire. 
Generally, the aim of this paragraph is to compare the economic growth in term of GDP, 
unemployment and government debts of the member-countries with some of the best 
performance economies between the states that have signed the Convention on the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development. The choice to confront the most performing 
countries of the OECD with the participants of the EEU has the purpose to show that: 1) if will be 
established an economic dialogue, especially with the EU, the Western countries could really 
contribute to the expansion of the Union worldwide; and 2) the target of the EEU is to become 
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competitive with the greater global economies, as the EU. For that a comparison with the 
European bloc assumes a determinant meaning to measure the actual development of the Union. 
Figure 95: Gross Domestic Products comparison between the EEU members and the most 
performing OECD countries in USD bn. 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Armenia 24,5 27,4 28,9 30,1 30,5 
Belarus 168,0 172,3 177,9 172,9 170,5 
Kazakhstan 371,6 400,3 424,4 433,8 443,8 
Kyrgyzstan 20,7 23,3 24,7 25,9 27,3 
Russia 3 625,4 3 656,6 3 722,0 3 470,2 3 432,1 
Great Britain 2 387,3 2 502,1 2 630,4 2 720,3 2 812,9 
Germany 3 503,7 3 647,8 3 810,9 3 920,9 4 046,2 
Italy 2 157,5 2 176,3 2 206,3 2 262,5 2 301,5 
Canada 1 464,6 1 550,3 1 602,4 1 584,7 1 630,3 
South Korea 1 611,3 1 644,8 1 706,7 1 749,8 1 822,2 
Mexico 1 985,0 2 039,3 2 151,6 2 165,3 2 262,9 
USA 16 155,3 16 691,5 17 393,1 18 036,6 18 569,1 
France 2 471,8 2 606,1 2 658,5 2 727,0 2 796,5 
Japan 4 746,7 4 967,1 5 013,0 5 172,9 5 286,7 
Source: Cf. Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Yevraziyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz v Tsifrakh”. Kratkiy 
Statisticheskiy Sbornik. Moskva, 2017. Pp. 186-187 
Analyzing the course of the GPD, can be noted as in the period 2012-2016 all the biggest world 
economies and EEU’s countries have performed positively and increased their indexes annually 
(excluded Russia and Belarus for the period 2015-2016). In a confrontation between Russia and 
Germany, for the period 2015-2016, the German Federation registered a growth of its GDP by 
3.20%, while the Russian Federation recorded a decrease of -1.10%. However, Russia during 2016 
had a GDP higher than Great Britain (2 812.9 USD bn.), Italy (2 301.5 USD bn.), Canada (1 630.3 
USD bn.), South Korea (1 822.2 USD bn.), Mexico (2 262.9 USD bn.) and France (2 796.5 USD bn.), 
testifying as the Russian Federation has still a significant role in the world economy.  
Confronting the members of the Union with other OECD countries that have an equal economic 
status, it is possible to observe, that: from an hand, Armenia totalized in 2016 a GDP of 30.5 USD 
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billion; and Kyrgyzstan by 27.3 USD billion, registering a value higher than e.g. Iceland (16.9 USD 
bn.) and similar to Estonia (39.2 USD bn.); while from another hand these indexes demonstrate 
their tenuous role not just within the EEU but even in the world economy. Considering Belarus, in 
2016 the Belarusian GDP amounted to 170.5 USD bn. more than e.g. Slovakia (169.4 USD bn.) and 
similar to New Zeeland (183 USD bn.). Kazakhstan, the second biggest economic power of the EEU, 
had in 2016 an index of 443.8 USD billion, more than e.g. Ireland (334.1 USD bn.), Norway (331 
USD bn.) or Austria (438.8 USD billion)674.  
Seeing the GDP per capita of the countries of the Union for the year 2015, Armenia performed 3 
489.1 USD; Belarus 5 754.6 USD; Kazakhstan 10 510.0 USD; Kyrgyzstan 1 103.2 USD; and Russia 9 
329.3 USD675. Though, in a comparison with the most developed economies, the values of the 
EEU’s members are very weak: Germany — 41 178.5 USD; United Kingdom — 43 929.7 USD; USA 
— 56 115.7 USD. Even in a direct comparison with the other world countries on same level with 
the members of the Union in term of GDP, this value calculated per capita is still different and has 
higher values than the EEU’s countries: e.g. Estonia 17 084.5 USD; New Zeeland 37 808.0; or 
Slovakia 16 089 USD676.  
Figure 96: GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity of currencies between EEU members 
and most performing OECD countries in USD  
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Armenia 8 095 9 065 9 587 10 009 10 202 
Belarus 17 745 18 204 18 773 18 223 17 944 
Kazakhstan 22 131 23 496 24 549 24 727 24 933 
Kyrgyzstan 3 688 4 073 4 228 4 350 4 482 
Russia 25 317 25 481 25 477 23 703 23 400 
Great Britain 37 475 39 030 40 719 41 779 42 898 
Germany 43 564 45 232 47 058 47 999 48 908 
Italy 35 757 35 885 36 294 37 255 37 964 
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France 37 671 39 531 40 142 41 005 41 945 
Sweden 44 725 45 673 46 405 47 823 49 490 
Source: Cf. Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Yevraziyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz v Tsifrakh”. Kratkiy 
Statisticheskiy Sbornik. Moskva, 2017. Pp. 190-191 
Also equalizing the purchasing power of different currencies through the elimination of 
differences in price levels between the countries for a same quantity of specific goods or services, 
the GDP per capita based on PPP for the members of the Union results to be inferior to the other 
biggest powers of the world. The difference is mostly visible in the year 2016 in a direct 
confrontation between Russia and Germany, that performed respectively 23 400 USD and 48 908 
USD. Always referring to the year 2016, Kazakhstan performed within the EEU the best outcome 
— 24 933 USD. Although this index results to be tenous in a comparison with best performing 
European Union countries, we can assert that Kazakhstan had in it complex a value similar to 
Poland — 27 587 USD; Estonia — 29 764 USD; or Latvia — 30 691677. 
Figure 97: EU-28 and EEU unemployment comparison 2014-2016 (as a percentage of the 
economically active population) 
 
Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Yevraziyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz v Tsifrakh”. Kratkiy 
Statisticheskiy Sbornik. Moskva, 2017. P. 194 
Taking into consideration the unemployment rate, the Eurasian Economic Union performed better 
than the European Union in last three years, maintaining a stable rate around 5.7% against the 
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8.5% of the EU for the year 2016. Belarus for example in the year 2016 with its rate of 
unemployment by 5.8% recorded an index better than Austria (6%), Canada (7%) or France 
(10%)678. 
Figure 98: Unemployment comparison between the EEU countries and the EU-28 (% of total labor 
force) 
 
Source: “Unemployment, total (% of total labor force)”. Economic data of the World Bank 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS (last view: 07.09.2017) 
In a direct evaluation between the single members of the EEU and the EU-28, according to the 
data of the World Bank, apart Armenia, that detains the highest unemployment rate within the 
Union by 16.8% (2016), the other countries of the Union have maintained, despite the economic 
crisis of last years, their indexes constant, with an amelioration for Kyrgyzstan from 8.4% (2012) to 
7.7% (2016), recording, as even reported in the data of the Eurasian Commission, an aggregated 
index lower than the European Union’s value. 
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Figure 99: Government administrative debt between the EEU’s members and some most 
performance OECD countries 2016 (as a percentage of GDP)  
 
Yevraziskaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommisiya (2017): “Yevraziyskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz v Tsifrakh”. Kratkiy 
Statisticheskiy Sbornik. Moskva, 2017. P. 200 
The debt of the member-states was approximately constant in 2016 and similar with the other 
world economies in term of percentage to the GPD as Germany (67.6%); and inferior to countries 
as France (96.6%) or Canada (92.3%). 
On the whole, the data analyzed in this paragraph demonstrate that between the countries of the 
Union and the solidest economies of the OECD there are significant differences especially in terms 
of economic growth. Russia, the strongest force of the Union, is still inferior to economies as 
Germany or USA. Nevertheless, the slow economic regrowth of the first quarter 2017 after years 
of recession (industrial production restarted to grow by 1% y-o-y only in January 2016, although 
economy recovery is expected to start only in 2017–2018 and with the growth at a slower rate 
than in 2010–2011679), could allow Russia to play again in future a considerable and equal role 
with the other most performing economies of the world, contributing too in parallel to the 
improvement of the internal economies of the other member-countries, in order to better 
performance even with the most developed world economies. 
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Conclusion 
The economic data of the Union have showed as the EEU has met since its beginning in 2015 
different troubles to improve the internal economies of the member-states and to affirm itself as 
economic bloc in the global scenario, due mostly to the economic slowdown in Russia caused in 
primis by the sharp currency devaluation of last years and the drop of the oil price. 
In detail, according to the analysis of the Eurasian Development Bank, the economic decrease of 
the five Eurasian countries was primarily due to the worsening international economic climate. In 
December 2015, energy prices were down by 39.1% year-on-year. Prices also declined in 
metallurgy and agriculture (although the drop was much less severe). Metal prices fell by an 
average 28.4% and prices of agricultural produce by 12%. The most negative consequences of the 
economic shock were visible in the internal economy of Russia firstly, with successive 
repercussions to the other members. Here, the decline of oil price and the extended foreign trade 
and investment sanctions had the most noticeable and predictably negative effect on economic 
growth in Russia. In 2015, annual growth was -3.7% in Russia, compared to growth of 0.6% in 
2014. For Kazakhstan, although the situation was better than in Russia with a GDP growth that 
remained positive at 1.2%, compared to 4.4% in 2014, the main supply-side negative was a 
reduction in oil and iron production and, on the demand side, lower consumption due to a 
decrease in real household incomes. States as Belarus and Kazakhstan that depend in large 
measure on Russian economy were afflicted by the depreciation of the Russian ruble negatively, 
with the result that investments were cut, remittance declined and foreign trade slowed. In 
addition, the central banks of Belarus and Kazakhstan had to tighten their monetary policies to 
support national currencies that were pegged to the US dollar more than the Russian ruble, which 
also affected their GDP growth. The devaluation of the rubles generated serious problems to the 
local currencies of the member-countries. For example, according to the EDB, in Belarus during 
2015 declining investment and consumer spending created the deepest economic recession in the 
last decade. The country’s GDP fell by 3.9% in 2015, compared to growth of 1.6% in the previous 
year680. These factors stress as real development of the EEU is not yet started; on the contrary the 
difficulties of market economy generated passivity for the economic growth, evolving de facto the 
economies of the Union negatively. 
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But, analyzing the actual statistics of the Eurasian Economic Commission, is visible in the first 
quarter 2017, after two years dominated by a strong economic recession (in 2016 the GDP of the 
Union totalized 1 485 422 USD bn. against 2 404 881 USD bn. of 2014, recording in two years a 
difference of 919 459 USD billion), a slow regrowth of the GDP of the member-states, e.g. Belarus 
– 0.3% or Russia – 0.2%.  
Moreover, to confirm the intrinsic economic potential of the Union, can be stressed as the EEU has 
a gas production of 686.2 billion m3 (2016) and of crude oil by 628.3 million tons (2016), reasons 
that explain as the raw market of the Union is the key sector to further increase its position in the 
world economy in next years. 
Though, referring to a possible development of the Union globally, we must ascertain that the EEU 
was not yet able to neutralize the negative external influence factors that are still acting on the 
economies of the member-states. For that the EEU is failing in the role of developer of internal 
economies of its associates and to expand its capability as economic bloc in the global scenario – 
especially if we considerate the fact that in 2016 the volumes of foreign trade of goods of the EEU 
with third countries registered a turnover of 509.7 USD bn. (export: 308.4 USD billion; import: 
2012.3 USD billion), inferior to the turnover of 873.1 USD bn. in 2014. The same data are visible 
also regarding the mutual trade between the member-countries that in a confrontation between 
2014 and 2015 diminished sensibly: e.g. the turnover of Belarus-Russia for the period 2014-2016 
registered a difference of -11 409 USD million (-30.53%), confirming from a side the difficulties of 
the system of the EEU to reach the objective to improve the mutual trade; and testifying from the 
other side as the Union rests still dependent on imports from third countries. 
These observations come from the fact that the Union in its first two years has known different 
obstacles to the improvement of the regional trade and consequently to its extension in the world 
economy. The principal causes of the destabilization can be summarized in: 1) the economic and 
financial crisis started since 2008; 2) devaluation of Russian rubles; 3) drop of oil price; 4) effects of 
civil war in Ukraine with a deprecation on the investments in the territory of the Union; 5) Russian 
embargo against the agricultural and food products of the European Union; 6) American economic 
sanctions against Russia; 7) Russia’s unilateral sanctions against Turkey in December 2015 in 
response to the abatement of a Russian plane on the Turkish-Syrian border; 8) lack of 
implementation for the necessary steps to deepen the economic integration, due to different 
economic levels; 9) internal systemic problems (e.g. corruption, protection of the respective 
national markets, nonpolitical and oligopoly structures, state influence on the economy); 10) 
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political reasons (as the containment of the Russian influence on the national level and the 
maintaining of the national sovereignty); and 11) general economic recession in all member-
countries. These facets underline as the EEU is currently trapped in a situation of stagnation, 
expressly because its development depends on the Russian economic trend and on its geopolitical 
implications. Indeed, if is considerated that for example in January 2017 Russia accounted for the 
88.3% of the entire industrial production of the Union (Kazakhstan – 6.7%, Belarus – 4.4%, 
Armenia and Kyrgyzstan – 0.3%) and for the 78% of the agrarian production of the Union 
(Kazakhstan – 10%, Belarus – 7%, Armenia – 2%; and Kyrgyzstan – 3%), it is easy to understand as 
Russia from a hand dominates the entire EEU’s market; and from another hand, all its economic 
troubles, as well the global political choices decided by the Kremlin, have direct consequences on 
the other countries-members. According to this statement, the economic stagnation of these 
years has not only undermined the role of the EEU, alimenting the perplexities of the member-
countries about the effectiveness of this organization – due to the risk to be affected by the 
troubles of the Russian economy – but also has made more difficult for Moscow to provide the 
funds that made integration more financially attractive to poorer states681. In fact, if is taken into 
account the fact that the fixed investment in 2016 decreased to 253 165 USD million against the 
428 015 USD million of 2014; and that the building sector knew in the same period of time a 
deprecation from 187 744 USD million (2014) to 107 061 USD million (2016), these actual data are 
not attractable for those states (e.g. Tajikistan or Uzbekistan) that could join the system of the 
Union.  
Considering the example of the Republic of Belarus, which economy depends in large measure 
from the Russian Federation, the two first years of the EEU has not brought considerable 
improvements to its internal economy – still in difficulty especially due to the economic recession 
caused by the global financial crisis, the high inflation rate and a general antiquated system of 
production. In fact the Belarusian GDP growth rate registered a decline from 2015 (-2%) to 2016 (-
1.9%) and only a tenuous regrowth in the first quarter 2017 (0.3%)682. In addition, the Russian 
economic and politic difficulties, specifically the disputable Russian geopolitical choices as the 
Crimea’s annexation and the drop of the oil price, weakened the Russian investments in Belarus, 
where the number of Russian organizations investing in Belarus declined from 2 712 (2014) to 2 
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556 (2015). This segment, connected with the necessity for Belarus to obtain the abolishment of 
tariffs and customs duties for the hydrocarbons market, finalized to an increment of its import 
quota from Russia with a reduced price, has the significance as still the economic Belarusian 
expansion within the EEU is in a moment of immobility.  
The EEU has in its first target the development and harmonization of the internal economies of the 
member-countriesm in order to increase their common trade and to modernize their economies. 
But, in consideration of this purpose, the Union had not yet achieved sensible steps in the 
achievement of national improvement for its participants. Indeed, the EEU turnover diminished 
from 769 088 USD million (2014) to 468 168 USD million (2016). Equal economic problems were 
registered inside the territory of the Union concerning the small enterprisers: sensible drop of 
small business from 764 213 USD million (2014) to 348 612 USD million (2015).   
Although in this analysis was demonstrated as the two first years of functioning of the EEU were 
characterized by a strong recession, must be also ascertained as positive signals of economic 
regrowth for the member-countries started to arrive already during the first quart 2017. Indeed, 
as reported by Tigran Sargsyan, “For the first time since 2014, economic growth was registered in 
all the five countries of the EEU. The volume of foreign trade of the Union countries in January - 
March 2017 increased by 29.6% compared to the same period of last year. The growth of mutual 
trade amounted to 31.1%683”. These optimistic signals are confirmed even from President Putin, 
who during the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council’s session in Bishkek on 14 April 2017 stressed 
as from January 2017 the EEU is showing its first positive results: “In January 2017 compared to 
January 2016 the mutual trade volume between the Union’s member states increased by 38%, and 
the supplies of EAEU states to third countries increased by 37%; in 2016 EAEU agriculture field 
recorded a 4% growth; the trade turnover of agricultural goods between Armenia and Russia 
increased by 22%; thanks to the Union’s market, a new field, machinery, is developing in 
Kazakhstan; Kyrgyzstan creates favorable conditions for the development of textile industry; the 
export of light industry products of Kyrgyzstan to the Union’s market increased by 38% in 2016684”. 
Even if the EEU started in 2017 to show a first positive impact, as recognized from the Russian 
President, must be observed as the still existing barriers in the trade of the Union, as the lack of a 
harmonized customs controls by the member-states, represents a limit to deepen the economic 
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integration. However, according to Putin, these barriers should be eliminated until the year 2025, 
in order to provide the full expansion of the Union.  
In general, the evolution of the organization is connected with the aim to achieve an equalization 
of the economic differences between the member-countries (difficult nowadays to reach 
especially in consideration of the enormous economic disparity between Russia and Kyrgyzstan); 
and the accomplishment of their access to the World Trade Organization – with Belarus still 
negotiating its accession. Reflecting about these targets, it can be argued that the future 
establishment of a unique regulated market of the EEU with the abolishment of customs duties 
could be a concrete step in the contribution to the equalization of the economies of the 
participants of the Union – an objective which can be reached through: a) standardization and 
harmonization of the regulation of their trade; b) coordination and together work by the 
exchanging of ideas between specialists of all member-countries ; and c) the creation of favorable 
business conditions in the finance policy by the diminishing of administrative barriers and 
additional costs. Exactly from these elements of coordination and regulation of all economic 
sectors, through the establishment of an agreed policy between the participants, depend the 
success of the EEU in the creation of mechanisms that can allow: 1) progress in the mutual trade; 
2) liberalization of the commerce; and 3) better competition between each country with 
consequently improvement of their standard of production.    
To simplify, according to Dr. Vinokurov, “The progress of Eurasian integration depends on the 
success of “bottom-up integration”— growth of mutual trade, mutual investments, and civilized 
labor migration. This requires that the “rules of the game” be uniform within the EAEU economy. 
The ultimate goal in the long term (until 2025) must be to increase the common market as much as 
possible. Elimination of exemptions in the single market is critical to the modernization and 
cooperation of EAEU economies685”. 
On the whole, it can be affirmed as the EEU in the two first years of its working has suffered from 
the financial and economic difficulties of the member-countries that have slowed down its 
development therefore. In this regard, is not possible to talk about a real development of the 
national economies of the member-states, rather must be observed, as in the last two years was 
recorded a common downgrade of the economic situation of every member. It means, that the 
obstacles to the integration, from external factors as the global financial crisis to internal as the 
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lack of a serious political engagement of the member-countries, in order to not lose their national 
sovereignty, are still generating a situation of stagnation in the evolution process of the EEU. For 
that, as long as the necessary conditions of a functioning common market and the dissolution of 
internal discrepancies will be not achieved for systemic or political reasons, the EEU cannot 
achieve its self-imposed objectives. Here, the regional economic integration against the challenges 
of the globalization is the aim that the Union must pursue through the unification of trade regime 
and building of common markets – especially for the production and trade of raw material within 
the territory of the Union. A realization of an integrated mechanism of cooperation without any 
trade-barrier can further provide a development of the internal economies of the associates of the 
organization with the possibility to improve their trade, to equalize their economic levels and to 
reduce the costs of production. 
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1 The EEU, an economic union still to implement  
The process of the EEU integration is correlated with the concept of regionalism. Explaining the 
notion of regionalism, it intends the aggregation of particular states of a precise geographic region 
(in this case of Eurasia) that decide to cooperate together to achieve common purposes (as their 
national economic development). Consequently, the member-states build an economic zone in 
order to: a) obtain collective economic advantages; and b) to guarantee a progressive expansion of 
their integration through the establishment and use of social and political standards too. 
From this assumption our research started to define the Eurasian region geographically, identified 
by Sir Mackinder in his article "The Geographical Pivot of the History” (1904) in the territory 
comprised between Russia and the Central Asia; and to analyze this portion of the world through 
the current of the Eurasianism culturally. The classic Eurasian idea, as presented by Trubetzkoy, 
Savitsky or Danilevsky in the XX century, emphasized the Eurasian and thus the Slavic culture as 
unique one with own facets and characteristics different from the Western identity. Through this 
resonance, the Eurasian thinkers wanted already in the last century to accentuate the grandeur of 
this world-zone and precisely of its pivot, Russia, with the objective to unite all Slavic people 
against the influence of the Westernization. The concepts of magnificence and strategic important 
of Eurasia were refined by the Geopolitical school from authors as Nicholas Spykman or Karl 
Haushofer, who e.g. in his work “Pan-Ideas in Geopolitics” (1931) underlined the military and 
political significance of Eurasia as sensible world region to determinate the strategic and military 
world equilibrium. Although during the Soviet Union the Eurasian doctrine did not prevail as 
primary cultural orientation, due to mostly the predominant ideology of Bolshevism, after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, the Eurasianism started to affirm its ideas in the philosophical debate 
predominantly. At the beginning of the new millennium, the Eurasianism commuted its features, 
assuming a different connotation based on more radical and populist inclination. Here, in the 
modern vision of the Eurasian idea, the Neo-Eurasianism, authors as Dugin, accentuated the clash 
of the Slavic culture against the Atlanticism, stressing the necessity for the Eurasian countries, thus 
the post-Soviet young Republics, to tie their capacities together, in order to better overcome the 
challenges of the modernity, as the global economic financial crisis. In this context, as underlined 
by Dugin in his book "The Fourth Political Theory" (2012), Russia, due to its economic 
predominance and geographical dimension, represents the fulcrum of Eurasia and has 
consequently the role to guide and coordinate its neighboring countries economically and 
politically. Though, the Neo-Eurasianism exalts mostly the Russian Nationalism, giving to the 
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Russian Federation a chief role in the coordination of the post-Soviet space in an economic and 
politic form. Subsequently, this extreme exaltation of Russia, as proposed by the Neo-Eurasianism, 
did not find correspondence in countries as Ukraine, divided nowadays between Europe and 
Russia ideologically, or in consideration of the EEU members, in Belarus and Kazakhstan. In fact, 
Belarus has a friendlier predisposition to other ideologies and in general to the Westernization, as 
historical result of the embossment of its culture by diverse cultures (from the polnish cultural 
influence to the Bolshevism). Kazakhstan respects the Russian economic predominance in Eurasia 
as the strongest economy, but politically, as expressed by Nazarbayev in his work “the Strategy of 
the Independence” (2003), every Eurasian state must be sovereign to exercise its own choices. 
However, from the philosophical idea of Eurasianism in the exaltation of the Slavic culture and the 
role that must be assumed by the Russian Federation as economic guide, it possible to find the 
roots of the modern integration process of Eurasia, namely the Eurasian Economic Union. 
In this regard the EEU, formed by post-Soviet states, thus countries that share an equal cultural 
orientation, wants to favorite an economic integration which can bring benefits for all its 
associates in term of welfare gain. But, the Union is nowadays still in the phase to create a 
common economic platform, moving gradually in the harmonization of the different national legal 
framework of its associates. The removal of protective and discriminatory barriers through the 
introduction of common economic standard norms for all the countries (although the dimension 
and economic power of the EEU’s members rest still too differentiated) can activate the further 
integration of all the participants. Precisely, an effective cooperation can create spillover effects 
on the member-countries, as for example through the exchange of qualified personnel, the 
transfer of technologies between the states of the Union or redistribution and reallocation of 
labor at the regional level, that can have positive impact in the development of the internal 
economies and in welfare gain.  
The three EEU’s founders, as underlined by Mazhikeyev Arman and Edwards Huw, have decided to 
move their regional expansion starting from the previous Custom Unions of the year 2010. With 
the Eurasian Economic Union they are moving further in their integration, beginning with the 
formation of a regional free trade area, then a customs union, a single market and the 
establishment of economic union with gradual enlargement686. Based on these purposes, an 
evaluation of the Eurasian Economic Union in the first years of its working, on the whole, must 
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advance three important considerations: 1) the integration process is blocked because the lack of 
homogeneous basic legal framework and the removal of barriers by the Commission (a part the 
White Report of 2016) is moving slowly, affecting in negative the trade of the Union and bringing 
any considerable effects on the improvement of the national economies; 2) the role of the Russian 
Federation is too strong in comparison to the other participants, determining that the Union 
depends in positive and negative on the Russian economy; and 3) the mutual trade is still too 
tenuous, explaining as the creation of the common markets, especially for the energetic sectors, 
and abolishment of barriers in the trade must be achieved rapidly. 
Statistically, the EEU in the year 2016 recorded a GDP of 1 485 422 USD billion, against the 2 404 
881 USD bn. of 2014, with a negativity by -919 459 USD billion. A slow increment of the national 
GDP of the member-states is possible to see only in the first quarter of 2017, e.g. Belarus – 0.3% 
and Russia – 0.2%. As sectors, considering the agricultural area of the Union, a decrease is visible 
as well in the period 2014-2016, respectively 146 681 USD million and 107 003 USD million, with a 
passivity of -39 678 USD million. Same results in the building sector with a decrease of -80683 USD 
million in the period 2014-2016: 187 744 USD million (2014) and 107 061 USD million (2016). In 
addition, the sharp difference between the mutual and extra trade of the EEU, respectively 42 
536.4 USD million and 509.7 USD billion for the year 2016, testifies the still high external 
dependence of the member-countries to export and import from third countries, in order to 
sustain their commerce.  
Reflecting about the mutual trade, it assumes a decisive character in the lecture of the Union, 
because the main aim of the EEU is the development of the national economies, and thus to carry 
benefits in primis to the small enterprises of the member-countries. Unfortunately, the not 
positive tendency of this sector is even confirmed in the consideration of the small national 
companies, that recorded a turnover of 764 213 USD million (2014) and 348 612 USD million 
(2015), registering in the first year of the EEU a negativity by -415 601 USD million. 
Regarding the not encouraging results of the Union in the first two years of its functioning, an 
explanation of this negative trend comes from the economic difficulties generated by the drop of 
the oil price (which began in July 2014 and amounted to the end of the year to more than 50%), 
that had a serious impact on all the states of Eurasian Economic Union, generating mostly an 
economic recession in their territories: 1) for Russia and Kazakhstan it had a negative impact on 
the exports of hydrocarbons (leader sector in the exports to foreign markets), with a reduction of 
the export-incomes. 2) Armenia and Kyrgyzstan, due to close ties with Russia and Kazakhstan, also 
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felt the influence of negative trends. 3) In turn, Belarus was influenced by the reduction in demand 
in Russia for basic export goods, and recorded a decrease in revenues from deliveries to external 
markets of oil products produced through the utilization of the Russian oil687. 
The fall of oil price and in consequence even in the commodity prices, had consequences in the 
foreign trade of the EEU’s participants: the export volumes of Belarus and Russia fell by 26.1% and 
30.9% respectively; while in Kazakhstan they decreased almost by half (42.7%). In Belarus, this was 
due to both a drop in prices for primary commodities, oil products and energy, and a reduction in 
demand of the export of manufactured goods. While, in Kyrgyzstan and Armenia the supply of 
goods to foreign markets declined in relation to a lesser extent because the favorable economic 
situation in the main export markets of the EEU partners, as the European Union and China688. 
The drop of the oil price, followed by the Russian embargo, implied the constant growth of 
economic uncertainty among the member-states, with an impact on the flows of mutual 
investment too. For example, Russia's direct foreign investment in Belarus in the form of 
participation in the capital declined in 2013-2015 by 3.7 times; to Kazakhstan – by 2.3 times; and 
to Armenia decreased in 2015 compared with 2014 by 38.5% after growth in 2013-2014 years689.  
Even in consideration of the EEU’s foreign market, the first two years of the Union have not 
showed a positive income for the organization on its whole, knowing a decline of its turnover by -
61.2 USD bn. as result of 2015 (168.3 USD bn.) and 2016 (107,1 USD billion).  
In correlation with the EU-28, a comparison EEU-EU remains nowadays difficult to present, 
because their notable economic differences: in 2016 the EEU recorded a GDP based on purchasing 
power parity of currencies of 4 104.2 USD bn. against the European of 19 904.4 USD billion. It 
means that the EEU is still far to acquire a notable position in the world economy. Only the 
development of the mutual trade, the further expansion of the Union through the accession of 
new states, the accession of Belarus in the WTO and the realization of FTZs with third countries 
could improve in the next years the role of the EEU in the global scenario. 
The negative trend of the EEU, characterized by an economic recession and a stagnant integration 
of its members, represented especially by their different structural economic systems, is even 
confirmed by the public opinion of the citizens of the Union. Specifically, according to the report of 
the Eurasian Development Bank, in the period 2012-2016, to the question about the favorable 
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economic integration of the EEU and the creation of a single market for the five countries, the 
typology of answer of the EEU’s citizens shows a firm contrast between the period before the 
creation of the Union and the time immediately after its beginning, underling as nowadays there is 
a climate of uncertainty in the Union and a rising negativity about the possible success of this 
integration project. In detail, the percentage of the respondents that have a positive opinion about 
the Union decreased in Armenia from 80% (2012) to 74% (2016); in Kazakhstan from 80% (2012) 
to 74% (2016) and in Russia from 72% (2012) to 69% (2016). Only Belarus and Kyrgyzstan 
registered an increment from 60% (2012) to 63% (2016) and 67% (2012) to 74% (2016)690 
respectively, showing as the Belarusian and Kyrgyz still believe in the system of the EEU as a 
mechanism that could bring positive contribution in the improvement of their national economies. 
A proper answer about the positive manifestation for the EEU of Belarus and Kyrgyzstan comes 
from the fact, that the Belarusian economy is still high dependent on the Russian one and thus a 
close economic connection with Russia through the EEU apparatus is seen positive for the 
achievement of internal economic stability. For Kyrgyzstan the Union has a positive 
reconnaissance due because the legal recognized opportunity of free movement and equalization 
of the Kyrgyz works in the territory of the EEU, allowing their stay and employment for example in 
Russia legally.  
So, in the accession to the EEU, the member-states committed themselves to a number of 
obligations across different areas of integration. But, the reality shows as the entire system, 
dominated firstly by Russia and by its geopolitical ambitious, was created through individual 
promises between Russia and the other member-states to reach individual objectives (e.g. Belarus 
to obtain raw materials without application of duties; Armenia to have a solid military ally and a 
free movement of labor; or Kyrgyzstan to have a legal free movement of workers) that reflect the 
specific priorities of the respective leaders. Indeed, with the accession in the system of the EEU, 
the participants agreed to formally participate to the economic of the Union, but without any 
genuine underlying of commitments to multi-faceted, deep economic integration. According to 
Dragneva and Wolczuk, “With key decisions being taken in EAEU member states by powerful, 
largely unaccountable political leaders, little attention is dedicated to the technical aspects of 
compliance. Even if political leaders were fully committed, the sheer speed and scope of integration 
is jeopardized by the absence of systemic political, administrative and judicial reforms in member 
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states. Furthermore, the required modernization of domestic institutions to facilitate effective 
integration – such as, for example, dismantling the monopolies controlling the Armenian economy 
– would disrupt rent-seeking networks and impinge on the interests of those close to political 
leaders. The poor governance characterizing EAEU member states, including Russia, creates a 
formidable obstacle to the effective functioning of the union as a rules-based regime. To sum up, 
launching an economic union as the ultimate platform of integration implies an intention to 
strengthen a common regime691”. 
It has the meaning that if the member-states want really to create a real economic integration, 
they must starting to respect mutual obligations and to eliminate obstacles in their tariff regime, 
applying the customs code of the Union, and beginning to cooperate each other by the exchange 
of technology, experts and modernization of infrastructure. Exactly here, the Astana Treaty affirms 
the intergovernmental integration, with the intention to give an equal position to the member-
states in the decision process. It takes the advantage that in the decision-making process, the 
member-countries are doted by flexibility in the expression of their decisions. But, the necessity to 
implement key-sectors as the energetic, the application of harmonized customs code for the 
mutual trade or the elimination of barriers, applying an equal recognition of all citizens of the 
Union are the priority that still must be reached, in order to provide the successive steps of deeper 
integration for the common development of the Union. 
2 Considerations and recommendations about the EEU 
The Eurasian Economic Union, inserted in the framework of the post-Soviet projects of regional 
economic integration, was thought by its founders to strengthen their economic cooperation as an 
updated form of the CU of the year 2010 and the SES, established in 2012, creating in the same 
time a compact system, opened for a possible accession of other countries of the Commonwealth 
of the Independent States prevalently. The decision of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia to further 
expand their economic alliance through the ratification of the Astana Treaty in year 2014, reflects 
the progresses achieved within the CU. Precisely, according to the study of Wiśniewska, the troika, 
within the mechanisms of the CU obtained principally: “1) the application of common import 
tariffs – coinciding in 80% with the import duties that were in force in Russia. 2) The exclusion of 
export duties from the common customs tariff regime. 3) The achievement of common external 
                                                          
691
 Dragneva R. and Wolczuk K. (2017): "The Eurasian Economic Union Deals, Rules and the Exercise of Power”. In 
Chatam House. Research Paper, May 2017. P. 16-17 
450 
 
tariff in January 2010 with the removal of internal border controls. 4) the realization of the 
Common Customs Code in July 2010, which from a side introduced facilitations of the clearance of 
goods sent across the external borders of the Customs Union with a reduction about the duration 
and number of documents required for these operations; and from the other side abolished the 
customs clearance of goods, originating in the Customs Union states and third countries, that have 
been cleared by customs services of any Customs Union member. 5) The implementation of the free 
movement of labor workers within the territory of the Union692”. 
Successively, quoting Sedik, the work of the Eurasian Economic Commission accomplished with 
the formulation of regulatory legislation, in order to realize the single market within the countries 
of the CU: “1) harmonization of agricultural support policy, setting the limits for overall support to 
agriculture; 2) harmonization of macroeconomic policy, coordinating the macroeconomic policies 
of the member-countries; 3) harmonization of competition policy, which provides the formation of 
a common competition policy to facilitate the free movement of goods and economic activities 
within the union; 4) harmonization of trade policy for agricultural goods and food; 5) development 
of mandatory technical specifications for goods; and 6) common SPS, veterinary, quarantine and 
pesticide and agrochemical rules to ensure an unified approach to veterinary issues, common 
principles and norms of veterinary control, quarantine rules, phytosanitary control and on the safe 
handling of pesticides, agrochemicals693”. 
In this scenario, the EEU proposes nowadays as the logical continuation of the CU, comprising 
additional steps towards economic integration through e.g. unification of labor and trade 
legislation694. Here, the actual economic success of the Union is connected with the liberalization 
of the economies of its associates and the application of a common legal framework that could 
assure an equal economic surplus for all the EEU members. For that assumes a notable priority the 
removal of obstacles that could restrict the free movement of goods, services, labor and capital; as 
the necessity to uniform the standards and norms in production, due especially to the different 
grad of economic development, internal institutions and national infrastructures. In this direction, 
during 2016 the Commission with the publication of the White Report detected 60 obstacles, of 
which 17 are exemptions, 34 are restrictions, and 9 barriers, that were hindering the commerce 
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within the Union, and started consequently to their removal as e.g.: 1) the adjustment of 
inspections measures for veterinary control; 2) the elimination of barriers in public procurement 
related to the access of goods of member-states; 3) the elimination of barriers in the labor 
migration with the complete recognition within all member-countries of the educational 
certificates of the different citizens of the Union; 4) the elimination of the barrier connected with 
restriction caused by lack of the unified methodology for calculation of authorized scope of state 
support in the agriculture sphere; or 5) the establishment of rules of charging a security payment 
in sale of alcoholic, eliminating inequalities in the security payment between the member-
countries. 
Though, despite these first progresses in the harmonization of the legal framework of the 
member-states, the actual economic results of the EEU are showing as the economic integration is 
going slowly, especially in consideration of the tenuous turnover of the mutual trade: 63112.7 USD 
– 2014; 45605.3 USD – 2015; 42536.4 USD – 2016. In this scenario, the technical regulations (as 
the elimination of border controls for imports and exports or the creation of common energetic 
market with the application of equal tariffs for import and export of raw material) represent a 
decisive key for the intra-trade development and for the harmonization of the national legal 
frameworks, in order to ensure competiveness and increase the business within the territory of 
the Union. For that the elimination of all barriers in the trade, especially in small business, through 
the improvement of the legal framework of the Union and by provision of the common 
macroeconomic fiscal and monetary policies, must be the cornerstone of the Union to guarantee 
freedom in the movement of goods and for the establishment of a common market where all 
enterprisers from Russia to Kyrgyzstan can be competitive.  
Therefore, we can assert, that the fundamental steps to real integrate the participants of the 
Union, as well to guarantee the success of the EEU in the next years, are firstly connected with: 1) 
the improvement of the standards of production of the member-countries through the 
modernization of infrastructure and instruments of productions (a decisive factor to reach the 
total freedom of movement for goods and services within the territory of the Union). 2) The 
definition of tariff regime, considering all the interests of the members – the actual adopted 
mechanism is mostly based on pre-existing Russian trade tariffs that were relatively high and 
therefore raised levies on imports for the more open economies of Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and 
Armenia. For example the already accession of the Kazakhstan in the Eurasian Customs Union 
determined an increase of its average tariff rate by 78% (from 6.2% to 9.1%) in order meet the 
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tariff rates of Russia and Belarus, with the consequence for Kazakhstan to impose higher costs for 
its imports695. For countries as Kyrgyzstan, which had low tariffs on its consumer-goods trade with 
China, could mean higher prices on Chinese imports and difficulties for wholesale and re-export 
trade. 3) The increment of the production and concurrency, through an anti-trust regulation 
within the territory of the Union. 4) The equalization of the economic levels of every participants 
of the EEU (difficult nowadays to be reached for the economic disparities). 5) The affirmation of 
the EEU as economic bloc in the global economy (still far because of the economic recession of last 
years and the geopolitical Russian decisions that have affected the Russian economy negatively). 
These principal aims can be achieved through the realization of a common agreed macroeconomic 
policy in the Union and the increment of foreign investments of third countries through the 
application of facilitations based on the Free Trade Regime – especially with China that could 
facilitate the integration of Central Asian countries in the system of the EEU and the European 
Union (principal economic partner of the EEU’s countries).  
But, the progresses of the Union depend even on the Russian economic and politic choices 
undoubtedly. Exactly, the Russian Federation, as first economic force of the Union, dominates its 
entire economic area (Russia represents the 86.6% of entire GDP of the Union). However, 
although the Russian economic decisions have direct impact on the other countries of the Union, it 
does not mean that the other states agree with all Russian decisions (a reason that underlines as 
every member of the Union wants to maintain its political independence excluding any Russian 
implication into the national system). An example of that is connected with the Russian-Ukrainian 
dispute, an issue not approved by the other members of the Union. In fact, the other members 
showed their unwillingness to adopt the sanctions that Russia has imposed on Ukraine, continuing 
to conduct business with Ukrainian companies and generally with the European Union even 
despite the Russian embargo against European food items. The relationship between Kiev and 
Minsk for example is still economically developing (in 2016 the trade between the two parts came 
close to 4 USD billion, up by more than 10% over 2015) and Belarus and Ukraine will work to 
increase the trade up to 8 USD billion, continuing to further develop their partnership, as 
confirmed by President Lukashenka in July 2017 during his official visit in Ukraine: “Today we 
continued the conversation, with the focus on economy. Belarus and Ukraine are interested in 
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expanding exports, developing industrial cooperation, joint projects for modernization of road 
transport infrastructure, introducing innovative technologies”696. 
Through these considerations is possible to assert as: 1) the right climate of cooperation that must 
exist for a regional organization as the EEU has not yet been achieved; 2) in the Union still is 
missing a strong character of cooperation as the countries desire; and 3) the different political 
choices (as the Russian occupation of Crimea) can have a negative impact not just on the trade of 
the member-states but even on their personal integration. 
In consequence of that, a significant concern that must be resolved in the Union is the 
achievement of a total sociopolitical cooperation between the member-states, in order to avoid 
misunderstanding and allow the realization of a more consolidated cooperation that would even 
help and simplify the decision making process of the Union.  
Economically, the common market for raw materials and the abolishment of barriers and duties in 
the mutual trade of oil and gas (still subjected on the bilateral accords of the member-countries), 
are essential aims that the EEU must realize, in order to increase the internal commerce and to 
modernize and improve the single economy of every participant.  
Considering the energetic market, there are obstacles that limit the development of mutual trade 
in energy resources. The main ones concern the restrictions established by bilateral agreements 
on the supply of oil, oil products and gas between the member-states.  
Reflecting about the gas and oil sphere can be essential to understand the mechanisms of 
cooperation between the Union, reporting the example of the Russian-Belarusian relationship. In 
this context, the gas-price rests still nowadays a controversial matter between the two parts, 
especially because the Belarusian debt to Russia exceeded 700 USD million and Russia increased 
from January 2017 the price toward Belarus to 141.1 USD per 1.000 cubic meters of gas. In 
addition, due to the Russian economic crisis of last years, in 2016 the import of Russian oil to 
Belarus decreased by 20.8% to 18.2 million tons697, prejudicing from an hand the development of 
the Belarusian economy (opposite to the aims of the integration of the Astana Treaty), with 
Belarus forced to find alternative energetic sources outside from the Union, as with Iran or 
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Azerbaijan698; showing from another hand the necessity about the realization of a common agreed 
energetic market within the EEU, as keystone for the further expansion of the Union. 
Currently, the bilateral accords between the member-countries represent the basis of the raw 
material market. The Commission in the White Paper of 2016 reported that there are 13 obstacles 
in the agreed list of obstacles in the energy sector: 2 are exemptions and 11 are restrictions. 
Specifically, the main obstacles in the energy sector are: 1) the limitations and exemptions in the 
main oil, gas, electricity markets; the necessity to form free markets and accession to the 
infrastructures that is largely a natural monopoly; and 2) the dependence on the budgets of 
member-states for the development of the energy sector, that still remains under the state 
regulation699. In this regard, the EEU is however moving the first sensible steps to harmonize and 
optimize interstate supplies connected with energetic sector. In fact, since October 2016 the 
Commission started a development of indicative (forecast) balances of gas, oil and petroleum 
products of the Union with the purpose to better delineate the guidelines of harmonization before 
the creation of the common oil and gas market, expected in the years 2024 and 2025 respectively. 
The finalization of these aims will conduce to the other significant targets that the participants are 
awaiting from the Union, namely the harmonization of the national levels with the equalization of 
the tariffs to a standard level of the Union in concordance with the WTO standards.  
As final consideration, we can emphasize that the EEU, as demonstrated through the economic 
analysis of the member-countries, has suffered in the first two years of its course from serious 
financial problems caused by a strong economic recession that has affected its macroeconomic 
indicators negatively with a direct impact on the internal economies of its participants. 
Considering this aspect, to deepen the integration within the EEU can be problematic, because the 
troubles of Russian economy can be a controversial point for the countries, as Belarus or Armenia 
that through their accession wanted to improve their business exactly with the Russian 
Federation.  
Observing the contemporary situation of the EEU, in the first quarter of 2017, were achieved first 
economic progresses for the member-states: 1) in January 2017 production of agricultural was 3.7 
billion US dollars and increased in constant prices by 0.8% compared to January 2016, (in January 
2016 compared to January 2015 – an increment of 2.9%); 2) the volume of mutual trade in goods 
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for January-March 2017, calculated as the sum of the value volumes of the export operations of 
the member in mutual trade amounted to 11.8 bn. USD, equivalent to 131.3% of January-March 
2016 – generated prevalently by the growth in average prices for goods (by 19.5%) and the 
increment in the physical volume of trade (by 9.9%); 3) in comparison with January-March 2016, 
the relative weight of mutual trade slightly increased from 14.1% to 14.3%: in Armenia – from 
29.8% to 31.1%, in Belarus – from 50.4% to 53.4%, in Kazakhstan – from 19.7% to 22.3%. In Russia, 
the amount remained unchanged by 8.8%, while Kyrgyzstan recorded a decrease from 41.9% to 
39.8%700. 
But, although these encouraging results, msut be stressed, that an appropriate valuation of the 
Union can be effectuated after the realization and functioning of a financial regulator system 
(2022–2025); the establishment of common electricity market (2019); the creation of oil market 
(2024); and the realization of the common gas market (2025). Moreover, to improve the 
integration is provided that around 2018 all roaming charges for mobile communications should 
be canceled; around the 2020 an integrated market for tobacco and alcohol should take shape; 
and in 2025 a supranational institution in charge of financial supervision should be established in 
Almaty. 
In this context, is extremely important the coordinated work of the Eurasian Economic 
Commission with the authorities of the member-states, which must be finalized to the 
achievement of a complete harmonization of all economic structures of the participants of the 
Union. It has the meaning of the realization of a real economic union. Unfortunately, the political 
contrasts of the member-states (especially the volition to maintain their sovereignty against a 
possible Russian implication on the national level) and diverse structural economic problems (as 
the Belarusian economy still based on Soviet system; or the oligarchs in Russian that do not want 
to renounce on their economic monopolies) show as the total acceptation of the EEU’s rules is still 
complicated to realize.   
Summarizing, this study wanted to emphasize as the Eurasian Economic Union is an ambitious 
project undoubtedly, which, though, in the first two years of its beginning has met economic 
difficulties, that have precluded an expansion, development and deep integration of its 
participants, giving therefore an negative evaluation. The work identified the global financial crisis, 
with the consequence of an increment of inflation, the drop of oil price and the recession of the 
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Russian economy, as primary external reasons of stagnation of the economic integration. Within 
the system of the EEU, the internal causes that have generated a phase of economic uncertainty 
are connected with: a) the lack of a common legal framework between the states-members, 
accentuated by the still existing barriers in the mutual trade; b) the disparities of their economic 
levels; and 3) the still low self-sufficiency of the common market with a consequently high 
dominance of imports from third countries. In general, these causes proof as a real economic 
integration in the Union must be still achieved. Only a deeper economic integration, through the 
removal of barriers, and adjustment of the economies of member-states, by the respect of the 
mutual obligations as provided in the Treaty, could level the economic differences within the 
Union, bringing a concrete development of the member-countries. Thus, theoretically, the 
removal of discriminations in the trade, as underlined by the economist Belassa (1962), the 
promotion of the free movement of goods, (Robson, 1987) and the liberalization of the trade 
among the partners, coordinating their national policies (Molle, 1990) are fundamental steps in 
the direction of full economic integration. The Eurasian Economic Union must follow these 
passages gradually (in the two first years, the Union has showed too tenuous steps in direction of 
full integration), if really wants in the future to coordinate the economies of the member-
countries efficiently and elevate its economic status worldwide. 
In conclusion, economically, we can assert that a possible future success of the EEU could bring 
benefits for a further expansion of the Union in the region concretely. Firstly, it would have the 
consequence of a future enlargement of the Union in direction of the Central Asian States that, 
through their accession, could expand the Eurasian market easily, bringing benefits to the intra 
and extra trade of the entire Union. Secondly, the achievement of economic progresses within the 
EEU could give again to Moscow a leadership towards the Eurasian countries, increasing 
consequently its role in the geopolitical chessboard.   
3 The EEU between economic and politic implications 
Before concluding the analysis, it can be useful to retrace and make some observations about the 
motivations that have pushed the actual member-states to access to the system of the EEU. 
Indeed, if the economic reason is the main reason of the integration, cannot be exclude as the 
political implications can play, especially in the future, even an important role for the regional 
integration of the entire Eurasia. It means that a successive examination of the Union could not 
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analyze only the economic dimension, but even the political impact that the EEU could play in the 
regional and global scenario. 
Through the conducted economic overview of the Union, was evinced that the economic position 
of the Russian Federation is without doubts massive in comparison to the other members. In this 
context, from a sidemm the Russian volition is addressed to complete by the system of the EEU 
that integration process of the post-Soviet countries initiated after the dissolution of the USSR 
with the formation of the CIS. From another side, the expectations of the other members of the 
Union, with an economic potential definitively inferior in comparison to Russia, are connected 
with the economic facilitations that they can achieve through the EEU from Moscow in the 
improvement of their trade principally. 
In the example of Belarus, the EEU would expand its internal market, pushing the country to 
become a member of the World Trade Organization rapidly. To be a member of the WTO could 
have the meaning for Belarus to modernize its mechanisms of production, favoring its economic 
development directly and creating the conditions for Belarus to be more competitive in the global 
economy, especially in a confrontation with the European countries.  
Historically, the relationship between Russia and Belarus has mostly showed a stable character 
and Minsk since the collapse of the Soviet Union has always followed Moscow in all its integration 
processes. This determinant role of Belarus in the integration processes in the post-Soviet area 
was stressed by Grigory Rapota, State Secretary of the Belarus-Russia Union State, who named 
Belarus as one of the key elements of all the integration processes in the post-Soviet area. He cited 
the interstate associations in which Belarus plays an active role: the Belarus-Russia Union State, 
the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, the 
Eurasian Economic Union. Belarus is an active associated member of the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization, in particular in such essential matters as the development of the new Silk Road set 
to unite China and Europe701. A passage which attests as: a) the mutual understanding between 
the two countries is really working; and b) Belarus recovers an important role as promoter of the 
Eurasian project. 
But, a part the value of the ideological cooperation, economically, in connection with the adhesion 
to the mechanisms of the EEU, the Belarusian authorities await a concrete abolishment of all 
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duties for the import of raw materials from Russia and consequently to obtain a mayor economic 
position in the Eurasian market with facilitations in the investments in the member-countries. 
About the oil sector, the demand of Minsk – since the CU of 2010 - concerns the total abolishment 
of the duties on the import of the Russian crude oil to the Belarusian oil refineries (Russia provides 
Belarus already with around 23 million tons of duty-free oil on a yearly basis702). However, by the 
EEU, Belarus is awaiting complete free duties export and import in its commerce with Russia. 
Here, we can assert that generally the Eurasian Economic Union is profitable for Belarus because, 
through the combining and regulation of its market with the Russian, it can facilitate more the 
Russian investments in the country, consolidating their economic partnership, and have a solid 
contribution for the improvement of its national economy. Indeed, the modernization of the 
internal economy of Belarus passes through the Eurasian integration and the direct help of 
Moscow – for example the project to build nuclear power plant in the country is financed and 
supported through multi-billion loan from Russia. This passage explains the reason because 
Belarus decided to choose the Russian project instead of the Chinese or Japanese. Precisely here, 
the nuclear power plant is a project combining political, technological, scientific, economic 
aspects, where both sides, Minsk and Moscow, have challenges and benefits, and can be 
interpreted as evidence that testifies more intensively their stable association and volition to 
cooperate deeply.  
Though, in this sublime context, we can be found two considerable points of dissatisfaction for 
Belarus connected with the EEU: a) the oil and gas tariffs and b) the Putin’s volition to transform in 
the future the Union in a political organization at the same basis of the European Union.  
Concerning the first point, the accession of Belarus in the EEU was dictated principally by the fact 
to obtain advantages in its trade with Russia for the supply of oil and gas. Exactly, the Belarusian 
volition is the abolishment of all quotas and longs, in order to liberalize of the oil and gas market, 
which would allow Belarus to purchase oil from Russia without having to return large sums in 
export duties to the Russian budget. But, according to the analysis of Astapenia and Balkunets, in 
consideration of the actual economic scenario, the importance of oil and gas has fallen in Belarus 
sharply. Precisely, if with the former high global hydrocarbon prices Belarus received a “dotation” 
(the difference between the market price and the price of shipment to Belarus) which amounted 
to as much as 10 USD bn. per year, then, after the sharp decline in oil prices since late 2014, the 
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importance of Belarus’ cheap access to Russian energy has lessened as prices for oil and gas in 
Belarus and the EU countries is equalizing gradually. This is a significant fall, if is considered that 
energy subsidies from Russia exceeded 80 USD bn. in 2002-2015703. Regarding the second point, 
the Putin's target through the EEU is to restore the integration process similar to the Soviet Union 
in order to revive the Russian hegemony in Eurasia. From this point of view, the idea of Putin, 
assumes a patriotic character definitely, where his target is to give emphasis on Russia and its 
population, trying from an hand to affirm again the leadership of Moscow towards the post-Soviet 
Republics; and from the other hand to become a fundamental pole in a multi-polar world, as 
highlighted in the vision of the Neo-Eurasianism philosophically.  
In relation to the politic facets that the EEU could assume, must be considered that the integration 
of post-Soviet countries has long been an ambition of Russia and the foundation of the Union 
wants nowadays to represent the culmination of the efforts to bring Russia’ neighborhood again 
under the control of Moscow. Minsk is however already against a possible political involvement of 
the Union, because it would mean the loss of its national sovereignty in favor of one organization 
where the majority is expressed by the Russian authorities. Nevertheless, a political integration 
within the EEU for Russia and Belarus would be difficult because of different political aims based 
on diverse economic models: Belarusian manufacturing and Russian trading of raw materials. 
Despite these arguments, should even stressed as actually a general consolidated political 
cooperation between Belarus and Russia exists and is very strong since the institution of the CIS, 
expressing as the two states, also if there are some different political and economic visions, are 
each other very related. 
Essentially, due to the economic problems of last years of Russia and thus of the Union entirely, 
that have undermined its position and economic credibility of development towards the other 
members, the future of the EEU is still uncertain. Truly, must be not excluded as the Eurasian 
Economic Union could just develop a market within the post-Soviet countries, continuing the same 
setting of the CU and CIS, but with more consolidated economic ties. It is a real possibility, if is 
taken into account that already Kazakhstan after the loss of the possibility to have Ukraine as 
member in the Union – an important partner for a deeper integration of the Union – seems to 
want to use the EEU as an instrument to improve its personal commerce with Russia principally. 
But, the Kazakh critic to the EEU and precisely to Moscow is dictated by the fact, that Nazarbayev, 
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equal as Lukashenka, is totally adverse about some political implications of the Union, which, in his 
prospective, must treat only economic aspects: “The politicization of the newly-created union is 
unacceptable. Such matters as border control, migration, security and defense, as well as 
healthcare, education, culture, legal aid to citizens on matters of civil, administrative and criminal 
law, are not related to economic integration and cannot be brought into the framework of an 
economic union704.” Shortly, Kazakhstan wishes just a functional economic union that delivers 
benefits to its members exactly in economic terms.  
The economic integration can be reached through the adoption of common technical regulations. 
For that it is important that the member-states find a compromise between their political plans, 
national legislation and the previsions of the Astana Treaty, respecting and applying the mutual 
obligations of the Union. Only a uniform conformation to the regulation of the EEU can provide for 
a further expansion of the Union with the positive desiderated effects, as the improvement of the 
mutual trade and of the national economies. 
For Kyrgyzstan its accession to the EEU could have the meaning to lift barriers in the movement of 
goods, services, capital and workforce; to implement new investment opportunities in the energy, 
transport and agriculture areas. But, mostly important, the Kyrgyz citizens get the right to be 
employed in any member-state of the Union on the same terms as the citizens of the state of 
employment – a central issue if we consider that in Russia lives more than 1 million of migrants of 
Kyrgyzstan and according to Russia’s Federal Migration Service up to 300 thousand citizens of 
Kyrgyzstan are now employed in the Russian Federation705. Therefore, the free movement of labor 
force between the EEU’s members is what Bishkek demands for its integration in the Union. 
In addition, as underlined by Popescu, Kyrgyz president Atambayev would reach through the 
membership in the Union financial support for the creation of industries (to compensate people 
who might lose their incomes if will be a drastic reduction of re-export opportunities from China, 
applying the unique tariffs of the Union); and exemptions from the application of the EEU tariff 
levels for the import of equipment and machinery from countries such as Turkey or China706.   
The Armenian economy is mostly determined by the Russian economic vicissitudes. In order to 
have more stability even the small Armenian enterprisers accepted the reality to be integrated to 
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the Russian plan instead to the Europeans. This decision was even dictated from the fact that the 
European economy results to be more competitive and difficult to match for the Armenian 
companies. Quoting Giragosian, “The Eurasian integration will have the meaning of economic 
changes in the country, where Armenia will adopt more protectionist policies as the other members 
of the organization, sacrificing its traditionally opened economy – something that but could have 
repercussion to the most important and fastest-growing Armenian sector of the information 
technology (IT) which accounted in 2014 to 475 USD million707”. 
In generaly, the positive side of the EEU for Yerevan is connected with the possibility to increase 
its economic relationship without external costs in the mutual trade with the Russian Federation 
and the other members of the Union; namely the possibility of a price reduction for transporting 
Russian natural gas and rough diamonds, as well as the expectation that the Armenian rail 
network will be modernized with the help of Russian investments708. Furthermore, the role of 
Armenia in the EEU, with the help of Russian military support, would loosen the tensions in the 
Eurasian region, in order to provide further steps for a possible integration of other Eurasian 
countries. Especially the shared volition between all members to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia would be a decisive step to integrate even Azerbaijan in 
the mechanisms of the Union, although this complex situation from a political side seems still 
nowadays difficult to be resolved. Considering this conflict, seems that the Armenian joining of the 
EEU is connected with the issue to have support from the Russian troops in the face of its conflict 
with Azerbaijan. However, the Nagorno-Karabakh is excluded from the arrangement of the Union, 
properly because the aims of the EEU are momently only of economic nature and not politic.  
On the whole, nowadays a possible political implication of the EEU is however excluded. The 
Treaty does not provide for a political dimension of the Union. Moreover, states as Kazakhstan and 
Belarus are firmament against a possible connotation of the EEU which could implicate political 
decisions with limitation of their sovereignty in favor of the Russian Federation. Though, in a 
situation of economic crisis which has afflicted Russia seriously, diminishing its power in the region 
could even mean that Moscow can be ready to accept political compromises from other Eurasian 
states in order to not lose its volition of integration of the post-Soviet space.  
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But, this analysis does not want to exclude at all a possible political dimension of the Union – 
essential for a more coordinated decision process within the Union in order to decide about 
economic plans appropriately. For that, we can argue that it would be possible if precise 
conditions are respected: a) if all countries can cooperate on a same level, without distinction 
between center and periphery; b) if all necessities of every country is discussed and solved 
through a common cooperation; c) if the EEU will ensure economic stability to the countries 
through abolishment of every custom duties and the modernization of the internal market; and d) 
if Russia will respect the guaranties about the democratic process of decision inside the Union. 
Though, this scenario represents nowadays only a hypothesis and difficult to be reached because 
of the complicated economic troubles of the EEU, which still needs to affirm its economic verve.  
Considering the functionalist character of the EEU, we have stressed as every country acceded to 
the system of the Union in order to achieve national aims, from economic, to politic and military. 
Here, the question is however that a full economic integration should touch national aspects of 
the member-states, as for example the volition to have a consolidated equal legal framework for 
all the countries of the Union or the necessity to respect the mutual obligations as provided by the 
Astana Treaty. These elements emphasize that the EEU, in order to achieve its aims of integration 
and therefore of economic expansion, should have both an economic and political form. But, if 
from a side a political implication could mean the creation of a general system of the Union, which 
could intervene even on the national political dimension, performing better and faster the 
provisions of the Treaty and developing consequently better the economic status of the member-
countries; from the other side, political implications could mean the limitation of sovereignty for 
the member-states in favor of the biggest country of the Union, the Russian Federation. This point 
is not accepted firstly by Lukashenka and Nazarbayev that do not want to lose their national 
sovereignty. Besides, must not be excluded that a limited sovereignty could have an impact in the 
Eurasian countries similar to the Ukrainian crisis. These aspects, correlated to the slow economic 
improvement of the member-countries, show as the further development of the Union depends 
on the mutual approval and sharing of economic and political accords between all the EEU Leaders 
– a foundamental step to provide a serious and coordinated growth of the Union in next years.   
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